What is the offense-defense balance and can we measure it?

International Security

Volumn 22, Issue 4, 1998, Pages 44-82

  Glaser, Charles L ^a   Kaufmann, Chaim ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031087039     PISSN: 01622889     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2539240     Document Type: Article

References (197)

1. Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2 (January 1978), pp. 167-214, is usually credited with launching this body of work. George Quester, Offense and Defense in the International System (New York: Wiley, 1977), makes many of the same arguments.
2. Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2 (January 1978), pp. 167-214, is usually credited with launching this body of work. George Quester, Offense and Defense in the International System (New York: Wiley, 1977), makes many of the same arguments.
3. On balancing versus bandwagoning, see Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987); on the tightness of alliances, see Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," International Organization, Vol. 44, No. 1 (Spring 1990), pp. 137-168; and Thomas J. Christensen, "Perceptions and Allies in Europe, 1865-1940," International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 1 (Winter 1997), pp. 65-97. On alliance choices of small powers, see Karl Mueller, "Alignment Balancing and Stability in Eastern Europe," Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Autumn 1995), pp. 38-76. On comparative grand strategy, see Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War, Volume 1: The Structure of Power and the Roots of War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, forthcoming), pp. 191-245 (of the September 1994 draft). On military doctrine, see Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984). On competition and cooperation see George W. Downs, David M. Rocke, and Randolph L. Siverson, "Arms Races and Cooperation," in Kenneth A. Oye, ed., Cooperation under Anarchy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 118-146; Charles L. Glaser, "Political Consequences of Military Strategy: Expanding and Refining the Spiral and Deterrence Models," World Politics, Vol. 44, No. 4 (July 1992), pp. 497-538; and Robert Powell, "Guns, Butter, and Anarchy," American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 1 (March 1993), pp. 115-232. On nuclear strategy, see Shai Feldman, Israeli Nuclear Deterrence: A Strategy for the 1980s (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982); and Charles L. Glaser, Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990). Although not cast in offense-defense terms, offense-defense differentiation plays a central role in qualitative arms control; see Thomas C. Schelling and Morton H. Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1961). The 1972 ABM treaty and certain provisions of the START treaties were justified on offense-defense logic. On conventional arms control see Jack Snyder, "Limiting Offensive Conventional Forces: Soviet Proposals and Western Options," International Security, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Spring 1988), pp. 48-77; Ivan Oelrich, Conventional Arms Control: The Limits and Their Verification (Cambridge, Mass.: Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, 1990); and Anders Boserup and Robert Neild, eds., The Foundations of Defensive Defence (New York: St. Martin's, 1990).
4. On balancing versus bandwagoning, see Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987); on the tightness of alliances, see Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," International Organization, Vol. 44, No. 1 (Spring 1990), pp. 137-168; and Thomas J. Christensen, "Perceptions and Allies in Europe, 1865-1940," International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 1 (Winter 1997), pp. 65-97. On alliance choices of small powers, see Karl Mueller, "Alignment Balancing and Stability in Eastern Europe," Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Autumn 1995), pp. 38-76. On comparative grand strategy, see Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War, Volume 1: The Structure of Power and the Roots of War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, forthcoming), pp. 191-245 (of the September 1994 draft). On military doctrine, see Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984). On competition and cooperation see George W. Downs, David M. Rocke, and Randolph L. Siverson, "Arms Races and Cooperation," in Kenneth A. Oye, ed., Cooperation under Anarchy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 118-146; Charles L. Glaser, "Political Consequences of Military Strategy: Expanding and Refining the Spiral and Deterrence Models," World Politics, Vol. 44, No. 4 (July 1992), pp. 497-538; and Robert Powell, "Guns, Butter, and Anarchy," American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 1 (March 1993), pp. 115-232. On nuclear strategy, see Shai Feldman, Israeli Nuclear Deterrence: A Strategy for the 1980s (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982); and Charles L. Glaser, Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990). Although not cast in offense-defense terms, offense-defense differentiation plays a central role in qualitative arms control; see Thomas C. Schelling and Morton H. Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1961). The 1972 ABM treaty and certain provisions of the START treaties were justified on offense-defense logic. On conventional arms control see Jack Snyder, "Limiting Offensive Conventional Forces: Soviet Proposals and Western Options," International Security, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Spring 1988), pp. 48-77; Ivan Oelrich, Conventional Arms Control: The Limits and Their Verification (Cambridge, Mass.: Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, 1990); and Anders Boserup and Robert Neild, eds., The Foundations of Defensive Defence (New York: St. Martin's, 1990).
5. On balancing versus bandwagoning, see Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987); on the tightness of alliances, see Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," International Organization, Vol. 44, No. 1 (Spring 1990), pp. 137-168; and Thomas J. Christensen, "Perceptions and Allies in Europe, 1865-1940," International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 1 (Winter 1997), pp. 65-97. On alliance choices of small powers, see Karl Mueller, "Alignment Balancing and Stability in Eastern Europe," Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Autumn 1995), pp. 38-76. On comparative grand strategy, see Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War, Volume 1: The Structure of Power and the Roots of War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, forthcoming), pp. 191-245 (of the September 1994 draft). On military doctrine, see Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984). On competition and cooperation see George W. Downs, David M. Rocke, and Randolph L. Siverson, "Arms Races and Cooperation," in Kenneth A. Oye, ed., Cooperation under Anarchy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 118-146; Charles L. Glaser, "Political Consequences of Military Strategy: Expanding and Refining the Spiral and Deterrence Models," World Politics, Vol. 44, No. 4 (July 1992), pp. 497-538; and Robert Powell, "Guns, Butter, and Anarchy," American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 1 (March 1993), pp. 115-232. On nuclear strategy, see Shai Feldman, Israeli Nuclear Deterrence: A Strategy for the 1980s (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982); and Charles L. Glaser, Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990). Although not cast in offense-defense terms, offense-defense differentiation plays a central role in qualitative arms control; see Thomas C. Schelling and Morton H. Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1961). The 1972 ABM treaty and certain provisions of the START treaties were justified on offense-defense logic. On conventional arms control see Jack Snyder, "Limiting Offensive Conventional Forces: Soviet Proposals and Western Options," International Security, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Spring 1988), pp. 48-77; Ivan Oelrich, Conventional Arms Control: The Limits and Their Verification (Cambridge, Mass.: Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, 1990); and Anders Boserup and Robert Neild, eds., The Foundations of Defensive Defence (New York: St. Martin's, 1990).
6. On balancing versus bandwagoning, see Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987); on the tightness of alliances, see Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," International Organization, Vol. 44, No. 1 (Spring 1990), pp. 137-168; and Thomas J. Christensen, "Perceptions and Allies in Europe, 1865-1940," International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 1 (Winter 1997), pp. 65-97. On alliance choices of small powers, see Karl Mueller, "Alignment Balancing and Stability in Eastern Europe," Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Autumn 1995), pp. 38-76. On comparative grand strategy, see Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War, Volume 1: The Structure of Power and the Roots of War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, forthcoming), pp. 191-245 (of the September 1994 draft). On military doctrine, see Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984). On competition and cooperation see George W. Downs, David M. Rocke, and Randolph L. Siverson, "Arms Races and Cooperation," in Kenneth A. Oye, ed., Cooperation under Anarchy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 118-146; Charles L. Glaser, "Political Consequences of Military Strategy: Expanding and Refining the Spiral and Deterrence Models," World Politics, Vol. 44, No. 4 (July 1992), pp. 497-538; and Robert Powell, "Guns, Butter, and Anarchy," American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 1 (March 1993), pp. 115-232. On nuclear strategy, see Shai Feldman, Israeli Nuclear Deterrence: A Strategy for the 1980s (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982); and Charles L. Glaser, Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990). Although not cast in offense-defense terms, offense-defense differentiation plays a central role in qualitative arms control; see Thomas C. Schelling and Morton H. Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1961). The 1972 ABM treaty and certain provisions of the START treaties were justified on offense-defense logic. On conventional arms control see Jack Snyder, "Limiting Offensive Conventional Forces: Soviet Proposals and Western Options," International Security, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Spring 1988), pp. 48-77; Ivan Oelrich, Conventional Arms Control: The Limits and Their Verification (Cambridge, Mass.: Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, 1990); and Anders Boserup and Robert Neild, eds., The Foundations of Defensive Defence (New York: St. Martin's, 1990).
7. On balancing versus bandwagoning, see Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987); on the tightness of alliances, see Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," International Organization, Vol. 44, No. 1 (Spring 1990), pp. 137-168; and Thomas J. Christensen, "Perceptions and Allies in Europe, 1865-1940," International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 1 (Winter 1997), pp. 65-97. On alliance choices of small powers, see Karl Mueller, "Alignment Balancing and Stability in Eastern Europe," Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Autumn 1995), pp. 38-76. On comparative grand strategy, see Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War, Volume 1: The Structure of Power and the Roots of War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, forthcoming), pp. 191-245 (of the September 1994 draft). On military doctrine, see Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984). On competition and cooperation see George W. Downs, David M. Rocke, and Randolph L. Siverson, "Arms Races and Cooperation," in Kenneth A. Oye, ed., Cooperation under Anarchy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 118-146; Charles L. Glaser, "Political Consequences of Military Strategy: Expanding and Refining the Spiral and Deterrence Models," World Politics, Vol. 44, No. 4 (July 1992), pp. 497-538; and Robert Powell, "Guns, Butter, and Anarchy," American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 1 (March 1993), pp. 115-232. On nuclear strategy, see Shai Feldman, Israeli Nuclear Deterrence: A Strategy for the 1980s (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982); and Charles L. Glaser, Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990). Although not cast in offense-defense terms, offense-defense differentiation plays a central role in qualitative arms control; see Thomas C. Schelling and Morton H. Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1961). The 1972 ABM treaty and certain provisions of the START treaties were justified on offense-defense logic. On conventional arms control see Jack Snyder, "Limiting Offensive Conventional Forces: Soviet Proposals and Western Options," International Security, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Spring 1988), pp. 48-77; Ivan Oelrich, Conventional Arms Control: The Limits and Their Verification (Cambridge, Mass.: Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, 1990); and Anders Boserup and Robert Neild, eds., The Foundations of Defensive Defence (New York: St. Martin's, 1990).
8. On balancing versus bandwagoning, see Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987); on the tightness of alliances, see Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," International Organization, Vol. 44, No. 1 (Spring 1990), pp. 137-168; and Thomas J. Christensen, "Perceptions and Allies in Europe, 1865-1940," International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 1 (Winter 1997), pp. 65-97. On alliance choices of small powers, see Karl Mueller, "Alignment Balancing and Stability in Eastern Europe," Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Autumn 1995), pp. 38-76. On comparative grand strategy, see Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War, Volume 1: The Structure of Power and the Roots of War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, forthcoming), pp. 191-245 (of the September 1994 draft). On military doctrine, see Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984). On competition and cooperation see George W. Downs, David M. Rocke, and Randolph L. Siverson, "Arms Races and Cooperation," in Kenneth A. Oye, ed., Cooperation under Anarchy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 118-146; Charles L. Glaser, "Political Consequences of Military Strategy: Expanding and Refining the Spiral and Deterrence Models," World Politics, Vol. 44, No. 4 (July 1992), pp. 497-538; and Robert Powell, "Guns, Butter, and Anarchy," American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 1 (March 1993), pp. 115-232. On nuclear strategy, see Shai Feldman, Israeli Nuclear Deterrence: A Strategy for the 1980s (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982); and Charles L. Glaser, Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990). Although not cast in offense-defense terms, offense-defense differentiation plays a central role in qualitative arms control; see Thomas C. Schelling and Morton H. Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1961). The 1972 ABM treaty and certain provisions of the START treaties were justified on offense-defense logic. On conventional arms control see Jack Snyder, "Limiting Offensive Conventional Forces: Soviet Proposals and Western Options," International Security, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Spring 1988), pp. 48-77; Ivan Oelrich, Conventional Arms Control: The Limits and Their Verification (Cambridge, Mass.: Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, 1990); and Anders Boserup and Robert Neild, eds., The Foundations of Defensive Defence (New York: St. Martin's, 1990).
