Trading with the enemy: Security and relative economic gains

International Security

Volumn 21, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 147-175

  Liberman, Peter ^a  

^a NONE

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0030518596     PISSN: 01622889     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/isec.21.1.147     Document Type: Article

References (166)

1. Joseph M. Grieco, Cooperation among Nations: Europe, America, and Non-tariff Barriers to Trade (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990); Michael Mastanduno, "Do Relative Gains Matter? America's Response to Japanese Industrial Policy," International Security Vol. 16, No. 1 (Summer 1991), pp. 73-113; Duncan Snidal, "Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation," American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 3 (September 1991), pp. 701-726; Snidal, "International Cooperation Among Relative Gains Maximizers," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 35, No. 4 (December 1991), pp. 387-402; Robert Powell, "Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory," American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 4 (December 1991), pp. 1303-1320; and the contributions of Joseph Grieco, Robert Powell, and Duncan Snidal 74o "The Relative-Gains Problem for International Cooperation," American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 3 (September 1993), pp. 729-743. Much of the debate has been reproduced in David A. Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).
2. Joseph M. Grieco, Cooperation among Nations: Europe, America, and Non-tariff Barriers to Trade (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990); Michael Mastanduno, "Do Relative Gains Matter? America's Response to Japanese Industrial Policy," International Security Vol. 16, No. 1 (Summer 1991), pp. 73-113; Duncan Snidal, "Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation," American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 3 (September 1991), pp. 701-726; Snidal, "International Cooperation Among Relative Gains Maximizers," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 35, No. 4 (December 1991), pp. 387-402; Robert Powell, "Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory," American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 4 (December 1991), pp. 1303-1320; and the contributions of Joseph Grieco, Robert Powell, and Duncan Snidal 74o "The Relative-Gains Problem for International Cooperation," American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 3 (September 1993), pp. 729-743. Much of the debate has been reproduced in David A. Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).
3. Joseph M. Grieco, Cooperation among Nations: Europe, America, and Non-tariff Barriers to Trade (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990); Michael Mastanduno, "Do Relative Gains Matter? America's Response to Japanese Industrial Policy," International Security Vol. 16, No. 1 (Summer 1991), pp. 73-113; Duncan Snidal, "Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation," American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 3 (September 1991), pp. 701-726; Snidal, "International Cooperation Among Relative Gains Maximizers," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 35, No. 4 (December 1991), pp. 387-402; Robert Powell, "Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory," American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 4 (December 1991), pp. 1303-1320; and the contributions of Joseph Grieco, Robert Powell, and Duncan Snidal 74o "The Relative-Gains Problem for International Cooperation," American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 3 (September 1993), pp. 729-743. Much of the debate has been reproduced in David A. Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).
4. Joseph M. Grieco, Cooperation among Nations: Europe, America, and Non-tariff Barriers to Trade (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990); Michael Mastanduno, "Do Relative Gains Matter? America's Response to Japanese Industrial Policy," International Security Vol. 16, No. 1 (Summer 1991), pp. 73-113; Duncan Snidal, "Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation," American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 3 (September 1991), pp. 701-726; Snidal, "International Cooperation Among Relative Gains Maximizers," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 35, No. 4 (December 1991), pp. 387-402; Robert Powell, "Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory," American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 4 (December 1991), pp. 1303-1320; and the contributions of Joseph Grieco, Robert Powell, and Duncan Snidal 74o "The Relative-Gains Problem for International Cooperation," American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 3 (September 1993), pp. 729-743. Much of the debate has been reproduced in David A. Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).
5. Joseph M. Grieco, Cooperation among Nations: Europe, America, and Non-tariff Barriers to Trade (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990); Michael Mastanduno, "Do Relative Gains Matter? America's Response to Japanese Industrial Policy," International Security Vol. 16, No. 1 (Summer 1991), pp. 73-113; Duncan Snidal, "Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation," American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 3 (September 1991), pp. 701-726; Snidal, "International Cooperation Among Relative Gains Maximizers," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 35, No. 4 (December 1991), pp. 387-402; Robert Powell, "Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory," American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 4 (December 1991), pp. 1303-1320; and the contributions of Joseph Grieco, Robert Powell, and Duncan Snidal 74o "The Relative-Gains Problem for International Cooperation," American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 3 (September 1993), pp. 729-743. Much of the debate has been reproduced in David A. Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).
6. Joseph M. Grieco, Cooperation among Nations: Europe, America, and Non-tariff Barriers to Trade (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990); Michael Mastanduno, "Do Relative Gains Matter? America's Response to Japanese Industrial Policy," International Security Vol. 16, No. 1 (Summer 1991), pp. 73-113; Duncan Snidal, "Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation," American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 3 (September 1991), pp. 701-726; Snidal, "International Cooperation Among Relative Gains Maximizers," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 35, No. 4 (December 1991), pp. 387-402; Robert Powell, "Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory," American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 4 (December 1991), pp. 1303-1320; and the contributions of Joseph Grieco, Robert Powell, and Duncan Snidal 74o "The Relative-Gains Problem for International Cooperation," American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 3 (September 1993), pp. 729-743. Much of the debate has been reproduced in David A. Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).
7. Joseph M. Grieco, Cooperation among Nations: Europe, America, and Non-tariff Barriers to Trade (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990); Michael Mastanduno, "Do Relative Gains Matter? America's Response to Japanese Industrial Policy," International Security Vol. 16, No. 1 (Summer 1991), pp. 73-113; Duncan Snidal, "Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation," American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 3 (September 1991), pp. 701-726; Snidal, "International Cooperation Among Relative Gains Maximizers," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 35, No. 4 (December 1991), pp. 387-402; Robert Powell, "Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory," American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 4 (December 1991), pp. 1303-1320; and the contributions of Joseph Grieco, Robert Powell, and Duncan Snidal 74o "The Relative-Gains Problem for International Cooperation," American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 3 (September 1993), pp. 729-743. Much of the debate has been reproduced in David A. Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).
