Posing problems without catching up: China's rise and challenges for U.S. security policy

International Security

Volumn 25, Issue 4, 2001, Pages 5-40

  Christensen, Thomas J ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0035606448     PISSN: 01622889     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/01622880151091880     Document Type: Article

References (135)

1. The peer competitor debate was the focus of two major conferences in 1993-94: one at Harvard University's Fairbank Center for East Asian Research, entitled "The China Threat?"; and the other at the Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, entitled "China: Strategic Partner or Peer Competitor?" For examples of concerns about China's rise to great power status, see Nicholas Kristof, "The Rise of China," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 6 (November/December 1993), pp. 59-74; and Denny Roy, "Hegemon on the Horizon? China's Threat to East Asian Security," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 149-168. Richard Bernstein and Ross Munro even predict that China will become a global rival of the United States in the next two decades. See Bernstein and Munro, "Coming Conflict with America," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 2 (March/April 1997), pp. 18-31; and Richard Bernstein and Ross Munro, The Coming Conflict with China (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1997). For predictions of China as a peer competitor in line with previous power transitions in history see Peter T.R. Brookes, "Strategic Realism: The Future of U.S.-Sino Security Relations," Strategic Review, Summer 1999, pp. 53-56; Fareed Zakaria, "China: Appease or Contain? Speak Softly Carry a Veiled Threat," New York Times Magazine, February 18, 1996, p. 36; and Stephen Götz Richter, "Repeating History: In Dealing with China, the United States Can Learn a Great Deal from British-German Relations in 1880," July 11, 2000, http://www.theglobalist.com/nor/news. For counterarguments emphasizing China's persistent weaknesses in comparison to the United States and other militaries, see Michael C. Gallagher, "China's Illusory Threat to the South China Sea," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 169-194; Paul Godwin, "The PLA Faces the Twenty-first Century: Reflections on Technology, Doctrine, Strategy, and Operations," in James R. Lilley and David Shambaugh, eds., China's Military Faces the Future (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), pp. 39-63; Robert S. Ross and Andrew J. Nathan, The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China's Search for Security (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997); Robert S. Ross, "Beijing as a Conservative Power," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 2 (March/April 1997), pp. 33-44; and Russell D. Howard, The Chinese People's Liberation Army: "Short Arms and Slow Legs," Institute for National Security Studies Occasional Paper 28, Regional Security Series, U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, Colorado, September 1999.
2. The peer competitor debate was the focus of two major conferences in 1993-94: one at Harvard University's Fairbank Center for East Asian Research, entitled "The China Threat?"; and the other at the Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, entitled "China: Strategic Partner or Peer Competitor?" For examples of concerns about China's rise to great power status, see Nicholas Kristof, "The Rise of China," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 6 (November/December 1993), pp. 59-74; and Denny Roy, "Hegemon on the Horizon? China's Threat to East Asian Security," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 149-168. Richard Bernstein and Ross Munro even predict that China will become a global rival of the United States in the next two decades. See Bernstein and Munro, "Coming Conflict with America," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 2 (March/April 1997), pp. 18-31; and Richard Bernstein and Ross Munro, The Coming Conflict with China (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1997). For predictions of China as a peer competitor in line with previous power transitions in history see Peter T.R. Brookes, "Strategic Realism: The Future of U.S.-Sino Security Relations," Strategic Review, Summer 1999, pp. 53-56; Fareed Zakaria, "China: Appease or Contain? Speak Softly Carry a Veiled Threat," New York Times Magazine, February 18, 1996, p. 36; and Stephen Götz Richter, "Repeating History: In Dealing with China, the United States Can Learn a Great Deal from British-German Relations in 1880," July 11, 2000, http://www.theglobalist.com/nor/news. For counterarguments emphasizing China's persistent weaknesses in comparison to the United States and other militaries, see Michael C. Gallagher, "China's Illusory Threat to the South China Sea," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 169-194; Paul Godwin, "The PLA Faces the Twenty-first Century: Reflections on Technology, Doctrine, Strategy, and Operations," in James R. Lilley and David Shambaugh, eds., China's Military Faces the Future (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), pp. 39-63; Robert S. Ross and Andrew J. Nathan, The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China's Search for Security (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997); Robert S. Ross, "Beijing as a Conservative Power," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 2 (March/April 1997), pp. 33-44; and Russell D. Howard, The Chinese People's Liberation Army: "Short Arms and Slow Legs," Institute for National Security Studies Occasional Paper 28, Regional Security Series, U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, Colorado, September 1999.
3. The peer competitor debate was the focus of two major conferences in 1993-94: one at Harvard University's Fairbank Center for East Asian Research, entitled "The China Threat?"; and the other at the Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, entitled "China: Strategic Partner or Peer Competitor?" For examples of concerns about China's rise to great power status, see Nicholas Kristof, "The Rise of China," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 6 (November/December 1993), pp. 59-74; and Denny Roy, "Hegemon on the Horizon? China's Threat to East Asian Security," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 149-168. Richard Bernstein and Ross Munro even predict that China will become a global rival of the United States in the next two decades. See Bernstein and Munro, "Coming Conflict with America," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 2 (March/April 1997), pp. 18-31; and Richard Bernstein and Ross Munro, The Coming Conflict with China (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1997). For predictions of China as a peer competitor in line with previous power transitions in history see Peter T.R. Brookes, "Strategic Realism: The Future of U.S.-Sino Security Relations," Strategic Review, Summer 1999, pp. 53-56; Fareed Zakaria, "China: Appease or Contain? Speak Softly Carry a Veiled Threat," New York Times Magazine, February 18, 1996, p. 36; and Stephen Götz Richter, "Repeating History: In Dealing with China, the United States Can Learn a Great Deal from British-German Relations in 1880," July 11, 2000, http://www.theglobalist.com/nor/news. For counterarguments emphasizing China's persistent weaknesses in comparison to the United States and other militaries, see Michael C. Gallagher, "China's Illusory Threat to the South China Sea," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 169-194; Paul Godwin, "The PLA Faces the Twenty-first Century: Reflections on Technology, Doctrine, Strategy, and Operations," in James R. Lilley and David Shambaugh, eds., China's Military Faces the Future (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), pp. 39-63; Robert S. Ross and Andrew J. Nathan, The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China's Search for Security (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997); Robert S. Ross, "Beijing as a Conservative Power," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 2 (March/April 1997), pp. 33-44; and Russell D. Howard, The Chinese People's Liberation Army: "Short Arms and Slow Legs," Institute for National Security Studies Occasional Paper 28, Regional Security Series, U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, Colorado, September 1999.
4. The peer competitor debate was the focus of two major conferences in 1993-94: one at Harvard University's Fairbank Center for East Asian Research, entitled "The China Threat?"; and the other at the Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, entitled "China: Strategic Partner or Peer Competitor?" For examples of concerns about China's rise to great power status, see Nicholas Kristof, "The Rise of China," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 6 (November/December 1993), pp. 59-74; and Denny Roy, "Hegemon on the Horizon? China's Threat to East Asian Security," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 149-168. Richard Bernstein and Ross Munro even predict that China will become a global rival of the United States in the next two decades. See Bernstein and Munro, "Coming Conflict with America," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 2 (March/April 1997), pp. 18-31; and Richard Bernstein and Ross Munro, The Coming Conflict with China (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1997). For predictions of China as a peer competitor in line with previous power transitions in history see Peter T.R. Brookes, "Strategic Realism: The Future of U.S.-Sino Security Relations," Strategic Review, Summer 1999, pp. 53-56; Fareed Zakaria, "China: Appease or Contain? Speak Softly Carry a Veiled Threat," New York Times Magazine, February 18, 1996, p. 36; and Stephen Götz Richter, "Repeating History: In Dealing with China, the United States Can Learn a Great Deal from British-German Relations in 1880," July 11, 2000, http://www.theglobalist.com/nor/news. For counterarguments emphasizing China's persistent weaknesses in comparison to the United States and other militaries, see Michael C. Gallagher, "China's Illusory Threat to the South China Sea," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 169-194; Paul Godwin, "The PLA Faces the Twenty-first Century: Reflections on Technology, Doctrine, Strategy, and Operations," in James R. Lilley and David Shambaugh, eds., China's Military Faces the Future (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), pp. 39-63; Robert S. Ross and Andrew J. Nathan, The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China's Search for Security (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997); Robert S. Ross, "Beijing as a Conservative Power," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 2 (March/April 1997), pp. 33-44; and Russell D. Howard, The Chinese People's Liberation Army: "Short Arms and Slow Legs," Institute for National Security Studies Occasional Paper 28, Regional Security Series, U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, Colorado, September 1999.
5. The peer competitor debate was the focus of two major conferences in 1993-94: one at Harvard University's Fairbank Center for East Asian Research, entitled "The China Threat?"; and the other at the Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, entitled "China: Strategic Partner or Peer Competitor?" For examples of concerns about China's rise to great power status, see Nicholas Kristof, "The Rise of China," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 6 (November/December 1993), pp. 59-74; and Denny Roy, "Hegemon on the Horizon? China's Threat to East Asian Security," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 149-168. Richard Bernstein and Ross Munro even predict that China will become a global rival of the United States in the next two decades. See Bernstein and Munro, "Coming Conflict with America," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 2 (March/April 1997), pp. 18-31; and Richard Bernstein and Ross Munro, The Coming Conflict with China (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1997). For predictions of China as a peer competitor in line with previous power transitions in history see Peter T.R. Brookes, "Strategic Realism: The Future of U.S.-Sino Security Relations," Strategic Review, Summer 1999, pp. 53-56; Fareed Zakaria, "China: Appease or Contain? Speak Softly Carry a Veiled Threat," New York Times Magazine, February 18, 1996, p. 36; and Stephen Götz Richter, "Repeating History: In Dealing with China, the United States Can Learn a Great Deal from British-German Relations in 1880," July 11, 2000, http://www.theglobalist.com/nor/news. For counterarguments emphasizing China's persistent weaknesses in comparison to the United States and other militaries, see Michael C. Gallagher, "China's Illusory Threat to the South China Sea," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 169-194; Paul Godwin, "The PLA Faces the Twenty-first Century: Reflections on Technology, Doctrine, Strategy, and Operations," in James R. Lilley and David Shambaugh, eds., China's Military Faces the Future (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), pp. 39-63; Robert S. Ross and Andrew J. Nathan, The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China's Search for Security (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997); Robert S. Ross, "Beijing as a Conservative Power," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 2 (March/April 1997), pp. 33-44; and Russell D. Howard, The Chinese People's Liberation Army: "Short Arms and Slow Legs," Institute for National Security Studies Occasional Paper 28, Regional Security Series, U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, Colorado, September 1999.
