The stability of a unipolar world

International Security

Volumn 24, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 5-40

  Wohlforth, William C ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0033413896     PISSN: 01622889     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/016228899560031     Document Type: Article

References (158)

1. Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 70, No. 1 (Winter 1990/1991), pp. 23-33.
2. Patrick Tyler, "The Lone Superpower Plan: Ammunition for Critics," New York Times, March 10, 1992, p. A12.
3. For the most thorough and theoretically grounded criticism of this strategy, see Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Arise," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 5-51; and Layne, "From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America's Future Grand Strategy," International Security, Vol. 22, No. 1 (Summer 1997), pp. 86-124.
4. For the most thorough and theoretically grounded criticism of this strategy, see Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Arise," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 5-51; and Layne, "From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America's Future Grand Strategy," International Security, Vol. 22, No. 1 (Summer 1997), pp. 86-124.
5. The phrase - commonly attributed to Secretary of State Madeleine Albright - is also a favorite of President Bill Clinton's. For example, see the account of his speech announcing the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in Alison Mitchell, "Clinton Urges NATO Expansion in 1999," New York Times, October 23, 1996, p. A20.
6. Kenneth N. Waltz, "Evaluating Theories," American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 915-916; Layne, "Unipolar Illusion"; and Michael Mastanduno, "Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy after the Cold War," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Spring 1997), pp. 44-98. Although I differ with Waltz on the stability of unipolarity, the title of this article and much of its contents reflect intellectual debts to his work on system structure and stability. See Waltz, "The Stability of a Bipolar World," Daedalus, Vol. 93, No. 3 (Summer 1964), pp. 881-901.
7. Kenneth N. Waltz, "Evaluating Theories," American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 915-916; Layne, "Unipolar Illusion"; and Michael Mastanduno, "Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy after the Cold War," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Spring 1997), pp. 44-98. Although I differ with Waltz on the stability of unipolarity, the title of this article and much of its contents reflect intellectual debts to his work on system structure and stability. See Waltz, "The Stability of a Bipolar World," Daedalus, Vol. 93, No. 3 (Summer 1964), pp. 881-901.
8. Kenneth N. Waltz, "Evaluating Theories," American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 915-916; Layne, "Unipolar Illusion"; and Michael Mastanduno, "Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy after the Cold War," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Spring 1997), pp. 44-98. Although I differ with Waltz on the stability of unipolarity, the title of this article and much of its contents reflect intellectual debts to his work on system structure and stability. See Waltz, "The Stability of a Bipolar World," Daedalus, Vol. 93, No. 3 (Summer 1964), pp. 881-901.
9. Kenneth N. Waltz, "Evaluating Theories," American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 915-916; Layne, "Unipolar Illusion"; and Michael Mastanduno, "Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy after the Cold War," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Spring 1997), pp. 44-98. Although I differ with Waltz on the stability of unipolarity, the title of this article and much of its contents reflect intellectual debts to his work on system structure and stability. See Waltz, "The Stability of a Bipolar World," Daedalus, Vol. 93, No. 3 (Summer 1964), pp. 881-901.
10. See Charles A. Kupchan, "After Pax Americana: Benign Power, Regional Integration, and the Sources of Stable Multipolarity," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Fall 1998), pp. 40-79. Samuel P. Huntington maintained this position in Huntington, "Why International Primacy Matters," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 63-83, but he has since abandoned it. A more bullish assessment, although still more pessimistic than the analysis here, is Douglas Lemke, "Continuity of History: Power Transition Theory and the End of the Cold War," Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 34, No. 1 (February 1996), pp. 203-236.
11. See Charles A. Kupchan, "After Pax Americana: Benign Power, Regional Integration, and the Sources of Stable Multipolarity," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Fall 1998), pp. 40-79. Samuel P. Huntington maintained this position in Huntington, "Why International Primacy Matters," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 63-83, but he has since abandoned it. A more bullish assessment, although still more pessimistic than the analysis here, is Douglas Lemke, "Continuity of History: Power Transition Theory and the End of the Cold War," Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 34, No. 1 (February 1996), pp. 203-236.
12. See Charles A. Kupchan, "After Pax Americana: Benign Power, Regional Integration, and the Sources of Stable Multipolarity," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Fall 1998), pp. 40-79. Samuel P. Huntington maintained this position in Huntington, "Why International Primacy Matters," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 63-83, but he has since abandoned it. A more bullish assessment, although still more pessimistic than the analysis here, is Douglas Lemke, "Continuity of History: Power Transition Theory and the End of the Cold War," Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 34, No. 1 (February 1996), pp. 203-236.
13. As Glenn H. Snyder puts it, the international system "appears to be unipolar, though incipiently multipolar." Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997), p. 18. The quoted phrases in this sentence appear in Charles A. Kupchan, "Rethinking Europe," National Interest, No. 56 (Summer 1999); Kupchan, "After Pax Americana," p. 41; Layne, "Unipolar Illusion"; Mastanduno, "Preserving the Unipolar Moment"; and Waltz, "Evaluating Theories," p. 914. Although Charles Krauthammer coined the term "unipolar moment" in his article under that title, he argued that unipolarity had the potential to last a generation.
14. As Glenn H. Snyder puts it, the international system "appears to be unipolar, though incipiently multipolar." Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997), p. 18. The quoted phrases in this sentence appear in Charles A. Kupchan, "Rethinking Europe," National Interest, No. 56 (Summer 1999); Kupchan, "After Pax Americana," p. 41; Layne, "Unipolar Illusion"; Mastanduno, "Preserving the Unipolar Moment"; and Waltz, "Evaluating Theories," p. 914. Although Charles Krauthammer coined the term "unipolar moment" in his article under that title, he argued that unipolarity had the potential to last a generation.
15. As Glenn H. Snyder puts it, the international system "appears to be unipolar, though incipiently multipolar." Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997), p. 18. The quoted phrases in this sentence appear in Charles A. Kupchan, "Rethinking Europe," National Interest, No. 56 (Summer 1999); Kupchan, "After Pax Americana," p. 41; Layne, "Unipolar Illusion"; Mastanduno, "Preserving the Unipolar Moment"; and Waltz, "Evaluating Theories," p. 914. Although Charles Krauthammer coined the term "unipolar moment" in his article under that title, he argued that unipolarity had the potential to last a generation.
16. As Glenn H. Snyder puts it, the international system "appears to be unipolar, though incipiently multipolar." Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997), p. 18. The quoted phrases in this sentence appear in Charles A. Kupchan, "Rethinking Europe," National Interest, No. 56 (Summer 1999); Kupchan, "After Pax Americana," p. 41; Layne, "Unipolar Illusion"; Mastanduno, "Preserving the Unipolar Moment"; and Waltz, "Evaluating Theories," p. 914. Although Charles Krauthammer coined the term "unipolar moment" in his article under that title, he argued that unipolarity had the potential to last a generation.
17. As Glenn H. Snyder puts it, the international system "appears to be unipolar, though incipiently multipolar." Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997), p. 18. The quoted phrases in this sentence appear in Charles A. Kupchan, "Rethinking Europe," National Interest, No. 56 (Summer 1999); Kupchan, "After Pax Americana," p. 41; Layne, "Unipolar Illusion"; Mastanduno, "Preserving the Unipolar Moment"; and Waltz, "Evaluating Theories," p. 914. Although Charles Krauthammer coined the term "unipolar moment" in his article under that title, he argued that unipolarity had the potential to last a generation.
18. As Glenn H. Snyder puts it, the international system "appears to be unipolar, though incipiently multipolar." Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997), p. 18. The quoted phrases in this sentence appear in Charles A. Kupchan, "Rethinking Europe," National Interest, No. 56 (Summer 1999); Kupchan, "After Pax Americana," p. 41; Layne, "Unipolar Illusion"; Mastanduno, "Preserving the Unipolar Moment"; and Waltz, "Evaluating Theories," p. 914. Although Charles Krauthammer coined the term "unipolar moment" in his article under that title, he argued that unipolarity had the potential to last a generation.
19. Samuel P. Huntington, "The Lonely Superpower," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 2 (March/April 1999), p. 36. For similar views of the post-Cold War structure, see Aaron L. Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Winter 1993/94), pp. 5-33; and Josef Joffe, "'Bismarck' or 'Britain'? Toward an American Grand Strategy after Bipolarity," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring 1995), pp. 94-117.
20. Samuel P. Huntington, "The Lonely Superpower," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 2 (March/April 1999), p. 36. For similar views of the post-Cold War structure, see Aaron L. Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Winter 1993/94), pp. 5-33; and Josef Joffe, "'Bismarck' or 'Britain'? Toward an American Grand Strategy after Bipolarity," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring 1995), pp. 94-117.
21. Samuel P. Huntington, "The Lonely Superpower," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 2 (March/April 1999), p. 36. For similar views of the post-Cold War structure, see Aaron L. Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Winter 1993/94), pp. 5-33; and Josef Joffe, "'Bismarck' or 'Britain'? Toward an American Grand Strategy after Bipolarity," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring 1995), pp. 94-117.
22. The assumption that realism predicts instability after the Cold War pervades the scholarly debate. See, for example, Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, eds., The Cold War and After: Prospects for Peace - An International Security Reader (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1993); and David A. Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). For more varied perspectives on realism and unipolarity, see Ethan B. Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno, eds., Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies after the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999). Explanations for stability despite the balance of power fall roughly into three categories: (1) liberal arguments, including democratization, economic interdependence, and international institutions. For examples, see Bruce M. Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993); John R. Oneal and Bruce M. Russett, "The Classical Liberals Were Right: Democracy, Interdependence, and Conflict, 1950-1985," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 41, No. 2 (June 1997), pp. 267-294; G. John Ikenberry, "Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Persistence of the American Postwar Order," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Winter 1998/99), pp. 43-78. Cultural and ideational arguments that highlight social learning. See John Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War (Rochester, N.Y.: University of Rochester Press, 1989); and Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), chap. 6. Arguments that highlight systemic and material factors other than the balance of power, such as globalization, the offense-defense balance, or nuclear weapons. See Stephen G. Brooks, "The Globalization of Production and the Changing Benefits of Conquest," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 43, No. 5 (October 1999); and Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe after the Cold War," in Jones and Miller, Cold War and After.