8. John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War," International Security, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Summer 1990), pp. 47-48.
9. See, e.g., Samuel P. Huntington, "Why International Primacy Matters," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), p. 81.
10. In addition to the sources cited above, see Stephen D. Krasner, "Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier," World Politics, Vol. 43, No. 3 (April 1991), pp. 336-366; Emerson M.S. Niou and Peter C. Ordeshook, "'Less Filling, Tastes Great': The Realist-Neoliberal Debate," World Politics, Vol. 46, No. 2 (January 1994), pp. 209-234; Robert Powell, "Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate," International Organization, Vol. 48, No. 2 (Spring 1994), pp. 334-343; John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 19-24; Charles L. Glaser, "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 72-79; Robert O. Keohane and Lisa Martin, "The Promise of Institutionalist Theory," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 44-46.
11. In addition to the sources cited above, see Stephen D. Krasner, "Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier," World Politics, Vol. 43, No. 3 (April 1991), pp. 336-366; Emerson M.S. Niou and Peter C. Ordeshook, "'Less Filling, Tastes Great': The Realist-Neoliberal Debate," World Politics, Vol. 46, No. 2 (January 1994), pp. 209-234; Robert Powell, "Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate," International Organization, Vol. 48, No. 2 (Spring 1994), pp. 334-343; John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 19-24; Charles L. Glaser, "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 72-79; Robert O. Keohane and Lisa Martin, "The Promise of Institutionalist Theory," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 44-46.
12. In addition to the sources cited above, see Stephen D. Krasner, "Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier," World Politics, Vol. 43, No. 3 (April 1991), pp. 336-366; Emerson M.S. Niou and Peter C. Ordeshook, "'Less Filling, Tastes Great': The Realist-Neoliberal Debate," World Politics, Vol. 46, No. 2 (January 1994), pp. 209-234; Robert Powell, "Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate," International Organization, Vol. 48, No. 2 (Spring 1994), pp. 334-343; John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 19-24; Charles L. Glaser, "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 72-79; Robert O. Keohane and Lisa Martin, "The Promise of Institutionalist Theory," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 44-46.
13. In addition to the sources cited above, see Stephen D. Krasner, "Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier," World Politics, Vol. 43, No. 3 (April 1991), pp. 336-366; Emerson M.S. Niou and Peter C. Ordeshook, "'Less Filling, Tastes Great': The Realist-Neoliberal Debate," World Politics, Vol. 46, No. 2 (January 1994), pp. 209-234; Robert Powell, "Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate," International Organization, Vol. 48, No. 2 (Spring 1994), pp. 334-343; John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 19-24; Charles L. Glaser, "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 72-79; Robert O. Keohane and Lisa Martin, "The Promise of Institutionalist Theory," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 44-46.
14. In addition to the sources cited above, see Stephen D. Krasner, "Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier," World Politics, Vol. 43, No. 3 (April 1991), pp. 336-366; Emerson M.S. Niou and Peter C. Ordeshook, "'Less Filling, Tastes Great': The Realist-Neoliberal Debate," World Politics, Vol. 46, No. 2 (January 1994), pp. 209-234; Robert Powell, "Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate," International Organization, Vol. 48, No. 2 (Spring 1994), pp. 334-343; John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 19-24; Charles L. Glaser, "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 72-79; Robert O. Keohane and Lisa Martin, "The Promise of Institutionalist Theory," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 44-46.
15. In addition to the sources cited above, see Stephen D. Krasner, "Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier," World Politics, Vol. 43, No. 3 (April 1991), pp. 336-366; Emerson M.S. Niou and Peter C. Ordeshook, "'Less Filling, Tastes Great': The Realist-Neoliberal Debate," World Politics, Vol. 46, No. 2 (January 1994), pp. 209-234; Robert Powell, "Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate," International Organization, Vol. 48, No. 2 (Spring 1994), pp. 334-343; John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 19-24; Charles L. Glaser, "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 72-79; Robert O. Keohane and Lisa Martin, "The Promise of Institutionalist Theory," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 44-46.
16. The definitive study is Michael Mastanduno, Economic Containment: CoCom and the Politics of East-West Trade (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1992).
17. Grieco, Cooperation among Nations; Mastanduno, "Do Relative Gains Matter?"
18. Grieco, Cooperation among Nations; Mastanduno, "Do Relative Gains Matter?"
19. Joanne Gowa and Edward D. Mansfield, "Power Politics and International Trade," American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 2 (June 1993), pp. 408-420. However, James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson, and Tressa Tabares find that trade patterns correlate with common democracy and interests, but not with alliance, even under bipolarity. See Morrow, Siverson, and Tabares, "Terms of Trade: The Political Determinants of Major Power International Trade, 1907-1965," manuscript, January 1996. Other studies showing an inverse relationship between political-military conflict and trade levels in the bipolar Cold War period include Mark Gasiorowski, "Economic Interdependence and International Conflict: Some Cross-National Evidence," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 30, No. 1 (March 1986), pp. 23-38; Brian M. Pollins, "Does Trade Still Follow the Flag?" American Political Science Review, Vol. 83, No. 2 (June 1989), pp. 465-480; Pollins, "Conflict, Cooperation, and Commerce: The Effects of International Political Interactions on Bilateral Trade Flows," American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 33, No. 3 (August 1989), pp. 737-761.