6. The peer competitor debate was the focus of two major conferences in 1993-94: one at Harvard University's Fairbank Center for East Asian Research, entitled "The China Threat?"; and the other at the Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, entitled "China: Strategic Partner or Peer Competitor?" For examples of concerns about China's rise to great power status, see Nicholas Kristof, "The Rise of China," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 6 (November/December 1993), pp. 59-74; and Denny Roy, "Hegemon on the Horizon? China's Threat to East Asian Security," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 149-168. Richard Bernstein and Ross Munro even predict that China will become a global rival of the United States in the next two decades. See Bernstein and Munro, "Coming Conflict with America," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 2 (March/April 1997), pp. 18-31; and Richard Bernstein and Ross Munro, The Coming Conflict with China (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1997). For predictions of China as a peer competitor in line with previous power transitions in history see Peter T.R. Brookes, "Strategic Realism: The Future of U.S.-Sino Security Relations," Strategic Review, Summer 1999, pp. 53-56; Fareed Zakaria, "China: Appease or Contain? Speak Softly Carry a Veiled Threat," New York Times Magazine, February 18, 1996, p. 36; and Stephen Götz Richter, "Repeating History: In Dealing with China, the United States Can Learn a Great Deal from British-German Relations in 1880," July 11, 2000, http://www.theglobalist.com/nor/news. For counterarguments emphasizing China's persistent weaknesses in comparison to the United States and other militaries, see Michael C. Gallagher, "China's Illusory Threat to the South China Sea," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 169-194; Paul Godwin, "The PLA Faces the Twenty-first Century: Reflections on Technology, Doctrine, Strategy, and Operations," in James R. Lilley and David Shambaugh, eds., China's Military Faces the Future (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), pp. 39-63; Robert S. Ross and Andrew J. Nathan, The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China's Search for Security (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997); Robert S. Ross, "Beijing as a Conservative Power," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 2 (March/April 1997), pp. 33-44; and Russell D. Howard, The Chinese People's Liberation Army: "Short Arms and Slow Legs," Institute for National Security Studies Occasional Paper 28, Regional Security Series, U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, Colorado, September 1999.
7. The peer competitor debate was the focus of two major conferences in 1993-94: one at Harvard University's Fairbank Center for East Asian Research, entitled "The China Threat?"; and the other at the Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, entitled "China: Strategic Partner or Peer Competitor?" For examples of concerns about China's rise to great power status, see Nicholas Kristof, "The Rise of China," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 6 (November/December 1993), pp. 59-74; and Denny Roy, "Hegemon on the Horizon? China's Threat to East Asian Security," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 149-168. Richard Bernstein and Ross Munro even predict that China will become a global rival of the United States in the next two decades. See Bernstein and Munro, "Coming Conflict with America," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 2 (March/April 1997), pp. 18-31; and Richard Bernstein and Ross Munro, The Coming Conflict with China (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1997). For predictions of China as a peer competitor in line with previous power transitions in history see Peter T.R. Brookes, "Strategic Realism: The Future of U.S.-Sino Security Relations," Strategic Review, Summer 1999, pp. 53-56; Fareed Zakaria, "China: Appease or Contain? Speak Softly Carry a Veiled Threat," New York Times Magazine, February 18, 1996, p. 36; and Stephen Götz Richter, "Repeating History: In Dealing with China, the United States Can Learn a Great Deal from British-German Relations in 1880," July 11, 2000, http://www.theglobalist.com/nor/news. For counterarguments emphasizing China's persistent weaknesses in comparison to the United States and other militaries, see Michael C. Gallagher, "China's Illusory Threat to the South China Sea," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 169-194; Paul Godwin, "The PLA Faces the Twenty-first Century: Reflections on Technology, Doctrine, Strategy, and Operations," in James R. Lilley and David Shambaugh, eds., China's Military Faces the Future (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), pp. 39-63; Robert S. Ross and Andrew J. Nathan, The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China's Search for Security (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997); Robert S. Ross, "Beijing as a Conservative Power," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 2 (March/April 1997), pp. 33-44; and Russell D. Howard, The Chinese People's Liberation Army: "Short Arms and Slow Legs," Institute for National Security Studies Occasional Paper 28, Regional Security Series, U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, Colorado, September 1999.
8. The peer competitor debate was the focus of two major conferences in 1993-94: one at Harvard University's Fairbank Center for East Asian Research, entitled "The China Threat?"; and the other at the Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, entitled "China: Strategic Partner or Peer Competitor?" For examples of concerns about China's rise to great power status, see Nicholas Kristof, "The Rise of China," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 6 (November/December 1993), pp. 59-74; and Denny Roy, "Hegemon on the Horizon? China's Threat to East Asian Security," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 149-168. Richard Bernstein and Ross Munro even predict that China will become a global rival of the United States in the next two decades. See Bernstein and Munro, "Coming Conflict with America," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 2 (March/April 1997), pp. 18-31; and Richard Bernstein and Ross Munro, The Coming Conflict with China (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1997). For predictions of China as a peer competitor in line with previous power transitions in history see Peter T.R. Brookes, "Strategic Realism: The Future of U.S.-Sino Security Relations," Strategic Review, Summer 1999, pp. 53-56; Fareed Zakaria, "China: Appease or Contain? Speak Softly Carry a Veiled Threat," New York Times Magazine, February 18, 1996, p. 36; and Stephen Götz Richter, "Repeating History: In Dealing with China, the United States Can Learn a Great Deal from British-German Relations in 1880," July 11, 2000, http://www.theglobalist.com/nor/news. For counterarguments emphasizing China's persistent weaknesses in comparison to the United States and other militaries, see Michael C. Gallagher, "China's Illusory Threat to the South China Sea," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 169-194; Paul Godwin, "The PLA Faces the Twenty-first Century: Reflections on Technology, Doctrine, Strategy, and Operations," in James R. Lilley and David Shambaugh, eds., China's Military Faces the Future (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), pp. 39-63; Robert S. Ross and Andrew J. Nathan, The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China's Search for Security (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997); Robert S. Ross, "Beijing as a Conservative Power," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 2 (March/April 1997), pp. 33-44; and Russell D. Howard, The Chinese People's Liberation Army: "Short Arms and Slow Legs," Institute for National Security Studies Occasional Paper 28, Regional Security Series, U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, Colorado, September 1999.
9. The peer competitor debate was the focus of two major conferences in 1993-94: one at Harvard University's Fairbank Center for East Asian Research, entitled "The China Threat?"; and the other at the Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, entitled "China: Strategic Partner or Peer Competitor?" For examples of concerns about China's rise to great power status, see Nicholas Kristof, "The Rise of China," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 6 (November/December 1993), pp. 59-74; and Denny Roy, "Hegemon on the Horizon? China's Threat to East Asian Security," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 149-168. Richard Bernstein and Ross Munro even predict that China will become a global rival of the United States in the next two decades. See Bernstein and Munro, "Coming Conflict with America," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 2 (March/April 1997), pp. 18-31; and Richard Bernstein and Ross Munro, The Coming Conflict with China (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1997). For predictions of China as a peer competitor in line with previous power transitions in history see Peter T.R. Brookes, "Strategic Realism: The Future of U.S.-Sino Security Relations," Strategic Review, Summer 1999, pp. 53-56; Fareed Zakaria, "China: Appease or Contain? Speak Softly Carry a Veiled Threat," New York Times Magazine, February 18, 1996, p. 36; and Stephen Götz Richter, "Repeating History: In Dealing with China, the United States Can Learn a Great Deal from British-German Relations in 1880," July 11, 2000, http://www.theglobalist.com/nor/news. For counterarguments emphasizing China's persistent weaknesses in comparison to the United States and other militaries, see Michael C. Gallagher, "China's Illusory Threat to the South China Sea," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 169-194; Paul Godwin, "The PLA Faces the Twenty-first Century: Reflections on Technology, Doctrine, Strategy, and Operations," in James R. Lilley and David Shambaugh, eds., China's Military Faces the Future (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), pp. 39-63; Robert S. Ross and Andrew J. Nathan, The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China's Search for Security (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997); Robert S. Ross, "Beijing as a Conservative Power," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 2 (March/April 1997), pp. 33-44; and Russell D. Howard, The Chinese People's Liberation Army: "Short Arms and Slow Legs," Institute for National Security Studies Occasional Paper 28, Regional Security Series, U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, Colorado, September 1999.
10. The peer competitor debate was the focus of two major conferences in 1993-94: one at Harvard University's Fairbank Center for East Asian Research, entitled "The China Threat?"; and the other at the Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, entitled "China: Strategic Partner or Peer Competitor?" For examples of concerns about China's rise to great power status, see Nicholas Kristof, "The Rise of China," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 6 (November/December 1993), pp. 59-74; and Denny Roy, "Hegemon on the Horizon? China's Threat to East Asian Security," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 149-168. Richard Bernstein and Ross Munro even predict that China will become a global rival of the United States in the next two decades. See Bernstein and Munro, "Coming Conflict with America," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 2 (March/April 1997), pp. 18-31; and Richard Bernstein and Ross Munro, The Coming Conflict with China (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1997). For predictions of China as a peer competitor in line with previous power transitions in history see Peter T.R. Brookes, "Strategic Realism: The Future of U.S.-Sino Security Relations," Strategic Review, Summer 1999, pp. 53-56; Fareed Zakaria, "China: Appease or Contain? Speak Softly Carry a Veiled Threat," New York Times Magazine, February 18, 1996, p. 36; and Stephen Götz Richter, "Repeating History: In Dealing with China, the United States Can Learn a Great Deal from British-German Relations in 1880," July 11, 2000, http://www.theglobalist.com/nor/news. For counterarguments emphasizing China's persistent weaknesses in comparison to the United States and other militaries, see Michael C. Gallagher, "China's Illusory Threat to the South China Sea," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 169-194; Paul Godwin, "The PLA Faces the Twenty-first Century: Reflections on Technology, Doctrine, Strategy, and Operations," in James R. Lilley and David Shambaugh, eds., China's Military Faces the Future (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), pp. 39-63; Robert S. Ross and Andrew J. Nathan, The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China's Search for Security (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997); Robert S. Ross, "Beijing as a Conservative Power," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 2 (March/April 1997), pp. 33-44; and Russell D. Howard, The Chinese People's Liberation Army: "Short Arms and Slow Legs," Institute for National Security Studies Occasional Paper 28, Regional Security Series, U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, Colorado, September 1999.