23. The assumption that realism predicts instability after the Cold War pervades the scholarly debate. See, for example, Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, eds., The Cold War and After: Prospects for Peace - An International Security Reader (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1993); and David A. Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). For more varied perspectives on realism and unipolarity, see Ethan B. Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno, eds., Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies after the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999). Explanations for stability despite the balance of power fall roughly into three categories: (1) liberal arguments, including democratization, economic interdependence, and international institutions. For examples, see Bruce M. Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993); John R. Oneal and Bruce M. Russett, "The Classical Liberals Were Right: Democracy, Interdependence, and Conflict, 1950-1985," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 41, No. 2 (June 1997), pp. 267-294; G. John Ikenberry, "Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Persistence of the American Postwar Order," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Winter 1998/99), pp. 43-78. Cultural and ideational arguments that highlight social learning. See John Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War (Rochester, N.Y.: University of Rochester Press, 1989); and Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), chap. 6. Arguments that highlight systemic and material factors other than the balance of power, such as globalization, the offense-defense balance, or nuclear weapons. See Stephen G. Brooks, "The Globalization of Production and the Changing Benefits of Conquest," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 43, No. 5 (October 1999); and Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe after the Cold War," in Jones and Miller, Cold War and After.
24. The assumption that realism predicts instability after the Cold War pervades the scholarly debate. See, for example, Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, eds., The Cold War and After: Prospects for Peace - An International Security Reader (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1993); and David A. Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). For more varied perspectives on realism and unipolarity, see Ethan B. Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno, eds., Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies after the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999). Explanations for stability despite the balance of power fall roughly into three categories: (1) liberal arguments, including democratization, economic interdependence, and international institutions. For examples, see Bruce M. Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993); John R. Oneal and Bruce M. Russett, "The Classical Liberals Were Right: Democracy, Interdependence, and Conflict, 1950-1985," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 41, No. 2 (June 1997), pp. 267-294; G. John Ikenberry, "Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Persistence of the American Postwar Order," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Winter 1998/99), pp. 43-78. Cultural and ideational arguments that highlight social learning. See John Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War (Rochester, N.Y.: University of Rochester Press, 1989); and Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), chap. 6. Arguments that highlight systemic and material factors other than the balance of power, such as globalization, the offense-defense balance, or nuclear weapons. See Stephen G. Brooks, "The Globalization of Production and the Changing Benefits of Conquest," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 43, No. 5 (October 1999); and Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe after the Cold War," in Jones and Miller, Cold War and After.
25. The assumption that realism predicts instability after the Cold War pervades the scholarly debate. See, for example, Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, eds., The Cold War and After: Prospects for Peace - An International Security Reader (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1993); and David A. Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). For more varied perspectives on realism and unipolarity, see Ethan B. Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno, eds., Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies after the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999). Explanations for stability despite the balance of power fall roughly into three categories: (1) liberal arguments, including democratization, economic interdependence, and international institutions. For examples, see Bruce M. Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993); John R. Oneal and Bruce M. Russett, "The Classical Liberals Were Right: Democracy, Interdependence, and Conflict, 1950-1985," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 41, No. 2 (June 1997), pp. 267-294; G. John Ikenberry, "Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Persistence of the American Postwar Order," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Winter 1998/99), pp. 43-78. Cultural and ideational arguments that highlight social learning. See John Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War (Rochester, N.Y.: University of Rochester Press, 1989); and Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), chap. 6. Arguments that highlight systemic and material factors other than the balance of power, such as globalization, the offense-defense balance, or nuclear weapons. See Stephen G. Brooks, "The Globalization of Production and the Changing Benefits of Conquest," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 43, No. 5 (October 1999); and Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe after the Cold War," in Jones and Miller, Cold War and After.
26. The assumption that realism predicts instability after the Cold War pervades the scholarly debate. See, for example, Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, eds., The Cold War and After: Prospects for Peace - An International Security Reader (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1993); and David A. Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). For more varied perspectives on realism and unipolarity, see Ethan B. Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno, eds., Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies after the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999). Explanations for stability despite the balance of power fall roughly into three categories: (1) liberal arguments, including democratization, economic interdependence, and international institutions. For examples, see Bruce M. Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993); John R. Oneal and Bruce M. Russett, "The Classical Liberals Were Right: Democracy, Interdependence, and Conflict, 1950-1985," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 41, No. 2 (June 1997), pp. 267-294; G. John Ikenberry, "Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Persistence of the American Postwar Order," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Winter 1998/99), pp. 43-78. Cultural and ideational arguments that highlight social learning. See John Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War (Rochester, N.Y.: University of Rochester Press, 1989); and Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), chap. 6. Arguments that highlight systemic and material factors other than the balance of power, such as globalization, the offense-defense balance, or nuclear weapons. See Stephen G. Brooks, "The Globalization of Production and the Changing Benefits of Conquest," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 43, No. 5 (October 1999); and Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe after the Cold War," in Jones and Miller, Cold War and After.
27. The assumption that realism predicts instability after the Cold War pervades the scholarly debate. See, for example, Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, eds., The Cold War and After: Prospects for Peace - An International Security Reader (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1993); and David A. Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). For more varied perspectives on realism and unipolarity, see Ethan B. Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno, eds., Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies after the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999). Explanations for stability despite the balance of power fall roughly into three categories: (1) liberal arguments, including democratization, economic interdependence, and international institutions. For examples, see Bruce M. Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993); John R. Oneal and Bruce M. Russett, "The Classical Liberals Were Right: Democracy, Interdependence, and Conflict, 1950-1985," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 41, No. 2 (June 1997), pp. 267-294; G. John Ikenberry, "Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Persistence of the American Postwar Order," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Winter 1998/99), pp. 43-78. Cultural and ideational arguments that highlight social learning. See John Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War (Rochester, N.Y.: University of Rochester Press, 1989); and Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), chap. 6. Arguments that highlight systemic and material factors other than the balance of power, such as globalization, the offense-defense balance, or nuclear weapons. See Stephen G. Brooks, "The Globalization of Production and the Changing Benefits of Conquest," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 43, No. 5 (October 1999); and Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe after the Cold War," in Jones and Miller, Cold War and After.
28. The assumption that realism predicts instability after the Cold War pervades the scholarly debate. See, for example, Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, eds., The Cold War and After: Prospects for Peace - An International Security Reader (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1993); and David A. Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). For more varied perspectives on realism and unipolarity, see Ethan B. Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno, eds., Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies after the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999). Explanations for stability despite the balance of power fall roughly into three categories: (1) liberal arguments, including democratization, economic interdependence, and international institutions. For examples, see Bruce M. Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993); John R. Oneal and Bruce M. Russett, "The Classical Liberals Were Right: Democracy, Interdependence, and Conflict, 1950-1985," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 41, No. 2 (June 1997), pp. 267-294; G. John Ikenberry, "Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Persistence of the American Postwar Order," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Winter 1998/99), pp. 43-78. Cultural and ideational arguments that highlight social learning. See John Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War (Rochester, N.Y.: University of Rochester Press, 1989); and Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), chap. 6. Arguments that highlight systemic and material factors other than the balance of power, such as globalization, the offense-defense balance, or nuclear weapons. See Stephen G. Brooks, "The Globalization of Production and the Changing Benefits of Conquest," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 43, No. 5 (October 1999); and Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe after the Cold War," in Jones and Miller, Cold War and After.
29. The assumption that realism predicts instability after the Cold War pervades the scholarly debate. See, for example, Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, eds., The Cold War and After: Prospects for Peace - An International Security Reader (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1993); and David A. Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). For more varied perspectives on realism and unipolarity, see Ethan B. Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno, eds., Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies after the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999). Explanations for stability despite the balance of power fall roughly into three categories: (1) liberal arguments, including democratization, economic interdependence, and international institutions. For examples, see Bruce M. Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993); John R. Oneal and Bruce M. Russett, "The Classical Liberals Were Right: Democracy, Interdependence, and Conflict, 1950-1985," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 41, No. 2 (June 1997), pp. 267-294; G. John Ikenberry, "Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Persistence of the American Postwar Order," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Winter 1998/99), pp. 43-78. Cultural and ideational arguments that highlight social learning. See John Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War (Rochester, N.Y.: University of Rochester Press, 1989); and Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), chap. 6. Arguments that highlight systemic and material factors other than the balance of power, such as globalization, the offense-defense balance, or nuclear weapons. See Stephen G. Brooks, "The Globalization of Production and the Changing Benefits of Conquest," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 43, No. 5 (October 1999); and Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe after the Cold War," in Jones and Miller, Cold War and After.
30. The assumption that realism predicts instability after the Cold War pervades the scholarly debate. See, for example, Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, eds., The Cold War and After: Prospects for Peace - An International Security Reader (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1993); and David A. Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). For more varied perspectives on realism and unipolarity, see Ethan B. Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno, eds., Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies after the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999). Explanations for stability despite the balance of power fall roughly into three categories: (1) liberal arguments, including democratization, economic interdependence, and international institutions. For examples, see Bruce M. Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993); John R. Oneal and Bruce M. Russett, "The Classical Liberals Were Right: Democracy, Interdependence, and Conflict, 1950-1985," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 41, No. 2 (June 1997), pp. 267-294; G. John Ikenberry, "Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Persistence of the American Postwar Order," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Winter 1998/99), pp. 43-78. Cultural and ideational arguments that highlight social learning. See John Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War (Rochester, N.Y.: University of Rochester Press, 1989); and Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), chap. 6. Arguments that highlight systemic and material factors other than the balance of power, such as globalization, the offense-defense balance, or nuclear weapons. See Stephen G. Brooks, "The Globalization of Production and the Changing Benefits of Conquest," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 43, No. 5 (October 1999); and Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe after the Cold War," in Jones and Miller, Cold War and After.
31. The assumption that realism predicts instability after the Cold War pervades the scholarly debate. See, for example, Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, eds., The Cold War and After: Prospects for Peace - An International Security Reader (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1993); and David A. Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). For more varied perspectives on realism and unipolarity, see Ethan B. Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno, eds., Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies after the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999). Explanations for stability despite the balance of power fall roughly into three categories: (1) liberal arguments, including democratization, economic interdependence, and international institutions. For examples, see Bruce M. Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993); John R. Oneal and Bruce M. Russett, "The Classical Liberals Were Right: Democracy, Interdependence, and Conflict, 1950-1985," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 41, No. 2 (June 1997), pp. 267-294; G. John Ikenberry, "Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Persistence of the American Postwar Order," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Winter 1998/99), pp. 43-78. Cultural and ideational arguments that highlight social learning. See John Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War (Rochester, N.Y.: University of Rochester Press, 1989); and Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), chap. 6. Arguments that highlight systemic and material factors other than the balance of power, such as globalization, the offense-defense balance, or nuclear weapons. See Stephen G. Brooks, "The Globalization of Production and the Changing Benefits of Conquest," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 43, No. 5 (October 1999); and Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe after the Cold War," in Jones and Miller, Cold War and After.
32. I focus on material elements of power mainly because current scholarly debates place a premium on making clear distinctions between ideas and material forces. See Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics; and Jeffrey Legro and Andrew Moravscik, "Is Anybody Still a Realist?" International Security, Vol. 24, No. 2 (Fall 1999). Many nonmaterial elements of power also favor the United States and strengthen the argument for unipolarity's stability. On "soft power," see Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (New York: Basic Books, 1990).