20. Joanne Gowa and Edward D. Mansfield, "Power Politics and International Trade," American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 2 (June 1993), pp. 408-420. However, James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson, and Tressa Tabares find that trade patterns correlate with common democracy and interests, but not with alliance, even under bipolarity. See Morrow, Siverson, and Tabares, "Terms of Trade: The Political Determinants of Major Power International Trade, 1907-1965," manuscript, January 1996. Other studies showing an inverse relationship between political-military conflict and trade levels in the bipolar Cold War period include Mark Gasiorowski, "Economic Interdependence and International Conflict: Some Cross-National Evidence," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 30, No. 1 (March 1986), pp. 23-38; Brian M. Pollins, "Does Trade Still Follow the Flag?" American Political Science Review, Vol. 83, No. 2 (June 1989), pp. 465-480; Pollins, "Conflict, Cooperation, and Commerce: The Effects of International Political Interactions on Bilateral Trade Flows," American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 33, No. 3 (August 1989), pp. 737-761.
21. Joanne Gowa and Edward D. Mansfield, "Power Politics and International Trade," American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 2 (June 1993), pp. 408-420. However, James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson, and Tressa Tabares find that trade patterns correlate with common democracy and interests, but not with alliance, even under bipolarity. See Morrow, Siverson, and Tabares, "Terms of Trade: The Political Determinants of Major Power International Trade, 1907-1965," manuscript, January 1996. Other studies showing an inverse relationship between political-military conflict and trade levels in the bipolar Cold War period include Mark Gasiorowski, "Economic Interdependence and International Conflict: Some Cross-National Evidence," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 30, No. 1 (March 1986), pp. 23-38; Brian M. Pollins, "Does Trade Still Follow the Flag?" American Political Science Review, Vol. 83, No. 2 (June 1989), pp. 465-480; Pollins, "Conflict, Cooperation, and Commerce: The Effects of International Political Interactions on Bilateral Trade Flows," American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 33, No. 3 (August 1989), pp. 737-761.
22. Joanne Gowa and Edward D. Mansfield, "Power Politics and International Trade," American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 2 (June 1993), pp. 408-420. However, James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson, and Tressa Tabares find that trade patterns correlate with common democracy and interests, but not with alliance, even under bipolarity. See Morrow, Siverson, and Tabares, "Terms of Trade: The Political Determinants of Major Power International Trade, 1907-1965," manuscript, January 1996. Other studies showing an inverse relationship between political-military conflict and trade levels in the bipolar Cold War period include Mark Gasiorowski, "Economic Interdependence and International Conflict: Some Cross-National Evidence," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 30, No. 1 (March 1986), pp. 23-38; Brian M. Pollins, "Does Trade Still Follow the Flag?" American Political Science Review, Vol. 83, No. 2 (June 1989), pp. 465-480; Pollins, "Conflict, Cooperation, and Commerce: The Effects of International Political Interactions on Bilateral Trade Flows," American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 33, No. 3 (August 1989), pp. 737-761.
23. Joanne Gowa and Edward D. Mansfield, "Power Politics and International Trade," American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 2 (June 1993), pp. 408-420. However, James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson, and Tressa Tabares find that trade patterns correlate with common democracy and interests, but not with alliance, even under bipolarity. See Morrow, Siverson, and Tabares, "Terms of Trade: The Political Determinants of Major Power International Trade, 1907-1965," manuscript, January 1996. Other studies showing an inverse relationship between political-military conflict and trade levels in the bipolar Cold War period include Mark Gasiorowski, "Economic Interdependence and International Conflict: Some Cross-National Evidence," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 30, No. 1 (March 1986), pp. 23-38; Brian M. Pollins, "Does Trade Still Follow the Flag?" American Political Science Review, Vol. 83, No. 2 (June 1989), pp. 465-480; Pollins, "Conflict, Cooperation, and Commerce: The Effects of International Political Interactions on Bilateral Trade Flows," American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 33, No. 3 (August 1989), pp. 737-761.
24. Joanne Gowa and Edward D. Mansfield, "Power Politics and International Trade," American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 2 (June 1993), pp. 408-420. However, James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson, and Tressa Tabares find that trade patterns correlate with common democracy and interests, but not with alliance, even under bipolarity. See Morrow, Siverson, and Tabares, "Terms of Trade: The Political Determinants of Major Power International Trade, 1907-1965," manuscript, January 1996. Other studies showing an inverse relationship between political-military conflict and trade levels in the bipolar Cold War period include Mark Gasiorowski, "Economic Interdependence and International Conflict: Some Cross-National Evidence," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 30, No. 1 (March 1986), pp. 23-38; Brian M. Pollins, "Does Trade Still Follow the Flag?" American Political Science Review, Vol. 83, No. 2 (June 1989), pp. 465-480; Pollins, "Conflict, Cooperation, and Commerce: The Effects of International Political Interactions on Bilateral Trade Flows," American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 33, No. 3 (August 1989), pp. 737-761.
25. Grieco, Cooperation among Nations, pp. 10, 39.
26. Joanne Gowa, "Bipolarity, Multipolarity, and Free Trade," American Political Science Review, Vol. 83, No. 4 (December 1989), pp. 1245-1256; and Gowa, Allies, Adversaries, and International Trade (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 31-53. Nations must have sufficient market power to affect the terms of trade in order to use optimum tariffs to bolster their income at the expense of trading partners, but retaliation can vitiate the gain.
27. Joanne Gowa, "Bipolarity, Multipolarity, and Free Trade," American Political Science Review, Vol. 83, No. 4 (December 1989), pp. 1245-1256; and Gowa, Allies, Adversaries, and International Trade (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 31-53. Nations must have sufficient market power to affect the terms of trade in order to use optimum tariffs to bolster their income at the expense of trading partners, but retaliation can vitiate the gain.
28. Thus Grieco argues that sensitivity to gaps in gains - what he calls the coefficient of relative gains sensitivity, "k" - depends on the probability that they will be converted into military threats. Grieco, Cooperation among Nations, pp. 45-46.
29. The conception of realism used here differs from structural realism by its focus on threat rather than aggregate power as the independent variable. On why balancing is caused by threat rather than power alone, see Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987), esp. pp. 21-28.