11. The peer competitor debate was the focus of two major conferences in 1993-94: one at Harvard University's Fairbank Center for East Asian Research, entitled "The China Threat?"; and the other at the Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, entitled "China: Strategic Partner or Peer Competitor?" For examples of concerns about China's rise to great power status, see Nicholas Kristof, "The Rise of China," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 6 (November/December 1993), pp. 59-74; and Denny Roy, "Hegemon on the Horizon? China's Threat to East Asian Security," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 149-168. Richard Bernstein and Ross Munro even predict that China will become a global rival of the United States in the next two decades. See Bernstein and Munro, "Coming Conflict with America," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 2 (March/April 1997), pp. 18-31; and Richard Bernstein and Ross Munro, The Coming Conflict with China (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1997). For predictions of China as a peer competitor in line with previous power transitions in history see Peter T.R. Brookes, "Strategic Realism: The Future of U.S.-Sino Security Relations," Strategic Review, Summer 1999, pp. 53-56; Fareed Zakaria, "China: Appease or Contain? Speak Softly Carry a Veiled Threat," New York Times Magazine, February 18, 1996, p. 36; and Stephen Götz Richter, "Repeating History: In Dealing with China, the United States Can Learn a Great Deal from British-German Relations in 1880," July 11, 2000, http://www.theglobalist.com/nor/news. For counterarguments emphasizing China's persistent weaknesses in comparison to the United States and other militaries, see Michael C. Gallagher, "China's Illusory Threat to the South China Sea," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 169-194; Paul Godwin, "The PLA Faces the Twenty-first Century: Reflections on Technology, Doctrine, Strategy, and Operations," in James R. Lilley and David Shambaugh, eds., China's Military Faces the Future (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), pp. 39-63; Robert S. Ross and Andrew J. Nathan, The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China's Search for Security (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997); Robert S. Ross, "Beijing as a Conservative Power," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 2 (March/April 1997), pp. 33-44; and Russell D. Howard, The Chinese People's Liberation Army: "Short Arms and Slow Legs," Institute for National Security Studies Occasional Paper 28, Regional Security Series, U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, Colorado, September 1999.
12. The peer competitor debate was the focus of two major conferences in 1993-94: one at Harvard University's Fairbank Center for East Asian Research, entitled "The China Threat?"; and the other at the Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, entitled "China: Strategic Partner or Peer Competitor?" For examples of concerns about China's rise to great power status, see Nicholas Kristof, "The Rise of China," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 6 (November/December 1993), pp. 59-74; and Denny Roy, "Hegemon on the Horizon? China's Threat to East Asian Security," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 149-168. Richard Bernstein and Ross Munro even predict that China will become a global rival of the United States in the next two decades. See Bernstein and Munro, "Coming Conflict with America," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 2 (March/April 1997), pp. 18-31; and Richard Bernstein and Ross Munro, The Coming Conflict with China (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1997). For predictions of China as a peer competitor in line with previous power transitions in history see Peter T.R. Brookes, "Strategic Realism: The Future of U.S.-Sino Security Relations," Strategic Review, Summer 1999, pp. 53-56; Fareed Zakaria, "China: Appease or Contain? Speak Softly Carry a Veiled Threat," New York Times Magazine, February 18, 1996, p. 36; and Stephen Götz Richter, "Repeating History: In Dealing with China, the United States Can Learn a Great Deal from British-German Relations in 1880," July 11, 2000, http://www.theglobalist.com/nor/news. For counterarguments emphasizing China's persistent weaknesses in comparison to the United States and other militaries, see Michael C. Gallagher, "China's Illusory Threat to the South China Sea," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 169-194; Paul Godwin, "The PLA Faces the Twenty-first Century: Reflections on Technology, Doctrine, Strategy, and Operations," in James R. Lilley and David Shambaugh, eds., China's Military Faces the Future (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), pp. 39-63; Robert S. Ross and Andrew J. Nathan, The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China's Search for Security (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997); Robert S. Ross, "Beijing as a Conservative Power," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 2 (March/April 1997), pp. 33-44; and Russell D. Howard, The Chinese People's Liberation Army: "Short Arms and Slow Legs," Institute for National Security Studies Occasional Paper 28, Regional Security Series, U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, Colorado, September 1999.
13. See, for example, Thomas E. Ricks, "For Pentagon, Asia Moving to Forefront: Shift Has Implications for Strategy, Forces, Weapons," Washington Post, May 26, 2000, p. 1. Timothy Thomas, an analyst at the U.S. Army's Foreign Military Studies Office, argues that information warfare techniques might "enable China to catch up with the West in both strategic military and international status." See "Analyst Warns of China's Aggressive Approach to Info Warfare," Inside the Pentagon, November 30, 2000, p. 2. For a recent article that focuses critically on such thinking in Washington and argues that the People's Liberation Army will continue to "lag behind the U.S. military," see Bates Gill and Michael O'Hanlon, "China's Hollow Military," National Interest, Summer 1999, pp. 55-62.
14. See, for example, Thomas E. Ricks, "For Pentagon, Asia Moving to Forefront: Shift Has Implications for Strategy, Forces, Weapons," Washington Post, May 26, 2000, p. 1. Timothy Thomas, an analyst at the U.S. Army's Foreign Military Studies Office, argues that information warfare techniques might "enable China to catch up with the West in both strategic military and international status." See "Analyst Warns of China's Aggressive Approach to Info Warfare," Inside the Pentagon, November 30, 2000, p. 2. For a recent article that focuses critically on such thinking in Washington and argues that the People's Liberation Army will continue to "lag behind the U.S. military," see Bates Gill and Michael O'Hanlon, "China's Hollow Military," National Interest, Summer 1999, pp. 55-62.
15. See, for example, Thomas E. Ricks, "For Pentagon, Asia Moving to Forefront: Shift Has Implications for Strategy, Forces, Weapons," Washington Post, May 26, 2000, p. 1. Timothy Thomas, an analyst at the U.S. Army's Foreign Military Studies Office, argues that information warfare techniques might "enable China to catch up with the West in both strategic military and international status." See "Analyst Warns of China's Aggressive Approach to Info Warfare," Inside the Pentagon, November 30, 2000, p. 2. For a recent article that focuses critically on such thinking in Washington and argues that the People's Liberation Army will continue to "lag behind the U.S. military," see Bates Gill and Michael O'Hanlon, "China's Hollow Military," National Interest, Summer 1999, pp. 55-62.
16. For a discussion that focuses on invasion scenarios, see Michael O'Hanlon, "Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan," International Security, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Fall 2000), pp. 51-86. For a balance-of-forces analysis arguing that Taiwan will be safe from mainland attack long into the future, see James Nolt, "The China-Taiwan Military Balance," January 7, 2000, http://www.taiwansecurity.org. For a counterargument that, over the course of the next decade, the balance of power will shift gradually but decisively from Taiwan's favor to the PRC's favor, see David Shambaugh, "A Matter of Time: Taiwan's Eroding Military Advantage," Washington Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Spring 2000), pp. 119-133.
17. For a discussion that focuses on invasion scenarios, see Michael O'Hanlon, "Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan," International Security, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Fall 2000), pp. 51-86. For a balance-of-forces analysis arguing that Taiwan will be safe from mainland attack long into the future, see James Nolt, "The China-Taiwan Military Balance," January 7, 2000, http://www.taiwansecurity.org. For a counterargument that, over the course of the next decade, the balance of power will shift gradually but decisively from Taiwan's favor to the PRC's favor, see David Shambaugh, "A Matter of Time: Taiwan's Eroding Military Advantage," Washington Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Spring 2000), pp. 119-133.
18. For a discussion that focuses on invasion scenarios, see Michael O'Hanlon, "Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan," International Security, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Fall 2000), pp. 51-86. For a balance-of-forces analysis arguing that Taiwan will be safe from mainland attack long into the future, see James Nolt, "The China-Taiwan Military Balance," January 7, 2000, http://www.taiwansecurity.org. For a counterargument that, over the course of the next decade, the balance of power will shift gradually but decisively from Taiwan's favor to the PRC's favor, see David Shambaugh, "A Matter of Time: Taiwan's Eroding Military Advantage," Washington Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Spring 2000), pp. 119-133.
19. For examples of the realist literature on the desirability and durability of American unipolarity, see William C. Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World," International Security, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Summer 1999), pp. 5-41; Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 5-51; and Michael Mastanduno, "Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy after the Cold War," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Spring 1997), pp. 49-88.
20. For examples of the realist literature on the desirability and durability of American unipolarity, see William C. Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World," International Security, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Summer 1999), pp. 5-41; Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 5-51; and Michael Mastanduno, "Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy after the Cold War," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Spring 1997), pp. 49-88.
21. For examples of the realist literature on the desirability and durability of American unipolarity, see William C. Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World," International Security, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Summer 1999), pp. 5-41; Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 5-51; and Michael Mastanduno, "Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy after the Cold War," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Spring 1997), pp. 49-88.
22. For an explication of American strategic goals, see Department of Defense, United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region, 1998.
23. Robert S. Ross "The Geography of the Peace: East Asia in the Twenty-first Century," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Spring 1999), pp. 101-102, at p. 102. For a concerned view about what a nontransparent China might be doing in the fields of military high technology, see Wendy Frieman, "The Understated Revolution in Chinese Science and Technology," in Lilley and Shambaugh, China's Military Faces the Future, pp. 247-267. For a less rosy assessment of trends in China's technological capabilities compared with those of the United States and others, see Bernard D. Cole and Paul H.B. Godwin, "Advanced Military Technology and the PLA: Priorities and Capabilities for the Twenty-first Century," paper presented at the 1998 American Enterprise Institute Conference on the People's Liberation Army, Wye Plantation, Aspen, Maryland; and Bates Gill and Lonnie Henley, China and the Revolution in Military Affairs (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, 1996).
24. Robert S. Ross "The Geography of the Peace: East Asia in the Twenty-first Century," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Spring 1999), pp. 101-102, at p. 102. For a concerned view about what a nontransparent China might be doing in the fields of military high technology, see Wendy Frieman, "The Understated Revolution in Chinese Science and Technology," in Lilley and Shambaugh, China's Military Faces the Future, pp. 247-267. For a less rosy assessment of trends in China's technological capabilities compared with those of the United States and others, see Bernard D. Cole and Paul H.B. Godwin, "Advanced Military Technology and the PLA: Priorities and Capabilities for the Twenty-first Century," paper presented at the 1998 American Enterprise Institute Conference on the People's Liberation Army, Wye Plantation, Aspen, Maryland; and Bates Gill and Lonnie Henley, China and the Revolution in Military Affairs (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, 1996).
25. Robert S. Ross "The Geography of the Peace: East Asia in the Twenty-first Century," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Spring 1999), pp. 101-102, at p. 102. For a concerned view about what a nontransparent China might be doing in the fields of military high technology, see Wendy Frieman, "The Understated Revolution in Chinese Science and Technology," in Lilley and Shambaugh, China's Military Faces the Future, pp. 247-267. For a less rosy assessment of trends in China's technological capabilities compared with those of the United States and others, see Bernard D. Cole and Paul H.B. Godwin, "Advanced Military Technology and the PLA: Priorities and Capabilities for the Twenty-first Century," paper presented at the 1998 American Enterprise Institute Conference on the People's Liberation Army, Wye Plantation, Aspen, Maryland; and Bates Gill and Lonnie Henley, China and the Revolution in Military Affairs (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, 1996).