33. I focus on material elements of power mainly because current scholarly debates place a premium on making clear distinctions between ideas and material forces. See Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics; and Jeffrey Legro and Andrew Moravscik, "Is Anybody Still a Realist?" International Security, Vol. 24, No. 2 (Fall 1999). Many nonmaterial elements of power also favor the United States and strengthen the argument for unipolarity's stability. On "soft power," see Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (New York: Basic Books, 1990).
34. I focus on material elements of power mainly because current scholarly debates place a premium on making clear distinctions between ideas and material forces. See Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics; and Jeffrey Legro and Andrew Moravscik, "Is Anybody Still a Realist?" International Security, Vol. 24, No. 2 (Fall 1999). Many nonmaterial elements of power also favor the United States and strengthen the argument for unipolarity's stability. On "soft power," see Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (New York: Basic Books, 1990).
35. I define "stability" as peacefulness and durability. Kenneth Waltz first conflated these two meanings of stability in "The Stability of a Bipolar World." He later eliminated the ambiguity by defining stability exclusively as durability in Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979). avoid ambiguity by treating peacefulness and durability separately. Durability subsumes another common understanding of stability: the idea of a self-reinforcing equilibrium. To say that an international system is durable implies that it can experience significant shifts in power relations without undergoing fundamental change. See Robert Jervis, Systems Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997), chap. 3.
36. I define "stability" as peacefulness and durability. Kenneth Waltz first conflated these two meanings of stability in "The Stability of a Bipolar World." He later eliminated the ambiguity by defining stability exclusively as durability in Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979). avoid ambiguity by treating peacefulness and durability separately. Durability subsumes another common understanding of stability: the idea of a self-reinforcing equilibrium. To say that an international system is durable implies that it can experience significant shifts in power relations without undergoing fundamental change. See Robert Jervis, Systems Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997), chap. 3.
37. Because overwhelming preponderance favors both peace and durability, stability is less sensitive to how the United States defines its interests than most scholars assume. In contrast, many realists hold that stability is strictly contingent upon Washington's nonthreatening or status quo stance in world affairs. See Mastanduno, "Preserving the Unipolar Moment." Similarly, Kupchan, "After Pax Americana," argues that the United States' "benign" character explains stability.
38. Because overwhelming preponderance favors both peace and durability, stability is less sensitive to how the United States defines its interests than most scholars assume. In contrast, many realists hold that stability is strictly contingent upon Washington's nonthreatening or status quo stance in world affairs. See Mastanduno, "Preserving the Unipolar Moment." Similarly, Kupchan, "After Pax Americana," argues that the United States' "benign" character explains stability.
39. This was Krauthammer's original argument in "The Unipolar Moment." For a comprehensive review of the debate that reflects the standard scholarly skepticism toward the stability of unipolarity, see Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, "Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Winter 1996/97), pp. 5-54.
40. This was Krauthammer's original argument in "The Unipolar Moment." For a comprehensive review of the debate that reflects the standard scholarly skepticism toward the stability of unipolarity, see Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, "Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Winter 1996/97), pp. 5-54.
41. This definition flows from the logic of neorealist balance-of-power theory, but it is consistent with classical balance-of-power thinking. See Layne, "Unipolar Illusion," p. 130 n. 2; Snyder, Alliance Politics, chap. 1; Morton Kaplan, System and Process in International Politics (New York: Wiley, 1957), pp. 22-36; Harrison Wagner, "What Was Bipolarity?" International Organization, Vol. 47, No. 1 (Winter 1993), pp. 77-106; and Emerson M.S. Niou, Peter C. Ordeshook, and Gregory F. Rose, The Balance of Power: Stability in International Systems (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 76.
42. This definition flows from the logic of neorealist balance-of-power theory, but it is consistent with classical balance-of-power thinking. See Layne, "Unipolar Illusion," p. 130 n. 2; Snyder, Alliance Politics, chap. 1; Morton Kaplan, System and Process in International Politics (New York: Wiley, 1957), pp. 22-36; Harrison Wagner, "What Was Bipolarity?" International Organization, Vol. 47, No. 1 (Winter 1993), pp. 77-106; and Emerson M.S. Niou, Peter C. Ordeshook, and Gregory F. Rose, The Balance of Power: Stability in International Systems (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 76.
43. This definition flows from the logic of neorealist balance-of-power theory, but it is consistent with classical balance-of-power thinking. See Layne, "Unipolar Illusion," p. 130 n. 2; Snyder, Alliance Politics, chap. 1; Morton Kaplan, System and Process in International Politics (New York: Wiley, 1957), pp. 22-36; Harrison Wagner, "What Was Bipolarity?" International Organization, Vol. 47, No. 1 (Winter 1993), pp. 77-106; and Emerson M.S. Niou, Peter C. Ordeshook, and Gregory F. Rose, The Balance of Power: Stability in International Systems (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 76.
44. This definition flows from the logic of neorealist balance-of-power theory, but it is consistent with classical balance-of-power thinking. See Layne, "Unipolar Illusion," p. 130 n. 2; Snyder, Alliance Politics, chap. 1; Morton Kaplan, System and Process in International Politics (New York: Wiley, 1957), pp. 22-36; Harrison Wagner, "What Was Bipolarity?" International Organization, Vol. 47, No. 1 (Winter 1993), pp. 77-106; and Emerson M.S. Niou, Peter C. Ordeshook, and Gregory F. Rose, The Balance of Power: Stability in International Systems (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 76.
45. This definition flows from the logic of neorealist balance-of-power theory, but it is consistent with classical balance-of-power thinking. See Layne, "Unipolar Illusion," p. 130 n. 2; Snyder, Alliance Politics, chap. 1; Morton Kaplan, System and Process in International Politics (New York: Wiley, 1957), pp. 22-36; Harrison Wagner, "What Was Bipolarity?" International Organization, Vol. 47, No. 1 (Winter 1993), pp. 77-106; and Emerson M.S. Niou, Peter C. Ordeshook, and Gregory F. Rose, The Balance of Power: Stability in International Systems (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 76.
46. Germany was clearly the strongest state in Europe in 1910, and the United States was generally thought to be the strongest state in the world in 1960, but neither system was unipolar. One of Waltz's most widely accepted insights was that the world was bipolar in the Cold War even though the two poles shared it with other major powers such as France, Britain, West Germany, Japan, and China. In the same vein, a system can be unipolar, with unique properties owing to the extreme concentration of capabilities in one state, and yet also contain other substantial powers. Cf. Huntington, "Lonely Superpower," who defines unipolarity as a system with only one great power. Throughout this article, I hew as closely as possible to the definitions of central terms in Waltz, Theory of International Politics, as they have gained the widest currency. Although the distinction between bipolarity and multipolarity is one of the most basic in international relations theory, scholars do debate whether bipolar structures are more durable or peaceful than multipolar ones. For a concise discussion, see Jack S. Levy, "The Causes of War and the Conditions of Peace," Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 1 (1998), pp. 139-165. There are good reasons for analyzing tripolarity as a distinct structure. See Randall L. Schweller, Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler's Strategy of World Conquest (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998).
47. Germany was clearly the strongest state in Europe in 1910, and the United States was generally thought to be the strongest state in the world in 1960, but neither system was unipolar. One of Waltz's most widely accepted insights was that the world was bipolar in the Cold War even though the two poles shared it with other major powers such as France, Britain, West Germany, Japan, and China. In the same vein, a system can be unipolar, with unique properties owing to the extreme concentration of capabilities in one state, and yet also contain other substantial powers. Cf. Huntington, "Lonely Superpower," who defines unipolarity as a system with only one great power. Throughout this article, I hew as closely as possible to the definitions of central terms in Waltz, Theory of International Politics, as they have gained the widest currency. Although the distinction between bipolarity and multipolarity is one of the most basic in international relations theory, scholars do debate whether bipolar structures are more durable or peaceful than multipolar ones. For a concise discussion, see Jack S. Levy, "The Causes of War and the Conditions of Peace," Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 1 (1998), pp. 139-165. There are good reasons for analyzing tripolarity as a distinct structure. See Randall L. Schweller, Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler's Strategy of World Conquest (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998).
48. Germany was clearly the strongest state in Europe in 1910, and the United States was generally thought to be the strongest state in the world in 1960, but neither system was unipolar. One of Waltz's most widely accepted insights was that the world was bipolar in the Cold War even though the two poles shared it with other major powers such as France, Britain, West Germany, Japan, and China. In the same vein, a system can be unipolar, with unique properties owing to the extreme concentration of capabilities in one state, and yet also contain other substantial powers. Cf. Huntington, "Lonely Superpower," who defines unipolarity as a system with only one great power. Throughout this article, I hew as closely as possible to the definitions of central terms in Waltz, Theory of International Politics, as they have gained the widest currency. Although the distinction between bipolarity and multipolarity is one of the most basic in international relations theory, scholars do debate whether bipolar structures are more durable or peaceful than multipolar ones. For a concise discussion, see Jack S. Levy, "The Causes of War and the Conditions of Peace," Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 1 (1998), pp. 139-165. There are good reasons for analyzing tripolarity as a distinct structure. See Randall L. Schweller, Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler's Strategy of World Conquest (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998).
49. Germany was clearly the strongest state in Europe in 1910, and the United States was generally thought to be the strongest state in the world in 1960, but neither system was unipolar. One of Waltz's most widely accepted insights was that the world was bipolar in the Cold War even though the two poles shared it with other major powers such as France, Britain, West Germany, Japan, and China. In the same vein, a system can be unipolar, with unique properties owing to the extreme concentration of capabilities in one state, and yet also contain other substantial powers. Cf. Huntington, "Lonely Superpower," who defines unipolarity as a system with only one great power. Throughout this article, I hew as closely as possible to the definitions of central terms in Waltz, Theory of International Politics, as they have gained the widest currency. Although the distinction between bipolarity and multipolarity is one of the most basic in international relations theory, scholars do debate whether bipolar structures are more durable or peaceful than multipolar ones. For a concise discussion, see Jack S. Levy, "The Causes of War and the Conditions of Peace," Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 1 (1998), pp. 139-165. There are good reasons for analyzing tripolarity as a distinct structure. See Randall L. Schweller, Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler's Strategy of World Conquest (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998).
50. Another useful comparison pursued by Layne, "Unipolar Illusion, " is the Hapsburg ascendancy in sixteenth-and seventeenth-century Europe. I omit if for space reasons (the comparison to pre-Westphalian international politics is especially demanding) and because of limited data.
51. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 31.