30. Powell, "Absolute and Relative Gains"; and Powell, "Anarchy in International Relations Theory," pp. 334-338.
31. Powell, "Absolute and Relative Gains"; and Powell, "Anarchy in International Relations Theory," pp. 334-338.
32. Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Fall 1993), p. 74; and Glaser, "Realists as Optimists," p. 79.
33. Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Fall 1993), p. 74; and Glaser, "Realists as Optimists," p. 79.
34. Samuel P. Huntington, "Arms Races: Prerequisites and Results," Public Policy, Vol. 8, No. 1 (1958), pp. 41-83.
35. Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984), pp. 27-54. For an extension of this work that modifies payoffs to simulate relative gains, see Marc L. Busch and Eric R. Reinhardt, "Nice Strategies in a World of Relative Gains," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 37, No. 3 (September 1993), pp. 427-445.
36. Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984), pp. 27-54. For an extension of this work that modifies payoffs to simulate relative gains, see Marc L. Busch and Eric R. Reinhardt, "Nice Strategies in a World of Relative Gains," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 37, No. 3 (September 1993), pp. 427-445.
37. Snidal, "Relative Gains"; and Snidal, "International Cooperation."
38. Snidal, "Relative Gains"; and Snidal, "International Cooperation."
39. Gowa, "Bipolarity, Multipolarity, and Free Trade."
40. Mastanduno, Economic Containment.
41. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979), p. 168. See also Glenn H. Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," World Politics, Vol. 35, No. 4 (July 1984), pp. 461-495; and Gowa, "Bipolarity, Multipolarity, and Free Trade," esp. pp. 1249-1251.
42. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979), p. 168. See also Glenn H. Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," World Politics, Vol. 35, No. 4 (July 1984), pp. 461-495; and Gowa, "Bipolarity, Multipolarity, and Free Trade," esp. pp. 1249-1251.
43. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979), p. 168. See also Glenn H. Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," World Politics, Vol. 35, No. 4 (July 1984), pp. 461-495; and Gowa, "Bipolarity, Multipolarity, and Free Trade," esp. pp. 1249-1251.
44. Robert A. Pollard, Economic Security and the Origins of the Cold War, 1945-1950 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985). For an extension of Gowa's argument to Cold War intra-allied economic relations, see Alan Rousso, "Tipping the Balance of Power: The Political Economy of Intra-Alliance Trade in the Nuclear Age" (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1994).
45. Robert A. Pollard, Economic Security and the Origins of the Cold War, 1945-1950 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985). For an extension of Gowa's argument to Cold War intra-allied economic relations, see Alan Rousso, "Tipping the Balance of Power: The Political Economy of Intra-Alliance Trade in the Nuclear Age" (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1994).
46. Grieco admits this in Cooperation Among Nations, pp. 47-48, 220-226, 230-231. But while Grieco thinks side-agreements are difficult to negotiate, Snidal deems them relatively easy; Snidal, "Relative Gains," p. 703.
47. Grieco admits this in Cooperation Among Nations, pp. 47-48, 220-226, 230-231. But while Grieco thinks side-agreements are difficult to negotiate, Snidal deems them relatively easy; Snidal, "Relative Gains," p. 703.
48. Albert O. Hirschman, National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1945), chap. 2.
49. This point is alluded to by Grieco, Cooperation among Nations, p. 46; and by Snidal, "Relative Gains Problem," p. 739.
50. This point is alluded to by Grieco, Cooperation among Nations, p. 46; and by Snidal, "Relative Gains Problem," p. 739.
51. David A. Baldwin, Economic Statecraft (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), pp. 214-224; Mastanduno, Economic Containment.
52. David A. Baldwin, Economic Statecraft (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), pp. 214-224; Mastanduno, Economic Containment.
53. James D. Morrow, "When Do 'Relative Gains' Impede Trade?" manuscript, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, October 1995.
54. For the same reason, states are typically more concerned about cheating on security agreements than on economic ones. Charles Lipson, "International Cooperation in Security and Economic Affairs," World Politics, Vol. 37, No. 1 (October 1985), pp. 1-23.
55. Robert O. Keohane, "Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge After the Cold War," in Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism, pp. 279-280.
56. A good introduction to strategic-trade theory and practice is Wayne Sandholtz et al., The Highest Stakes: The Economic Foundations of the Next Security System (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).
57. Firms worry about this too; see Jonathan B. Tucker, "Partners and Rivals: A Model of International Collaboration in Advanced Technology," International Organization, Vol. 45, No. 1 (Winter 1991), pp. 83-120.
58. Powell, "Absolute and Relative Gains."
59. The two studies are Grieco, Cooperation among Nations; and Mastanduno, "Do Relative Gains Matter?"
60. The two studies are Grieco, Cooperation among Nations; and Mastanduno, "Do Relative Gains Matter?"
61. Grieco, Cooperation among Nations, p. 14. Since realism has been tested more for political-military rather than economic behavior, Grieco also points out that predictions for the latter also provide a relatively difficult hurdle for the theory.
62. Mastanduno, "Do Relative Gains Matter?" pp. 78-83.
63. Grieco, Cooperation among Nations, p. 207.
64. Keohane criticizes Grieco, but not Mastanduno, for failing to demonstrate relative-gains motives in empirical research, in "Institutional Theory," pp. 279-283. My point is a different one: even if both showed relative-gains seeking for competitiveness reasons, that still would not show that security concerns played a role.
65. Mastanduno, "Do Relative Gains Matter?" p. 109.
66. Mastanduno, "Do Relative Gains Matter?" p. 99, emphasis added.
67. See especially Grieco, "Relative-Gains Problem," pp. 734-735.
68. Helen Milner, "International Theories of Cooperation among Nations," World Politics, Vol. 44, No. 3 (April 1992), pp. 466-496, esp. pp. 487-488.