26. Robert S. Ross "The Geography of the Peace: East Asia in the Twenty-first Century," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Spring 1999), pp. 101-102, at p. 102. For a concerned view about what a nontransparent China might be doing in the fields of military high technology, see Wendy Frieman, "The Understated Revolution in Chinese Science and Technology," in Lilley and Shambaugh, China's Military Faces the Future, pp. 247-267. For a less rosy assessment of trends in China's technological capabilities compared with those of the United States and others, see Bernard D. Cole and Paul H.B. Godwin, "Advanced Military Technology and the PLA: Priorities and Capabilities for the Twenty-first Century," paper presented at the 1998 American Enterprise Institute Conference on the People's Liberation Army, Wye Plantation, Aspen, Maryland; and Bates Gill and Lonnie Henley, China and the Revolution in Military Affairs (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, 1996).
27. Lieut. Gen. Wang Houqing and Maj. Gen. Zhang Xingye, chief eds., Zhanyi Xue [Military campaign studies] (Beijing: National Defense University Press, May 2000) (military circulation only), p. 28. For a similar argument, see Sr. Cols. Huang Xing and Zuo Quandian, "Holding the Initiative in Our Hands in Conducting Operations, Giving Full Play to Our Advantages to Defeat Our Enemy - A Study of the Core Idea of the Operational Doctrine of the People's Liberation Army," in Zhongguo Junshi Kexue [Chinese military science], November 20, 1996, pp. 49-56, in Foreign Broadcast and Information Service-China (hereinafter FBIS-China), June 19, 1997; and Li Yinian, Chen Ligong, and Li Chunli, "Gao Jishu Tiajian Xia Jubu Zhanzheng Ruhe Dacheng 'Yi Lie Sheng You'" [How to attain victory of the weak over the strong in local wars under high-tech conditions], Zhongguo Junshi Kexue, No. 4, 1998, pp. 171-175.
28. Lieut. Gen. Wang Houqing and Maj. Gen. Zhang Xingye, chief eds., Zhanyi Xue [Military campaign studies] (Beijing: National Defense University Press, May 2000) (military circulation only), p. 28. For a similar argument, see Sr. Cols. Huang Xing and Zuo Quandian, "Holding the Initiative in Our Hands in Conducting Operations, Giving Full Play to Our Advantages to Defeat Our Enemy - A Study of the Core Idea of the Operational Doctrine of the People's Liberation Army," in Zhongguo Junshi Kexue [Chinese military science], November 20, 1996, pp. 49-56, in Foreign Broadcast and Information Service-China (hereinafter FBIS-China), June 19, 1997; and Li Yinian, Chen Ligong, and Li Chunli, "Gao Jishu Tiajian Xia Jubu Zhanzheng Ruhe Dacheng 'Yi Lie Sheng You'" [How to attain victory of the weak over the strong in local wars under high-tech conditions], Zhongguo Junshi Kexue, No. 4, 1998, pp. 171-175.
29. Lieut. Gen. Wang Houqing and Maj. Gen. Zhang Xingye, chief eds., Zhanyi Xue [Military campaign studies] (Beijing: National Defense University Press, May 2000) (military circulation only), p. 28. For a similar argument, see Sr. Cols. Huang Xing and Zuo Quandian, "Holding the Initiative in Our Hands in Conducting Operations, Giving Full Play to Our Advantages to Defeat Our Enemy - A Study of the Core Idea of the Operational Doctrine of the People's Liberation Army," in Zhongguo Junshi Kexue [Chinese military science], November 20, 1996, pp. 49-56, in Foreign Broadcast and Information Service-China (hereinafter FBIS-China), June 19, 1997; and Li Yinian, Chen Ligong, and Li Chunli, "Gao Jishu Tiajian Xia Jubu Zhanzheng Ruhe Dacheng 'Yi Lie Sheng You'" [How to attain victory of the weak over the strong in local wars under high-tech conditions], Zhongguo Junshi Kexue, No. 4, 1998, pp. 171-175.
30. For an argument along these lines, see You Ji, "Chinese Military Security/Foreign Policy Challenge in the New Century," paper presented at the conference on Chinese Foreign Policy Facing the New Century, Beijing, June 10-11, 2000; and You Ji, The Armed Forces of China (St. Leonard's, New South Wales, Australia: Allen and Unwin, 1999), pp. 202-204. A few recent analyses, including a June 2000 Pentagon report to Congress on the military power of the PRC, are big improvements over the arguments made in the peer competitor debate. Rather than just addressing China's ability to counter the United States as a peer competitor, they focus on Chinese efforts to handle specific security challenges in the region, particularly regarding Taiwan, in a manner that Beijing elites believe might preclude or complicate effective U.S. intervention. Department of Defense, "Report to Congress Pursuant to the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act," June 22, 2000, http//www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2000/china06222000.htm. For related arguments, see James Lilley and Carl Ford, "China's Military: A Second Opinion," National Interest, Fall 1999, pp. 71-77.
31. For an argument along these lines, see You Ji, "Chinese Military Security/Foreign Policy Challenge in the New Century," paper presented at the conference on Chinese Foreign Policy Facing the New Century, Beijing, June 10-11, 2000; and You Ji, The Armed Forces of China (St. Leonard's, New South Wales, Australia: Allen and Unwin, 1999), pp. 202-204. A few recent analyses, including a June 2000 Pentagon report to Congress on the military power of the PRC, are big improvements over the arguments made in the peer competitor debate. Rather than just addressing China's ability to counter the United States as a peer competitor, they focus on Chinese efforts to handle specific security challenges in the region, particularly regarding Taiwan, in a manner that Beijing elites believe might preclude or complicate effective U.S. intervention. Department of Defense, "Report to Congress Pursuant to the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act," June 22, 2000, http//www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2000/china06222000.htm. For related arguments, see James Lilley and Carl Ford, "China's Military: A Second Opinion," National Interest, Fall 1999, pp. 71-77.
32. For an argument along these lines, see You Ji, "Chinese Military Security/Foreign Policy Challenge in the New Century," paper presented at the conference on Chinese Foreign Policy Facing the New Century, Beijing, June 10-11, 2000; and You Ji, The Armed Forces of China (St. Leonard's, New South Wales, Australia: Allen and Unwin, 1999), pp. 202-204. A few recent analyses, including a June 2000 Pentagon report to Congress on the military power of the PRC, are big improvements over the arguments made in the peer competitor debate. Rather than just addressing China's ability to counter the United States as a peer competitor, they focus on Chinese efforts to handle specific security challenges in the region, particularly regarding Taiwan, in a manner that Beijing elites believe might preclude or complicate effective U.S. intervention. Department of Defense, "Report to Congress Pursuant to the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act," June 22, 2000, http//www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2000/china06222000.htm. For related arguments, see James Lilley and Carl Ford, "China's Military: A Second Opinion," National Interest, Fall 1999, pp. 71-77.
33. For an argument along these lines, see You Ji, "Chinese Military Security/Foreign Policy Challenge in the New Century," paper presented at the conference on Chinese Foreign Policy Facing the New Century, Beijing, June 10-11, 2000; and You Ji, The Armed Forces of China (St. Leonard's, New South Wales, Australia: Allen and Unwin, 1999), pp. 202-204. A few recent analyses, including a June 2000 Pentagon report to Congress on the military power of the PRC, are big improvements over the arguments made in the peer competitor debate. Rather than just addressing China's ability to counter the United States as a peer competitor, they focus on Chinese efforts to handle specific security challenges in the region, particularly regarding Taiwan, in a manner that Beijing elites believe might preclude or complicate effective U.S. intervention. Department of Defense, "Report to Congress Pursuant to the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act," June 22, 2000, http//www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2000/china06222000.htm. For related arguments, see James Lilley and Carl Ford, "China's Military: A Second Opinion," National Interest, Fall 1999, pp. 71-77.
34. Author interviews with PLA officers and with Western military attachés in Beijing, March 1993. Civilian strategic analysts repeated a similar theme in interviews in Beijing in June 2000. For reasons of privacy, Chinese interlocutors are not identified by name in this article. For a written version of this thesis regarding the Taiwan issue, see Niu Jun, "Bu Pa Meiguo de Ganshe" [Do not fear U.S. intervention], Huanqiu Shibao [Global times], September 24, 1999. Mr. Niu is an America watcher at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, a state think tank.
35. T.V. Paul, Asymmetric Conflicts: War Initiations by Weaker Powers (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 5-10.
36. John Arquilla, Dubious Battles: Aggression, Defeat, and the International System (Washington, D.C.: Crane and Russak, 1992). I am grateful to Michael Pillsbury for bringing this work to my attention. For power transition theory, see A.F.K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980). On small states attacking great powers, see Andrew Mack, "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict," World Politics, Vol. 27, No. 2 (April 1975), pp. 175-200; Paul, Asymmetric Conflicts; Michael P. Fischerkeller, "David versus Goliath: Cultural Judgments in Assymetric Wars," Security Studies, Vol. 7, No. 4 (Summer 1998), pp. 1-43; and Ivan Arreguin-Toft, "Arts of Darkness: Guerrilla War and Barbarism in Asymmetric Conflict," Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1998. Arreguin-Toft argues that smaller states have become increasingly successful in taking on much stronger foes.
37. John Arquilla, Dubious Battles: Aggression, Defeat, and the International System (Washington, D.C.: Crane and Russak, 1992). I am grateful to Michael Pillsbury for bringing this work to my attention. For power transition theory, see A.F.K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980). On small states attacking great powers, see Andrew Mack, "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict," World Politics, Vol. 27, No. 2 (April 1975), pp. 175-200; Paul, Asymmetric Conflicts; Michael P. Fischerkeller, "David versus Goliath: Cultural Judgments in Assymetric Wars," Security Studies, Vol. 7, No. 4 (Summer 1998), pp. 1-43; and Ivan Arreguin-Toft, "Arts of Darkness: Guerrilla War and Barbarism in Asymmetric Conflict," Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1998. Arreguin-Toft argues that smaller states have become increasingly successful in taking on much stronger foes.
38. John Arquilla, Dubious Battles: Aggression, Defeat, and the International System (Washington, D.C.: Crane and Russak, 1992). I am grateful to Michael Pillsbury for bringing this work to my attention. For power transition theory, see A.F.K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980). On small states attacking great powers, see Andrew Mack, "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict," World Politics, Vol. 27, No. 2 (April 1975), pp. 175-200; Paul, Asymmetric Conflicts; Michael P. Fischerkeller, "David versus Goliath: Cultural Judgments in Assymetric Wars," Security Studies, Vol. 7, No. 4 (Summer 1998), pp. 1-43; and Ivan Arreguin-Toft, "Arts of Darkness: Guerrilla War and Barbarism in Asymmetric Conflict," Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1998. Arreguin-Toft argues that smaller states have become increasingly successful in taking on much stronger foes.