9. On balancing versus bandwagoning, see Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987); on the tightness of alliances, see Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," International Organization, Vol. 44, No. 1 (Spring 1990), pp. 137-168; and Thomas J. Christensen, "Perceptions and Allies in Europe, 1865-1940," International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 1 (Winter 1997), pp. 65-97. On alliance choices of small powers, see Karl Mueller, "Alignment Balancing and Stability in Eastern Europe," Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Autumn 1995), pp. 38-76. On comparative grand strategy, see Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War, Volume 1: The Structure of Power and the Roots of War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, forthcoming), pp. 191-245 (of the September 1994 draft). On military doctrine, see Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984). On competition and cooperation see George W. Downs, David M. Rocke, and Randolph L. Siverson, "Arms Races and Cooperation," in Kenneth A. Oye, ed., Cooperation under Anarchy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 118-146; Charles L. Glaser, "Political Consequences of Military Strategy: Expanding and Refining the Spiral and Deterrence Models," World Politics, Vol. 44, No. 4 (July 1992), pp. 497-538; and Robert Powell, "Guns, Butter, and Anarchy," American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 1 (March 1993), pp. 115-232. On nuclear strategy, see Shai Feldman, Israeli Nuclear Deterrence: A Strategy for the 1980s (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982); and Charles L. Glaser, Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990). Although not cast in offense-defense terms, offense-defense differentiation plays a central role in qualitative arms control; see Thomas C. Schelling and Morton H. Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1961). The 1972 ABM treaty and certain provisions of the START treaties were justified on offense-defense logic. On conventional arms control see Jack Snyder, "Limiting Offensive Conventional Forces: Soviet Proposals and Western Options," International Security, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Spring 1988), pp. 48-77; Ivan Oelrich, Conventional Arms Control: The Limits and Their Verification (Cambridge, Mass.: Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, 1990); and Anders Boserup and Robert Neild, eds., The Foundations of Defensive Defence (New York: St. Martin's, 1990).
10. On balancing versus bandwagoning, see Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987); on the tightness of alliances, see Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," International Organization, Vol. 44, No. 1 (Spring 1990), pp. 137-168; and Thomas J. Christensen, "Perceptions and Allies in Europe, 1865-1940," International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 1 (Winter 1997), pp. 65-97. On alliance choices of small powers, see Karl Mueller, "Alignment Balancing and Stability in Eastern Europe," Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Autumn 1995), pp. 38-76. On comparative grand strategy, see Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War, Volume 1: The Structure of Power and the Roots of War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, forthcoming), pp. 191-245 (of the September 1994 draft). On military doctrine, see Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984). On competition and cooperation see George W. Downs, David M. Rocke, and Randolph L. Siverson, "Arms Races and Cooperation," in Kenneth A. Oye, ed., Cooperation under Anarchy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 118-146; Charles L. Glaser, "Political Consequences of Military Strategy: Expanding and Refining the Spiral and Deterrence Models," World Politics, Vol. 44, No. 4 (July 1992), pp. 497-538; and Robert Powell, "Guns, Butter, and Anarchy," American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 1 (March 1993), pp. 115-232. On nuclear strategy, see Shai Feldman, Israeli Nuclear Deterrence: A Strategy for the 1980s (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982); and Charles L. Glaser, Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990). Although not cast in offense-defense terms, offense-defense differentiation plays a central role in qualitative arms control; see Thomas C. Schelling and Morton H. Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1961). The 1972 ABM treaty and certain provisions of the START treaties were justified on offense-defense logic. On conventional arms control see Jack Snyder, "Limiting Offensive Conventional Forces: Soviet Proposals and Western Options," International Security, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Spring 1988), pp. 48-77; Ivan Oelrich, Conventional Arms Control: The Limits and Their Verification (Cambridge, Mass.: Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, 1990); and Anders Boserup and Robert Neild, eds., The Foundations of Defensive Defence (New York: St. Martin's, 1990).
11. On balancing versus bandwagoning, see Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987); on the tightness of alliances, see Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," International Organization, Vol. 44, No. 1 (Spring 1990), pp. 137-168; and Thomas J. Christensen, "Perceptions and Allies in Europe, 1865-1940," International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 1 (Winter 1997), pp. 65-97. On alliance choices of small powers, see Karl Mueller, "Alignment Balancing and Stability in Eastern Europe," Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Autumn 1995), pp. 38-76. On comparative grand strategy, see Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War, Volume 1: The Structure of Power and the Roots of War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, forthcoming), pp. 191-245 (of the September 1994 draft). On military doctrine, see Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984). On competition and cooperation see George W. Downs, David M. Rocke, and Randolph L. Siverson, "Arms Races and Cooperation," in Kenneth A. Oye, ed., Cooperation under Anarchy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 118-146; Charles L. Glaser, "Political Consequences of Military Strategy: Expanding and Refining the Spiral and Deterrence Models," World Politics, Vol. 44, No. 4 (July 1992), pp. 497-538; and Robert Powell, "Guns, Butter, and Anarchy," American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 1 (March 1993), pp. 115-232. On nuclear strategy, see Shai Feldman, Israeli Nuclear Deterrence: A Strategy for the 1980s (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982); and Charles L. Glaser, Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990). Although not cast in offense-defense terms, offense-defense differentiation plays a central role in qualitative arms control; see Thomas C. Schelling and Morton H. Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1961). The 1972 ABM treaty and certain provisions of the START treaties were justified on offense-defense logic. On conventional arms control see Jack Snyder, "Limiting Offensive Conventional Forces: Soviet Proposals and Western Options," International Security, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Spring 1988), pp. 48-77; Ivan Oelrich, Conventional Arms Control: The Limits and Their Verification (Cambridge, Mass.: Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, 1990); and Anders Boserup and Robert Neild, eds., The Foundations of Defensive Defence (New York: St. Martin's, 1990).
12. On balancing versus bandwagoning, see Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987); on the tightness of alliances, see Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," International Organization, Vol. 44, No. 1 (Spring 1990), pp. 137-168; and Thomas J. Christensen, "Perceptions and Allies in Europe, 1865-1940," International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 1 (Winter 1997), pp. 65-97. On alliance choices of small powers, see Karl Mueller, "Alignment Balancing and Stability in Eastern Europe," Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Autumn 1995), pp. 38-76. On comparative grand strategy, see Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War, Volume 1: The Structure of Power and the Roots of War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, forthcoming), pp. 191-245 (of the September 1994 draft). On military doctrine, see Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984). On competition and cooperation see George W. Downs, David M. Rocke, and Randolph L. Siverson, "Arms Races and Cooperation," in Kenneth A. Oye, ed., Cooperation under Anarchy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 118-146; Charles L. Glaser, "Political Consequences of Military Strategy: Expanding and Refining the Spiral and Deterrence Models," World Politics, Vol. 44, No. 4 (July 1992), pp. 497-538; and Robert Powell, "Guns, Butter, and Anarchy," American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 1 (March 1993), pp. 115-232. On nuclear strategy, see Shai Feldman, Israeli Nuclear Deterrence: A Strategy for the 1980s (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982); and Charles L. Glaser, Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990). Although not cast in offense-defense terms, offense-defense differentiation plays a central role in qualitative arms control; see Thomas C. Schelling and Morton H. Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1961). The 1972 ABM treaty and certain provisions of the START treaties were justified on offense-defense logic. On conventional arms control see Jack Snyder, "Limiting Offensive Conventional Forces: Soviet Proposals and Western Options," International Security, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Spring 1988), pp. 48-77; Ivan Oelrich, Conventional Arms Control: The Limits and Their Verification (Cambridge, Mass.: Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, 1990); and Anders Boserup and Robert Neild, eds., The Foundations of Defensive Defence (New York: St. Martin's, 1990).
13. On balancing versus bandwagoning, see Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987); on the tightness of alliances, see Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," International Organization, Vol. 44, No. 1 (Spring 1990), pp. 137-168; and Thomas J. Christensen, "Perceptions and Allies in Europe, 1865-1940," International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 1 (Winter 1997), pp. 65-97. On alliance choices of small powers, see Karl Mueller, "Alignment Balancing and Stability in Eastern Europe," Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Autumn 1995), pp. 38-76. On comparative grand strategy, see Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War, Volume 1: The Structure of Power and the Roots of War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, forthcoming), pp. 191-245 (of the September 1994 draft). On military doctrine, see Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984). On competition and cooperation see George W. Downs, David M. Rocke, and Randolph L. Siverson, "Arms Races and Cooperation," in Kenneth A. Oye, ed., Cooperation under Anarchy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 118-146; Charles L. Glaser, "Political Consequences of Military Strategy: Expanding and Refining the Spiral and Deterrence Models," World Politics, Vol. 44, No. 4 (July 1992), pp. 497-538; and Robert Powell, "Guns, Butter, and Anarchy," American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 1 (March 1993), pp. 115-232. On nuclear strategy, see Shai Feldman, Israeli Nuclear Deterrence: A Strategy for the 1980s (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982); and Charles L. Glaser, Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990). Although not cast in offense-defense terms, offense-defense differentiation plays a central role in qualitative arms control; see Thomas C. Schelling and Morton H. Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1961). The 1972 ABM treaty and certain provisions of the START treaties were justified on offense-defense logic. On conventional arms control see Jack Snyder, "Limiting Offensive Conventional Forces: Soviet Proposals and Western Options," International Security, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Spring 1988), pp. 48-77; Ivan Oelrich, Conventional Arms Control: The Limits and Their Verification (Cambridge, Mass.: Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, 1990); and Anders Boserup and Robert Neild, eds., The Foundations of Defensive Defence (New York: St. Martin's, 1990).
14. On balancing versus bandwagoning, see Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987); on the tightness of alliances, see Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," International Organization, Vol. 44, No. 1 (Spring 1990), pp. 137-168; and Thomas J. Christensen, "Perceptions and Allies in Europe, 1865-1940," International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 1 (Winter 1997), pp. 65-97. On alliance choices of small powers, see Karl Mueller, "Alignment Balancing and Stability in Eastern Europe," Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Autumn 1995), pp. 38-76. On comparative grand strategy, see Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War, Volume 1: The Structure of Power and the Roots of War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, forthcoming), pp. 191-245 (of the September 1994 draft). On military doctrine, see Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984). On competition and cooperation see George W. Downs, David M. Rocke, and Randolph L. Siverson, "Arms Races and Cooperation," in Kenneth A. Oye, ed., Cooperation under Anarchy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 118-146; Charles L. Glaser, "Political Consequences of Military Strategy: Expanding and Refining the Spiral and Deterrence Models," World Politics, Vol. 44, No. 4 (July 1992), pp. 497-538; and Robert Powell, "Guns, Butter, and Anarchy," American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 1 (March 1993), pp. 115-232. On nuclear strategy, see Shai Feldman, Israeli Nuclear Deterrence: A Strategy for the 1980s (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982); and Charles L. Glaser, Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990). Although not cast in offense-defense terms, offense-defense differentiation plays a central role in qualitative arms control; see Thomas C. Schelling and Morton H. Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1961). The 1972 ABM treaty and certain provisions of the START treaties were justified on offense-defense logic. On conventional arms control see Jack Snyder, "Limiting Offensive Conventional Forces: Soviet Proposals and Western Options," International Security, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Spring 1988), pp. 48-77; Ivan Oelrich, Conventional Arms Control: The Limits and Their Verification (Cambridge, Mass.: Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, 1990); and Anders Boserup and Robert Neild, eds., The Foundations of Defensive Defence (New York: St. Martin's, 1990).
15. On balancing versus bandwagoning, see Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987); on the tightness of alliances, see Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," International Organization, Vol. 44, No. 1 (Spring 1990), pp. 137-168; and Thomas J. Christensen, "Perceptions and Allies in Europe, 1865-1940," International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 1 (Winter 1997), pp. 65-97. On alliance choices of small powers, see Karl Mueller, "Alignment Balancing and Stability in Eastern Europe," Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Autumn 1995), pp. 38-76. On comparative grand strategy, see Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War, Volume 1: The Structure of Power and the Roots of War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, forthcoming), pp. 191-245 (of the September 1994 draft). On military doctrine, see Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984). On competition and cooperation see George W. Downs, David M. Rocke, and Randolph L. Siverson, "Arms Races and Cooperation," in Kenneth A. Oye, ed., Cooperation under Anarchy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 118-146; Charles L. Glaser, "Political Consequences of Military Strategy: Expanding and Refining the Spiral and Deterrence Models," World Politics, Vol. 44, No. 4 (July 1992), pp. 497-538; and Robert Powell, "Guns, Butter, and Anarchy," American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 1 (March 1993), pp. 115-232. On nuclear strategy, see Shai Feldman, Israeli Nuclear Deterrence: A Strategy for the 1980s (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982); and Charles L. Glaser, Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990). Although not cast in offense-defense terms, offense-defense differentiation plays a central role in qualitative arms control; see Thomas C. Schelling and Morton H. Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1961). The 1972 ABM treaty and certain provisions of the START treaties were justified on offense-defense logic. On conventional arms control see Jack Snyder, "Limiting Offensive Conventional Forces: Soviet Proposals and Western Options," International Security, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Spring 1988), pp. 48-77; Ivan Oelrich, Conventional Arms Control: The Limits and Their Verification (Cambridge, Mass.: Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, 1990); and Anders Boserup and Robert Neild, eds., The Foundations of Defensive Defence (New York: St. Martin's, 1990).