69. On the development of the Anglo-German rivalry, particularly from the British perspective, see Samuel R. Williamson, Jr., The Politics of Grand Strategy: Britain and France Prepare for War, 1904-14 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969); Michael Howard, The Continental Commitment (London: Maurice Temple Smith Ltd., 1972), chaps. 1-2; Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery (London: Allen Lane, 1976); Kennedy, The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860-1914 (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1980); Zara S. Steiner, Britain and the Origins of the First World War (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977). For an argument that the British Foreign Office exaggerated the German threat, see Keith M. Wilson, The Policy of the Entente: Essays on the Determinants of British Foreign Policy, 1904-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 100-120.
70. On the development of the Anglo-German rivalry, particularly from the British perspective, see Samuel R. Williamson, Jr., The Politics of Grand Strategy: Britain and France Prepare for War, 1904-14 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969); Michael Howard, The Continental Commitment (London: Maurice Temple Smith Ltd., 1972), chaps. 1-2; Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery (London: Allen Lane, 1976); Kennedy, The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860-1914 (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1980); Zara S. Steiner, Britain and the Origins of the First World War (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977). For an argument that the British Foreign Office exaggerated the German threat, see Keith M. Wilson, The Policy of the Entente: Essays on the Determinants of British Foreign Policy, 1904-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 100-120.
71. On the development of the Anglo-German rivalry, particularly from the British perspective, see Samuel R. Williamson, Jr., The Politics of Grand Strategy: Britain and France Prepare for War, 1904-14 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969); Michael Howard, The Continental Commitment (London: Maurice Temple Smith Ltd., 1972), chaps. 1-2; Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery (London: Allen Lane, 1976); Kennedy, The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860-1914 (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1980); Zara S. Steiner, Britain and the Origins of the First World War (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977). For an argument that the British Foreign Office exaggerated the German threat, see Keith M. Wilson, The Policy of the Entente: Essays on the Determinants of British Foreign Policy, 1904-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 100-120.
72. On the development of the Anglo-German rivalry, particularly from the British perspective, see Samuel R. Williamson, Jr., The Politics of Grand Strategy: Britain and France Prepare for War, 1904-14 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969); Michael Howard, The Continental Commitment (London: Maurice Temple Smith Ltd., 1972), chaps. 1-2; Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery (London: Allen Lane, 1976); Kennedy, The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860-1914 (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1980); Zara S. Steiner, Britain and the Origins of the First World War (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977). For an argument that the British Foreign Office exaggerated the German threat, see Keith M. Wilson, The Policy of the Entente: Essays on the Determinants of British Foreign Policy, 1904-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 100-120.
73. On the development of the Anglo-German rivalry, particularly from the British perspective, see Samuel R. Williamson, Jr., The Politics of Grand Strategy: Britain and France Prepare for War, 1904-14 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969); Michael Howard, The Continental Commitment (London: Maurice Temple Smith Ltd., 1972), chaps. 1-2; Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery (London: Allen Lane, 1976); Kennedy, The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860-1914 (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1980); Zara S. Steiner, Britain and the Origins of the First World War (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977). For an argument that the British Foreign Office exaggerated the German threat, see Keith M. Wilson, The Policy of the Entente: Essays on the Determinants of British Foreign Policy, 1904-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 100-120.
74. On the development of the Anglo-German rivalry, particularly from the British perspective, see Samuel R. Williamson, Jr., The Politics of Grand Strategy: Britain and France Prepare for War, 1904-14 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969); Michael Howard, The Continental Commitment (London: Maurice Temple Smith Ltd., 1972), chaps. 1-2; Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery (London: Allen Lane, 1976); Kennedy, The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860-1914 (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1980); Zara S. Steiner, Britain and the Origins of the First World War (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977). For an argument that the British Foreign Office exaggerated the German threat, see Keith M. Wilson, The Policy of the Entente: Essays on the Determinants of British Foreign Policy, 1904-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 100-120.
75. Paul Kennedy, "Tirpitz, England and the Second Navy Law of 1900: A Strategical Critique," Militargeschichtliche Mitteilungen, No. 2 (1970), pp. 33-57; Kennedy, Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery, chap. 8.
76. Paul Kennedy, "Tirpitz, England and the Second Navy Law of 1900: A Strategical Critique," Militargeschichtliche Mitteilungen, No. 2 (1970), pp. 33-57; Kennedy, Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery, chap. 8.
77. Paul Kennedy, Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New York: Random House, 1987), p. 203.
78. Quoted in Kennedy, Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery, p. 215.
79. Quoted in James Joll, Origins of the First World War, 2nd ed. (New York: Longman House, 1992), p. 76.
80. Viscount Alfred Milner, a prominent Liberal imperialist who had served as governor of the Cape Colony and Transvaal from 1897-1905, quoted in Kennedy, Anglo-German Antagonism, p. 428.
81. Quoted in Kennedy, Anglo-German Antagonism, p. 277.
82. Quoted in Steiner, Britain, p. 40. See also ibid., pp. 57-58, 175-187; and Kennedy, Anglo-German Antagonism, pp. 448, 361-385.
83. Quoted in Steiner, Britain, p. 40. See also ibid., pp. 57-58, 175-187; and Kennedy, Anglo-German Antagonism, pp. 448, 361-385.
84. Quoted in Steiner, Britain, p. 40. See also ibid., pp. 57-58, 175-187; and Kennedy, Anglo-German Antagonism, pp. 448, 361-385.
85. Charles Hardinge and Arthur Nicolson, respectively, quoted in Wilson, Policy of the Entente, p. 100.
86. "Memorandum on the Present State of British Relations with France and Germany," January 1, 1907, reprinted in G.P. Gooch and Harold Temperley, eds., British Documents on the Origins of the War 1898-1914 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office [HMSO], 1928), Vol. 3, p. 419.
87. "Memorandum," p. 417.
88. Steiner, Britain, pp. 105-109; Sean Lynn-Jones, "Détente and Deterrence: Anglo-German Relations, 1911-1914," International Security, Vol. 11, No. 2 (Fall 1986), pp. 121-150.