52. Writing of the United States in the 1960s, Waltz notes, "Never in modern history has a great power enjoyed so wide an economic and technological lead over the only other great power in the race." Ibid., p. 201. Throughout he is more concerned about the United States' surplus power and its associated temptations than about the rising power of any other states.
53. Bruce M. Russett, "The Mysterious Case of Vanishing Hegemony. Or, Is Mark Twain Really Dead?" International Organization, Vol. 39, No. 2 (Spring 1985), p. 211. See also Samuel P. Huntington, "The U.S.: Decline or Renewal?" Foreign Affairs, Vol. 67, No. 2 (Winter 1988/1989), pp. 76-96; and Susan Strange, "The Persistent Myth of Lost Hegemony," International Organization, Vol. 41, No. 4 (Autumn 1987), pp. 551-574.
54. Bruce M. Russett, "The Mysterious Case of Vanishing Hegemony. Or, Is Mark Twain Really Dead?" International Organization, Vol. 39, No. 2 (Spring 1985), p. 211. See also Samuel P. Huntington, "The U.S.: Decline or Renewal?" Foreign Affairs, Vol. 67, No. 2 (Winter 1988/1989), pp. 76-96; and Susan Strange, "The Persistent Myth of Lost Hegemony," International Organization, Vol. 41, No. 4 (Autumn 1987), pp. 551-574.
55. Bruce M. Russett, "The Mysterious Case of Vanishing Hegemony. Or, Is Mark Twain Really Dead?" International Organization, Vol. 39, No. 2 (Spring 1985), p. 211. See also Samuel P. Huntington, "The U.S.: Decline or Renewal?" Foreign Affairs, Vol. 67, No. 2 (Winter 1988/1989), pp. 76-96; and Susan Strange, "The Persistent Myth of Lost Hegemony," International Organization, Vol. 41, No. 4 (Autumn 1987), pp. 551-574.
56. Nye, Bound to Lead; and Henry R. Nau, The Myth of America's Decline: Leading the World Economy into the 1990s (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990).
57. Nye, Bound to Lead; and Henry R. Nau, The Myth of America's Decline: Leading the World Economy into the 1990s (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990).
58. By the 1980s, U.S. productivity growth had fallen to 1 percent a year. Since 1992 the rate of increase has been as high as 3 percent a year. See Nicholas Valéry, "Innovation in Industry," Economist, February 20, 1999, p. 27. For comparisons that show the increased productivity gap in favor of the United States among Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, see European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Transition Report 1997 (London: EBRD, 1997).
59. By the 1980s, U.S. productivity growth had fallen to 1 percent a year. Since 1992 the rate of increase has been as high as 3 percent a year. See Nicholas Valéry, "Innovation in Industry," Economist, February 20, 1999, p. 27. For comparisons that show the increased productivity gap in favor of the United States among Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, see European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Transition Report 1997 (London: EBRD, 1997).
60. The COW index combines the following indicators with equal weights: total population, urban population, energy consumption, iron and steel production, military expenditures, and military personnel. As noted in Table 1, 1996 data were compiled by the author from different sources; COW methodology may lead to different results. I include the COW measure not because I think it is a good one but because it has a long history in the field. Quantitative scholars are increasingly critical of all such composite indexes. Gross domestic product (GDP) is becoming the favored indicator, a trend started by A.F.K. Organski in World Politics, 2d ed. (New York: Knopf, 1965): pp. 199-200, 211-215, and furthered by Organski and Jacek Kugler in The War Ledger (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980). Given its weighting of energy consumption, steel production, and military personnel, for example, the COW index had the Soviet Union surpassing U.S. power in 1971. Indeed, despite the fact that the Soviet Union produced, at best, one-third of U.S. GDP in the 1980s, it decisively surpassed the United States on every composite power indicator. See John R. Oneal, "Measuring the Material Base of the Contemporary East-West Balance of Power," International Interactions, Vol. 15, No. 2 (Summer 1989), pp. 177-196.
61. The COW index combines the following indicators with equal weights: total population, urban population, energy consumption, iron and steel production, military expenditures, and military personnel. As noted in Table 1, 1996 data were compiled by the author from different sources; COW methodology may lead to different results. I include the COW measure not because I think it is a good one but because it has a long history in the field. Quantitative scholars are increasingly critical of all such composite indexes. Gross domestic product (GDP) is becoming the favored indicator, a trend started by A.F.K. Organski in World Politics, 2d ed. (New York: Knopf, 1965): pp. 199-200, 211-215, and furthered by Organski and Jacek Kugler in The War Ledger (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980). Given its weighting of energy consumption, steel production, and military personnel, for example, the COW index had the Soviet Union surpassing U.S. power in 1971. Indeed, despite the fact that the Soviet Union produced, at best, one-third of U.S. GDP in the 1980s, it decisively surpassed the United States on every composite power indicator. See John R. Oneal, "Measuring the Material Base of the Contemporary East-West Balance of Power," International Interactions, Vol. 15, No. 2 (Summer 1989), pp. 177-196.
62. The COW index combines the following indicators with equal weights: total population, urban population, energy consumption, iron and steel production, military expenditures, and military personnel. As noted in Table 1, 1996 data were compiled by the author from different sources; COW methodology may lead to different results. I include the COW measure not because I think it is a good one but because it has a long history in the field. Quantitative scholars are increasingly critical of all such composite indexes. Gross domestic product (GDP) is becoming the favored indicator, a trend started by A.F.K. Organski in World Politics, 2d ed. (New York: Knopf, 1965): pp. 199-200, 211-215, and furthered by Organski and Jacek Kugler in The War Ledger (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980). Given its weighting of energy consumption, steel production, and military personnel, for example, the COW index had the Soviet Union surpassing U.S. power in 1971. Indeed, despite the fact that the Soviet Union produced, at best, one-third of U.S. GDP in the 1980s, it decisively surpassed the United States on every composite power indicator. See John R. Oneal, "Measuring the Material Base of the Contemporary East-West Balance of Power," International Interactions, Vol. 15, No. 2 (Summer 1989), pp. 177-196.
63. The only major indicator of hegemonic status in which the United States has continued to decline is net foreign indebtedness, which surpassed $1 trillion in 1996. For a strong argument on the importance of this indicator in governing the international political economy, see Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1987). There are other power indexes - many of which are linked to highly specific theories-that show continued U.S. decline. See George Modelski and William R. Thompson, Leading Sectors and World Powers: The Coevolution of Global Economics and Politics (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1996); and Karen A. Rasler and William R. Thompson, Great Powers and Global Struggle, 1490-1990 (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1994). By most other measures of naval power or industrial competitiveness, however, the U.S. position has improved in the 1990s.
64. The only major indicator of hegemonic status in which the United States has continued to decline is net foreign indebtedness, which surpassed $1 trillion in 1996. For a strong argument on the importance of this indicator in governing the international political economy, see Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1987). There are other power indexes - many of which are linked to highly specific theories-that show continued U.S. decline. See George Modelski and William R. Thompson, Leading Sectors and World Powers: The Coevolution of Global Economics and Politics (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1996); and Karen A. Rasler and William R. Thompson, Great Powers and Global Struggle, 1490-1990 (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1994). By most other measures of naval power or industrial competitiveness, however, the U.S. position has improved in the 1990s.
65. The only major indicator of hegemonic status in which the United States has continued to decline is net foreign indebtedness, which surpassed $1 trillion in 1996. For a strong argument on the importance of this indicator in governing the international political economy, see Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1987). There are other power indexes - many of which are linked to highly specific theories-that show continued U.S. decline. See George Modelski and William R. Thompson, Leading Sectors and World Powers: The Coevolution of Global Economics and Politics (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1996); and Karen A. Rasler and William R. Thompson, Great Powers and Global Struggle, 1490-1990 (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1994). By most other measures of naval power or industrial competitiveness, however, the U.S. position has improved in the 1990s.
66. According to the COW index, Britain's relative power peaked in 1860, with a 36 percent share. In that year, Britain consumed 50 percent more energy and produced 35 percent more iron than all the other great powers (including the United States) combined; its urban population was twice as large as that of the next most urban power (France). This is the indicator Layne, "Unipolar Illusion," uses to make his case for Britain's status as a unipolar power. For more on measuring relative power, polarity, and concentration of capabilities over time, see J. David Singer and Paul F. Diehl, eds., Measuring the Correlates of War (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1990).
67. According to the COW index, Britain's relative power peaked in 1860, with a 36 percent share. In that year, Britain consumed 50 percent more energy and produced 35 percent more iron than all the other great powers (including the United States) combined; its urban population was twice as large as that of the next most urban power (France). This is the indicator Layne, "Unipolar Illusion," uses to make his case for Britain's status as a unipolar power. For more on measuring relative power, polarity, and concentration of capabilities over time, see J. David Singer and Paul F. Diehl, eds., Measuring the Correlates of War (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1990).
68. Table 2 substitutes per capita gross domestic product for urban population (which was supposed to capture modernization) and manufacturing production for steel production (which was supposed to capture industrial power).
69. OECD, Science, Technology, and Industry: Scoreboard of Indicators 1997 (Paris: OECD, 1997). By one estimate, the United States accounted for 35.8 percent of total world spending on technology in 1997. Japan accounted for 17.6
70. OECD, Science, Technology, and Industry: Scoreboard of Indicators 2997 (Paris: OECD, 1997). By one estimate, the United States accounted for 35.8 percent of total world spending on technology in 1997. Japan accounted for 17.6 percent, Germany 6.6 percent, Britain 5.7 percent, France 5.1 percent, and China 1.6 percent. Mark Landler, "When the Dragon Awakes . . . and Finds That It's Not 1999 Anymore," New York Times, May 11, 1999, p. C1.
71. These studies do forecast future challenges - as they have since the 1970s. The incentives of nearly all data-gathering agencies are to emphasize U.S. vulnerability, yet as good social scientists, the authors of these studies acknowledge the country's decisive current advantages. See, for example, U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of Technology Policy, The New Innovators: Global Patenting Trends in Five Sectors (Washington, D.C.: OTP, 1998). Similarly, according to Valéry, "Innovation in Industry," p. 27, "By 1998, the Council on Competitiveness, an industry think tank in Washington set up to fathom the reasons for the country's decline, concluded that America had not only regained its former strengths, but was now far ahead technologically in the five most crucial sectors of its economy."
72. These studies do forecast future challenges - as they have since the 1970s. The incentives of nearly all data-gathering agencies are to emphasize U.S. vulnerability, yet as good social scientists, the authors of these studies acknowledge the country's decisive current advantages. See, for example, U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of Technology Policy, The New Innovators: Global Patenting Trends in Five Sectors (Washington, D.C.: OTP, 1998). Similarly, according to Valéry, "Innovation in Industry," p. 27, "By 1998, the Council on Competitiveness, an industry think tank in Washington set up to fathom the reasons for the country's decline, concluded that America had not only regained its former strengths, but was now far ahead technologically in the five most crucial sectors of its economy."
