The Constructivist Challenge to Structural Realism: A Review Essay

International Security

Volumn 25, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 187-212

  Copeland, Dale C ^a  

^a NONE

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0034366152     PISSN: 01622889     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/016228800560499     Document Type: Article

References (104)

1. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979).
2. See, inter alia, Alexander Wendt, "The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory," International Organization, Vol. 41, No. 3 (Summer 1987), pp. 335-370; Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Spring 1992), pp. 391-425; Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State," American Political Science Review, Vol. 88, No. 2 (June 1994), pp. 384-396; and Wendt, "Constructing International Politics," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 71-81.
3. See, inter alia, Alexander Wendt, "The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory," International Organization, Vol. 41, No. 3 (Summer 1987), pp. 335-370; Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Spring 1992), pp. 391-425; Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State," American Political Science Review, Vol. 88, No. 2 (June 1994), pp. 384-396; and Wendt, "Constructing International Politics," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 71-81.
4. See, inter alia, Alexander Wendt, "The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory," International Organization, Vol. 41, No. 3 (Summer 1987), pp. 335-370; Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Spring 1992), pp. 391-425; Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State," American Political Science Review, Vol. 88, No. 2 (June 1994), pp. 384-396; and Wendt, "Constructing International Politics," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 71-81.
5. See, inter alia, Alexander Wendt, "The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory," International Organization, Vol. 41, No. 3 (Summer 1987), pp. 335-370; Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Spring 1992), pp. 391-425; Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State," American Political Science Review, Vol. 88, No. 2 (June 1994), pp. 384-396; and Wendt, "Constructing International Politics," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 71-81.
6. Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). References to Wendt's book are given in the text, enclosed in parentheses.
7. See Audie Klotz and Cecilia Lynch, "Conflicted Constructivism? Positivist Leanings vs. Interpretivist Meanings," paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Minneapolis, Minnesota, March 1998, pp. 4-5; Jeffrey Checkel, "The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory," Vol. 50, No. 2 (January 1998), pp. 324-348; Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It"; Emanuel Adler, "Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics," European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 3, No. 3 (September 1997), pp. 319-363; and Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996), chap. 1.
8. See Audie Klotz and Cecilia Lynch, "Conflicted Constructivism? Positivist Leanings vs. Interpretivist Meanings," paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Minneapolis, Minnesota, March 1998, pp. 4-5; Jeffrey Checkel, "The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory," Vol. 50, No. 2 (January 1998), pp. 324-348; Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It"; Emanuel Adler, "Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics," European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 3, No. 3 (September 1997), pp. 319-363; and Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996), chap. 1.
9. See Audie Klotz and Cecilia Lynch, "Conflicted Constructivism? Positivist Leanings vs. Interpretivist Meanings," paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Minneapolis, Minnesota, March 1998, pp. 4-5; Jeffrey Checkel, "The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory," Vol. 50, No. 2 (January 1998), pp. 324-348; Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It"; Emanuel Adler, "Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics," European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 3, No. 3 (September 1997), pp. 319-363; and Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996), chap. 1.
10. See Audie Klotz and Cecilia Lynch, "Conflicted Constructivism? Positivist Leanings vs. Interpretivist Meanings," paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Minneapolis, Minnesota, March 1998, pp. 4-5; Jeffrey Checkel, "The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory," Vol. 50, No. 2 (January 1998), pp. 324-348; Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It"; Emanuel Adler, "Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics," European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 3, No. 3 (September 1997), pp. 319-363; and Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996), chap. 1.
11. See Audie Klotz and Cecilia Lynch, "Conflicted Constructivism? Positivist Leanings vs. Interpretivist Meanings," paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Minneapolis, Minnesota, March 1998, pp. 4-5; Jeffrey Checkel, "The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory," Vol. 50, No. 2 (January 1998), pp. 324-348; Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It"; Emanuel Adler, "Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics," European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 3, No. 3 (September 1997), pp. 319-363; and Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996), chap. 1.
12. See Nicholas G. Onuf, World of Our Making (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1989), chap. 1; Audie Klotz, "Norms Reconstituting Interests: Global Racial Equality and U.S. Sanctions against South Africa," International Organization, Vol. 49, No. 3 (Summer 1995), pp. 451-478; Klotz and Lynch, "Conflicted Constructivism?" p. 7; Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, and Volker Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 158-167; Peter J. Katzenstein, "Introduction: Alternative Perspectives in National Security," in Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 1-32; Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter J. Katzenstein, "Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security," in ibid., pp. 33-75; Alexander Wendt and Raymond Duvall, "Institutions and International Order," in Ernst-Otto Czempiel and James N. Rosenau, eds., Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1989), pp. 51-73; Finnemore, National Interests in International Society, chap. 1; John Gerard Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity (London: Routledge, 1998), chap. 1; Mlada Bukovansky, "American Identity and Neutral Rights from Independence to the War of 1812," International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 2 (Spring 1997), pp. 207-243; and the special issue of Security Studies on the origins of national interests, Vol. 8, Nos. 2-3 (Winter-Spring 1999). For a broader discussion of the rationalist-constructivist debate and for further references, see the special issue of International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4 (Autumn 1998).