39. John Arquilla, Dubious Battles: Aggression, Defeat, and the International System (Washington, D.C.: Crane and Russak, 1992). I am grateful to Michael Pillsbury for bringing this work to my attention. For power transition theory, see A.F.K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980). On small states attacking great powers, see Andrew Mack, "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict," World Politics, Vol. 27, No. 2 (April 1975), pp. 175-200; Paul, Asymmetric Conflicts; Michael P. Fischerkeller, "David versus Goliath: Cultural Judgments in Assymetric Wars," Security Studies, Vol. 7, No. 4 (Summer 1998), pp. 1-43; and Ivan Arreguin-Toft, "Arts of Darkness: Guerrilla War and Barbarism in Asymmetric Conflict," Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1998. Arreguin-Toft argues that smaller states have become increasingly successful in taking on much stronger foes.
40. John Arquilla, Dubious Battles: Aggression, Defeat, and the International System (Washington, D.C.: Crane and Russak, 1992). I am grateful to Michael Pillsbury for bringing this work to my attention. For power transition theory, see A.F.K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980). On small states attacking great powers, see Andrew Mack, "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict," World Politics, Vol. 27, No. 2 (April 1975), pp. 175-200; Paul, Asymmetric Conflicts; Michael P. Fischerkeller, "David versus Goliath: Cultural Judgments in Assymetric Wars," Security Studies, Vol. 7, No. 4 (Summer 1998), pp. 1-43; and Ivan Arreguin-Toft, "Arts of Darkness: Guerrilla War and Barbarism in Asymmetric Conflict," Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1998. Arreguin-Toft argues that smaller states have become increasingly successful in taking on much stronger foes.
41. John Arquilla, Dubious Battles: Aggression, Defeat, and the International System (Washington, D.C.: Crane and Russak, 1992). I am grateful to Michael Pillsbury for bringing this work to my attention. For power transition theory, see A.F.K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980). On small states attacking great powers, see Andrew Mack, "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict," World Politics, Vol. 27, No. 2 (April 1975), pp. 175-200; Paul, Asymmetric Conflicts; Michael P. Fischerkeller, "David versus Goliath: Cultural Judgments in Assymetric Wars," Security Studies, Vol. 7, No. 4 (Summer 1998), pp. 1-43; and Ivan Arreguin-Toft, "Arts of Darkness: Guerrilla War and Barbarism in Asymmetric Conflict," Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1998. Arreguin-Toft argues that smaller states have become increasingly successful in taking on much stronger foes.
42. See Thomas J. Christensen, "Perceptions and Alliance in Europe: 1865-1940," International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 1 (Winter 1997), pp. 65-98.
43. Paul, Asymmetric Conflicts, chaps. 1-2.
44. For this reason, some apparently relevant examples of great power peers designing inferior forces to deter intervention by superior ones, such as Tirpitz's "risk fleet" in the early twentieth century, are not explored in any depth here.
45. See, for example, Paul M. Kennedy's figures that place Japan's 1937 national war potential at less than 10 percent that of the United States. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (New York: Random House, 1987), p. 332. A much more generous national power ranking for Japan in the interwar period still grants the Japanese less than half of the Americans' war-fighting potential. See Randall L. Schweller, Deadly Imbalances: Triplolarity and Hitler's Strategy of World Conquest (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), pp. 203-208.
46. See, for example, Paul M. Kennedy's figures that place Japan's 1937 national war potential at less than 10 percent that of the United States. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (New York: Random House, 1987), p. 332. A much more generous national power ranking for Japan in the interwar period still grants the Japanese less than half of the Americans' war-fighting potential. See Randall L. Schweller, Deadly Imbalances: Triplolarity and Hitler's Strategy of World Conquest (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), pp. 203-208.
47. Michael Barnhart, Japan Prepares for Total War: The Search for Economic Security, 1919-1941 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987), chap. 13; Scott D. Sagan, "The Origins of the Pacific War," Journal of Interdisciplinary History, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Spring 1988), pp. 911-912; Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University, 1991), pp. 148-149; and Paul, Asymmetric Conflicts, chap. 4.
48. Michael Barnhart, Japan Prepares for Total War: The Search for Economic Security, 1919-1941 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987), chap. 13; Scott D. Sagan, "The Origins of the Pacific War," Journal of Interdisciplinary History, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Spring 1988), pp. 911-912; Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University, 1991), pp. 148-149; and Paul, Asymmetric Conflicts, chap. 4.
49. Michael Barnhart, Japan Prepares for Total War: The Search for Economic
50. Michael Barnhart, Japan Prepares for Total War: The Search for Economic Security, 1919-1941 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987), chap. 13; Scott D. Sagan, "The Origins of the Pacific War," Journal of Interdisciplinary History, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Spring 1988), pp. 911-912; Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University, 1991), pp. 148-149; and Paul, Asymmetric Conflicts, chap. 4.
51. Allen S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1960); Chen Jian, China's Road to the Korean War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994); and Thomas J. Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-58 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996), chap. 5.
52. Allen S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1960); Chen Jian, China's Road to the Korean War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994); and Thomas J. Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-58 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996), chap. 5.
53. Allen S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1960); Chen Jian, China's Road to the Korean War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994); and Thomas J. Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-58 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996), chap. 5.
54. For more detailed discussion of this point, see Thomas J. Christensen, "Chinese Realpolitik," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 5 (September/October 1996), pp. 37-52.
55. Author's not-for-attribution interview with a civilian security analyst in the Chinese government, in Beijing, June 2000. One senior Chinese military officer said that the United States and China might very likely fight a war over Taiwan in the next several years. He seemed to be implying that this was regrettable but preferable perhaps to fighting an even larger war in the more distant future.
56. Author interviews with Chinese officials, government analysts, and scholars, in Beijing, January 2001.
57. Author interviews with civilian and military government experts in Beijing and Shanghai, 1995-2000. In a June 2000 interview in Beijing, one government analyst pointed out that belief in the high likelihood of war with the United States over Taiwan in the next ten years has become so widespread that strange fault lines have emerged in the party. He claims that now the soft-line elements in the party are the ones who believe that the United States will likely not get involved militarily in Taiwan scenarios or will leave quickly if it does, whereas hard-liners are preaching for more strike capacity against U.S. forces and U.S. bases. His point was that under normal conditions, where war is not considered inevitable, one would expect only hard-liners to be stating that war could be won cheaply, and soft-liners to be arguing for the hopelessness of the use of force for securing political goals. For an article in a pro-Beijing Hong Kong journal that says the United States might fight hard for awhile before eventually backing down, see Tsiao Hsia, "U.S. Constraints on China's Use of Force in Resolving the Taiwan Issue," Kuang Chiao Ching [Wide angle], February 16, 2000, pp. 43-45, in FBIS-China, February 16, 2000. Tsao writes: "China's use of force in achieving reunification with Taiwan is extremely unfavorable to the United States. If the war is indefinitely stalled or extended, it will be no different from another 'Vietnam War.' The United States will do its utmost to contain the war within a limited spatial or time frame. This will be favorable to China. However, this does not preclude the fact that the United States and Taiwan may resort to extreme measures."
58. An interview with Zhang Zhaozhong in Ma Ling, "Will Foreign Armed Forces Be Involved in a War between the Two Sides of the Taiwan Strait?" Ta Kung Pao (Hong Kong), August 18, 1999, p. A3, in FBIS-China, August 19, 1999.
59. Author interviews in China, 1993-2000. Zhou Shijun, "Try as Far as Possible to Move Battlefields toward Enemy Side," Jiefangjun Bao [People's Liberation Army daily], September 14, 1999, p. 6, in FBIS-China, September 27, 1999. A similar argument states that "the government had no alternative but to succumb to mass pressure and call a halt to the military operations [in Somalia]"; see Zhou Demin, "Dialectical View of Information: Advantages and Disadvantages," Jiefangjun Bao, April 28, 1996, p. 6, in FBIS-China, May 20, 1998.
60. Author interviews in China, 1993-2000. Zhou Shijun, "Try as Far as Possible to Move Battlefields toward Enemy Side," Jiefangjun Bao [People's Liberation Army daily], September 14, 1999, p. 6, in FBIS-China, September 27, 1999. A similar argument states that "the government had no alternative but to succumb to mass pressure and call a halt to the military operations [in Somalia]"; see Zhou Demin, "Dialectical View of Information: Advantages and Disadvantages," Jiefangjun Bao, April 28, 1996, p. 6, in FBIS-China, May 20, 1998.
61. Fu Liqun, "Several Basic Ideas in U.S. Strategic Thinking," in Zhongguo Junshi Kexue, February 20, 1997, in FBIS-China, June 5, 1997.
62. See the views of Gen. Li Jijun as reported in Michael Pillsbury, China Debates the Future Security Environment (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2000), p. 76; see also James J. Perry, "Operation Allied Force: The View from Beijing," Aerospace Power Journal, Vol. 14, No. 2 (Summer 2000), pp. 79-91.
63. See the views of Gen. Li Jijun as reported in Michael Pillsbury, China Debates the Future Security Environment (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2000), p. 76; see also James J. Perry, "Operation Allied Force: The View from Beijing," Aerospace Power Journal, Vol. 14, No. 2 (Summer 2000), pp. 79-91.
64. Zhang Zuqian, "Guofang Xiandaihua yu Taiwan Wenti" [National defense modernization and the Taiwan problem], Zhanlüe yu Guanli [Strategy and management], No. 6 (1996), pp. 45-49, at p. 48.
65. Niu, "Bu Pa Meiguo de Ganshe." Niu does not argue that China currently has the ability to raise American casualties to an unacceptable level.
66. For this theoretical distinction, see Richard K. Betts, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1987).
67. Chu Shulong, "Zhongguo de Guojia Liyi, Guojia Liliang, he Guojia Zhanlüe" [China's national interests, national power, and national strategy], Zhanlüe yu Guanli, No. 4 (1999), pp. 17-18.
68. Author interviews with two government think tank analysts in Beijing, June 2000.
69. Niu, "Bu Pa Meiguo de Ganshe."
70. One Chinese diplomatic historian wrote that even after the Gulf of Tonkin incident and the subsequent escalation of American military action against North Vietnam, Mao believed that the United States would be incapable of fighting China alone and would have to rely on active Japanese and South Korean assistance to do so. See Li Danhui, "Zhong Su Zai Yuan Yue Kang Mei Wenti shang do Maodun yu Chongtu, 1965-72" [Contradictions and conflicts in Sino-Soviet relations over the Aid Vietnam and Resist America War, 1965-72], unpublished Chinese-language manuscript presented at a conference entitled "New Evidence on China, Southeast Asia, and the Indochina Wars," Hong Kong, January 11-12, 2000.
71. Cai Zuming, chief ed., Meiguo Junshi Zhanlüe Yanjiu [Studies of American military strategy] (Beijing: Academy of Military Sciences Publishers, January 1993) (internally circulated), pp. 218-220.