73. This is based on the neoclassical realist argument that power is important to decisionmakers but very hard to measure. See, for a general discussion, Gideon Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy," World Politics, Vol. 51, No. 1 (October 1998), pp. 144-172.
74. The relationship between hierarchies of power revealed by systemic wars and the stability of international systems is explored in Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). On wars as power tests, see Geoffrey Blainey The Causes of War (New York: Free Press, 1973).
75. The relationship between hierarchies of power revealed by systemic wars and the stability of international systems is explored in Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). On wars as power tests, see Geoffrey Blainey The Causes of War (New York: Free Press, 1973).
76. It goes without saying that the nineteenth-century international system was perceived as multipolar, although Russia and Britain were seen as being in a class by themselves. See R.W. Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 1789-1914: A Survey of Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1937). To gain a sense of Russia's power in the period, it is enough to recall Czar Nicholas's dispatch of 400,000 troops to crush the 1848 revolt in Hungary - and his simultaneous offer to send another contingent across Europe to establish order in Paris should it be necessary. On Russia as Europe's hegemon, see M.S. Anderson, The Rise of Modern Diplomacy, 1450-1919 (London: Longman, 1993); Adam Watson, "Russia in the European States System," in Watson and Hedley Bull, eds., The Expansion of International Society (Oxford: Clarendon, 1984). On Russia and Britain as (rivalrous) "cohegemons," see Paul W. Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics (London: Oxford University Press, 1993); and Gordon A. Craig, "The System of Alliances and the Balance of Power," in J.P.T. Bury, ed., New Cambridge Modern History, Volume 10: The Zenith of European Power, 1830-70 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1960). The best, concise discussion of the nature and limitations of British power in this period is Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery (London: Macmillan, 1983), chap. 6.
77. It goes without saying that the nineteenth-century international system was perceived as multipolar, although Russia and Britain were seen as being in a class by themselves. See R.W. Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 1789-1914: A Survey of Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1937). To gain a sense of Russia's power in the period, it is enough to recall Czar Nicholas's dispatch of 400,000 troops to crush the 1848 revolt in Hungary - and his simultaneous offer to send another contingent across Europe to establish order in Paris should it be necessary. On Russia as Europe's hegemon, see M.S. Anderson, The Rise of Modern Diplomacy, 1450-1919 (London: Longman, 1993); Adam Watson, "Russia in the European States System," in Watson and Hedley Bull, eds., The Expansion of International Society (Oxford: Clarendon, 1984). On Russia and Britain as (rivalrous) "cohegemons," see Paul W. Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics (London: Oxford University Press, 1993); and Gordon A. Craig, "The System of Alliances and the Balance of Power," in J.P.T. Bury, ed., New Cambridge Modern History, Volume 10: The Zenith of European Power, 1830-70 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1960). The best, concise discussion of the nature and limitations of British power in this period is Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery (London: Macmillan, 1983), chap. 6.
78. It goes without saying that the nineteenth-century international system was perceived as multipolar, although Russia and Britain were seen as being in a class by themselves. See R.W. Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 1789-1914: A Survey of Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1937). To gain a sense of Russia's power in the period, it is enough to recall Czar Nicholas's dispatch of 400,000 troops to crush the 1848 revolt in Hungary - and his simultaneous offer to send another contingent across Europe to establish order in Paris should it be necessary. On Russia as Europe's hegemon, see M.S. Anderson, The Rise of Modern Diplomacy, 1450-1919 (London: Longman, 1993); Adam Watson, "Russia in the European States System," in Watson and Hedley Bull, eds., The Expansion of International Society (Oxford: Clarendon, 1984). On Russia and Britain as (rivalrous) "cohegemons," see Paul W. Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics (London: Oxford University Press, 1993); and Gordon A. Craig, "The System of Alliances and the Balance of Power," in J.P.T. Bury, ed., New Cambridge Modern History, Volume 10: The Zenith of European Power, 1830-70 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1960). The best, concise discussion of the nature and limitations of British power in this period is Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery (London: Macmillan, 1983), chap. 6.
79. It goes without saying that the nineteenth-century international system was perceived as multipolar, although Russia and Britain were seen as being in a class by themselves. See R.W. Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 1789-1914: A Survey of Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1937). To gain a sense of Russia's power in the period, it is enough to recall Czar Nicholas's dispatch of 400,000 troops to crush the 1848 revolt in Hungary - and his simultaneous offer to send another contingent across Europe to establish order in Paris should it be necessary. On Russia as Europe's hegemon, see M.S. Anderson, The Rise of Modern Diplomacy, 1450-1919 (London: Longman, 1993); Adam Watson, "Russia in the European States System," in Watson and Hedley Bull, eds., The Expansion of International Society (Oxford: Clarendon, 1984). On Russia and Britain as (rivalrous) "cohegemons," see Paul W. Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics (London: Oxford University Press, 1993); and Gordon A. Craig, "The System of Alliances and the Balance of Power," in J.P.T. Bury, ed., New Cambridge Modern History, Volume 10: The Zenith of European Power, 1830-70 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1960). The best, concise discussion of the nature and limitations of British power in this period is Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery (London: Macmillan, 1983), chap. 6.
80. It goes without saying that the nineteenth-century international system was perceived as multipolar, although Russia and Britain were seen as being in a class by themselves. See R.W. Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 1789-1914: A Survey of Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1937). To gain a sense of Russia's power in the period, it is enough to recall Czar Nicholas's dispatch of 400,000 troops to crush the 1848 revolt in Hungary - and his simultaneous offer to send another contingent across Europe to establish order in Paris should it be necessary. On Russia as Europe's hegemon, see M.S. Anderson, The Rise of Modern Diplomacy, 1450-1919 (London: Longman, 1993); Adam Watson, "Russia in the European States System," in Watson and Hedley Bull, eds., The Expansion of International Society (Oxford: Clarendon, 1984). On Russia and Britain as (rivalrous) "cohegemons," see Paul W. Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics (London: Oxford University Press, 1993); and Gordon A. Craig, "The System of Alliances and the Balance of Power," in J.P.T. Bury, ed., New Cambridge Modern History, Volume 10: The Zenith of European Power, 1830-70 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1960). The best, concise discussion of the nature and limitations of British power in this period is Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery (London: Macmillan, 1983), chap. 6.
81. It goes without saying that the nineteenth-century international system was perceived as multipolar, although Russia and Britain were seen as being in a class by themselves. See R.W. Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 1789-1914: A Survey of Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1937). To gain a sense of Russia's power in the period, it is enough to recall Czar Nicholas's dispatch of 400,000 troops to crush the 1848 revolt in Hungary - and his simultaneous offer to send another contingent across Europe to establish order in Paris should it be necessary. On Russia as Europe's hegemon, see M.S. Anderson, The Rise of Modern Diplomacy, 1450-1919 (London: Longman, 1993); Adam Watson, "Russia in the European States System," in Watson and Hedley Bull, eds., The Expansion of International Society (Oxford: Clarendon, 1984). On Russia and Britain as (rivalrous) "cohegemons," see Paul W. Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics (London: Oxford University Press, 1993); and Gordon A. Craig, "The System of Alliances and the Balance of Power," in J.P.T. Bury, ed., New Cambridge Modern History, Volume 10: The Zenith of European Power, 1830-70 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1960). The best, concise discussion of the nature and limitations of British power in this period is Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery (London: Macmillan, 1983), chap. 6.
82. For an excellent account of the British debate on the lessons of Crimea, see Olive Anderson, A Liberal State at War: English Politics and Economics during the Crimean War (New York: St. Martin's, 1967).
83. Thus the COW measure suffers from a hindsight bias that accords importance to industrial capabilities before their military significance was appreciated. Cf. William B. Moul, "Measuring the 'Balance of Power': A Look at Some Numbers," Review of International Studies, Vol. 15, No. 2 (April 1989), pp. 101-121. On the conservatism of nineteenth-century military assessments, see B.H. Liddell-Hart, "Armed Forces and the Art of War: Armies," in Bury, New Cambridge Modern History. On the slowly growing perceptions of industrialization and its implications for war, see William H. McNeil, The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society since A.D. 1000 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982); Dennis Showalter, Railroads and Rifles: Soldiers, Technology, and the Unification of Germany (Hamden, Conn.: Archer, 1975); Paul Kennedy, The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860-1914 (London: Allen and Unwin, 1980); and Kennedy, Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery.
84. Thus the COW measure suffers from a hindsight bias that accords importance to industrial capabilities before their military significance was appreciated. Cf. William B. Moul, "Measuring the 'Balance of Power': A Look at Some Numbers," Review of International Studies, Vol. 15, No. 2 (April 1989), pp. 101-121. On the conservatism of nineteenth-century military assessments, see B.H. Liddell-Hart, "Armed Forces and the Art of War: Armies," in Bury, New Cambridge Modern History. On the slowly growing perceptions of industrialization and its implications for war, see William H. McNeil, The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society since A.D. 1000 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982); Dennis Showalter, Railroads and Rifles: Soldiers, Technology, and the Unification of Germany (Hamden, Conn.: Archer, 1975); Paul Kennedy, The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860-1914 (London: Allen and Unwin, 1980); and Kennedy, Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery.
85. Thus the COW measure suffers from a hindsight bias that accords importance to industrial capabilities before their military significance was appreciated. Cf. William B. Moul, "Measuring the 'Balance of Power': A Look at Some Numbers," Review of International Studies, Vol. 15, No. 2 (April 1989), pp. 101-121. On the conservatism of nineteenth-century military assessments, see B.H. Liddell-Hart, "Armed Forces and the Art of War: Armies," in Bury, New Cambridge Modern History. On the slowly growing perceptions of industrialization and its implications for war, see William H. McNeil, The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society since A.D. 1000 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982); Dennis Showalter, Railroads and Rifles: Soldiers, Technology, and the Unification of Germany (Hamden, Conn.: Archer, 1975); Paul Kennedy, The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860-1914 (London: Allen and Unwin, 1980); and Kennedy, Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery.
86. Thus the COW measure suffers from a hindsight bias that accords importance to industrial capabilities before their military significance was appreciated. Cf. William B. Moul, "Measuring the 'Balance of Power': A Look at Some Numbers," Review of International Studies, Vol. 15, No. 2 (April 1989), pp. 101-121. On the conservatism of nineteenth-century military assessments, see B.H. Liddell-Hart, "Armed Forces and the Art of War: Armies," in Bury, New Cambridge Modern History. On the slowly growing perceptions of industrialization and its implications for war, see William H. McNeil, The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society since A.D. 1000 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982); Dennis Showalter, Railroads and Rifles: Soldiers, Technology, and the Unification of Germany (Hamden, Conn.: Archer, 1975); Paul Kennedy, The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860-1914 (London: Allen and Unwin, 1980); and Kennedy, Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery.