13. See Nicholas G. Onuf, World of Our Making (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1989), chap. 1; Audie Klotz, "Norms Reconstituting Interests: Global Racial Equality and U.S. Sanctions against South Africa," International Organization, Vol. 49, No. 3 (Summer 1995), pp. 451-478; Klotz and Lynch, "Conflicted Constructivism?" p. 7; Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, and Volker Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 158-167; Peter J. Katzenstein, "Introduction: Alternative Perspectives in National Security," in Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 1-32; Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter J. Katzenstein, "Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security," in ibid., pp. 33-75; Alexander Wendt and Raymond Duvall, "Institutions and International Order," in Ernst-Otto Czempiel and James N. Rosenau, eds., Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1989), pp. 51-73; Finnemore, National Interests in International Society, chap. 1; John Gerard Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity (London: Routledge, 1998), chap. 1; Mlada Bukovansky, "American Identity and Neutral Rights from Independence to the War of 1812," International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 2 (Spring 1997), pp. 207-243; and the special issue of Security Studies on the origins of national interests, Vol. 8, Nos. 2-3 (Winter-Spring 1999). For a broader discussion of the rationalist-constructivist debate and for further references, see the special issue of International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4 (Autumn 1998).
14. See Nicholas G. Onuf, World of Our Making (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1989), chap. 1; Audie Klotz, "Norms Reconstituting Interests: Global Racial Equality and U.S. Sanctions against South Africa," International Organization, Vol. 49, No. 3 (Summer 1995), pp. 451-478; Klotz and Lynch, "Conflicted Constructivism?" p. 7; Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, and Volker Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 158-167; Peter J. Katzenstein, "Introduction: Alternative Perspectives in National Security," in Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 1-32; Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter J. Katzenstein, "Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security," in ibid., pp. 33-75; Alexander Wendt and Raymond Duvall, "Institutions and International Order," in Ernst-Otto Czempiel and James N. Rosenau, eds., Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1989), pp. 51-73; Finnemore, National Interests in International Society, chap. 1; John Gerard Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity (London: Routledge, 1998), chap. 1; Mlada Bukovansky, "American Identity and Neutral Rights from Independence to the War of 1812," International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 2 (Spring 1997), pp. 207-243; and the special issue of Security Studies on the origins of national interests, Vol. 8, Nos. 2-3 (Winter-Spring 1999). For a broader discussion of the rationalist-constructivist debate and for further references, see the special issue of International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4 (Autumn 1998).
15. See Nicholas G. Onuf, World of Our Making (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1989), chap. 1; Audie Klotz, "Norms Reconstituting Interests: Global Racial Equality and U.S. Sanctions against South Africa," International Organization, Vol. 49, No. 3 (Summer 1995), pp. 451-478; Klotz and Lynch, "Conflicted Constructivism?" p. 7; Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, and Volker Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 158-167; Peter J. Katzenstein, "Introduction: Alternative Perspectives in National Security," in Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 1-32; Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter J. Katzenstein, "Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security," in ibid., pp. 33-75; Alexander Wendt and Raymond Duvall, "Institutions and International Order," in Ernst-Otto Czempiel and James N. Rosenau, eds., Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1989), pp. 51-73; Finnemore, National Interests in International Society, chap. 1; John Gerard Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity (London: Routledge, 1998), chap. 1; Mlada Bukovansky, "American Identity and Neutral Rights from Independence to the War of 1812," International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 2 (Spring 1997), pp. 207-243; and the special issue of Security Studies on the origins of national interests, Vol. 8, Nos. 2-3 (Winter-Spring 1999). For a broader discussion of the rationalist-constructivist debate and for further references, see the special issue of International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4 (Autumn 1998).
16. See Nicholas G. Onuf, World of Our Making (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1989), chap. 1; Audie Klotz, "Norms Reconstituting Interests: Global Racial Equality and U.S. Sanctions against South Africa," International Organization, Vol. 49, No. 3 (Summer 1995), pp. 451-478; Klotz and Lynch, "Conflicted Constructivism?" p. 7; Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, and Volker Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 158-167; Peter J. Katzenstein, "Introduction: Alternative Perspectives in National Security," in Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 1-32; Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter J. Katzenstein, "Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security," in ibid., pp. 33-75; Alexander Wendt and Raymond Duvall, "Institutions and International Order," in Ernst-Otto Czempiel and James N. Rosenau, eds., Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1989), pp. 51-73; Finnemore, National Interests in International Society, chap. 1; John Gerard Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity (London: Routledge, 1998), chap. 1; Mlada Bukovansky, "American Identity and Neutral Rights from Independence to the War of 1812," International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 2 (Spring 1997), pp. 207-243; and the special issue of Security Studies on the origins of national interests, Vol. 8, Nos. 2-3 (Winter-Spring 1999). For a broader discussion of the rationalist-constructivist debate and for further references, see the special issue of International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4 (Autumn 1998).