16. On balancing versus bandwagoning, see Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987); on the tightness of alliances, see Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," International Organization, Vol. 44, No. 1 (Spring 1990), pp. 137-168; and Thomas J. Christensen, "Perceptions and Allies in Europe, 1865-1940," International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 1 (Winter 1997), pp. 65-97. On alliance choices of small powers, see Karl Mueller, "Alignment Balancing and Stability in Eastern Europe," Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Autumn 1995), pp. 38-76. On comparative grand strategy, see Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War, Volume 1: The Structure of Power and the Roots of War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, forthcoming), pp. 191-245 (of the September 1994 draft). On military doctrine, see Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984). On competition and cooperation see George W. Downs, David M. Rocke, and Randolph L. Siverson, "Arms Races and Cooperation," in Kenneth A. Oye, ed., Cooperation under Anarchy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 118-146; Charles L. Glaser, "Political Consequences of Military Strategy: Expanding and Refining the Spiral and Deterrence Models," World Politics, Vol. 44, No. 4 (July 1992), pp. 497-538; and Robert Powell, "Guns, Butter, and Anarchy," American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 1 (March 1993), pp. 115-232. On nuclear strategy, see Shai Feldman, Israeli Nuclear Deterrence: A Strategy for the 1980s (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982); and Charles L. Glaser, Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990). Although not cast in offense-defense terms, offense-defense differentiation plays a central role in qualitative arms control; see Thomas C. Schelling and Morton H. Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1961). The 1972 ABM treaty and certain provisions of the START treaties were justified on offense-defense logic. On conventional arms control see Jack Snyder, "Limiting Offensive Conventional Forces: Soviet Proposals and Western Options," International Security, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Spring 1988), pp. 48-77; Ivan Oelrich, Conventional Arms Control: The Limits and Their Verification (Cambridge, Mass.: Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, 1990); and Anders Boserup and Robert Neild, eds., The Foundations of Defensive Defence (New York: St. Martin's, 1990).
17. On balancing versus bandwagoning, see Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987); on the tightness of alliances, see Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," International Organization, Vol. 44, No. 1 (Spring 1990), pp. 137-168; and Thomas J. Christensen, "Perceptions and Allies in Europe, 1865-1940," International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 1 (Winter 1997), pp. 65-97. On alliance choices of small powers, see Karl Mueller, "Alignment Balancing and Stability in Eastern Europe," Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Autumn 1995), pp. 38-76. On comparative grand strategy, see Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War, Volume 1: The Structure of Power and the Roots of War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, forthcoming), pp. 191-245 (of the September 1994 draft). On military doctrine, see Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984). On competition and cooperation see George W. Downs, David M. Rocke, and Randolph L. Siverson, "Arms Races and Cooperation," in Kenneth A. Oye, ed., Cooperation under Anarchy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 118-146; Charles L. Glaser, "Political Consequences of Military Strategy: Expanding and Refining the Spiral and Deterrence Models," World Politics, Vol. 44, No. 4 (July 1992), pp. 497-538; and Robert Powell, "Guns, Butter, and Anarchy," American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 1 (March 1993), pp. 115-232. On nuclear strategy, see Shai Feldman, Israeli Nuclear Deterrence: A Strategy for the 1980s (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982); and Charles L. Glaser, Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990). Although not cast in offense-defense terms, offense-defense differentiation plays a central role in qualitative arms control; see Thomas C. Schelling and Morton H. Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1961). The 1972 ABM treaty and certain provisions of the START treaties were justified on offense-defense logic. On conventional arms control see Jack Snyder, "Limiting Offensive Conventional Forces: Soviet Proposals and Western Options," International Security, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Spring 1988), pp. 48-77; Ivan Oelrich, Conventional Arms Control: The Limits and Their Verification (Cambridge, Mass.: Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, 1990); and Anders Boserup and Robert Neild, eds., The Foundations of Defensive Defence (New York: St. Martin's, 1990).
18. On World War I, see Jack L. Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984); and Stephen Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War," International Security, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Summer 1984), pp. 58-107. On ethnic conflict see Barry R. Posen, "The Security Dilemma in Ethnic Conflict," in Michael E. Brown, ed., Ethnic Conflict and International Security (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 103-124; and Chaim Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Spring 1996), pp. 136-175. On revolutionary states, see Stephen M. Walt, Revolution and War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996). On U.S. grand strategy, see Stephen M. Walt, "The Case for Finite Containment: Analyzing U.S. Grand Strategy," International Security, Vol. 14, No. 1 (Summer 1989), pp. 5-49; and Barry R. Posen, Inadvertent Escalation: Conventional War and Nuclear Risks (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1991). On the future of Europe, see Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe after the Cold War," International Security, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Winter 1990/91), pp. 7-57. On the number of states, see Stanislav Andreski, Military Organization and Society (London: Routledge and Keegan Paul, 1968), pp. 75-76; and Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 61.
19. On World War I, see Jack L. Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984); and Stephen Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War," International Security, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Summer 1984), pp. 58-107. On ethnic conflict see Barry R. Posen, "The Security Dilemma in Ethnic Conflict," in Michael E. Brown, ed., Ethnic Conflict and International Security (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 103-124; and Chaim Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Spring 1996), pp. 136-175. On revolutionary states, see Stephen M. Walt, Revolution and War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996). On U.S. grand strategy, see Stephen M. Walt, "The Case for Finite Containment: Analyzing U.S. Grand Strategy," International Security, Vol. 14, No. 1 (Summer 1989), pp. 5-49; and Barry R. Posen, Inadvertent Escalation: Conventional War and Nuclear Risks (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1991). On the future of Europe, see Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe after the Cold War," International Security, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Winter 1990/91), pp. 7-57. On the number of states, see Stanislav Andreski, Military Organization and Society (London: Routledge and Keegan Paul, 1968), pp. 75-76; and Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 61.
20. On World War I, see Jack L. Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984); and Stephen Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War," International Security, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Summer 1984), pp. 58-107. On ethnic conflict see Barry R. Posen, "The Security Dilemma in Ethnic Conflict," in Michael E. Brown, ed., Ethnic Conflict and International Security (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 103-124; and Chaim Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Spring 1996), pp. 136-175. On revolutionary states, see Stephen M. Walt, Revolution and War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996). On U.S. grand strategy, see Stephen M. Walt, "The Case for Finite Containment: Analyzing U.S. Grand Strategy," International Security, Vol. 14, No. 1 (Summer 1989), pp. 5-49; and Barry R. Posen, Inadvertent Escalation: Conventional War and Nuclear Risks (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1991). On the future of Europe, see Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe after the Cold War," International Security, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Winter 1990/91), pp. 7-57. On the number of states, see Stanislav Andreski, Military Organization and Society (London: Routledge and Keegan Paul, 1968), pp. 75-76; and Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 61.
21. On World War I, see Jack L. Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984); and Stephen Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War," International Security, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Summer 1984), pp. 58-107. On ethnic conflict see Barry R. Posen, "The Security Dilemma in Ethnic Conflict," in Michael E. Brown, ed., Ethnic Conflict and International Security (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 103-124; and Chaim Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Spring 1996), pp. 136-175. On revolutionary states, see Stephen M. Walt, Revolution and War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996). On U.S. grand strategy, see Stephen M. Walt, "The Case for Finite Containment: Analyzing U.S. Grand Strategy," International Security, Vol. 14, No. 1 (Summer 1989), pp. 5-49; and Barry R. Posen, Inadvertent Escalation: Conventional War and Nuclear Risks (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1991). On the future of Europe, see Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe after the Cold War," International Security, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Winter 1990/91), pp. 7-57. On the number of states, see Stanislav Andreski, Military Organization and Society (London: Routledge and Keegan Paul, 1968), pp. 75-76; and Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 61.
22. On World War I, see Jack L. Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984); and Stephen Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War," International Security, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Summer 1984), pp. 58-107. On ethnic conflict see Barry R. Posen, "The Security Dilemma in Ethnic Conflict," in Michael E. Brown, ed., Ethnic Conflict and International Security (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 103-124; and Chaim Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Spring 1996), pp. 136-175. On revolutionary states, see Stephen M. Walt, Revolution and War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996). On U.S. grand strategy, see Stephen M. Walt, "The Case for Finite Containment: Analyzing U.S. Grand Strategy," International Security, Vol. 14, No. 1 (Summer 1989), pp. 5-49; and Barry R. Posen, Inadvertent Escalation: Conventional War and Nuclear Risks (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1991). On the future of Europe, see Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe after the Cold War," International Security, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Winter 1990/91), pp. 7-57. On the number of states, see Stanislav Andreski, Military Organization and Society (London: Routledge and Keegan Paul, 1968), pp. 75-76; and Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 61.
23. On World War I, see Jack L. Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984); and Stephen Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War," International Security, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Summer 1984), pp. 58-107. On ethnic conflict see Barry R. Posen, "The Security Dilemma in Ethnic Conflict," in Michael E. Brown, ed., Ethnic Conflict and International Security (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 103-124; and Chaim Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Spring 1996), pp. 136-175. On revolutionary states, see Stephen M. Walt, Revolution and War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996). On U.S. grand strategy, see Stephen M. Walt, "The Case for Finite Containment: Analyzing U.S. Grand Strategy," International Security, Vol. 14, No. 1 (Summer 1989), pp. 5-49; and Barry R. Posen, Inadvertent Escalation: Conventional War and Nuclear Risks (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1991). On the future of Europe, see Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe after the Cold War," International Security, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Winter 1990/91), pp. 7-57. On the number of states, see Stanislav Andreski, Military Organization and Society (London: Routledge and Keegan Paul, 1968), pp. 75-76; and Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 61.
24. On World War I, see Jack L. Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984); and Stephen Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War," International Security, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Summer 1984), pp. 58-107. On ethnic conflict see Barry R. Posen, "The Security Dilemma in Ethnic Conflict," in Michael E. Brown, ed., Ethnic Conflict and International Security (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 103-124; and Chaim Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Spring 1996), pp. 136-175. On revolutionary states, see Stephen M. Walt, Revolution and War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996). On U.S. grand strategy, see Stephen M. Walt, "The Case for Finite Containment: Analyzing U.S. Grand Strategy," International Security, Vol. 14, No. 1 (Summer 1989), pp. 5-49; and Barry R. Posen, Inadvertent Escalation: Conventional War and Nuclear Risks (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1991). On the future of Europe, see Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe after the Cold War," International Security, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Winter 1990/91), pp. 7-57. On the number of states, see Stanislav Andreski, Military Organization and Society (London: Routledge and Keegan Paul, 1968), pp. 75-76; and Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 61.
25. On World War I, see Jack L. Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984); and Stephen Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War," International Security, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Summer 1984), pp. 58-107. On ethnic conflict see Barry R. Posen, "The Security Dilemma in Ethnic Conflict," in Michael E. Brown, ed., Ethnic Conflict and International Security (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 103-124; and Chaim Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Spring 1996), pp. 136-175. On revolutionary states, see Stephen M. Walt, Revolution and War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996). On U.S. grand strategy, see Stephen M. Walt, "The Case for Finite Containment: Analyzing U.S. Grand Strategy," International Security, Vol. 14, No. 1 (Summer 1989), pp. 5-49; and Barry R. Posen, Inadvertent Escalation: Conventional War and Nuclear Risks (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1991). On the future of Europe, see Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe after the Cold War," International Security, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Winter 1990/91), pp. 7-57. On the number of states, see Stanislav Andreski, Military Organization and Society (London: Routledge and Keegan Paul, 1968), pp. 75-76; and Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 61.
26. On World War I, see Jack L. Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984); and Stephen Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War," International Security, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Summer 1984), pp. 58-107. On ethnic conflict see Barry R. Posen, "The Security Dilemma in Ethnic Conflict," in Michael E. Brown, ed., Ethnic Conflict and International Security (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 103-124; and Chaim Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Spring 1996), pp. 136-175. On revolutionary states, see Stephen M. Walt, Revolution and War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996). On U.S. grand strategy, see Stephen M. Walt, "The Case for Finite Containment: Analyzing U.S. Grand Strategy," International Security, Vol. 14, No. 1 (Summer 1989), pp. 5-49; and Barry R. Posen, Inadvertent Escalation: Conventional War and Nuclear Risks (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1991). On the future of Europe, see Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe after the Cold War," International Security, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Winter 1990/91), pp. 7-57. On the number of states, see Stanislav Andreski, Military Organization and Society (London: Routledge and Keegan Paul, 1968), pp. 75-76; and Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 61.
27. On World War I, see Jack L. Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984); and Stephen Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War," International Security, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Summer 1984), pp. 58-107. On ethnic conflict see Barry R. Posen, "The Security Dilemma in Ethnic Conflict," in Michael E. Brown, ed., Ethnic Conflict and International Security (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 103-124; and Chaim Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Spring 1996), pp. 136-175. On revolutionary states, see Stephen M. Walt, Revolution and War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996). On U.S. grand strategy, see Stephen M. Walt, "The Case for Finite Containment: Analyzing U.S. Grand Strategy," International Security, Vol. 14, No. 1 (Summer 1989), pp. 5-49; and Barry R. Posen, Inadvertent Escalation: Conventional War and Nuclear Risks (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1991). On the future of Europe, see Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe after the Cold War," International Security, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Winter 1990/91), pp. 7-57. On the number of states, see Stanislav Andreski, Military Organization and Society (London: Routledge and Keegan Paul, 1968), pp. 75-76; and Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 61.
28. Jack S. Levy, "The Offensive/Defensive Balance of Military Technology: A Theoretical and Historical Analysis," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 38, No. 2 (June 1984), pp. 219-238.