89. Steiner, Britain, pp. 105-109; Sean Lynn-Jones, "Détente and Deterrence: Anglo-German Relations, 1911-1914," International Security, Vol. 11, No. 2 (Fall 1986), pp. 121-150.
90. Kennedy, Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, p. 203; Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery, p. 229.
91. Kennedy, Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, p. 203; Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery, p. 229.
92. Kennedy, Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery, ch. 8.
93. Kennedy, Anglo-German Antagonism, p. 283; see also Williamson, Politics of Grand Strategy, pp. 1-88.
94. Kennedy, Anglo-German Antagonism, p. 283; see also Williamson, Politics of Grand Strategy, pp. 1-88.
95. Williamson, Politics of Grand Strategy, pp. 167-226, 264-299; Steiner, Britain, pp. 99-104, 194-210.
96. Williamson, Politics of Grand Strategy, pp. 167-226, 264-299; Steiner, Britain, pp. 99-104, 194-210.
97. Grey, quoted in Joll, Origins, p. 55; see also Beryl Williams, "Great Britain and Russia 1905-1907," in F.H. Hinsley, ed., British Foreign Policy under Sir Edward Grey (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp. 133-147; Howard, Continental Commitment, chaps. 1-2.
98. Grey, quoted in Joll, Origins, p. 55; see also Beryl Williams, "Great Britain and Russia 1905-1907," in F.H. Hinsley, ed., British Foreign Policy under Sir Edward Grey (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp. 133-147; Howard, Continental Commitment, chaps. 1-2.
99. Grey, quoted in Joll, Origins, p. 55; see also Beryl Williams, "Great Britain and Russia 1905-1907," in F.H. Hinsley, ed., British Foreign Policy under Sir Edward Grey (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp. 133-147; Howard, Continental Commitment, chaps. 1-2.
100. Colin Clark, The Conditions of Economic Progress, 3rd ed. (London: Macmillan, 1957), pp. 132, 139.
101. Aaron L. Friedberg, The Weary Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, 1895-1905 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), p. 49; cf. pp. 24-26. See also D.C.M. Platt, Finance, Trade, and Politics in British Foreign Policy, 1815-1914 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), pp. 81-82.
102. Aaron L. Friedberg, The Weary Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, 1895-1905 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), p. 49; cf. pp. 24-26. See also D.C.M. Platt, Finance, Trade, and Politics in British Foreign Policy, 1815-1914 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), pp. 81-82.
103. Quoted in Ross J.S. Hoffman, Great Britain and the German Trade Rivalry (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1933), pp. 247, 284.
104. Quoted in Hoffman, Great Britain, p. 293.
105. Hoffman, Great Britain, pp. 284-85.
106. Viscount Northcliffe, quoted in Kennedy, Anglo-German Antagonism, p. 315.
107. Sidney Pollard, Peaceful Conquest: The Industrialization of Europe, 1760-1970, repr. ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 259.
108. Steiner, Britain, p. 63.
109. B.R. Mitchell, International Historical Statistics: Europe, 1750-1988, 3rd ed. (New York: Stockton Press, 1992), Tables E1, E2.
110. Steiner, Britain, p. 61.
111. Hoffman, Great Britain, pp. 98-101, 284.
112. Platt, Finance, Trade, and Politics, pp. 145-146; Friedberg, Weary Titan, pp. 51-52.
113. Platt, Finance, Trade, and Politics, pp. 145-146; Friedberg, Weary Titan, pp. 51-52.
114. Hoffman, Great Britain, pp. 260, 288; Kennedy, Anglo-German Antagonism, pp. 291-305; Friedberg, Weary Titan, pp. 21-88.
115. Hoffman, Great Britain, pp. 260, 288; Kennedy, Anglo-German Antagonism, pp. 291-305; Friedberg, Weary Titan, pp. 21-88.
116. Hoffman, Great Britain, pp. 260, 288; Kennedy, Anglo-German Antagonism, pp. 291-305; Friedberg, Weary Titan, pp. 21-88.
117. Quoted in Friedberg, Weary Titan, p. 72.
118. Friedberg, Weary Titan, pp. 54-77.
119. Robert Vansittart, quoted in Steiner, Britain, p. 65.
120. Kennedy, Anglo-German Antagonism, p. 302.
121. Quoted in Friedberg, Weary Titan, p. 73.
122. Platt, Finance, Trade, and Politics, p. 147.
123. "Memorandum," p. 403.
124. See Peter Gourevitch, Politics in Hard Times: Comparative Responses to International Economic Crises (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986), ch. 3; Stephen D. Krasner, "State Power and the Structure of International Trade," World Politics, Vol. 28, No. 3 (April 1976), pp. 317-347; and Timothy J. McKeown, "Hegemonic Stability Theory and 19th Century Tariff Levels in Europe," International Organization, Vol. 37, No. 1 (Winter 1983), pp. 73-91.
125. See Peter Gourevitch, Politics in Hard Times: Comparative Responses to International Economic Crises (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986), ch. 3; Stephen D. Krasner, "State Power and the Structure of International Trade," World Politics, Vol. 28, No. 3 (April 1976), pp. 317-347; and Timothy J. McKeown, "Hegemonic Stability Theory and 19th Century Tariff Levels in Europe," International Organization, Vol. 37, No. 1 (Winter 1983), pp. 73-91.
126. See Peter Gourevitch, Politics in Hard Times: Comparative Responses to International Economic Crises (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986), ch. 3; Stephen D. Krasner, "State Power and the Structure of International Trade," World Politics, Vol. 28, No. 3 (April 1976), pp. 317-347; and Timothy J. McKeown, "Hegemonic Stability Theory and 19th Century Tariff Levels in Europe," International Organization, Vol. 37, No. 1 (Winter 1983), pp. 73-91.