87. Thus the COW measure suffers from a hindsight bias that accords importance to industrial capabilities before their military significance was appreciated. Cf. William B. Moul, "Measuring the 'Balance of Power': A Look at Some Numbers," Review of International Studies, Vol. 15, No. 2 (April 1989), pp. 101-121. On the conservatism of nineteenth-century military assessments, see B.H. Liddell-Hart, "Armed Forces and the Art of War: Armies," in Bury, New Cambridge Modern History. On the slowly growing perceptions of industrialization and its implications for war, see William H. McNeil, The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society since A.D. 1000 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982); Dennis Showalter, Railroads and Rifles: Soldiers, Technology, and the Unification of Germany (Hamden, Conn.: Archer, 1975); Paul Kennedy, The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860-1914 (London: Allen and Unwin, 1980); and Kennedy, Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery.
88. Thus the COW measure suffers from a hindsight bias that accords importance to industrial capabilities before their military significance was appreciated. Cf. William B. Moul, "Measuring the 'Balance of Power': A Look at Some Numbers," Review of International Studies, Vol. 15, No. 2 (April 1989), pp. 101-121. On the conservatism of nineteenth-century military assessments, see B.H. Liddell-Hart, "Armed Forces and the Art of War: Armies," in Bury, New Cambridge Modern History. On the slowly growing perceptions of industrialization and its implications for war, see William H. McNeil, The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society since A.D. 1000 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982); Dennis Showalter, Railroads and Rifles: Soldiers, Technology, and the Unification of Germany (Hamden, Conn.: Archer, 1975); Paul Kennedy, The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860-1914 (London: Allen and Unwin, 1980); and Kennedy, Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery.
89. I discuss these lessons in Wohlforth, Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions during the Cold War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993). A much fuller analysis is available in recent historical works. For the U.S. side, see Marc Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999); and Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1992). And for the view from Moscow, see Vladislav M. Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin's Cold War (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996); and Vojtech Mastny, The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).
90. I discuss these lessons in Wohlforth, Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions during the Cold War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993). A much fuller analysis is available in recent historical works. For the U.S. side, see Marc Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999); and Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1992). And for the view from Moscow, see Vladislav M. Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin's Cold War (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996); and Vojtech Mastny, The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).
91. I discuss these lessons in Wohlforth, Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions during the Cold War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993). A much fuller analysis is available in recent historical works. For the U.S. side, see Marc Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999); and Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1992). And for the view from Moscow, see Vladislav M. Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin's Cold War (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996); and Vojtech Mastny, The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).
92. I discuss these lessons in Wohlforth, Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions during the Cold War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993). A much fuller analysis is available in recent historical works. For the U.S. side, see Marc Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999); and Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1992). And for the view from Moscow, see Vladislav M. Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin's Cold War (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996); and Vojtech Mastny, The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).
93. I discuss these lessons in Wohlforth, Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions during the Cold War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993). A much fuller analysis is available in recent historical works. For the U.S. side, see Marc Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999); and Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1992). And for the view from Moscow, see Vladislav M. Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin's Cold War (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996); and Vojtech Mastny, The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).
94. As Marc Trachtenberg summarizes the view from Washington in 1948: "The defense of the West rested on a very narrow base. Even with the nuclear monopoly, American power only barely balanced Soviet power in central Europe." See Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace, p. 91. Cf. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power, who is more critical of U.S. officials' power assessments. Nevertheless, Leffler's narrative - and the massive documentary evidence it relies on - would not be possible had the Soviet potential to dominate Eurasia not been plausible.
95. As Marc Trachtenberg summarizes the view from Washington in 1948: "The defense of the West rested on a very narrow base. Even with the nuclear monopoly, American power only barely balanced Soviet power in central Europe." See Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace, p. 91. Cf. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power, who is more critical of U.S. officials' power assessments. Nevertheless, Leffler's narrative - and the massive documentary evidence it relies on - would not be possible had the Soviet potential to dominate Eurasia not been plausible.
96. For simplicity, I treat only Waltz's neorealist version of balance-of-power theory. By "hegemonic theory," I mean the theory of hegemonic war and change in Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, as well as power transition theory, which is sometimes applied to pairs of states other than hegemon and challenger. In addition to Organski, World Politics, and Organski and Kugler, War Ledger, see Jacek Kugler and Douglas Lemke, eds., Parity and War: Evaluation and Extension of the War Ledger (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996); and the chapters by George Modelski and William R. Thompson, Manus I. Midlarsky, and Jacek Kugler and A.F.K. Organski in Midlarsky, ed., Handbook of War Studies (London: Unwin, 1989). Theories of the balance of power and hegemony are often thought to be competing. I maintained this position in Elusive Balance, chap. 1. In many instances, however, they are complementary. See Randall L. Schweller and William C. Wohlforth, "Power Test: Updating Realism in Response to the End of the Cold War," Security Studies (forthcoming). For an interesting synthesis with some points of contact with the analysis here, see William R. Thompson, "Dehio, Long Cycles, and the Geohistorical Context of Structural Transition," World Politics, Vol. 45, No. 1 (October 1992), pp. 127-152; and Rasler and Thompson, Great Powers and Global Struggle.
97. For simplicity, I treat only Waltz's neorealist version of balance-of-power theory. By "hegemonic theory," I mean the theory of hegemonic war and change in Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, as well as power transition theory, which is sometimes applied to pairs of states other than hegemon and challenger. In addition to Organski, World Politics, and Organski and Kugler, War Ledger, see Jacek Kugler and Douglas Lemke, eds., Parity and War: Evaluation and Extension of the War Ledger (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996); and the chapters by George Modelski and William R. Thompson, Manus I. Midlarsky, and Jacek Kugler and A.F.K. Organski in Midlarsky, ed., Handbook of War Studies (London: Unwin, 1989). Theories of the balance of power and hegemony are often thought to be competing. I maintained this position in Elusive Balance, chap. 1. In many instances, however, they are complementary. See Randall L. Schweller and William C. Wohlforth, "Power Test: Updating Realism in Response to the End of the Cold War," Security Studies (forthcoming). For an interesting synthesis with some points of contact with the analysis here, see William R. Thompson, "Dehio, Long Cycles, and the Geohistorical Context of Structural Transition," World Politics, Vol. 45, No. 1 (October 1992), pp. 127-152; and Rasler and Thompson, Great Powers and Global Struggle.
98. For simplicity, I treat only Waltz's neorealist version of balance-of-power theory. By "hegemonic theory," I mean the theory of hegemonic war and change in Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, as well as power transition theory, which is sometimes applied to pairs of states other than hegemon and challenger. In addition to Organski, World Politics, and Organski and Kugler, War Ledger, see Jacek Kugler and Douglas Lemke, eds., Parity and War: Evaluation and Extension of the War Ledger (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996); and the chapters by George Modelski and William R. Thompson, Manus I. Midlarsky, and Jacek Kugler and A.F.K. Organski in Midlarsky, ed., Handbook of War Studies (London: Unwin, 1989). Theories of the balance of power and hegemony are often thought to be competing. I maintained this position in Elusive Balance, chap. 1. In many instances, however, they are complementary. See Randall L. Schweller and William C. Wohlforth, "Power Test: Updating Realism in Response to the End of the Cold War," Security Studies (forthcoming). For an interesting synthesis with some points of contact with the analysis here, see William R. Thompson, "Dehio, Long Cycles, and the Geohistorical Context of Structural Transition," World Politics, Vol. 45, No. 1 (October 1992), pp. 127-152; and Rasler and Thompson, Great Powers and Global Struggle.
99. For simplicity, I treat only Waltz's neorealist version of balance-of-power theory. By "hegemonic theory," I mean the theory of hegemonic war and change in Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, as well as power transition theory, which is sometimes applied to pairs of states other than hegemon and challenger. In addition to Organski, World Politics, and Organski and Kugler, War Ledger, see Jacek Kugler and Douglas Lemke, eds., Parity and War: Evaluation and Extension of the War Ledger (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996); and the chapters by George Modelski and William R. Thompson, Manus I. Midlarsky, and Jacek Kugler and A.F.K. Organski in Midlarsky, ed., Handbook of War Studies (London: Unwin, 1989). Theories of the balance of power and hegemony are often thought to be competing. I maintained this position in Elusive Balance, chap. 1. In many instances, however, they are complementary. See Randall L. Schweller and William C. Wohlforth, "Power Test: Updating Realism in Response to the End of the Cold War," Security Studies (forthcoming). For an interesting synthesis with some points of contact with the analysis here, see William R. Thompson, "Dehio, Long Cycles, and the Geohistorical Context of Structural Transition," World Politics, Vol. 45, No. 1 (October 1992), pp. 127-152; and Rasler and Thompson, Great Powers and Global Struggle.
100. For simplicity, I treat only Waltz's neorealist version of balance-of-power theory. By "hegemonic theory," I mean the theory of hegemonic war and change in Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, as well as power transition theory, which is sometimes applied to pairs of states other than hegemon and challenger. In addition to Organski, World Politics, and Organski and Kugler, War Ledger, see Jacek Kugler and Douglas Lemke, eds., Parity and War: Evaluation and Extension of the War Ledger (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996); and the chapters by George Modelski and William R. Thompson, Manus I. Midlarsky, and Jacek Kugler and A.F.K. Organski in Midlarsky, ed., Handbook of War Studies (London: Unwin, 1989). Theories of the balance of power and hegemony are often thought to be competing. I maintained this position in Elusive Balance, chap. 1. In many instances, however, they are complementary. See Randall L. Schweller and William C. Wohlforth, "Power Test: Updating Realism in Response to the End of the Cold War," Security Studies (forthcoming). For an interesting synthesis with some points of contact with the analysis here, see William R. Thompson, "Dehio, Long Cycles, and the Geohistorical Context of Structural Transition," World Politics, Vol. 45, No. 1 (October 1992), pp. 127-152; and Rasler and Thompson, Great Powers and Global Struggle.