29. Other criticisms include that ingenuity, not structural constraints, determine the balance; that state behavior is determined by perceptions, not the "objective" offense-defense balance; and that offense and defense cannot be distinguished. Many of these criticisms are addressed by Sean M. Lynn-Jones, "Offense-Defense Theory and Its Critics," Security Studies, Vol. 4, No. 4 (Summer 1995), pp. 660-691.
30. For example, Van Evera's optimistic assessment of the future of Europe in his "Primed for Peace" relies on the judgment that the offense-defense balance greatly favors defense.
31. Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," pp. 187-194, 199-206.
32. For related analysis, see Malcolm W. Hoag, "On Stability in Deterrent Races," World Politics, Vol. 13, No. 4 (July 1961), pp. 505-527.
33. On the relationship between first strike-advantages, preemption, and accidents, see Schelling and Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control, pp. 14-16.
34. Van Evera, Causes of War, pp. 191-245.
35. The deductive strength of this body of offense-defense hypotheses has gone largely unchallenged, but recent work has questioned the relationship between offense advantage and the frequency of war. Because the risks of war could be greater for the attacker (not only the defender) when offense has the advantage, potential attackers should face countervailing pressures that make them more cautious, especially when considering large wars. James D. Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War," International Organization, Vol. 49, No. 3 (Summer 1995), pp. 402-403.
36. A variety of literatures bear on military skill, including work on states' evaluative capabilities, such as Stephen Van Evera, "Why States Believe Foolish Ideas: Non-Self-Evaluation by Government and Society" (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., 1988); organization theory, for example, Snyder, Ideology of the Offensive; Posen, Sources of Military Doctrine; and culture, including Trevor N. Dupuy, A Genius for War: The German Army and General Staff, 1807-1945 (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1977); Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrines between the Wars (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997); and Stephen P. Rosen, "Military Effectiveness: Why Society Matters," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring 1995), pp. 5-31.
37. A variety of literatures bear on military skill, including work on states' evaluative capabilities, such as Stephen Van Evera, "Why States Believe Foolish Ideas: Non-Self-Evaluation by Government and Society" (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., 1988); organization theory, for example, Snyder, Ideology of the Offensive; Posen, Sources of Military Doctrine; and culture, including Trevor N. Dupuy, A Genius for War: The German Army and General Staff, 1807-1945 (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1977); Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrines between the Wars (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997); and Stephen P. Rosen, "Military Effectiveness: Why Society Matters," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring 1995), pp. 5-31.
38. A variety of literatures bear on military skill, including work on states' evaluative capabilities, such as Stephen Van Evera, "Why States Believe Foolish Ideas: Non-Self-Evaluation by Government and Society" (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., 1988); organization theory, for example, Snyder, Ideology of the Offensive; Posen, Sources of Military Doctrine; and culture, including Trevor N. Dupuy, A Genius for War: The German Army and General Staff, 1807-1945 (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1977); Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrines between the Wars (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997); and Stephen P. Rosen, "Military Effectiveness: Why Society Matters," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring 1995), pp. 5-31.
39. A variety of literatures bear on military skill, including work on states' evaluative capabilities, such as Stephen Van Evera, "Why States Believe Foolish Ideas: Non-Self-Evaluation by Government and Society" (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science
40. A variety of literatures bear on military skill, including work on states' evaluative capabilities, such as Stephen Van Evera, "Why States Believe Foolish Ideas: Non-Self-Evaluation by Government and Society" (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., 1988); organization theory, for example, Snyder, Ideology of the Offensive; Posen, Sources of Military Doctrine; and culture, including Trevor N. Dupuy, A Genius for War: The German Army and General Staff, 1807-1945 (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1977); Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrines between the Wars (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997); and Stephen P. Rosen, "Military Effectiveness: Why Society Matters," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring 1995), pp. 5-31.
41. A variety of literatures bear on military skill, including work on states' evaluative capabilities, such as Stephen Van Evera, "Why States Believe Foolish Ideas: Non-Self-Evaluation by Government and Society" (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., 1988); organization theory, for example, Snyder, Ideology of the Offensive; Posen, Sources of Military Doctrine; and culture, including Trevor N. Dupuy, A Genius for War: The German Army and General Staff, 1807-1945 (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1977); Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrines between the Wars (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997); and Stephen P. Rosen, "Military Effectiveness: Why Society Matters," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring 1995), pp. 5-31.
42. See Charles L. Glaser, "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 50-90; Sean M. Lynn-Jones, "Rivalry and Rapprochement: Accommodation between Adversaries in International Politics" (Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, in progress); Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991), pp. 11-12; and Van Evera, Causes of War. For similar efforts that combine perceptions of the offense-defense balance and power, see Christensen and Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks," and Christensen, "Perceptions and Allies in Europe, 1865-1940."
43. See Charles L. Glaser, "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 50-90; Sean M. Lynn-Jones, "Rivalry and Rapprochement: Accommodation between Adversaries in International Politics" (Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, in progress); Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991), pp. 11-12; and Van Evera, Causes of War. For similar efforts that combine perceptions of the offense-defense balance and power, see Christensen and Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks," and Christensen, "Perceptions and Allies in Europe, 1865-1940."
44. See Charles L. Glaser, "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 50-90; Sean M. Lynn-Jones, "Rivalry and Rapprochement: Accommodation between Adversaries in International Politics" (Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, in progress); Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991), pp. 11-12; and Van Evera, Causes of War. For similar efforts that combine perceptions of the offense-defense balance and power, see Christensen and Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks," and Christensen, "Perceptions and Allies in Europe, 1865-1940."
45. See Charles L. Glaser, "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 50-90; Sean M. Lynn-Jones, "Rivalry and Rapprochement: Accommodation between Adversaries in International Politics" (Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, in progress); Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991), pp. 11-12; and Van Evera, Causes of War. For similar efforts that combine perceptions of the offense-defense balance and power, see Christensen and Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks," and Christensen, "Perceptions and Allies in Europe, 1865-1940."
46. See Charles L. Glaser, "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 50-90; Sean M. Lynn-Jones, "Rivalry and Rapprochement: Accommodation between Adversaries in International Politics" (Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, in progress); Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991), pp. 11-12; and Van Evera, Causes of War. For similar efforts that combine perceptions of the offense-defense balance and power, see Christensen and Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks," and Christensen, "Perceptions and Allies in Europe, 1865-1940."
47. See Charles L. Glaser, "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 50-90; Sean M. Lynn-Jones, "Rivalry and Rapprochement: Accommodation between Adversaries in International Politics" (Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, in progress); Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991), pp. 11-12; and Van Evera, Causes of War. For similar efforts that combine perceptions of the offense-defense balance and power, see Christensen and Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks," and Christensen, "Perceptions and Allies in Europe, 1865-1940."
48. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979).
49. Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," p. 178.
50. Ibid,; and Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, p. 62; see also Quester, Offense and Defense in the International System, for a definition cast in terms of force ratios instead of investment.
51. Ibid,; and Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, p. 62; see also Quester, Offense and Defense in the International System, for a definition cast in terms of force ratios instead of investment.
52. Ibid,; and Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, p. 62; see also Quester, Offense and Defense in the International System, for a definition cast in terms of force ratios instead of investment.
53. Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, p. 63.
54. Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," p. 178. Fearon, "The Offense-Defense Balance and War since 1648," paper prepared for the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Chicago, 1995, defines the balance in terms of the expected costs and benefits of attacking versus defending.
55. Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," p. 178. Fearon, "The Offense-Defense Balance and War since 1648," paper prepared for the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Chicago, 1995, defines the balance in terms of the expected costs and benefits of attacking versus defending.
56. Stephen W. Van Evera, "Causes of War" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1984), p. 78.
57. Levy, "The Offense/Defense Balance of Military Technology," pp. 222-230, reviews works that use this definition as well as the ones above.
58. We do not claim that this is the only workable definition of the offense-defense balance. Instead, we explain the advantages of the cost-ratio definition and develop some of its important, less apparent features.
59. Although in principle "investment" is a straightforward concept, in practice it raises some complicated issues. For instance, what countries pay for resources may not reflect the value they place on them. An obvious example is when two countries pay different amounts to field soldiers of comparable quality, as can happen when one country has a draft system and the other has a volunteer army. However, although these systems allow countries to pay different amounts for soldiers, we may prefer to say that adding an equal number of equal-quality soldiers represents an equal investment.
60. The offense-defense balance should be calculated in terms of the countries' peacetime force requirements: by what ratio must the attacker outspend the defender before the start of the war, taking into account likely wartime mobilization by both sides? This choice is best for two reasons: first, the main questions addressed by the security dilemma focus on judgments made about peacetime national security policy choices, such as: how secure can my state be? and, how intensely do I need to arms race? Second, if defenders have an advantage in wartime extraction, for example, because of nationalism, incorporating this wartime spending would have the perverse effect of making the balance appear to shift toward offense when conquest was actually becoming more difficult.
61. As we have suggested, a more complete theory would include a third key variable - military skill. Structural theories do not focus on this variable, assuming that states have high and roughly equal levels of skill.
62. To be precise, the first specification below is required for some but not all definitions of the balance; the others are required for all definitions.
63. The same observation applies to the probability of taking territory: forces that are expected to succeed in taking territory with a higher probability will be more expensive.
64. Even the theories that we think of as most purely structural must make assumptions about actors' values. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 105-106, for example, assumes that states value security far more than expansion. Randall Schweller, "Neorealism's Status Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?" Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Spring 1996), pp. 90-121, argues that changing this assumption would lead to quite different predictions.
65. Even the theories that we think of as most purely structural must make assumptions about actors' values. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 105-106, for example, assumes that states value security far more than expansion. Randall Schweller, "Neorealism's Status Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?" Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Spring 1996), pp. 90-121, argues that changing this assumption would lead to quite different predictions.
66. Because the level at which the cost of taking territory is set can dramatically influence the offense-defense balance, it is essential that users of offense-defense theory be explicit about this choice.
67. John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983), applies this standard to large-scale offensive campaigns that aim to take a large part or all of the defender's territory; willingness to accept costs for limited gains would presumably be lower. Consensus on this is not complete. For example, some participants in the Cold War debate over the conventional balance in Europe argued that Soviet willingness to pay costs for expansion might be higher than Mearsheimer's standard. See Samuel P. Huntington, "Conventional Deterrence and Conventional Retaliation in Europe," International Security, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Winter 1983/84), pp. 32-56; and Eliot A. Cohen, "Toward Better Net Assessment: Rethinking the European Conventional Balance," International Security, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Summer 1988), pp. 50-89.
68. John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983), applies this standard to large-scale offensive campaigns that aim to take a large part or all of the defender's territory; willingness to accept costs for limited gains would presumably be lower. Consensus on this is not complete. For example, some participants in the Cold War debate over the conventional balance in Europe argued that Soviet willingness to pay costs for expansion might be higher than Mearsheimer's standard. See Samuel P. Huntington, "Conventional Deterrence and Conventional Retaliation in Europe," International Security, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Winter 1983/84), pp. 32-56; and Eliot A. Cohen, "Toward Better Net Assessment: Rethinking the European Conventional Balance," International Security, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Summer 1988), pp. 50-89.
69. John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983), applies this standard to large-scale offensive campaigns that aim to take a large part or all of the defender's territory; willingness to accept costs for limited gains would presumably be lower. Consensus on this is not complete. For example, some participants in the Cold War debate over the conventional balance in Europe argued that Soviet willingness to pay costs for expansion might be higher than Mearsheimer's standard. See Samuel P. Huntington, "Conventional Deterrence and Conventional Retaliation in Europe," International Security, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Winter 1983/84), pp. 32-56; and Eliot A. Cohen, "Toward Better Net Assessment: Rethinking the European Conventional Balance," International Security, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Summer 1988), pp. 50-89.
70. Many would consider this a highly conservative standard, although some argued that the United States needed to be able to destroy Soviet forces and leadership, as well as Soviet society. Reviewing this debate is Charles L. Glaser, "Why Do Strategists Disagree about the Requirements of Deterrence?" in Lynn Eden and Steven E. Miller, eds., Nuclear Arguments (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989).
71. The preceding discussion makes clear why, although the balance is defined in terms of the relative cost of forces, the cost of fighting a war nevertheless influences the balance. If the costs of fighting increase, the balance shifts toward defense because the attacker must pay more to acquire forces that enable it to take territory at the specified cost of fighting.
72. This implies that the offense-defense theory can be useful in predicting not only the likelihood of war, but also the scale of likely wars.
73. On limited aims strategies, see Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence, pp. 53-56.
74. For a model of some of the issues involved, see Stephen D. Biddle, "The Determinants of Offensiveness and Defensiveness in Conventional Land Warfare" (Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1992). Limited offensives are not always easier than unlimited ones. Early conquests could promote rather than retard additional gains if the attacker can extract militarily useful benefits that exceed the costs of occupation (see the discussion of cumulative resources below). Also, if the tactical and operational balances favor the offense at least as strongly as the strategic balance, then it may be easier to achieve total victory than to hold early gains against later counterattacks. For instance, given the powerful punch but small size of the Germans' mechanized forces in 1940, it may have been more practical for them to conquer all of France than to try to hold just Belgium and northern France.