127. Mitchell, International Historical Statistics: Europe, 1750-1988, Table E2.
128. Quoted in Utley, Going to War, p. 137.
129. Herbert Feis, The Road to Pearl Harbor: The Coming of the War Between the United States and Japan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950); Dallek, Roosevelt; Utley, Going to War; Barnhart, Japan Prepares; and Waldo Heinrichs, Threshold of War: Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Entry Into World War II (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988).
130. Herbert Feis, The Road to Pearl Harbor: The Coming of the War Between the United States and Japan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950); Dallek, Roosevelt; Utley, Going to War; Barnhart, Japan Prepares; and Waldo Heinrichs, Threshold of War: Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Entry Into World War II (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988).
131. U.S. Department of Commerce, Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1975), pp. 903-905.
132. Ibid., pp. 224, 903-905; B.R. Mitchell, International Historical Statistics: Africa and Asia (New York: New York University Press, 1982), Tables K1 and F2. The estimate on relative economic size is from Clark, Conditions of Economic Progress.
133. Ibid., pp. 224, 903-905; B.R. Mitchell, International Historical Statistics: Africa and Asia (New York: New York University Press, 1982), Tables K1 and F2. The estimate on relative economic size is from Clark, Conditions of Economic Progress.
134. On U.S. assessments of Japanese economic vulnerability, see Barnhart, Japan Prepares pp. 55, 58-59, 61-63, 122, 132, 178, 186.
135. A few minor tariffs and voluntary export restraints were placed on Japanese goods that threatened U.S. producers. On these and other U.S.-Japanese trade issues in the 1930s, see Mira Wilkins, "The Role of U.S. Business," in Dorothy Borg and Shumpei Okamoto, eds., Pearl Harbor as History: Japanese Relations 1931-1941, pp. 341-376; James Richard Herzberg, "American Economic Policies Towards Japan, 1931-1941" (Ph.D. diss., University of Texas at Austin, 1977).
136. A few minor tariffs and voluntary export restraints were placed on Japanese goods that threatened U.S. producers. On these and other U.S.-Japanese trade issues in the 1930s, see Mira Wilkins, "The Role of U.S. Business," in Dorothy Borg and Shumpei Okamoto, eds., Pearl Harbor as History: Japanese Relations 1931-1941, pp. 341-376; James Richard Herzberg, "American Economic Policies Towards Japan, 1931-1941" (Ph.D. diss., University of Texas at Austin, 1977).
137. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan 1931-1941, Vol. 2 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office [U.S. GPO], 1943), pp. 201-273; W.N. Medlicott, The Economic Blockade, Vol. 1, pp. 328-382, 468-508; Vol. 2, pp. 63-123 (London: HMSO, 1952, 1959); Utley, Going to War, pp. 62-63, 76-79, 93-107, 119-133; Barnhart, Japan Prepares, pp. 129-135, 183-197, 215, 232 n. 47.
138. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan 1931-1941, Vol. 2 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office [U.S. GPO], 1943), pp. 201-273; W.N. Medlicott, The Economic Blockade, Vol. 1, pp. 328-382, 468-508; Vol. 2, pp. 63-123 (London: HMSO, 1952, 1959); Utley, Going to War, pp. 62-63, 76-79, 93-107, 119-133; Barnhart, Japan Prepares, pp. 129-135, 183-197, 215, 232 n. 47.
139. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan 1931-1941, Vol. 2 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office [U.S. GPO], 1943), pp. 201-273; W.N. Medlicott, The Economic Blockade, Vol. 1, pp. 328-382, 468-508; Vol. 2, pp. 63-123 (London: HMSO, 1952, 1959); Utley, Going to War, pp. 62-63, 76-79, 93-107, 119-133; Barnhart, Japan Prepares, pp. 129-135, 183-197, 215, 232 n. 47.
140. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan 1931-1941, Vol. 2 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office [U.S. GPO], 1943), pp. 201-273; W.N. Medlicott, The Economic Blockade, Vol. 1, pp. 328-382, 468-508; Vol. 2, pp. 63-123 (London: HMSO, 1952, 1959); Utley, Going to War, pp. 62-63, 76-79, 93-107, 119-133; Barnhart, Japan Prepares, pp. 129-135, 183-197, 215, 232 n. 47.
141. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan 1931-1941, Vol. 2 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office [U.S. GPO], 1943), pp. 201-273; W.N. Medlicott, The Economic Blockade, Vol. 1, pp. 328-382, 468-508; Vol. 2, pp. 63-123 (London: HMSO, 1952, 1959); Utley, Going to War, pp. 62-63, 76-79, 93-107, 119-133; Barnhart, Japan Prepares, pp. 129-135, 183-197, 215, 232 n. 47.
142. U.S. Department of Commerce, Monthly Summary of Foreign Commerce of the United States, 1940 and 1941.
143. Irvine H. Anderson, Jr., The Standard-Vacuum Oil Company and United States East Asian Policy, 1933-1941 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), pp. 174-180; Dallek, Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, p. 275; Utley, Going to War, pp. 153-156; Barnhart, Japan Prepares, pp. 229-232. For a dissenting view, see Heinrichs, Threshold of War, p. 246 n. 68.
144. Irvine H. Anderson, Jr., The Standard-Vacuum Oil Company and United States East Asian Policy, 1933-1941 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), pp. 174-180; Dallek, Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, p. 275; Utley, Going to War, pp. 153-156; Barnhart, Japan Prepares, pp. 229-232. For a dissenting view, see Heinrichs, Threshold of War, p. 246 n. 68.
145. Irvine H. Anderson, Jr., The Standard-Vacuum Oil Company and United States East Asian Policy, 1933-1941 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), pp. 174-180; Dallek, Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, p. 275; Utley, Going to War, pp. 153-156; Barnhart, Japan Prepares, pp. 229-232. For a dissenting view, see Heinrichs, Threshold of War, p. 246 n. 68.