72. One military strategy book emphasizes the political means to separate attackers from their alliances. See Huang Yuzhang, chief ed., Junshi Zhanlüe Gailun [Introduction to military strategy] (Beijing: National Defense University Press, December 1991), pp. 264-265 (military circulation only). You Ji similarly discusses China's need to be able to attack Japan if Tokyo decides to give assistance to U.S. efforts in Taiwan. See You, "Chinese Military Security/Foreign Policy Challenge in the New Century"; and You, The Armed Forces of China, p. 204. Several of my interlocutors in China in 1999 and 2000 also argued that Japanese assistance to U.S. forces in a Taiwan scenario would amount to a Japanese declaration of war on China and that China is developing its capability to attack U.S. bases in Japan.
73. One military strategy book emphasizes the political means to separate attackers from their alliances. See Huang Yuzhang, chief ed., Junshi Zhanlüe Gailun [Introduction to military strategy] (Beijing: National Defense University Press, December 1991), pp. 264-265 (military circulation only). You Ji similarly discusses China's need to be able to attack Japan if Tokyo decides to give assistance to U.S. efforts in Taiwan. See You, "Chinese Military Security/Foreign Policy Challenge in the New Century"; and You, The Armed Forces of China, p. 204. Several of my interlocutors in China in 1999 and 2000 also argued that Japanese assistance to U.S. forces in a Taiwan scenario would amount to a Japanese declaration of war on China and that China is developing its capability to attack U.S. bases in Japan.
74. Over the past few years, Chinese interlocutors have emphasized that the PLA is developing better means to strike Japan and U.S. bases in Japan with conventional missiles. Without direct reference to Japan, an internally circulated military text discusses the conventional arm of the Second Artillery, the PLA's rocket force, in the following terms: "The surface-to-surface missile weapons of the Second Artillery's conventional missile battle groups [changgui daodan junyi juntuan] have the special characteristics of being long range, highly accurate, high speed, powerful [weili da], and so on. This is an extremely abundant [jifu] high-tech deterrent capability." Wang and Zhang, Zhanyi Xue, p. 379.
75. Along these lines, Chief of the General Staff Gen. Fu Quanyou argues that "there is inferiority within superiority and weakness within strength" and that high-tech advancements in weaponry have left "a vast leeway for the weaker side, giving free rein to man's courage and superior intelligence." See Fu, "Deepen the Study of the Characteristics and Laws of High-Technology Local War and Raise the Standard of Guidance for Winning High-Technology Local War of the Future," Zhongguo Junshi Kexue, February 20, 1999, pp. 6-14, in FBIS-China, July 1, 1999.
76. Amphibious assault using conventional and unconventional assets, such as an armada of fishing and merchant vessels, has been discussed in my interviews and in PLA writings. See, for example, Wang and Zhang, Zhanyi Xue, chap. 17, on amphibious landing. But because a direct successful amphibious assault would likely require a great deal of military might that China lacks, for the purpose of this article, I focus on other scenarios that might be alternatives to a direct amphibious assault.
77. A consistent argument by Chinese elites in private over the past two years is that Beijing does not demand that Taiwan simply become part of an expanded People's Republic of China in the unification process. Author interviews with Chinese government analysts in Beijing, Shanghai, and the United States, 1999-2001. For a public statement to this effect to a visiting Taiwan delegation by Vice Premier Qian Qichen, see Maubo Chang, "Qian Qichen Continues 'One China' Pitch to Taiwan Legislators," Central News Agency (Taipei), July 18, 2000, in FBIS-China, July 18, 2000. The article reports: "Qian on Tuesday continued his pitch for Beijing's 'one-China principle' after telling a group of Taiwan media executives in Beijing on July 14 that 'one-China' does not have to mean 'either this or the other/ referring to the two sides of the Taiwan Straits." A Chinese television report quoted Qian Qichen similarly as saying, "There is only one China in the world and both the mainland and Taiwan belong to one China. This formulation is very inclusive." See "CCTV [Chinese Central Television] Reports Qian Qichen Interview on PRC-Taiwan Ties," September 11, 2000, in FBIS-China, September 11, 2000. For a more recent formula, see John Pomfret, "Beijing Signals New Flexibility on Taiwan," Washington Post, January 5, 2001, p. 1. For the most authoritative document containing Beijing's demands and the threat of war if they are not met, see Taiwan White Paper, February 2000, in Beijing Review, March 6, 2000, pp. 16-24.
78. A consistent argument by Chinese elites in private over the past two years is that Beijing does not demand that Taiwan simply become part of an expanded People's Republic of China in the unification process. Author interviews with Chinese government analysts in Beijing, Shanghai, and the United States, 1999-2001. For a public statement to this effect to a visiting Taiwan delegation by Vice Premier Qian Qichen, see Maubo Chang, "Qian Qichen Continues 'One China' Pitch to Taiwan Legislators," Central News Agency (Taipei), July 18, 2000, in FBIS-China, July 18, 2000. The article reports: "Qian on Tuesday continued his pitch for Beijing's 'one-China principle' after telling a group of Taiwan media executives in Beijing on July 14 that 'one-China' does not have to mean 'either this or the other/ referring to the two sides of the Taiwan Straits." A Chinese television report quoted Qian Qichen similarly as saying, "There is only one China in the world and both the mainland and Taiwan belong to one China. This formulation is very inclusive." See "CCTV [Chinese Central Television] Reports Qian Qichen Interview on PRC-Taiwan Ties," September 11, 2000, in FBIS-China, September 11, 2000. For a more recent formula, see John Pomfret, "Beijing Signals New Flexibility on Taiwan," Washington Post, January 5, 2001, p. 1. For the most authoritative document containing Beijing's demands and the threat of war if they are not met, see Taiwan White Paper, February 2000, in Beijing Review, March 6, 2000, pp. 16-24.
79. A consistent argument by Chinese elites in private over the past two years is that Beijing does not demand that Taiwan simply become part of an expanded People's Republic of China in the unification process. Author interviews with Chinese government analysts in Beijing, Shanghai, and the United States, 1999-2001. For a public statement to this effect to a visiting Taiwan delegation by Vice Premier Qian Qichen, see Maubo Chang, "Qian Qichen Continues 'One China' Pitch to Taiwan Legislators," Central News Agency (Taipei), July 18, 2000, in FBIS-China, July 18, 2000. The article reports: "Qian on Tuesday continued his pitch for Beijing's 'one-China principle' after telling a group of Taiwan media executives in Beijing on July 14 that 'one-China' does not have to mean 'either this or the other/ referring to the two sides of the Taiwan Straits." A Chinese television report quoted Qian Qichen similarly as saying, "There is only one China in the world and both the mainland and Taiwan belong to one China. This formulation is very inclusive." See "CCTV [Chinese Central Television] Reports Qian Qichen Interview on PRC-Taiwan Ties," September 11, 2000, in FBIS-China, September 11, 2000. For a more recent formula, see John Pomfret, "Beijing Signals New Flexibility on Taiwan," Washington Post, January 5, 2001, p. 1. For the most authoritative document containing Beijing's demands and the threat of war if they are not met, see Taiwan White Paper, February 2000, in Beijing Review, March 6, 2000, pp. 16-24.
80. A consistent argument by Chinese elites in private over the past two years is that Beijing does not demand that Taiwan simply become part of an expanded People's Republic of China in the unification process. Author interviews with Chinese government analysts in Beijing, Shanghai, and the United States, 1999-2001. For a public statement to this effect to a visiting Taiwan delegation by Vice Premier Qian Qichen, see Maubo Chang, "Qian Qichen Continues 'One China' Pitch to Taiwan Legislators," Central News Agency (Taipei), July 18, 2000, in FBIS-China, July 18, 2000. The article reports: "Qian on Tuesday continued his pitch for Beijing's 'one-China principle' after telling a group of Taiwan media executives in Beijing on July 14 that 'one-China' does not have to mean 'either this or the other/ referring to the two sides of the Taiwan Straits." A Chinese television report quoted Qian Qichen similarly as saying, "There is only one China in the world and both the mainland and Taiwan belong to one China. This formulation is very inclusive." See "CCTV [Chinese Central Television] Reports Qian Qichen Interview on PRC-Taiwan Ties," September 11, 2000, in FBIS-China, September 11, 2000. For a more recent formula, see John Pomfret, "Beijing Signals New Flexibility on Taiwan," Washington Post, January 5, 2001, p. 1. For the most authoritative document containing Beijing's demands and the threat of war if they are not met, see Taiwan White Paper, February 2000, in Beijing Review, March 6, 2000, pp. 16-24.
81. Paul, Asymmetric Conflicts, pp. 12-13.
82. Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Chao Xian Zhan: Dui Quanqiuhua Shidai Zhanzheng yu Zhanfa de Xiangding [Unrestricted warfare: Scenarios about war and war-fighting methods in the era of globalization] (Beijing: PLA Arts and Literature Publishers, August 1999). The book analyzed here, Wang and Zhang, Zhanyi Xue, has no preface, but the cover places it in a series entitled "National-Level Education on Key Topics" (Guojiaji zhongdian jiaocai). The chief editors' positions as PLA National Defense University leaders and the book's limited distribution status, for military circulation only (junnei faxing), make it plausible to surmise that it is used in training elite military officers or civilian officials at the national military academies. The book is available at the John K. Fairbank Center for East Asian Research Library, Harvard University.
83. Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Chao Xian Zhan: Dui Quanqiuhua Shidai Zhanzheng yu Zhanfa de Xiangding [Unrestricted warfare: Scenarios about war and war-fighting methods in the era of globalization] (Beijing: PLA Arts and Literature Publishers, August 1999). The book analyzed here, Wang and Zhang, Zhanyi Xue, has no preface, but the cover places it in a series entitled "National-Level Education on Key Topics" (Guojiaji zhongdian jiaocai). The chief editors' positions as PLA National Defense University leaders and the book's limited distribution status, for military circulation only (junnei faxing), make it plausible to surmise that it is used in training elite military officers or civilian officials at the national military academies. The book is available at the John K. Fairbank Center for East Asian Research Library, Harvard University.
84. Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Chao Xian Zhan: Dui Quanqiuhua Shidai Zhanzheng yu Zhanfa de Xiangding [Unrestricted warfare: Scenarios about war and war-fighting methods in the era of globalization] (Beijing: PLA Arts and Literature Publishers, August 1999). The book analyzed here, Wang and Zhang, Zhanyi Xue, has no preface, but the cover places it in a series entitled "National-Level Education on Key Topics" (Guojiaji zhongdian jiaocai). The chief editors' positions as PLA National Defense University leaders and the book's limited distribution status, for military circulation only (junnei faxing), make it plausible to surmise that it is used in training elite military officers or civilian officials at the national military academies. The book is available at the John K. Fairbank Center for East Asian Research Library, Harvard University.
85. Maj. Mark Stokes, U.S. Air Force, China's Strategic Modernization: Implications for the United States (Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, September 1999), chap. 4.
86. In April 1998, the Second Artillery formally raised to the PLA its concept for sudden conventional assault. Wang and Zhang, Zhanyi Xue, p. 369 and pp. 375-378, 411-412, 430-433. For similar themes, see Li Xinyi, "On the Air Superiority and Air Defense of Taiwan, China: Is Taiwan an Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier?" in Taiwan de Junbei [Taiwan armaments], July 1, 1996, pp. 11-18, in FBIS-China, November 13, 1997.