75. Strategy is generally understood as decisions concerning the achievement of ultimate war goals, such as mobilization of forces and their allocation to different campaigns or theaters of conflict. Operations concerns the movement of forces within a campaign or theater in order to ensure that battles are fought on favorable terms. Tactics concerns actions taken within a particular battle in order to win that battle. Edward N. Luttwak, Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987), pp. 69-70. On the difference between strategic and tactical offense-defense balances, see Ted Hopf, "Polarity, the Offense-Defense Balance, and War," American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 2 (June 1991), pp. 475-493.
76. Strategy is generally understood as decisions concerning the achievement of ultimate war goals, such as mobilization of forces and their allocation to different campaigns or theaters of conflict. Operations concerns the movement of forces within a campaign or theater in order to ensure that battles are fought on favorable terms. Tactics concerns actions taken within a particular battle in order to win that battle. Edward N. Luttwak, Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987), pp. 69-70. On the difference between strategic and tactical offense-defense balances, see Ted Hopf, "Polarity, the Offense-Defense Balance, and War," American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 2 (June 1991), pp. 475-493.
77. Quincy Wright, A Study of War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), p. 808; and Biddle, "Determinants of Offensiveness and Defensiveness," p. 59.
78. Quincy Wright, A Study of War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), p. 808; and Biddle, "Determinants of Offensiveness and Defensiveness," p. 59.
79. Any answer to the question of how long must the attacker hold its territorial gains to count as offensive success must be somewhat arbitrary. In keeping with the traditional primarily military focus of offense-defense theory, we prefer to consider an offensive a success if the territorial gain is maintained until the end of continuous military efforts to take it back, that is, until the end of the current war. One could make a case for a longer time horizon - for example, until the defender loses interest in retaking the territory - on the grounds that the attacker must expend effort even in peacetime to hold the territory as long as a revanchist campaign is imaginable. For instance, our definition would count Napoleon's victories over Prussia and Austria as offensive successes, although one could argue that he was never secure in the fruits of those campaigns. The problem with such a long time horizon is that it would be extremely difficult to measure, and in some cases might never expire.
80. The need to integrate across levels of warfare raises issues that are addressed on pages 73-74.
81. The meaning of "structure" used here is softer than the one favored by some structural realists, which excludes all unit-level attributes. Rather, we use "structure" to mean that states judge adversaries' goals and therefore the threat they pose based on the information provided by their military and foreign policies, not properties of their domestic systems. We do not, however, preclude states from considering properties of other states or their own state - such as the degree of technological sophistication and nationalism - in assessing military capabilities.
82. Jonathan Shimshoni, "Technology, Military Advantage, and World War I: A Case for Military Entrepreneurship," International Security, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Winter 1990/91), pp. 187-215, argues that the offense-defense balance has little practical meaning, because states can design strategy to shift it. Shimshoni's criticism is flawed, however, because he relaxes the assumption of optimality. All of his examples of military entrepreneurship hinge on states having significant advantages in military skill over their opponents.
83. On this point, we disagree with Van Evera, Causes of War, pp. 261-273; and Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," p. 212.
84. On this point, we disagree with Van Evera, Causes of War, pp. 261-273; and Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," p. 212.
85. On the degree to which German success in 1940 depended on suboptimal Allied doctrines, see Len Deighton, Blitzkrieg (New York: Ballantine, 1979).
86. Posen, Sources of Military Doctrine, pp. 228-236, argues that the greater the degree of threat, the closer states' military doctrines approach optimal choice.
87. We argue that such asymmetries should not simply be treated as a difference in military skill, because they are sometimes (not always) the result of differences in scientific or gross economic resources or rigidities in societal structure that even optimal policy cannot rectify quickly.
88. Such asymmetries can yield situations where, even with equal resources, one state of a dyad may be able to defeat the other on either offense or defense. Predictions about such cases will be more uncertain than other equal-resource cases, because they require greater information about states' goals; greedy states might attack when security seekers would not.
89. For example, the United States was less likely to use its nuclear monopoly to prevent Soviet development of nuclear weapons and an assured destruction capability because nuclear superiority was going to decay into a world of mutual assured destruction capabilities, (MAD), in which defense has a large advantage. See Glaser, Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy, chap. 5.
90. Since war outcomes are determined by power and skill as well as the offense-defense balance, this does not necessarily mean that France would have been more likely to win a war.
91. Given that the function of the offense-defense balance is to compare the efficacy of offensive strategies to defensive ones, situations where both sides choose offensive strategies create anomalies for offense-defense theory. This can happen in two ways: when the compound balance is less than 1, both sides could choose offense on efficiency grounds. The theory then predicts the states' strategy choices, but since the theory does not define an "offense-offense balance," it may tell us little about likely war outcomes. Second, when the compound balance is not much greater than 1 and one state chooses offense for nonsecurity reasons (i.e., because it is greedy), then the theory may not be able to predict the second state's strategy choice. Normally, if the compound balance is greater than 1 the second state would choose defense on efficiency grounds. We should expect, however, that an offensive strategy by the second state will do better against the first state's offense (since it is not optimized for defense) than it would against an opposing defense (which, by definition, is), but because we have no way of estimating how much better, we cannot predict the second state's best choice or whether it can achieve security. We do not have a solution for this, and are unaware of discussions that have addressed this issue.
92. At first glance, this may seem surprising, but there is an intuitive explanation. Whenever we say that one side can do better on defense than on offense, we must also be saying that the second side would do worse on offense (against the first side's defense) than on defense (against the first side's offense); thus both will prefer defense to offense.
93. Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," pp. 194-199. Quester, Offense and Defense in the International System, focuses mainly on technology. Both Lynn-Jones, "Offense-Defense Theory and Its Critics," p. 668; and Levy, "The Offensive/Defensive Balance of Military Technology," pp. 225-227, 229, argue explicitly for limiting the concept to technology.
94. Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," pp. 194-199. Quester, Offense and Defense in the International System, focuses mainly on technology. Both Lynn-Jones, "Offense-Defense Theory and Its Critics," p. 668; and Levy, "The Offensive/Defensive Balance of Military Technology," pp. 225-227, 229, argue explicitly for limiting the concept to technology.
95. Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," pp. 194-199. Quester, Offense and Defense in the International System, focuses mainly on technology. Both Lynn-Jones, "Offense-Defense Theory and Its Critics," p. 668; and Levy, "The Offensive/Defensive Balance of Military Technology," pp. 225-227, 229, argue explicitly for limiting the concept to technology.
96. Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," pp. 194-199. Quester, Offense and Defense in the International System, focuses mainly on technology. Both Lynn-Jones, "Offense-Defense Theory and Its Critics," p. 668; and Levy, "The Offensive/Defensive Balance of Military Technology," pp. 225-227, 229, argue explicitly for limiting the concept to technology.
97. See, for example, Hopf, "Polarity, the Offense-Defense Balance, and War"; and Van Evera, Causes of War, pp. 261-273. Stephen Walt, Revolution and War, pp. 37-43, suggests that the permeability of societies to ideas as a cause of offense dominance.
98. See, for example, Hopf, "Polarity, the Offense-Defense Balance, and War"; and Van Evera, Causes of War, pp. 261-273. Stephen Walt, Revolution and War, pp. 37-43, suggests that the permeability of societies to ideas as a cause of offense dominance.
99. See, for example, Hopf, "Polarity, the Offense-Defense Balance, and War"; and Van Evera, Causes of War, pp. 261-273. Stephen Walt, Revolution and War, pp. 37-43, suggests that the permeability of societies to ideas as a cause of offense dominance.
100. Additional arguments include claims that only technology is constant across the international system, and that the narrow definition is already the accepted one in the scholarly community. See Lynn-Jones, "Offense-Defense Theory and Its Critics," p. 668.
101. Analysts who reject the broad approach appreciate that additional factors besides technology and geography do influence the cost ratio of offensive to defensive strategies. Lynn-Jones, "Offense-Defense Theory and Its Critics," pp. 668-670. Thus this is not a deep disagreement about how the world works, but rather over how best to build theories.
102. A related, although not identical, distinction is the effect of a technology on moving versus nonmoving forces. The impact of both distinctions on the feasibility of offensive and defensive missions, however, is in most instances so similar that we often characterize the offense-defense implications of a given technology based on either distinction.
103. At least compared with technologies which are only usable by nonadvancing forces; in practice technologies that are actually more usable by advancing forces are rare because almost all tasks are easier to carry out while stationary than while moving.
104. Basil H. Liddell Hart, "Aggression and the Problem of Weapons," English Review 55 (1932), p. 73; Marion W. Boggs, "Attempts to Limit 'Aggressive' Armament in Diplomacy and Strategy" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Missouri, 1941), p. 85; Quester, Offense and Defense in the International System, pp. 2-3; Oelrich, Conventional Arms Control, pp. 14-25; Anders Boserup, "Mutual Defensive Superiority and the Problem of Mobility along an Extended Front," in Boserup and Nield, eds., Foundations of Defensive Defense, pp. 63-78; and Catherine M. Kelleher, "Indicators of Defensive Intent in Conventional Force Structures and Operations in Europe," in Lawrence Freedman, ed., Military Power in Europe (New York: St. Martin's, 1990), pp. 165-168.
105. Basil H. Liddell Hart, "Aggression and the Problem of Weapons," English Review 55 (1932), p. 73; Marion W. Boggs, "Attempts to Limit 'Aggressive' Armament in Diplomacy and Strategy" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Missouri, 1941), p. 85; Quester, Offense and Defense in the International System, pp. 2-3; Oelrich, Conventional Arms Control, pp. 14-25; Anders Boserup, "Mutual Defensive Superiority and the Problem of Mobility along an Extended Front," in Boserup and Nield, eds., Foundations of Defensive Defense, pp. 63-78; and Catherine M. Kelleher, "Indicators of Defensive Intent in Conventional Force Structures and Operations in Europe," in Lawrence Freedman, ed., Military Power in Europe (New York: St. Martin's, 1990), pp. 165-168.
106. Basil H. Liddell Hart, "Aggression and the Problem of Weapons," English Review 55 (1932), p. 73; Marion W. Boggs, "Attempts to Limit 'Aggressive' Armament in Diplomacy and Strategy" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Missouri, 1941), p. 85; Quester, Offense and Defense in the International System, pp. 2-3; Oelrich, Conventional Arms Control, pp. 14-25; Anders Boserup, "Mutual Defensive Superiority and the Problem of Mobility along an Extended Front," in Boserup and Nield, eds., Foundations of Defensive Defense, pp. 63-78; and Catherine M. Kelleher, "Indicators of Defensive Intent in Conventional Force Structures and Operations in Europe," in Lawrence Freedman, ed., Military Power in Europe (New York: St. Martin's, 1990), pp. 165-168.
107. Basil H. Liddell Hart, "Aggression and the Problem of Weapons," English Review 55 (1932), p. 73; Marion W. Boggs, "Attempts to Limit 'Aggressive' Armament in Diplomacy and Strategy" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Missouri, 1941), p. 85; Quester, Offense and Defense in the International System, pp. 2-3; Oelrich, Conventional Arms Control, pp. 14-25; Anders Boserup, "Mutual Defensive Superiority and the Problem of Mobility along an Extended Front," in Boserup and Nield, eds., Foundations of Defensive Defense, pp. 63-78; and Catherine M. Kelleher, "Indicators of Defensive Intent in Conventional Force Structures and Operations in Europe," in Lawrence Freedman, ed., Military Power in Europe (New York: St. Martin's, 1990), pp. 165-168.
108. Basil H. Liddell Hart, "Aggression and the Problem of Weapons," English Review 55 (1932), p. 73; Marion W. Boggs, "Attempts to Limit 'Aggressive' Armament in Diplomacy and Strategy" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Missouri, 1941), p. 85; Quester, Offense and Defense in the International System, pp. 2-3; Oelrich, Conventional Arms Control, pp. 14-25; Anders Boserup, "Mutual Defensive Superiority and the Problem of Mobility along an Extended Front," in Boserup and Nield, eds., Foundations of Defensive Defense, pp. 63-78; and Catherine M. Kelleher, "Indicators of Defensive Intent in Conventional Force Structures and Operations in Europe," in Lawrence Freedman, ed., Military Power in Europe (New York: St. Martin's, 1990), pp. 165-168.
109. Basil H. Liddell Hart, "Aggression and the Problem of Weapons," English Review 55 (1932), p. 73; Marion W. Boggs, "Attempts to Limit 'Aggressive' Armament in Diplomacy and Strategy" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Missouri, 1941), p. 85; Quester, Offense and Defense in the International System, pp. 2-3; Oelrich, Conventional Arms Control, pp. 14-25; Anders Boserup, "Mutual Defensive Superiority and the Problem of Mobility along an Extended Front," in Boserup and Nield, eds., Foundations of Defensive Defense, pp. 63-78; and Catherine M. Kelleher, "Indicators of Defensive Intent in Conventional Force Structures and Operations in Europe," in Lawrence Freedman, ed., Military Power in Europe (New York: St. Martin's, 1990), pp. 165-168.