101. For simplicity, I treat only Waltz's neorealist version of balance-of-power theory. By "hegemonic theory," I mean the theory of hegemonic war and change in Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, as well as power transition theory, which is sometimes applied to pairs of states other than hegemon and challenger. In addition to Organski, World Politics, and Organski and Kugler, War Ledger, see Jacek Kugler and Douglas Lemke, eds., Parity and War: Evaluation and Extension of the War Ledger (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996); and the chapters by George Modelski and William R. Thompson, Manus I. Midlarsky, and Jacek Kugler and A.F.K. Organski in Midlarsky, ed., Handbook of War Studies (London: Unwin, 1989). Theories of the balance of power and hegemony are often thought to be competing. I maintained this position in Elusive Balance, chap. 1. In many instances, however, they are complementary. See Randall L. Schweller and William C. Wohlforth, "Power Test: Updating Realism in Response to the End of the Cold War," Security Studies (forthcoming). For an interesting synthesis with some points of contact with the analysis here, see William R. Thompson, "Dehio, Long Cycles, and the Geohistorical Context of Structural Transition," World Politics, Vol. 45, No. 1 (October 1992), pp. 127-152; and Rasler and Thompson, Great Powers and Global Struggle.
102. For simplicity, I treat only Waltz's neorealist version of balance-of-power theory. By "hegemonic theory," I mean the theory of hegemonic war and change in Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, as well as power transition theory, which is sometimes applied to pairs of states other than hegemon and challenger. In addition to Organski, World Politics, and Organski and Kugler, War Ledger, see Jacek Kugler and Douglas Lemke, eds., Parity and War: Evaluation and Extension of the War Ledger (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996); and the chapters by George Modelski and William R. Thompson, Manus I. Midlarsky, and Jacek Kugler and A.F.K. Organski in Midlarsky, ed., Handbook of War Studies (London: Unwin, 1989). Theories of the balance of power and hegemony are often thought to be competing. I maintained this position in Elusive Balance, chap. 1. In many instances, however, they are complementary. See Randall L. Schweller and William C. Wohlforth, "Power Test: Updating Realism in Response to the End of the Cold War," Security Studies (forthcoming). For an interesting synthesis with some points of contact with the analysis here, see William R. Thompson, "Dehio, Long Cycles, and the Geohistorical Context of Structural Transition," World Politics, Vol. 45, No. 1 (October 1992), pp. 127-152; and Rasler and Thompson, Great Powers and Global Struggle.
103. For simplicity, I treat only Waltz's neorealist version of balance-of-power theory. By "hegemonic theory," I mean the theory of hegemonic war and change in Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, as well as power transition theory, which is sometimes applied to pairs of states other than hegemon and challenger. In addition to Organski, World Politics, and Organski and Kugler, War Ledger, see Jacek Kugler and Douglas Lemke, eds., Parity and War: Evaluation and Extension of the War Ledger (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996); and the chapters by George Modelski and William R. Thompson, Manus I. Midlarsky, and Jacek Kugler and A.F.K. Organski in Midlarsky, ed., Handbook of War Studies (London: Unwin, 1989). Theories of the balance of power and hegemony are often thought to be competing. I maintained this position in Elusive Balance, chap. 1. In many instances, however, they are complementary. See Randall L. Schweller and William C. Wohlforth, "Power Test: Updating Realism in Response to the End of the Cold War," Security Studies (forthcoming). For an interesting synthesis with some points of contact with the analysis here, see William R. Thompson, "Dehio, Long Cycles, and the Geohistorical Context of Structural Transition," World Politics, Vol. 45, No. 1 (October 1992), pp. 127-152; and Rasler and Thompson, Great Powers and Global Struggle.
104. Exceptions include Lemke, "Continuity of History"; and Mark S. Sheetz, "Correspondence: Debating the Unipolar Moment," International Security, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Winter 1997/1998), pp. 168-174.
105. Exceptions include Lemke, "Continuity of History"; and Mark S. Sheetz, "Correspondence: Debating the Unipolar Moment," International Security, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Winter 1997/1998), pp. 168-174.
106. Waltz, "Evaluating Theories," p. 915.
107. The connection between uncertainty, the number of principal players, and war proneness has been questioned. The key to most recent criticisms of neorealist arguments concerning stability is that the distribution of capabilities alone is insufficient to explain the war proneness of international systems. Ancillary assumptions concerning risk attitudes or preferences for the status quo are necessary. See Levy, "The Causes of War"; Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, "Neorealism's Logic and Evidence: When Is a Theory Falsified?" paper prepared for the Fiftieth Annual Conference of the International Studies Association, Washington, D.C., February 1999; and Robert Powell, "Stability and the Distribution of Power," World Politics, Vol. 48, No. 2 (January 1996), pp. 239-267, and sources cited therein. These analyses are right that no distribution of power rules out war if some states are great risk takers or have extreme clashes of interest. The greater the preponderance of power, however, the more extreme the values of other variables must be to produce war, because preponderance reduces the uncertainty of assessing the balance of power.
108. The connection between uncertainty, the number of principal players, and war proneness has been questioned. The key to most recent criticisms of neorealist arguments concerning stability is that the distribution of capabilities alone is insufficient to explain the war proneness of international systems. Ancillary assumptions concerning risk attitudes or preferences for the status quo are necessary. See Levy, "The Causes of War"; Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, "Neorealism's Logic and Evidence: When Is a Theory Falsified?" paper prepared for the Fiftieth Annual Conference of the International Studies Association, Washington, D.C., February 1999; and Robert Powell, "Stability and the Distribution of Power," World Politics, Vol. 48, No. 2 (January 1996), pp. 239-267, and sources cited therein. These analyses are right that no distribution of power rules out war if some states are great risk takers or have extreme clashes of interest. The greater the preponderance of power, however, the more extreme the values of other variables must be to produce war, because preponderance reduces the uncertainty of assessing the balance of power.
109. The connection between uncertainty, the number of principal players, and war proneness has been questioned. The key to most recent criticisms of neorealist arguments concerning stability is that the distribution of capabilities alone is insufficient to explain the war proneness of international systems. Ancillary assumptions concerning risk attitudes or preferences for the status quo are necessary. See Levy, "The Causes of War"; Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, "Neorealism's Logic and Evidence: When Is a Theory Falsified?" paper prepared for the Fiftieth Annual Conference of the International Studies Association, Washington, D.C., February 1999; and Robert Powell, "Stability and the Distribution of Power," World Politics, Vol. 48, No. 2 (January 1996), pp. 239-267, and sources cited therein. These analyses are right that no distribution of power rules out war if some states are great risk takers or have extreme clashes of interest. The greater the preponderance of power, however, the more extreme the values of other variables must be to produce war, because preponderance reduces the uncertainty of assessing the balance of power.
110. The sole pole's power advantages matter only to the degree that it is engaged, and it is most likely to be engaged in politics among the other major powers. The argument applies with less force to potential security competition between regional powers, or between a second-tier state and a lesser power with which the system leader lacks close ties.
111. Three may be worse than four, however. See Waltz, Theory of International Politics, chap. 9; and Schweller, Deadly Imbalances.
112. Three may be worse than four, however. See Waltz, Theory of International Politics, chap. 9; and Schweller, Deadly Imbalances.
113. See Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, Paul W. Schroeder, Austria, Britain, and the Crimean War: The Destruction of the European Concert (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1972); Adam Watson, The Evolution of International Society (London: Routledge, 1992); and William E. Echard, Napoleon III and the Concert of Europe (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1983), chaps. 1-2.
114. See Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, Paul W. Schroeder, Austria, Britain, and the Crimean War: The Destruction of the European Concert (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1972); Adam Watson, The Evolution of International Society (London: Routledge, 1992); and William E. Echard, Napoleon III and the Concert of Europe (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1983), chaps. 1-2.
115. See Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, Paul W. Schroeder, Austria, Britain, and the Crimean War: The Destruction of the European Concert (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1972); Adam Watson, The Evolution of International Society (London: Routledge, 1992); and William E. Echard, Napoleon III and the Concert of Europe (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1983), chaps. 1-2.
116. See Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, Paul W. Schroeder, Austria, Britain, and the Crimean War: The Destruction of the European Concert (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1972); Adam Watson, The Evolution of International Society (London: Routledge, 1992); and William E. Echard, Napoleon III and the Concert of Europe (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1983), chaps. 1-2.
117. Cf. David M. Goldfrank, The Origins of the Crimean War (London: Longman, 1994); Norman Rich, Why the Crimean War? A Cautionary Tale (London: University Press of America, 1985); Ludwig Dehio The Precarious Balance: Four Centuries of the European Struggle (New York: Knopf, 1962), chap 4; David Wetzel, The Crimean War: A Diplomatic History (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985); and A.J.P. Taylor's account in Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1954).
118. Cf. David M. Goldfrank, The Origins of the Crimean War (London: Longman, 1994); Norman Rich, Why the Crimean War? A Cautionary Tale (London: University Press of America, 1985); Ludwig Dehio The Precarious Balance: Four Centuries of the European Struggle (New York: Knopf, 1962), chap 4; David Wetzel, The Crimean War: A Diplomatic History (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985); and A.J.P. Taylor's account in Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1954).
119. Cf. David M. Goldfrank, The Origins of the Crimean War (London: Longman, 1994); Norman Rich, Why the Crimean War? A Cautionary Tale (London: University Press of America, 1985); Ludwig Dehio The Precarious Balance: Four Centuries of the European Struggle (New York: Knopf, 1962), chap 4; David Wetzel, The Crimean War: A Diplomatic History (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985); and A.J.P. Taylor's account in Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1954).
120. Cf. David M. Goldfrank, The Origins of the Crimean War (London: Longman, 1994); Norman Rich, Why the Crimean War? A Cautionary Tale (London: University Press of America, 1985); Ludwig Dehio The Precarious Balance: Four Centuries of the European Struggle (New York: Knopf, 1962), chap 4; David Wetzel, The Crimean War: A Diplomatic History (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985); and A.J.P. Taylor's account in Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1954).
121. Cf. David M. Goldfrank, The Origins of the Crimean War (London: Longman, 1994); Norman Rich, Why the Crimean War? A Cautionary Tale (London: University Press of America, 1985); Ludwig Dehio The Precarious Balance: Four Centuries of the European Struggle (New York: Knopf, 1962), chap 4; David Wetzel, The Crimean War: A Diplomatic History (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985); and A.J.P. Taylor's account in Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1954).
122. Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace; Leffler, A Preponderance of Power; John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); Mastny, The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity; and Zubok and Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin's Cold War.
123. Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace; Leffler, A Preponderance of Power; John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); Mastny, The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity; and Zubok and Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin's Cold War.
124. Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace; Leffler, A Preponderance of Power; John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); Mastny, The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity; and Zubok and Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin's Cold War.
125. Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace; Leffler, A Preponderance of Power; John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); Mastny, The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity; and Zubok and Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin's Cold War.
126. Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace; Leffler, A Preponderance of Power; John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); Mastny, The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity; and Zubok and Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin's Cold War.
127. Here I depart from Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 161-162, for whom a stable system is one with no "consequential variation" in the number of poles (e.g., changes between multi-, tri-, bi-, or unipolarity). In the European states system, multipolarity obtained for three centuries. While the multipolar structure itself was long lived, however, the identity of its members (the leading states in the system) changed with much greater frequency - a matter of no small consequence for the governments concerned. By this measure (change in the identity, as opposed to the number, of the states that define the structure), bipolarity had a typical life span. See Bueno de Mesquita, "Neorealism's Logic and Evidence." I expect that the unipolar era will be of comparable duration.