87. In April 1998, the Second Artillery formally raised to the PLA its concept for sudden conventional assault. Wang and Zhang, Zhanyi Xue, p. 369 and pp. 375-378, 411-412, 430-433. For similar themes, see Li Xinyi, "On the Air Superiority and Air Defense of Taiwan, China: Is Taiwan an Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier?" in Taiwan de Junbei [Taiwan armaments], July 1, 1996, pp. 11-18, in FBIS-China, November 13, 1997.
88. Wang and Zhang, Zhanyi Xue, p. 376.
89. It might take most of this decade or longer for China to develop a ballistic missile and cruise missile force of sufficient size and accuracy to convince Beijing elites that such an attack could be politically effective. But because the targets of such a campaign would not only be military but psychological, Beijing's standards for sufficiency might be lower than what an objective military assessment based on brute-force capabilities alone might prescribe. Moreover, any combination of Chinese overestimation of the power of PLA missiles or underestimation of Taiwanese, American, or Japanese resolve could make such a missile attack much more likely than we would otherwise expect.
90. On Iraq, see Zhou, "Try as Far as Possible to Move Battlefields toward Enemy Side"; and Gen. Li Jijun, cited in Pillsbury, China Debates the Future Security Environment, p. 76. On Kosovo, see Yan Xuetong, Meiguo Baquan he Zhongguo Anquan [American hegemony and Chinese security] (Tianjin: Tianjin People's Publishers, March 2000), pp. 33-35. Commenting on the Kosovo war, Yan Xuetong of the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations argues that the Yugoslavs drew the lesson that the war would have been impossible for NATO to pursue if Yugoslavia had possessed medium-range ballistic missiles, presumably because Yugoslavian forces could have struck NATO bases in Italy.
91. On Iraq, see Zhou, "Try as Far as Possible to Move Battlefields toward Enemy Side"; and Gen. Li Jijun, cited in Pillsbury, China Debates the Future Security Environment, p. 76. On Kosovo, see Yan Xuetong, Meiguo Baquan he Zhongguo Anquan [American hegemony and Chinese security] (Tianjin: Tianjin People's Publishers, March 2000), pp. 33-35. Commenting on the Kosovo war, Yan Xuetong of the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations argues that the Yugoslavs drew the lesson that the war would have been impossible for NATO to pursue if Yugoslavia had possessed medium-range ballistic missiles, presumably because Yugoslavian forces could have struck NATO bases in Italy.
92. On Iraq, see Zhou, "Try as Far as Possible to Move Battlefields toward Enemy Side"; and Gen. Li Jijun, cited in Pillsbury, China Debates the Future Security Environment, p. 76. On Kosovo, see Yan Xuetong, Meiguo Baquan he Zhongguo Anquan [American hegemony and Chinese security] (Tianjin: Tianjin People's Publishers, March 2000), pp. 33-35. Commenting on the Kosovo war, Yan Xuetong of the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations argues that the Yugoslavs drew the lesson that the war would have been impossible for NATO to pursue if Yugoslavia had possessed medium-range ballistic missiles, presumably because Yugoslavian forces could have struck NATO bases in Italy.
93. For two excellent studies of these RMA themes in Chinese open-source writings, see Stokes, China's Strategic Modernization, sec. 2; and Pillsbury, China Debates the Future Security Environment, chap. 6, entitled "Forecasting Future Wars." For recent confirming analysis of these themes, see Wang and Zhang, Zhanyi Xue, chap. 6 and passim. As with missile strikes, almost all forms of military activity call for some information warfare, from blinding enemies during all-out invasions to incapacitating the enemy's ability to track mine-laying submarines and to clear mines in blockade scenarios.
94. For two excellent studies of these RMA themes in Chinese open-source writings, see Stokes, China's Strategic Modernization, sec. 2; and Pillsbury, China Debates the Future Security Environment, chap. 6, entitled "Forecasting Future Wars." For recent confirming analysis of these themes, see Wang and Zhang, Zhanyi Xue, chap. 6 and passim. As with missile strikes, almost all forms of military activity call for some information warfare, from blinding enemies during all-out invasions to incapacitating the enemy's ability to track mine-laying submarines and to clear mines in blockade scenarios.
95. For two excellent studies of these RMA themes in Chinese open-source writings, see Stokes, China's Strategic Modernization, sec. 2; and Pillsbury, China Debates the Future Security Environment, chap. 6, entitled "Forecasting Future Wars." For recent confirming analysis of these themes, see Wang and Zhang, Zhanyi Xue, chap. 6 and passim. As with missile strikes, almost all forms of military activity call for some information warfare, from blinding enemies during all-out invasions to incapacitating the enemy's ability to track mine-laying submarines and to clear mines in blockade scenarios.
96. Wang and Zhang, Zhanyi Xue, pp. 174-175; Stokes, China's Strategic Modernization, chap. 3; and Fang Liangqing, "Development of High Technology and Changes in War Form," translated from Chinese Military Sciences, Vol. 3, 2000, pp. 100-105, by National Air Intelligence Center, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Dayton, Ohio, November 29, 2000.
97. Wang and Zhang, Zhanyi Xue, pp. 174-175; Stokes, China's Strategic Modernization, chap. 3; and Fang Liangqing, "Development of High Technology and Changes in War Form," translated from Chinese Military Sciences, Vol. 3, 2000, pp. 100-105, by National Air Intelligence Center, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Dayton, Ohio, November 29, 2000.
98. Wang and Zhang, Zhanyi Xue, pp. 174-175; Stokes, China's Strategic Modernization, chap. 3; and Fang Liangqing, "Development of High Technology and Changes in War Form," translated from Chinese Military Sciences, Vol. 3, 2000, pp. 100-105, by National Air Intelligence Center, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Dayton, Ohio, November 29, 2000.
99. Wang and Zhang, Zhanyi Xue, p. 174.
100. One PLA text states, "The soul of the thinking behind information warfare is to wreck the enemy's decision-making and to cause the enemy's will to break down." See Wang Jianghuai and Lin Dong, "Viewing Our Army's Quality Building from the Perspective of What Information Warfare Demands," Jiefangjun Bao, March 3, 1998, p. 6, in FBIS-China, March 13, 1998.
101. Wang and Zhang, Zhanyi Xue, pp. 174-175.
102. Ibid., pp. 172-179.
103. James C. Mulvenon, "The PLA and Information Warfare," in Mulvenon and Richard H. Yang, The People's Liberation Army in the Information Age (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1999), pp. 175-176. Mulvenon's chapter offers an excellent review of the current literature and thinking in China on information warfare.
104. See Huang and Zuo, "Holding the Initiative in Our Hands in Conducting Operations."
105. On this score, Michael O'Hanlon apparently agrees. See his "Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan," pp. 74-79. It is not clear, however, what political conditions he has in mind when he discusses Taiwan's "capitulation" as the standard of success for Beijing. For a pioneering discussion of a scenario involving a PLA blockade of Taiwan, see Paul H.B. Godwin, "The Use of Military Force against Taiwan: Potential PRC Scenarios," in Parris H. Chang and Martin L. Lasater, eds., If China Crosses the Taiwan Strait: The International Response (New York: University Press of America, 1993), pp. 15-34. For PLA writings on blockade scenarios of unnamed foes, see Wang and Zhang, Zhanyi Xue, pp. 320-324 and chap. 16. America's general weakness in minesweeping is widely recognized. Although the United States recently has developed new minesweeping and mine-hunting equipment, much of this equipment is kept on bases in the United States and would require a significant amount of time to be sent to the theater. A recent naval plan, "the fleet engagement strategy," backed by Secretary of Defense William Cohen, calls for increased "organic" mine-hunting and minesweeping capabilities within battle groups that would involve airborne (helicopters), surface, and submarine-based capabilities. It is unclear how effective these initiatives will be in providing U.S. forces in East Asia with readily available capability in a crisis. See Capt. Buzz Broughton and Comdr. Jay Burton, "The (R)evolution of Mine Countermeasures," Naval Institute Proceedings, May 1998, pp. 55-58; "Cohen Expected to Respond This Week to Navy Brief on Mine Warfare," Inside the Navy, August 17, 1998, p. 3; and "Cohen Directs Navy to Add $53 Million to Develop Minehunting System," Inside the Navy, August 31, 1998, p. 1.
106. On this score, Michael O'Hanlon apparently agrees. See his "Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan," pp. 74-79. It is not clear, however, what political conditions he has in mind when he discusses Taiwan's "capitulation" as the standard of success for Beijing. For a pioneering discussion of a scenario involving a PLA blockade of Taiwan, see Paul H.B. Godwin, "The Use of Military Force against Taiwan: Potential PRC Scenarios," in Parris H. Chang and Martin L. Lasater, eds., If China Crosses the Taiwan Strait: The International Response (New York: University Press of America, 1993), pp. 15-34. For PLA writings on blockade scenarios of unnamed foes, see Wang and Zhang, Zhanyi Xue, pp. 320-324 and chap. 16. America's general weakness in minesweeping is widely recognized. Although the United States recently has developed new minesweeping and mine-hunting equipment, much of this equipment is kept on bases in the United States and would require a significant amount of time to be sent to the theater. A recent naval plan, "the fleet engagement strategy," backed by Secretary of Defense William Cohen, calls for increased "organic" mine-hunting and minesweeping capabilities within battle groups that would involve airborne (helicopters), surface, and submarine-based capabilities. It is unclear how effective these initiatives will be in providing U.S. forces in East Asia with readily available capability in a crisis. See Capt. Buzz Broughton and Comdr. Jay Burton, "The (R)evolution of Mine Countermeasures," Naval Institute Proceedings, May 1998, pp. 55-58; "Cohen Expected to Respond This Week to Navy Brief on Mine Warfare," Inside the Navy, August 17, 1998, p. 3; and "Cohen Directs Navy to Add $53 Million to Develop Minehunting System," Inside the Navy, August 31, 1998, p. 1.
107. On this score, Michael O'Hanlon apparently agrees. See his "Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan," pp. 74-79. It is not clear, however, what political conditions he has in mind when he discusses Taiwan's "capitulation" as the standard of success for Beijing. For a pioneering discussion of a scenario involving a PLA blockade of Taiwan, see Paul H.B. Godwin, "The Use of Military Force against Taiwan: Potential PRC Scenarios," in Parris H. Chang and Martin L. Lasater, eds., If China Crosses the Taiwan Strait: The International Response (New York: University Press of America, 1993), pp. 15-34. For PLA writings on blockade scenarios of unnamed foes, see Wang and Zhang, Zhanyi Xue, pp. 320-324 and chap. 16. America's general weakness in minesweeping is widely recognized. Although the United States recently has developed new minesweeping and mine-hunting equipment, much of this equipment is kept on bases in the United States and would require a significant amount of time to be sent to the theater. A recent naval plan, "the fleet engagement strategy," backed by Secretary of Defense William Cohen, calls for increased "organic" mine-hunting and minesweeping capabilities within battle groups that would involve airborne (helicopters), surface, and submarine-based capabilities. It is unclear how effective these initiatives will be in providing U.S. forces in East Asia with readily available capability in a crisis. See Capt. Buzz Broughton and Comdr. Jay Burton, "The (R)evolution of Mine Countermeasures," Naval Institute Proceedings, May 1998, pp. 55-58; "Cohen Expected to Respond This Week to Navy Brief on Mine Warfare," Inside the Navy, August 17, 1998, p. 3; and "Cohen Directs Navy to Add $53 Million to Develop Minehunting System," Inside the Navy, August 31, 1998, p. 1.