110. This rather abstract discussion does not distinguish between attritional and blitzkrieg-style offensives, although actually both proceed in essentially the same two stages. The difference is the attacker's confidence that a breakthrough can be produced using a narrow versus a wide-front assault, and can be produced quickly and easily. On the two types of offensives, see Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence, pp. 33-43. On the role of breakthrough in attrition offensives, see C.R.M.F. Cruttwell's treatment of the 1917 Cambrai assault in A History of the Great War, 1914-1918, 2d ed. (Oxford, U.K.: Clarendon Press, 1936), pp. 467-477.
111. This rather abstract discussion does not distinguish between attritional and blitzkrieg-style offensives, although actually both proceed in essentially the same two stages. The difference is the attacker's confidence that a breakthrough can be produced using a narrow versus a wide-front assault, and can be produced quickly and easily. On the two types of offensives, see Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence, pp. 33-43. On the role of breakthrough in attrition offensives, see C.R.M.F. Cruttwell's treatment of the 1917 Cambrai assault in A History of the Great War, 1914-1918, 2d ed. (Oxford, U.K.: Clarendon Press, 1936), pp. 467-477.
112. Another way to put this is that mobility multiplies the attacker's advantage of the initiative. There is always a time lag between the initiation of an offensive action and the beginning of effective response by the defender because of the time needed to (1) detect the action, (2) the threat, (3) decide on a response, and (4) disseminate instructions to begin implementing the response. Increased mobility means that the attacker can accomplish more with an initiative lag of any given duration. For a formal model illustrating this, see Robert Nield, "The Relationship of Mobility to Defensive Stability," Defense Analysis, Vol. 8, No. 2 (August 1992), pp. 199-201. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence, p. 26, disagrees with this logic, arguing that the attacker can use the advantage of the initiative to position its forces at leisure, while once the offensive begins the defender must redeploy with great speed to meet the threat; thus increases in operational mobility actually favor defenders. This argument, however, has two weaknesses. First, it requires a huge initiative lag, sufficient to allow attacker forces to reposition virtually anywhere in the theater, before the defender detects anything. Second, it does not touch the differential value of tactical mobility to attackers.
113. Another way to put this is that mobility multiplies the attacker's advantage of the initiative. There is always a time lag between the initiation of an offensive action and the beginning of effective response by the defender because of the time needed to (1) detect the action, (2) the threat, (3) decide on a response, and (4) disseminate instructions to begin implementing the response. Increased mobility means that the attacker can accomplish more with an initiative lag of any given duration. For a formal model illustrating this, see Robert Nield, "The Relationship of Mobility to Defensive Stability," Defense Analysis, Vol. 8, No. 2 (August 1992), pp. 199-201. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence, p. 26, disagrees with this logic, arguing that the attacker can use the advantage of the initiative to position its forces at leisure, while once the offensive begins the defender must redeploy with great speed to meet the threat; thus increases in operational mobility actually favor defenders. This argument, however, has two weaknesses. First, it requires a huge initiative lag, sufficient to allow attacker forces to reposition virtually anywhere in the theater, before the defender detects anything. Second, it does not touch the differential value of tactical mobility to attackers.
114. Strategic mobility (the ability to transport and support large forces far from one's centers of mobilization) may not have much effect in the offense-defense balance in wars between small or medium-sized powers, but is essential to any long-distance offensive. See George Modelski and William R. Thompson, Seapower in Global Politics, 1494-1983 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1987), on the concept of the power/distance gradient; improvements in strategic mobility can be understood as a "flattening" of this gradient. In the special case where two sides share a traversable land border but one relies more heavily than the other on reinforcement from overseas territories and allies - for example, France in 1939-40 - better strategic mobility will simply favor the power of that side more than it favors either defense or offense.
115. Another reason why tactical nuclear weapons and the most powerful conventional munitions favor defense is that they destroy transportation infrastructure, thus reducing mobility.
116. On heavy artillery, see Liddell Hart, "Aggression and the Problem of Weapons," p. 73.
117. A standard discussion is Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," pp. 194-196.
118. Very dense cover, especially cities, is often extremely costly to capture because there is no way for advancing units to avoid exposing themselves to fire from defended positions, often at very short range. The German attackers at Stalingrad in 1942 and the Russians at Grozny in 1994-95 both suffered heavily despite possessing much more force than the defenders.
119. Heavy cover, such as stone or concrete buildings, or mountainous terrain in which caves or tunnels can be dug, can further delay an attacker by requiring very heavy firepower to destroy defenders even after they are located, although precision guided missiles are making this less important.
120. Some have argued that a neutral Eastern Europe would provide the United States and Russia better protection against each other than would expansion of NATO. See Mueller, "Alignment Balancing and Stability in Eastern, Europe," pp. 67-76.
121. Liddell Hart, "The Ratio of Troops to Space," Military Review, Vol. 40 (April 1960), pp. 3-14; Mearsheimer, "Why the Soviets Can't Win Quickly in Central Europe," International Security, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Summer 1982), pp. 3-39 at 26-30; and Biddle, "Offensiveness and Defensiveness," pp. 164-169. Biddle suggests that at extremely low force-to-space ratios, still lower densities can strengthen defense, down to the point at which offense is impossible because there are no forces at all.
122. Liddell Hart, "The Ratio of Troops to Space," Military Review, Vol. 40 (April 1960), pp. 3-14; Mearsheimer, "Why the Soviets Can't Win Quickly in Central Europe," International Security, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Summer 1982), pp. 3-39 at 26-30; and Biddle, "Offensiveness and Defensiveness," pp. 164-169. Biddle suggests that at extremely low force-to-space ratios, still lower densities can strengthen defense, down to the point at which offense is impossible because there are no forces at all.
123. Liddell Hart, "The Ratio of Troops to Space," Military Review, Vol. 40 (April 1960), pp. 3-14; Mearsheimer, "Why the Soviets Can't Win Quickly in Central Europe," International Security, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Summer 1982), pp. 3-39 at 26-30; and Biddle, "Offensiveness and Defensiveness," pp. 164-169. Biddle suggests that at extremely low force-to-space ratios, still lower densities can strengthen defense, down to the point at which offense is impossible because there are no forces at all.
124. Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," p. 204. Examples include the many Confederate soldiers who deserted the Army of Northern Virginia at the Potomac in 1862 because "they felt that they were fighting to defend Virginia's soil, not to invade the North" and Hitler's unwillingness to risk imposing full war mobilization on Germany until the failure of Barbarossa opened the possibility that Germany's own homeland security might be threatened. Bruce Catton, Mr. Lincoln's Army (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1951), p. 252; and Alan S. Milward, War, Economy, and Society 1939-1945 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), pp. 76-80.
125. Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," p. 204. Examples include the many Confederate soldiers who deserted the Army of Northern Virginia at the Potomac in 1862 because "they felt that they were fighting to defend Virginia's soil, not to invade the North" and Hitler's unwillingness to risk imposing full war mobilization on Germany until the failure of Barbarossa opened the possibility that Germany's own homeland security might be threatened. Bruce Catton, Mr. Lincoln's Army (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1951), p. 252; and Alan S. Milward, War, Economy, and Society 1939-1945 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), pp. 76-80.
126. Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," p. 204. Examples include the many Confederate soldiers who deserted the Army of Northern Virginia at the Potomac in 1862 because "they felt that they were fighting to defend Virginia's soil, not to invade the North" and Hitler's unwillingness to risk imposing full war mobilization on Germany until the failure of Barbarossa opened the possibility that Germany's own homeland security might be threatened. Bruce Catton, Mr. Lincoln's Army (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1951), p. 252; and Alan S. Milward, War, Economy, and Society 1939-1945 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), pp. 76-80.
127. Where there are significant irredenta, however, nationalists may fight just as hard on offense as on defense. More important, where multinational empires rule disgruntled subject people, nationalism may actually favor offense by raising the probability that invaders will not be resisted but welcomed as liberators. Examples include subject towns of both the Romans and Carthaginians which opened their gates to the other side in the First and Second Punic Wars, as well as the contrast between the collaboration of some Soviet subject peoples from 1941 to 1944 and the fierce resistance of ethnic Russians. Polybius, The Histories Vol. 4, trans. W.R. Taton (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1925), pp. 445-447, 455.
128. The decisiveness of cumulative resources to the outcome of a particular war depends on how quickly they can be converted to military power and on the length of the war.
129. Milward, War, Economy, and Society, pp. 18-36; and Michael A. Barnhart, Japan Prepares for Total War: The Search for Economic Security, 1919-1941 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987).
130. Milward, War, Economy, and Society, pp. 18-36; and Michael A. Barnhart, Japan Prepares for Total War: The Search for Economic Security, 1919-1941 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987).
131. Cumulative resources need not be directly military in nature if they substitute for domestic resources which the attacker can then shift to military production. For instance, German strategic plans in both world wars counted on acquiring grain from Eastern Europe to release German workers for war industries, and Germany's war effort in 1918 was severely hampered by failure to gain control of agricultural areas in the Ukraine in time to collect the 1917 harvest.
132. The importance of popular resistance means that cumulativity depends in part on the intensity of nationalism. On the economic side, Van Evera, Causes of War, pp. 180-183, argues that the transition to information-age economies may reduce cumulativity because these economies cannot function without a level of free communication which an occupier cannot safely permit. Peter Liberman, Does Conquest Pay? The Exploitation of Advanced Industrial Societies (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996), argues oppositely that increasing specialization makes it easier for attackers to use control of the food supply to compel urban workers to produce.
133. The importance of popular resistance means that cumulativity depends in part on the intensity of nationalism. On the economic side, Van Evera, Causes of War, pp. 180-183, argues that the transition to information-age economies may reduce cumulativity because these economies cannot function without a level of free communication which an occupier cannot safely permit. Peter Liberman, Does Conquest Pay? The Exploitation of Advanced Industrial Societies (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996), argues oppositely that increasing specialization makes it easier for attackers to use control of the food supply to compel urban workers to produce.
134. See Liberman, Does Conquest Pay?; and Van Evera, Causes of War, pp. 161-183.
135. See Liberman, Does Conquest Pay?; and Van Evera, Causes of War, pp. 161-183.
136. Van Evera, Causes of War; and Hopf, "Polarity, the Offense Defense Balance, and War."
137. Van Evera, Causes of War; and Hopf, "Polarity, the Offense Defense Balance, and War."
138. Fearon, "The Offense-Defense Balance and War Since 1648," pp. 11-12, makes a similar argument.
139. A theory of alliance behavior is required because the behavior that matters for measuring the balance is the behavior that states can reasonably expect in advance of war (and actually as far back as its decisions to procure forces and design its strategy), which may not be the same as what actually happens.
140. Christensen and Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks"; and Christensen, "Perceptions and Allies in Europe, 1865-1040."
141. Christensen and Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks"; and Christensen, "Perceptions and Allies in Europe, 1865-1040."
142. Van Evera, Causes of War, pp. 261-273.
143. Ibid., p, 270.
144. We are indebted to Karl Mueller for this insight.
145. For example, the formation of NATO not only increased the power resources available to resist a possible Soviet invasion of West Germany, but may also have shifted the offense-defense balance toward defense because of the likelihood that some NATO members might have been unwilling to participate in offensive military operations aimed at unifying East and West Germany.
146. Van Evera, ibid., pp. 52-54, uses the term the same way we do.
147. Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," pp. 188-189; and Van Evera, Causes of War, unnumbered page after p. 52 and pp. 73-74. Important works that predate offense-defense theory include Albert Wohlstetter, "The Delicate Balance of Terror," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 37, No. 2 (January 1959), pp. 211-234; and, Schelling, Arms and Influence, pp. 221-259. Dan Reiter, "Exploding the Powder Keg Myth: Pre-emptive Wars Almost Never Happen," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 2 (Fall 1995), pp. 5-34, argues that preemptive wars have been rare.
148. Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," pp. 188-189; and Van Evera, Causes of War, unnumbered page after p. 52 and pp. 73-74. Important works that predate offense-defense theory include Albert Wohlstetter, "The Delicate Balance of Terror," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 37, No. 2 (January 1959), pp. 211-234; and, Schelling, Arms and Influence, pp. 221-259. Dan Reiter, "Exploding the Powder Keg Myth: Pre-emptive Wars Almost Never Happen," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 2 (Fall 1995), pp. 5-34, argues that preemptive wars have been rare.
149. Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," pp. 188-189; and Van Evera, Causes of War, unnumbered page after p. 52 and pp. 73-74. Important works that predate offense-defense theory include Albert Wohlstetter, "The Delicate Balance of Terror," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 37, No. 2 (January 1959), pp. 211-234; and, Schelling, Arms and Influence, pp. 221-259. Dan Reiter, "Exploding the Powder Keg Myth: Pre-emptive Wars Almost Never Happen," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 2 (Fall 1995), pp. 5-34, argues that preemptive wars have been rare.
150. Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," pp. 188-189; and Van Evera, Causes of War, unnumbered page after p. 52 and pp. 73-74. Important works that predate offense-defense theory include Albert Wohlstetter, "The Delicate Balance of Terror," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 37, No. 2 (January 1959), pp. 211-234; and, Schelling, Arms and Influence, pp. 221-259. Dan Reiter, "Exploding the Powder Keg Myth: Pre-emptive Wars Almost Never Happen," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 2 (Fall 1995), pp. 5-34, argues that preemptive wars have been rare.
151. Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," pp. 188-189; and Van Evera, Causes of War, unnumbered page after p. 52 and pp. 73-74. Important works that predate offense-defense theory include Albert Wohlstetter, "The Delicate Balance of Terror," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 37, No. 2 (January 1959), pp. 211-234; and, Schelling, Arms and Influence, pp. 221-259. Dan Reiter, "Exploding the Powder Keg Myth: Pre-emptive Wars Almost Never Happen," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 2 (Fall 1995), pp. 5-34, argues that preemptive wars have been rare.
152. Much of the existing offense-defense literature has ignored this problem, apparently assuming that attackers always go first.
153. For example, if one side can destroy the other's unalerted air force on the ground, the other has an incentive to alert its planes simply to avoid this, even if it has no prospect of destroying the first side's air force.
154. Colin Gray, Weapons Don't Make War: Policy, Strategy, and Military Technology (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1993), p. 23, For a skeptical view of the feasibility of reliable net assessment, see Cohen, "Toward Better Net Assessment."
155. Colin Gray, Weapons Don't Make War: Policy, Strategy, and Military Technology (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1993), p. 23, For a skeptical view of the feasibility of reliable net assessment, see Cohen, "Toward Better Net Assessment."
156. To be more precise, the accuracy of our estimates of the offense-defense balance depends on the completeness of our model of the determinants of war outcomes. The better our understanding of war, the narrower the bands of uncertainty around our estimates of the balance. This problem is a central one in military history, with a large and active literature; a few political scientists are also beginning to take an interest, for example, Biddle, "Determinants of Offensiveness and Defensiveness."
157. Exceptions are possible where two or more different factors interact. For instance, an improvement in naval transport might normally favor offensive operations, but could favor defense at the strategic level if the major beneficiary was an offshore balancer that was too weak to attack any continental power but strong enough to assist certain of them in defense against others.
158. Shimshoni, "Technology, Military Advantage, and World War I," p. 192; and Gray, Weapons Don't Make War, pp. 36-37.
159. Shimshoni, "Technology, Military Advantage, and World War I," p. 192; and Gray, Weapons Don't Make War, pp. 36-37.
160. To be more precise, after answering this question, we then calculate the cost of these forces relative to the cost of the defender's forces.
161. Military assessments are sometimes stated in ways which are especially easily translatable into offense-defense terms. For example, Basil Liddell Hart's finding that in World War II Allied ground offensives rarely succeeded unless the attackers had a superiority of at least 5 to 1, together with domination of the air, amounts to an a statement that the offense-defense balance, at least at the tactical level, for these offensives was greater than 5. Liddell Hart, Deterrent or Defense (London: Stevens, 1960), p. 179. The recent discussion of the "3 to 1 rule" favored by the U.S. military and others is similar. FM 100-5: Operations (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 1976); Major H.F. Stoeckli, Soviet Operational Planning: Superiority Ratios vs. Casually Ratios (Sandhurst, U.K.; Royal Military Academy, 1985); John J. Mearsheimer, "Assessing the Conventional Balance: The 3:1 Rule and Its Critics," International Security, Vol. 13, No. 4 (Spring 1989), pp. 54-89; and Joshua Epstein, "The 3:1 Rule, the Adaptive Dynamic Model, and the Future of Security Studies," International Security, Vol. 13, No. 4 (Spring 1989), pp. 90-127.
162. Military assessments are sometimes stated in ways which are especially easily translatable into offense-defense terms. For example, Basil Liddell Hart's finding that in World War II Allied ground offensives rarely succeeded unless the attackers had a superiority of at least 5 to 1, together with domination of the air, amounts to an a statement that the offense-defense balance, at least at the tactical level, for these offensives was greater than 5. Liddell Hart, Deterrent or Defense (London: Stevens, 1960), p. 179. The recent discussion of the "3 to 1 rule" favored by the U.S. military and others is similar. FM 100-5: Operations (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 1976); Major H.F. Stoeckli, Soviet Operational Planning: Superiority Ratios vs. Casually Ratios (Sandhurst, U.K.; Royal Military Academy, 1985); John J. Mearsheimer, "Assessing the Conventional Balance: The 3:1 Rule and Its Critics," International Security, Vol. 13, No. 4 (Spring 1989), pp. 54-89; and Joshua Epstein, "The 3:1 Rule, the Adaptive Dynamic Model, and the Future of Security Studies," International Security, Vol. 13, No. 4 (Spring 1989), pp. 90-127.
163. Military assessments are sometimes stated in ways which are especially easily translatable into offense-defense terms. For example, Basil Liddell Hart's finding that in World War II Allied ground offensives rarely succeeded unless the attackers had a superiority of at least 5 to 1, together with domination of the air, amounts to an a statement that the offense-defense balance, at least at the tactical level, for these offensives was greater than 5. Liddell Hart, Deterrent or Defense (London: Stevens, 1960), p. 179. The recent discussion of the "3 to 1 rule" favored by the U.S. military and others is similar. FM 100-5: Operations (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 1976); Major H.F. Stoeckli, Soviet Operational Planning: Superiority Ratios vs. Casually Ratios (Sandhurst, U.K.; Royal Military Academy, 1985); John J. Mearsheimer, "Assessing the Conventional Balance: The 3:1 Rule and Its Critics," International Security, Vol. 13, No. 4 (Spring 1989), pp. 54-89; and Joshua Epstein, "The 3:1 Rule, the Adaptive Dynamic Model, and the Future of Security Studies," International Security, Vol. 13, No. 4 (Spring 1989), pp. 90-127.
164. Military assessments are sometimes stated in ways which are especially easily translatable into offense-defense terms. For example, Basil Liddell Hart's finding that in World War II Allied ground offensives rarely succeeded unless the attackers had a superiority of at least 5 to 1, together with domination of the air, amounts to an a statement that the offense-defense balance, at least at the tactical level, for these offensives was greater than 5. Liddell Hart, Deterrent or Defense (London: Stevens, 1960), p. 179. The recent discussion of the "3 to 1 rule" favored by the U.S. military and others is similar. FM 100-5: Operations (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 1976); Major H.F. Stoeckli, Soviet Operational Planning: Superiority Ratios vs. Casually Ratios (Sandhurst, U.K.; Royal Military Academy, 1985); John J. Mearsheimer, "Assessing the Conventional Balance: The 3:1 Rule and Its Critics," International Security, Vol. 13, No. 4 (Spring 1989), pp. 54-89; and Joshua Epstein, "The 3:1 Rule, the Adaptive Dynamic Model, and the Future of Security Studies," International Security, Vol. 13, No. 4 (Spring 1989), pp. 90-127.
165. Military assessments are sometimes stated in ways which are especially easily translatable into offense-defense terms. For example, Basil Liddell Hart's finding that in World War II Allied ground offensives rarely succeeded unless the attackers had a superiority of at least 5 to 1, together with domination of the air, amounts to an a statement that the offense-defense balance, at least at the tactical level, for these offensives was greater than 5. Liddell Hart, Deterrent or Defense (London: Stevens, 1960), p. 179. The recent discussion of the "3 to 1 rule" favored by the U.S. military and others is similar. FM 100-5: Operations (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 1976); Major H.F. Stoeckli, Soviet Operational Planning: Superiority Ratios vs. Casually Ratios (Sandhurst, U.K.; Royal Military Academy, 1985); John J. Mearsheimer, "Assessing the Conventional Balance: The 3:1 Rule and Its Critics," International Security, Vol. 13, No. 4 (Spring 1989), pp. 54-89; and Joshua Epstein, "The 3:1 Rule, the Adaptive Dynamic Model, and the Future of Security Studies," International Security, Vol. 13, No. 4 (Spring 1989), pp. 90-127.
166. Barry Posen, "Measuring the European Conventional Balance: Coping with Complexity in Threat Assessment," International Security, Vol. 9, No. 3 (Winter 1984/85), pp. 47-88.
167. Thus Mearsheimer's insistence that the balance cannot be measured is belied by his net assessment work.
168. Examples include Mearsheimer, "Why the Soviets Can't Win Quickly in Europe"; Posen, "Measuring the European Conventional Balance"; Joshua Epstein, Measuring Military Power: The Soviet Air Threat to Europe (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984); and Cohen, "Toward
169. Examples include Mearsheimer, "Why the Soviets Can't Win Quickly in Europe"; Posen, "Measuring the European Conventional Balance"; Joshua Epstein, Measuring Military Power: The Soviet Air Threat to Europe (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984); and Cohen, "Toward Better Net Assessment," as well as official studies such as James Blaker and Andrew Hamilton, Assessing the NATO/Warsaw Pact Military Balance (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Budget Office, December 1977).
170. Examples include Mearsheimer, "Why the Soviets Can't Win Quickly in Europe"; Posen, "Measuring the European Conventional Balance"; Joshua Epstein, Measuring Military Power: The Soviet Air Threat to Europe (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984); and Cohen, "Toward Better Net Assessment," as well as official studies such as James Blaker and Andrew Hamilton, Assessing the NATO/Warsaw Pact Military Balance (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Budget Office, December 1977).
171. Examples include Mearsheimer, "Why the Soviets Can't Win Quickly in Europe"; Posen, "Measuring the European Conventional Balance"; Joshua Epstein, Measuring Military Power: The Soviet Air Threat to Europe (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984); and Cohen, "Toward Better Net Assessment," as well as official studies such as James Blaker and Andrew Hamilton, Assessing the NATO/Warsaw Pact Military Balance (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Budget Office, December 1977).
172. Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War." On the generally better, but often still flawed, net assessments before World War II, see Williamson Murray and Allan Millett, eds., Calculations: Net Assessments and the Coming of World War II (New York: Free Press, 1992).
173. Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War." On the generally better, but often still flawed, net assessments before World War II, see Williamson Murray and Allan Millett, eds., Calculations: Net Assessments and the Coming of World War II (New York: Free Press, 1992).
174. Michael Howard, "Men against Fire: Expectations of War in 1914," International Security, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Summer 1984), pp. 41-57. Snyder, Ideology of the Offensive, and Van Evera, Causes of War, pp. 316-394, argue that prewar estimates were wrong because of bias, not inherent complexity. Scott Sagan, "1914 Revisited: Allies, offense, and Instability," International Security, Vol. 11, No. 2 (Fall 1986), pp. 151-176, argues that European powers' prewar estimates were reasonably accurate. On the British, see Edward L. Katzenbach, Jr., "The Horse Cavalry in the Twentieth Century," Public Policy (1958), pp. 120-149. John Ellis, The Social History of the Machine Gun (New York: Arno, 1975), argues that European racism contributed to the underestimation of firepower. On the evidence from late-nineteenth-and early-twentieth-century wars and the reports of military observers, see William McElwee, The Art of War: Waterloo to Mons (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1974), pp. 147-255. The most famous, accurate, contemporary civilian analysis is Ivan Bloch, The Future of War in Its Technical, Economic, and Political Aspects: Is War Now Impossible? trans. R. C. Long (New York: Doubleday and McClure, 1899).
175. Michael Howard, "Men against Fire: Expectations of War in 1914," International Security, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Summer 1984), pp. 41-57. Snyder, Ideology of the Offensive, and Van Evera, Causes of War, pp. 316-394, argue that prewar estimates were wrong because of bias, not inherent complexity. Scott Sagan, "1914 Revisited: Allies, offense, and Instability," International Security, Vol. 11, No. 2 (Fall 1986), pp. 151-176, argues that European powers' prewar estimates were reasonably accurate. On the British, see Edward L. Katzenbach, Jr., "The Horse Cavalry in the Twentieth Century," Public Policy (1958), pp. 120-149. John Ellis, The Social History of the Machine Gun (New York: Arno, 1975), argues that European racism contributed to the underestimation of firepower. On the evidence from late-nineteenth-and early-twentieth-century wars and the reports of military observers, see William McElwee, The Art of War: Waterloo to Mons (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1974), pp. 147-255. The most famous, accurate, contemporary civilian analysis is Ivan Bloch, The Future of War in Its Technical, Economic, and Political Aspects: Is War Now Impossible? trans. R. C. Long (New York: Doubleday and McClure, 1899).