128. Here I depart from Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 161-162, for whom a stable system is one with no "consequential variation" in the number of poles (e.g., changes between multi-, tri-, bi-, or unipolarity). In the European states system, multipolarity obtained for three centuries. While the multipolar structure itself was long lived, however, the identity of its members (the leading states in the system) changed with much greater frequency - a matter of no small consequence for the governments concerned. By this measure (change in the identity, as opposed to the number, of the states that define the structure), bipolarity had a typical life span. See Bueno de Mesquita, "Neorealism's Logic and Evidence." I expect that the unipolar era will be of comparable duration.
129. I do not deny the utility of making simplifying assumptions when speculating about the balance of power. For one such analysis, see Michael W. Doyle, Ways of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997), pp. 456-473.
130. Waltz, Theory of International Politics; and Snyder, Alliance Politics.
131. Waltz, Theory of International Politics; and Snyder, Alliance Politics.
132. See Snyder, Alliance Politics; and Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," International Organization, Vol. 44, No. 1 (Winter 1990), pp. 137-168.
133. See Snyder, Alliance Politics; and Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," International Organization, Vol. 44, No. 1 (Winter 1990), pp. 137-168.
134. The key here is that from the standpoint of balance-of-power theory, we are dealing with a structural fait accompli. Of the two powers that made up the bipolar order, one collapsed, leaving the other at the center of a unipolar system. A situation has arisen in which the theory's central tendency cannot operate. Many readers will perceive this state of affairs as a testimony to the weakness of balance-of-power theory. I agree. The weaker the theory, the longer our initial expectations of unipolarity's longevity.
135. On "pivotal states," see Robert Chase, Emily Hill, and Paul Kennedy, The Pivotal States: A New Framework for U.S. Policy in the Developing World (New York: W.W. Norton, 1999).
136. Kupchan, "Pax Americana," advocates just such a system.
137. See Kathleen R. McNamara, "European Monetary Union and International Economic Cooperation," a report on a workshop organized by the International Finance Section, Princeton University, April 3, 1998. Cf. Kupchan, "Rethinking Europe," who contends: "Assuming the European Union succeeds in deepening its level of integration and adding new members, it will soon have influence on matters of finance and trade equal to America's. A more balanced strategic relationship is likely to follow." Many Europeans see a contradiction between widening and deepening the EU.
138. See Kathleen R. McNamara, "European Monetary Union and International Economic Cooperation," a report on a workshop organized by the International Finance Section, Princeton University, April 3, 1998. Cf. Kupchan, "Rethinking Europe," who contends: "Assuming the European Union succeeds in deepening its level of integration and adding new members, it will soon have influence on matters of finance and trade equal to America's. A more balanced strategic relationship is likely to follow." Many Europeans see a contradiction between widening and deepening the EU.
139. This is why many Americans support an EU "security identity." If all goes well, Europe will become a more useful and outward-looking partner while posing virtually no chance of becoming a geopolitical competitor. See, for example, Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: American Strategy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives (New York: Basic Books, 1997), chap. 3.
140. See Max Otte, A Rising Middle Power? German Foreign Policy in Transformation, 1988-1998 (New York: St. Martin's, forthcoming), chap. 3.
141. Assessments of Japan's future growth in the late 1990s are probably as overly pessimistic as those of the 1980s were overly optimistic. According to Peter Hartcher, "Can Japan Recover?" National Interest, No. 54 (Winter 1998/1999), p. 33, "Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) estimates that even if the country manages to emerge from recession, its maximum potential growth rate until the year 2010 is a pathetic 1.8 percent, and a miserable 0.8 percent thereafter. And that is one of the more optimistic estimates." If, in contrast to these assumptions, the Japanese economy recovers in 2000 and grows at a robust annual average rate of 5 percent, while the U.S. economy grows at 2 percent, Japan's economy would surpass the United States around 2025 (2033 using PPP estimates of the size of the two economies in 1997).
142. These calculations are naturally heavily dependent on initial conditions. Assuming the Chinese economy grows at 8 percent a year while the U.S. economy grows at a 2 percent rate, China would surpass the United States in about 2013, extrapolating from 1997 PPP exchange-rate estimates of the two economies' relative size; 2020 if the PPP estimate is deflated as suggested by Central Intelligence Agency economists; and 2040 if market exchange rates are used. On measuring China's economic output, see Angus Maddison, Monitoring the World Economy, 1820-1992 (Paris: OECD, 1995), appendix C.
143. Ibid., Table C-16e.
144. A balanced appraisal is Avery Goldstein, "Great Expectations: Interpreting China's Arrival," International Security, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Winter 1997/98), pp. 36-73.
145. A preponderance of power makes other states less likely to oppose the United States, but it could also tempt Washington to demand more of others. Because an overwhelming preponderance of power fosters stability, the clash of interests would have to be extreme to produce a counter-balance. In other words, the United States would have to work very hard to push all the other great powers and many regional ones into an opposing alliance. The point is important in theory but moot in practice. Because the post-Cold War world is already so much a reflection of U.S. interests Washington is less tempted than another state might be to make additional claims as its relative power increases. The result is a preponderance of power backing up the status quo, a condition theorists of many stripes view as an augury of peace and stability. For different perspectives see E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis: 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations (London: Macmillan, 1951); Organski, World Politics; Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics; Powell, "Stability and the Distribution of Power"; and Randall L. Schweller, "Neorealism's Status Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?" Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Spring 1996), pp. 225-258.
146. A preponderance of power makes other states less likely to oppose the United States, but it could also tempt Washington to demand more of others. Because an overwhelming preponderance of power fosters stability, the clash of interests would have to be extreme to produce a counter-balance. In other words, the United States would have to work very hard to push all the other great powers and many regional ones into an opposing alliance. The point is important in theory but moot in practice. Because the post-Cold War world is already so much a reflection of U.S. interests Washington is less tempted than another state might be to make additional claims as its relative power increases. The result is a preponderance of power backing up the status quo, a condition theorists of many stripes view as an augury of peace and stability. For different perspectives see E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis: 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations (London: Macmillan, 1951); Organski, World Politics; Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics; Powell, "Stability and the Distribution of Power"; and Randall L. Schweller, "Neorealism's Status Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?" Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Spring 1996), pp. 225-258.
147. A preponderance of power makes other states less likely to oppose the United States, but it could also tempt Washington to demand more of others. Because an overwhelming preponderance of power fosters stability, the clash of interests would have to be extreme to produce a counter-balance. In other words, the United States would have to work very hard to push all the other great powers and many regional ones into an opposing alliance. The point is important in theory but moot in practice. Because the post-Cold War world is already so much a reflection of U.S. interests Washington is less tempted than another state might be to make additional claims as its relative power increases. The result is a preponderance of power backing up the status quo, a condition theorists of many stripes view as an augury of peace and stability. For different perspectives see E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis: 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations (London: Macmillan, 1951); Organski, World Politics; Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics; Powell, "Stability and the Distribution of Power"; and Randall L. Schweller, "Neorealism's Status Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?" Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Spring 1996), pp. 225-258.
148. A preponderance of power makes other states less likely to oppose the United States, but it could also tempt Washington to demand more of others. Because an overwhelming preponderance of power fosters stability, the clash of interests would have to be extreme to produce a counter-balance. In other words, the United States would have to work very hard to push all the other great powers and many regional ones into an opposing alliance. The point is important in theory but moot in practice. Because the post-Cold War world is already so much a reflection of U.S. interests Washington is less tempted than another state might be to make additional claims as its relative power increases. The result is a preponderance of power backing up the status quo, a condition theorists of many stripes view as an augury of peace and stability. For different perspectives see E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis: 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations (London: Macmillan, 1951); Organski, World Politics; Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics; Powell, "Stability and the Distribution of Power"; and Randall L. Schweller, "Neorealism's Status Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?" Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Spring 1996), pp. 225-258.
149. A preponderance of power makes other states less likely to oppose the United States, but it could also tempt Washington to demand more of others. Because an overwhelming preponderance of power fosters stability, the clash of interests would have to be extreme to produce a counter-balance. In other words, the United States would have to work very hard to push all the other great powers and many regional ones into an opposing alliance. The point is important in theory but moot in practice. Because the post-Cold War world is already so much a reflection of U.S. interests Washington is less tempted than another state might be to make additional claims as its relative power increases. The result is a preponderance of power backing up the status quo, a condition theorists of many stripes view as an augury of peace and stability. For different perspectives see E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis: 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations (London: Macmillan, 1951); Organski, World Politics; Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics; Powell, "Stability and the Distribution of Power"; and Randall L. Schweller, "Neorealism's Status Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?" Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Spring 1996), pp. 225-258.
150. Huntington, "Lonely Superpower," p. 42.
151. Waltz, "Evaluating Theories," pp. 915-916.
152. International Institute of Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1998/99 (London: IISS, 1999).
153. The enhanced autonomy of many regions compared to the bipolar order has given rise to an important new research agenda. See Etel Solingen, Regional Orders at Century's Dawn (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998); and David A. Lake and Patrick N. Morgan, eds., Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997). This evidence of new regional security dynamics leads many to view the
154. The enhanced autonomy of many regions compared to the bipolar order has given rise to an important new research agenda. See Etel Solingen, Regional Orders at Century's Dawn (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998); and David A. Lake and Patrick N. Morgan, eds., Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997). This evidence of new regional security dynamics leads many to view the current structure as a hybrid of unipolarity and multipolarity. See Huntington, "Lonely Superpower"; and Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry."
155. The enhanced autonomy of many regions compared to the bipolar order has given rise to an important new research agenda. See Etel Solingen, Regional Orders at Century's Dawn (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998); and David A. Lake and Patrick N. Morgan, eds., Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997). This evidence of new regional security dynamics leads many to view the current structure as a hybrid of unipolarity and multipolarity. See Huntington, "Lonely Superpower"; and Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry."
156. The enhanced autonomy of many regions compared to the bipolar order has given rise to an important new research agenda. See Etel Solingen, Regional Orders at Century's Dawn (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998); and David A. Lake and Patrick N. Morgan, eds., Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997). This evidence of new regional security dynamics leads many to view the current structure as a hybrid of unipolarity and multipolarity. See Huntington, "Lonely Superpower"; and Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry."
157. Avery Goldstein, "Structural Realism and China's Foreign Policy: A Good Part of the Story," paper prepared for the annual conference of the American Political Science Association, Boston, Massachusetts, September 3-6, 1998.
158. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 195.