108. On this score, Michael O'Hanlon apparently agrees. See his "Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan," pp. 74-79. It is not clear, however, what political conditions he has in mind when he discusses Taiwan's "capitulation" as the standard of success for Beijing. For a pioneering discussion of a scenario involving a PLA blockade of Taiwan, see Paul H.B. Godwin, "The Use of Military Force against Taiwan: Potential PRC Scenarios," in Parris H. Chang and Martin L. Lasater, eds., If China Crosses the Taiwan Strait: The International Response (New York: University Press of America, 1993), pp. 15-34. For PLA writings on blockade scenarios of unnamed foes, see Wang and Zhang, Zhanyi Xue, pp. 320-324 and chap. 16. America's general weakness in minesweeping is widely recognized. Although the United States recently has developed new minesweeping and mine-hunting equipment, much of this equipment is kept on bases in the United States and would require a significant amount of time to be sent to the theater. A recent naval plan, "the fleet engagement strategy," backed by Secretary of Defense William Cohen, calls for increased "organic" mine-hunting and minesweeping capabilities within battle groups that would involve airborne (helicopters), surface, and submarine-based capabilities. It is unclear how effective these initiatives will be in providing U.S. forces in East Asia with readily available capability in a crisis. See Capt. Buzz Broughton and Comdr. Jay Burton, "The (R)evolution of Mine Countermeasures," Naval Institute Proceedings, May 1998, pp. 55-58; "Cohen Expected to Respond This Week to Navy Brief on Mine Warfare," Inside the Navy, August 17, 1998, p. 3; and "Cohen Directs Navy to Add $53 Million to Develop Minehunting System," Inside the Navy, August 31, 1998, p. 1.
109. On this score, Michael O'Hanlon apparently agrees. See his "Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan," pp. 74-79. It is not clear, however, what political conditions he has in mind when he discusses Taiwan's "capitulation" as the standard of success for Beijing. For a pioneering discussion of a scenario involving a PLA blockade of Taiwan, see Paul H.B. Godwin, "The Use of Military Force against Taiwan: Potential PRC Scenarios," in Parris H. Chang and Martin L. Lasater, eds., If China Crosses the Taiwan Strait: The International Response (New York: University Press of America, 1993), pp. 15-34. For PLA writings on blockade scenarios of unnamed foes, see Wang and Zhang, Zhanyi Xue, pp. 320-324 and chap. 16. America's general weakness in minesweeping is widely recognized. Although the United States recently has developed new minesweeping and mine-hunting equipment, much of this equipment is kept on bases in the United States and would require a significant amount of time to be sent to the theater. A recent naval plan, "the fleet engagement strategy," backed by Secretary of Defense William Cohen, calls for increased "organic" mine-hunting and minesweeping capabilities within battle groups that would involve airborne (helicopters), surface, and submarine-based capabilities. It is unclear how effective these initiatives will be in providing U.S. forces in East Asia with readily available capability in a crisis. See Capt. Buzz Broughton and Comdr. Jay Burton, "The (R)evolution of Mine Countermeasures," Naval Institute Proceedings, May 1998, pp. 55-58; "Cohen Expected to Respond This Week to Navy Brief on Mine Warfare," Inside the Navy, August 17, 1998, p. 3; and "Cohen Directs Navy to Add $53 Million to Develop Minehunting System," Inside the Navy, August 31, 1998, p. 1.
110. On this score, Michael O'Hanlon apparently agrees. See his "Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan," pp. 74-79. It is not clear, however, what political conditions he has in mind when he discusses Taiwan's "capitulation" as the standard of success for Beijing. For a pioneering discussion of a scenario involving a PLA blockade of Taiwan, see Paul H.B. Godwin, "The Use of Military Force against Taiwan: Potential PRC Scenarios," in Parris H. Chang and Martin L. Lasater, eds., If China Crosses the Taiwan Strait: The International Response (New York: University Press of America, 1993), pp. 15-34. For PLA writings on blockade scenarios of unnamed foes, see Wang and Zhang, Zhanyi Xue, pp. 320-324 and chap. 16. America's general weakness in minesweeping is widely recognized. Although the United States recently has developed new minesweeping and mine-hunting equipment, much of this equipment is kept on bases in the United States and would require a significant amount of time to be sent to the theater. A recent naval plan, "the fleet engagement strategy," backed by Secretary of Defense William Cohen, calls for increased "organic" mine-hunting and minesweeping capabilities within battle groups that would involve airborne (helicopters), surface, and submarine-based capabilities. It is unclear how effective these initiatives will be in providing U.S. forces in East Asia with readily available capability in a crisis. See Capt. Buzz Broughton and Comdr. Jay Burton, "The (R)evolution of Mine Countermeasures," Naval Institute Proceedings, May 1998, pp. 55-58; "Cohen Expected to Respond This Week to Navy Brief on Mine Warfare," Inside the Navy, August 17, 1998, p. 3; and "Cohen Directs Navy to Add $53 Million to Develop Minehunting System," Inside the Navy, August 31, 1998, p. 1.
111. Author conversations with U.S. naval officers and civilian experts on the navy. For a concise and illuminating discussion on the Sovremennyi and the Sunburn, see Bates Gill, "China's Newest Warships," Far Eastern Economic Review, January 27, 2000, p. 30.
112. Wang and Zhang, Zhanyi Xue, pp. 415-416. Another text argues that "while Taiwan has a certain mineclearing capability, mineclearing is a difficult, time-consuming job." See Li Wei, "The Taiwan Strait Has Become a Mere Pond," Taiwan de Junbei [Taiwan armaments], July 1, 1997, pp. 34-36, in FBIS-China, February 6, 1998.
113. Wang and Zhang, Zhanyi Xue, pp. 415-416. Another text argues that "while Taiwan has a certain mineclearing capability, mineclearing is a difficult, time-consuming job." See Li Wei, "The Taiwan Strait Has Become a Mere Pond," Taiwan de Junbei [Taiwan armaments], July 1, 1997, pp. 34-36, in FBIS-China, February 6, 1998.
114. Wang and Zhang, Zhanyi Xue, pp. 409, 415-416. On weather patterns near China, see ibid., p. 64.
115. Wang and Zhang, Zhanyi Xue, pp. 409, 415-416. On weather patterns near China, see ibid., p. 64.
116. Ibid., chaps. 12, 16.
117. Author interviews with security experts in Beijing and Shanghai, 1998-2000; and Wang and Zhang, Zhanyi Xue, pp. 321, 410-411. Interestingly, although the word "Taiwan" is never mentioned in the text, it is fairly clear what the editors have in mind when discussing blockade. Yet, related to the protracted nature of blockade warfare, they discuss the danger of assistance from "third countries" (disan guo), a term that would be politically incorrect in discussion of Taiwan scenarios because Taiwan can never be afforded the status of a state in Beijing's official parlance.
118. Ibid., p. 411.
119. Author discussions in 2000 with several American experts on the U.S. Seventh Fleet (including five retired U.S. Navy officers), the PLA Navy, and the ROC Navy.
120. See Wang and Zhang, Zhanyi Xue, p. 409.
121. Stokes, China's Strategic Modernization, chaps. 3-5.
122. Wang and Zhang, Zhanyi Xue, chap. 18, especially p. 450.
123. Author discussion with a U.S. Navy officer.
124. Stokes, China's Strategic Modernization, pp. 112-113.
125. See Fang Fenghui, "Stealth Does Not Mean Invisible - On Striking at Stealth Planes," Jiefang Junbao, November 16, 1999, p. 6, in FBIS-China, December 16, 1999. The author celebrates the downing of an F-117A by Yugoslav forces; along the same lines, Huang and Zuo, "Holding the Initiative in Our Hands in Conducting Operations," point out hopefully that Saudi radars picked up F-117s during the Gulf War. On PLA antistealth and antisatellite writings and programs, see Stokes, China's Strategic Modernization, chap. 5.
126. See Fang Fenghui, "Stealth Does Not Mean Invisible - On Striking at Stealth Planes," Jiefang Junbao, November 16, 1999, p. 6, in FBIS-China, December 16, 1999. The author celebrates the downing of an F-117A by Yugoslav forces; along the same lines, Huang and Zuo, "Holding the Initiative in Our Hands in Conducting Operations," point out hopefully that Saudi radars picked up F-117s during the Gulf War. On PLA antistealth and antisatellite writings and programs, see Stokes, China's Strategic Modernization, chap. 5.
127. Recently, a few American Taiwan experts have argued to this author that Taiwan leaders are extremely unlikely to declare formal independence and that therefore this issue is a red herring. For the purposes of war prevention, however, it might not be enough to convince Taiwanese and Americans of that reality. Beijing elites must also be convinced, and many of them do not appear to be so confident that a Taiwan declaration of independence is impossible long into the future.
128. For further discussion, see Thomas J. Christensen, "China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Spring 1999), pp. 49-80.
129. This is another reason why more explicit efforts by Taipei to demonstrate Taiwan's political and economic resolve against mainland coercion campaigns are potentially problematic. Not only are they unlikely to convince mainland elites that Beijing could not obtain the limited concessions from Taiwan that are discussed above, but they are also likely to fuel conspiracy theories in Beijing that Taiwan is gearing up for a declaration of independence. Such expressions by Taiwan elites might make conflict more likely rather than less likely.
130. I develop this argument further in Christensen, "Clarity on Taiwan," Washington Post, March 20, 2000, p. A17.
131. I discuss this issue in more detail in Christensen, "Theater Missile Defense and Taiwan's Security," Orbis, Vol. 44, No. 1 (Winter 2000), pp. 79-90.
132. Xu Yufan, "China's Military Brings Up the Rear," special to Asia Times Online, June 13, 2000, at http://www.atimes.com. The author cites a report by Gen. Xing Shizhong.
133. Wang and Zhang, Zhanyi Xue, repeatedly recognize China's relative backwardness compared to unnamed "advanced" potential enemy nations and discusses the extreme complexity and difficulty for China of carrying out all forms of warfare.
134. Author interviews in Beijing and Shanghai, 1995-2000.
135. Author interviews with Chinese officials, government analysts, and scholars, in Beijing, January 2001.