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10
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85037410449
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In an example of how SKZ has attempted to distort the work of the POPA Panel, they state that the Panel "admit that these sizes are inexplicably large" even through as cited above, the Panel offered a number of possible explanations
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Technical Debate
, pp. 16
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Sullivan1
et., al.2
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15
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85037415925
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The only mention of this history in SKZ is in a footnote in a different section of their paper (Stein, et. al., "Response to," note 14), where they state that at the Zimmerman changed his view on the one issue of the fireball diameters..
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(1993)
POPA Panel Meeting
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16
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85037403729
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SKZ also argue that we use a "simplified" model of the intercept geometry, and that we ignore factors such as the interceptor angle of attack or that interceptor might not be approaching on an anti-parallel these factors are taken into account clear misses could actually be hits (Stein, et. al., "Response to," This is incorrect. In our analysis, these factors are simply irrelevant. When the correct size of the Patriot clear that the miss distance ins so large that factors such as angle of attack or the angle between the Patriot and Scud trajectories simply do not matter
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18
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85037402171
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According to a member of the HGOC investigative staff in no case was a Patriot fragment found in a Scud warhead. (private communication). That no Patriot fragments were found in Scud warheads is also indicated by panel's comment on page 10 that 'it is not clear from the public record if actual Patriot fragments were found in recovered Scud warheads,' such evidence of Patriot fragment holes (no fragments, as they are small and or fallen out) and missile parts was specifically discussed at the ad hoc panel's May 1993 meeting." Stein, et. al., "Response to," note 17 (italics added)
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19
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85037407363
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Electronic noise from U.S. gear prompted errant patriots
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28 September
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(1992)
Defense Week
, pp. 1
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Lovece, J.1
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22
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0004884730
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U.S. General Accounting Office, "Project Manager's Assessment of Patriot Missile's Overall Performance Is Not Supported," April
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(1992)
GAO/T-NSIAD-92-97
, pp. 5
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27
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0004895222
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Success of patriot system shapes debate on future antimissile weapons
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April 22
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(1991)
Aviation Week
, pp. 90-91
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Hughes, D.1
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28
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85037415490
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Specialists debate the value of patriot
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Unidentified Raytheon engineers quoted in Fred Kaplan, May 5, 22
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(1991)
Boston Globe
, pp. 1
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36
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85037418701
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As Postol noted in this article, Les Aspin, then the Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, had already indicated that Patriot's failure rate in Israel was 56%. Postol, Lessons of the Gulf War
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Lessons of the Gulf War Experience
, pp. 135
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Postol, T.A.1
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39
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85037419506
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The most detailed description of the Army's assessment is contained in the unclassified pages from the Army's Roadmap The Army's methodology is also very clearly laid out in other places, such as at the April House Operations Committee Hearing
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(1992)
U.S. Army, "Roadmap,"
, pp. 2-10
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42
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0004851181
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(Chair), (Cambridge, Mass.: Union of Concerned Scientists and M.I.T. Security Studies Program, April)
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(2000)
Countermeasures: A Technical Evaluation of the Operational Effectiveness of the Planned U.S. National Missile Defense System
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Sessler, A.M.1
Cornwall, J.M.2
Bob, D.3
Steve, P.4
Sherman, F.5
Garwin, R.L.6
Kurt, G.7
Lisbeth, G.8
Lewis, G.N.9
Postol, T.A.10
Wright, D.C.11
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44
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85037415470
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(BMDO's director of threats and countermeasures): ...It [the ability to deal with countermeasures] is one of the crown jewels that is shrouded in secrecy. And that is the way it is and that is the way it has to be, We listen and keep our mouths shut
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Ward, T.1
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