176. Michael Howard, "Men against Fire: Expectations of War in 1914," International Security, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Summer 1984), pp. 41-57. Snyder, Ideology of the Offensive, and Van Evera, Causes of War, pp. 316-394, argue that prewar estimates were wrong because of bias, not inherent complexity. Scott Sagan, "1914 Revisited: Allies, offense, and Instability," International Security, Vol. 11, No. 2 (Fall 1986), pp. 151-176, argues that European powers' prewar estimates were reasonably accurate. On the British, see Edward L. Katzenbach, Jr., "The Horse Cavalry in the Twentieth Century," Public Policy (1958), pp. 120-149. John Ellis, The Social History of the Machine Gun (New York: Arno, 1975), argues that European racism contributed to the underestimation of firepower. On the evidence from late-nineteenth-and early-twentieth-century wars and the reports of military observers, see William McElwee, The Art of War: Waterloo to Mons (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1974), pp. 147-255. The most famous, accurate, contemporary civilian analysis is Ivan Bloch, The Future of War in Its Technical, Economic, and Political Aspects: Is War Now Impossible? trans. R. C. Long (New York: Doubleday and McClure, 1899).
177. Michael Howard, "Men against Fire: Expectations of War in 1914," International Security, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Summer 1984), pp. 41-57. Snyder, Ideology of the Offensive, and Van Evera, Causes of War, pp. 316-394, argue that prewar estimates were wrong because of bias, not inherent complexity. Scott Sagan, "1914 Revisited: Allies, offense, and Instability," International Security, Vol. 11, No. 2 (Fall 1986), pp. 151-176, argues that European powers' prewar estimates were reasonably accurate. On the British, see Edward L. Katzenbach, Jr., "The Horse Cavalry in the Twentieth Century," Public Policy (1958), pp. 120-149. John Ellis, The Social History of the Machine Gun (New York: Arno, 1975), argues that European racism contributed to the underestimation of firepower. On the evidence from late-nineteenth-and early-twentieth-century wars and the reports of military observers, see William McElwee, The Art of War: Waterloo to Mons (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1974), pp. 147-255. The most famous, accurate, contemporary civilian analysis is Ivan Bloch, The Future of War in Its Technical, Economic, and Political Aspects: Is War Now Impossible? trans. R. C. Long (New York: Doubleday and McClure, 1899).
178. Michael Howard, "Men against Fire: Expectations of War in 1914," International Security, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Summer 1984), pp. 41-57. Snyder, Ideology of the Offensive, and Van Evera, Causes of War, pp. 316-394, argue that prewar estimates were wrong because of bias, not inherent complexity. Scott Sagan, "1914 Revisited: Allies, offense, and Instability," International Security, Vol. 11, No. 2 (Fall 1986), pp. 151-176, argues that European powers' prewar estimates were reasonably accurate. On the British, see Edward L. Katzenbach, Jr., "The Horse Cavalry in the Twentieth Century," Public Policy (1958), pp. 120-149. John Ellis, The Social History of the Machine Gun (New York: Arno, 1975), argues that European racism contributed to the underestimation of firepower. On the evidence from late-nineteenth-and early-twentieth-century wars and the reports of military observers, see William McElwee, The Art of War: Waterloo to Mons (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1974), pp. 147-255. The most famous, accurate, contemporary civilian analysis is Ivan Bloch, The Future of War in Its Technical, Economic, and Political Aspects: Is War Now Impossible? trans. R. C. Long (New York: Doubleday and McClure, 1899).
179. Michael Howard, "Men against Fire: Expectations of War in 1914," International Security, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Summer 1984), pp. 41-57. Snyder, Ideology of the Offensive, and Van Evera, Causes of War, pp. 316-394, argue that prewar estimates were wrong because of bias, not inherent complexity. Scott Sagan, "1914 Revisited: Allies, offense, and Instability," International Security, Vol. 11, No. 2 (Fall 1986), pp. 151-176, argues that European powers' prewar estimates were reasonably accurate. On the British, see Edward L. Katzenbach, Jr., "The Horse Cavalry in the Twentieth Century," Public Policy (1958), pp. 120-149. John Ellis, The Social History of the Machine Gun (New York: Arno, 1975), argues that European racism contributed to the underestimation of firepower. On the evidence from late-nineteenth-and early-twentieth-century wars and the reports of military observers, see William McElwee, The Art of War: Waterloo to Mons (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1974), pp. 147-255. The most famous, accurate, contemporary civilian analysis is Ivan Bloch, The Future of War in Its Technical, Economic, and Political Aspects: Is War Now Impossible? trans. R. C. Long (New York: Doubleday and McClure, 1899).
180. Michael Howard, "Men against Fire: Expectations of War in 1914," International Security, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Summer 1984), pp. 41-57. Snyder, Ideology of the Offensive, and Van Evera, Causes of War, pp. 316-394, argue that prewar estimates were wrong because of bias, not inherent complexity. Scott Sagan, "1914 Revisited: Allies, offense, and Instability," International Security, Vol. 11, No. 2 (Fall 1986), pp. 151-176, argues that European powers' prewar estimates were reasonably accurate. On the British, see Edward L. Katzenbach, Jr., "The Horse Cavalry in the Twentieth Century," Public Policy (1958), pp. 120-149. John Ellis, The Social History of the Machine Gun (New York: Arno, 1975), argues that European racism contributed to the underestimation of firepower. On the evidence from late-nineteenth-and early-twentieth-century wars and the reports of military observers, see William McElwee, The Art of War: Waterloo to Mons (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1974), pp. 147-255. The most famous, accurate, contemporary civilian analysis is Ivan Bloch, The Future of War in Its Technical, Economic, and Political Aspects: Is War Now Impossible? trans. R. C. Long (New York: Doubleday and McClure, 1899).
181. Michael Howard, "Men against Fire: Expectations of War in 1914," International Security, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Summer 1984), pp. 41-57. Snyder, Ideology of the Offensive, and Van Evera, Causes of War, pp. 316-394, argue that prewar estimates were wrong because of bias, not inherent complexity. Scott Sagan, "1914 Revisited: Allies, offense, and Instability," International Security, Vol. 11, No. 2 (Fall 1986), pp. 151-176, argues that European powers' prewar estimates were reasonably accurate. On the British, see Edward L. Katzenbach, Jr., "The Horse Cavalry in the Twentieth Century," Public Policy (1958), pp. 120-149. John Ellis, The Social History of the Machine Gun (New York: Arno, 1975), argues that European racism contributed to the underestimation of firepower. On the evidence from late-nineteenth-and early-twentieth-century wars and the reports of military observers, see William McElwee, The Art of War: Waterloo to Mons (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1974), pp. 147-255. The most famous, accurate, contemporary civilian analysis is Ivan Bloch, The Future of War in Its Technical, Economic, and Political Aspects: Is War Now Impossible? trans. R. C. Long (New York: Doubleday and McClure, 1899).
182. Martin Van Creveld, Supplying War: Logistics from Wallerstein to Patton (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp. 109-141.
183. Cohen, "Toward Better Net Assessment," argued that even the best net assessments of the Central Front did not do justice to the complexity of the problem. Most of his specific criticisms of Mearsheimer, Posen, and Epstein, however, concern, scenario issues, such as inclusion of certain Soviet units, possible Warsaw Pact advances through Austria or Denmark, the likelihood of airdrops in the NATO rear, or the possibility that NATO might not mobilize in time. A few of Cohen's criticisms - for example, that these authors overestimated force-to-space constraints on Warsaw Pact ground offensives as well as the effectiveness of NATO compared to Warsaw Pact airpower - are relevant to the quality of our understanding of modern land warfare, although the weight of opinion on these questions seems to be against Cohen. See John J. Mearsheimer, Barry R. Posen, and Eliot A. Cohen, "Correspondence: Reassessing Net Assessment," International Security, Vol. 13, No. 4 (Spring 1989), pp. 128-179.
184. Cohen, "Toward Better Net Assessment," argued that even the best net assessments of the Central Front did not do justice to the complexity of the problem. Most of his specific criticisms of Mearsheimer, Posen, and Epstein, however, concern, scenario issues, such as inclusion of certain Soviet units, possible Warsaw Pact advances through Austria or Denmark, the likelihood of airdrops in the NATO rear, or the possibility that NATO might not mobilize in time. A few of Cohen's criticisms - for example, that these authors overestimated force-to-space constraints on Warsaw Pact ground offensives as well as the effectiveness of NATO compared to Warsaw Pact airpower - are relevant to the quality of our understanding of modern land warfare, although the weight of opinion on these questions seems to be against Cohen. See John J. Mearsheimer, Barry R. Posen, and Eliot A. Cohen, "Correspondence: Reassessing Net Assessment," International Security, Vol. 13, No. 4 (Spring 1989), pp. 128-179.
185. See, for example, Congressional Budget office, Counterforce Issues for the U.S. Strategic Offensive Forces (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978); and Michael M. May, George F. Bing, and John D. Steinbruner, "Strategic Arsenals after START: The Implications of Deep Cuts," International Security, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Summer 1988), pp. 90-133.
186. See, for example, Congressional Budget office, Counterforce Issues for the U.S. Strategic Offensive Forces (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978); and Michael M. May, George F. Bing, and John D. Steinbruner, "Strategic Arsenals after START: The Implications of Deep Cuts," International Security, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Summer 1988), pp. 90-133.
187. Nicholas Spykman, America's Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance of Power (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1942), esp. 389-457.
188. John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), p. 23; see also Shimshoni, "Technology, Military Advantage, and World War I," pp. 190-191.
189. John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), p. 23; see also Shimshoni, "Technology, Military Advantage, and World War I," pp. 190-191.
190. In a forthcoming article we argue that offensive and defensive weapons and force postures generally are distinguishable.
191. Lynn-Jones, "Offense-Defense Theory and Its Critics," pp. 674-676, makes essentially the same argument. Biddle, "Determinants of Offensiveness and Defensiveness," pp. 17-19 and 341-343, concludes that defense has the advantage, although he argues that distinguishing offensive and defensive weapons is hard.
192. Lynn-Jones, "Offense-Defense Theory and Its Critics," pp. 674-676, makes essentially the same argument. Biddle, "Determinants of Offensiveness and Defensiveness," pp. 17-19 and 341-343, concludes that defense has the advantage, although he argues that distinguishing offensive and defensive weapons is hard.
193. On the difficulty of operationalizing power and the relevant literature, see William C. Wohlforth, The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions during the Cold War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993); see also Aaron Friedberg, The Weary Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, 1895-1905 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988).
194. On the difficulty of operationalizing power and the relevant literature, see William C. Wohlforth, The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions during the Cold War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993); see also Aaron Friedberg, The Weary Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, 1895-1905 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988).
195. For example, Liberman's study of the net resources that Germany was able to extract during World War II contributes to a research agenda on cumulativity; see Liberman, Does Conquest Pay? 106. For example, Biddle's work on the determinants of the relative success and failure of different stages of the German Spring Offensive of 1918 bears on the relative explanatory power of technology, terrain, numbers, and skill; Biddle, "Determinants of Offensiveness and Defensiveness," pp. 241-311. Sean Lynn-Jones in a personal communication has suggested that "experimental net assessment" using the sorts of techniques developed for the U.S. Army's National Training Center (NTC) might be a useful measurement approach for a variety of tactical-and operational-level questions. On the methods used at NTC, see Daniel Bolger, Dragons at War (Novato, Calif.: Presidio, 1986).
196. For example, Liberman's study of the net resources that Germany was able to extract during World War II contributes to a research agenda on cumulativity; see Liberman, Does Conquest Pay? 106. For example, Biddle's work on the determinants of the relative success and failure of different stages of the German Spring Offensive of 1918 bears on the relative explanatory power of technology, terrain, numbers, and skill; Biddle, "Determinants of Offensiveness and Defensiveness," pp. 241-311. Sean Lynn-Jones in a personal communication has suggested that "experimental net assessment" using the sorts of techniques developed for the U.S. Army's National Training Center (NTC) might be a useful measurement approach for a variety of tactical-and operational-level questions. On the methods used at NTC, see Daniel Bolger, Dragons at War (Novato, Calif.: Presidio, 1986).
197. For example, Liberman's study of the net resources that Germany was able to extract during World War II contributes to a research agenda on cumulativity; see Liberman, Does Conquest Pay? 106. For example, Biddle's work on the determinants of the relative success and failure of different stages of the German Spring Offensive of 1918 bears on the relative explanatory power of technology, terrain, numbers, and skill; Biddle, "Determinants of Offensiveness and Defensiveness," pp. 241-311. Sean Lynn-Jones in a personal communication has suggested that "experimental net assessment" using the sorts of techniques developed for the U.S. Army's National Training Center (NTC) might be a useful measurement approach for a variety of tactical-and operational-level questions. On the methods used at NTC, see Daniel Bolger, Dragons at War (Novato, Calif.: Presidio, 1986).