146. Irvine H. Anderson, Jr., The Standard-Vacuum Oil Company and United States East Asian Policy, 1933-1941 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), pp. 174-180; Dallek, Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, p. 275; Utley, Going to War, pp. 153-156; Barnhart, Japan Prepares, pp. 229-232. For a dissenting view, see Heinrichs, Threshold of War, p. 246 n. 68.
147. Irvine H. Anderson, Jr., The Standard-Vacuum Oil Company and United States East Asian Policy, 1933-1941 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), pp. 174-180; Dallek, Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, p. 275; Utley, Going to War, pp. 153-156; Barnhart, Japan Prepares, pp. 229-232. For a dissenting view, see Heinrichs, Threshold of War, p. 246 n. 68.
148. Utley, Going to War, pp. 50-51, 55, 97-105; Barnhart, Japan Prepares, pp. 55-60, 115-116, 121-122, 126-135, 176-197. Prior to his appointment, Stimson had publicly lobbied for a coercive boycott of Japanese goods; see Donald J. Friedman, The Road from Isolation: The Campaign of the American Committee for Non-Participation in Japanese Aggression, 1938-1941, Harvard East Asian Monographs No. 25 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968).
149. Utley, Going to War, pp. 50-51, 55, 97-105; Barnhart, Japan Prepares, pp. 55-60, 115-116, 121-122, 126-135, 176-197. Prior to his appointment, Stimson had publicly lobbied for a coercive boycott of Japanese goods; see Donald J. Friedman, The Road from Isolation: The Campaign of the American Committee for Non-Participation in Japanese Aggression, 1938-1941, Harvard East Asian Monographs No. 25 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968).
150. Utley, Going to War, pp. 50-51, 55, 97-105; Barnhart, Japan Prepares, pp. 55-60, 115-116, 121-122, 126-135, 176-197. Prior to his appointment, Stimson had publicly lobbied for a coercive boycott of Japanese goods; see Donald J. Friedman, The Road from Isolation: The Campaign of the American Committee for Non-Participation in Japanese Aggression, 1938-1941, Harvard East Asian Monographs No. 25 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968).
151. Utley, Going to War, pp. 49-57, 78-81; Barnhart, Japan Prepares, pp. 121-135.
152. Utley, Going to War, pp. 49-57, 78-81; Barnhart, Japan Prepares, pp. 121-135.
153. Quoted in Dallek, Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, pp. 242-243; cf. 238-243, 269-275.
154. On U.S. policy in July-September, see Utley, Going to War, pp. 151-175; Barnhart, Japan Prepares, pp. 215-236; Heinrichs, Threshold of War, pp. 118-145, 153-162, 177-179. On the response in Tokyo, see Barnhart, Japan Prepares, pp. 162-175, 237-273 .
155. On U.S. policy in July-September, see Utley, Going to War, pp. 151-175; Barnhart, Japan Prepares, pp. 215-236; Heinrichs, Threshold of War, pp. 118-145, 153-162, 177-179. On the response in Tokyo, see Barnhart, Japan Prepares, pp. 162-175, 237-273 .
156. On U.S. policy in July-September, see Utley, Going to War, pp. 151-175; Barnhart, Japan Prepares, pp. 215-236; Heinrichs, Threshold of War, pp. 118-145, 153-162, 177-179. On the response in Tokyo, see Barnhart, Japan Prepares, pp. 162-175, 237-273 .
157. On U.S. policy in July-September, see Utley, Going to War, pp. 151-175; Barnhart, Japan Prepares, pp. 215-236; Heinrichs, Threshold of War, pp. 118-145, 153-162, 177-179. On the response in Tokyo, see Barnhart, Japan Prepares, pp. 162-175, 237-273 .
158. Quoted in Wilkins, "Role of U.S. Business," pp. 349.
159. The other authors were the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Commercial Policy, the Trade Agreements Division chief, and the Assistant Adviser on International Economic Affairs. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1938, Vol. 3 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1954), p. 407; for Hornbeck's response, see pp. 425-427. Herzberg, however, notes that purely economic concerns took a back seat in congressional debates over sanctions, and that another 1938 study predicted that the impact on the U.S.
160. The other authors were the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Commercial Policy, the Trade Agreements Division chief, and the Assistant Adviser on International Economic Affairs. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1938, Vol. 3 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1954), p. 407; for Hornbeck's response, see pp. 425-427. Herzberg, however, notes that purely economic concerns took a back seat in congressional debates over sanctions, and that another 1938 study predicted that the impact on the U.S. economy would be minor. "American Economic Policies," pp. 269, 276-277.
161. The other authors were the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Commercial Policy, the Trade Agreements Division chief, and the Assistant Adviser on International Economic Affairs. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1938, Vol. 3 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1954), p. 407; for Hornbeck's response, see pp. 425-427. Herzberg, however, notes that purely economic concerns took a back seat in congressional debates over sanctions, and that another 1938 study predicted that the impact on the U.S. economy would be minor. "American Economic Policies," pp. 269, 276-277.
162. Utley, Going to War, pp. 125-126. For more details on the Anglo-American economic rivalry, see David R. Reynolds, The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance, 1937-41: A Study in Competitive Co-operation (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982), pp. 13-16, 34, 51-54, 77-78.
163. Utley, Going to War, pp. 125-126. For more details on the Anglo-American economic rivalry, see David R. Reynolds, The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance, 1937-41: A Study in Competitive Co-operation (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982), pp. 13-16, 34, 51-54, 77-78.
164. For a more thorough analysis, see Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989).
165. For examples, see Tucker, "Partners and Rivals"; and John C. Matthews III, "Current Gains and Future Outcomes: When Cumulative Relative Gains Matter," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Summer 1996), pp. 112-146.
166. For examples, see Tucker, "Partners and Rivals"; and John C. Matthews III, "Current Gains and Future Outcomes: When Cumulative Relative Gains Matter," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Summer 1996), pp. 112-146.