17. See Nicholas G. Onuf, World of Our Making (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1989), chap. 1; Audie Klotz, "Norms Reconstituting Interests: Global Racial Equality and U.S. Sanctions against South Africa," International Organization, Vol. 49, No. 3 (Summer 1995), pp. 451-478; Klotz and Lynch, "Conflicted Constructivism?" p. 7; Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, and Volker Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 158-167; Peter J. Katzenstein, "Introduction: Alternative Perspectives in National Security," in Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 1-32; Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter J. Katzenstein, "Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security," in ibid., pp. 33-75; Alexander Wendt and Raymond Duvall, "Institutions and International Order," in Ernst-Otto Czempiel and James N. Rosenau, eds., Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1989), pp. 51-73; Finnemore, National Interests in International Society, chap. 1; John Gerard Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity (London: Routledge, 1998), chap. 1; Mlada Bukovansky, "American Identity and Neutral Rights from Independence to the War of 1812," International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 2 (Spring 1997), pp. 207-243; and the special issue of Security Studies on the origins of national interests, Vol. 8, Nos. 2-3 (Winter-Spring 1999). For a broader discussion of the rationalist-constructivist debate and for further references, see the special issue of International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4 (Autumn 1998).
18. See Nicholas G. Onuf, World of Our Making (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1989), chap. 1; Audie Klotz, "Norms Reconstituting Interests: Global Racial Equality and U.S. Sanctions against South Africa," International Organization, Vol. 49, No. 3 (Summer 1995), pp. 451-478; Klotz and Lynch, "Conflicted Constructivism?" p. 7; Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, and Volker Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 158-167; Peter J. Katzenstein, "Introduction: Alternative Perspectives in National Security," in Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 1-32; Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter J. Katzenstein, "Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security," in ibid., pp. 33-75; Alexander Wendt and Raymond Duvall, "Institutions and International Order," in Ernst-Otto Czempiel and James N. Rosenau, eds., Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1989), pp. 51-73; Finnemore, National Interests in International Society, chap. 1; John Gerard Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity (London: Routledge, 1998), chap. 1; Mlada Bukovansky, "American Identity and Neutral Rights from Independence to the War of 1812," International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 2 (Spring 1997), pp. 207-243; and the special issue of Security Studies on the origins of national interests, Vol. 8, Nos. 2-3 (Winter-Spring 1999). For a broader discussion of the rationalist-constructivist debate and for further references, see the special issue of International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4 (Autumn 1998).
19. See Nicholas G. Onuf, World of Our Making (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1989), chap. 1; Audie Klotz, "Norms Reconstituting Interests: Global Racial Equality and U.S. Sanctions against South Africa," International Organization, Vol. 49, No. 3 (Summer 1995), pp. 451-478; Klotz and Lynch, "Conflicted Constructivism?" p. 7; Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, and Volker Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 158-167; Peter J. Katzenstein, "Introduction: Alternative Perspectives in National Security," in Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 1-32; Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter J. Katzenstein, "Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security," in ibid., pp. 33-75; Alexander Wendt and Raymond Duvall, "Institutions and International Order," in Ernst-Otto Czempiel and James N. Rosenau, eds., Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1989), pp. 51-73; Finnemore, National Interests in International Society, chap. 1; John Gerard Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity (London: Routledge, 1998), chap. 1; Mlada Bukovansky, "American Identity and Neutral Rights from Independence to the War of 1812," International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 2 (Spring 1997), pp. 207-243; and the special issue of Security Studies on the origins of national interests, Vol. 8, Nos. 2-3 (Winter-Spring 1999). For a broader discussion of the rationalist-constructivist debate and for further references, see the special issue of International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4 (Autumn 1998).
20. See Nicholas G. Onuf, World of Our Making (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1989), chap. 1; Audie Klotz, "Norms Reconstituting Interests: Global Racial Equality and U.S. Sanctions against South Africa," International Organization, Vol. 49, No. 3 (Summer 1995), pp. 451-478; Klotz and Lynch, "Conflicted Constructivism?" p. 7; Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, and Volker Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 158-167; Peter J. Katzenstein, "Introduction: Alternative Perspectives in National Security," in Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 1-32; Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter J. Katzenstein, "Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security," in ibid., pp. 33-75; Alexander Wendt and Raymond Duvall, "Institutions and International Order," in Ernst-Otto Czempiel and James N. Rosenau, eds., Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1989), pp. 51-73; Finnemore, National Interests in International Society, chap. 1; John Gerard Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity (London: Routledge, 1998), chap. 1; Mlada Bukovansky, "American Identity and Neutral Rights from Independence to the War of 1812," International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 2 (Spring 1997), pp. 207-243; and the special issue of Security Studies on the origins of national interests, Vol. 8, Nos. 2-3 (Winter-Spring 1999). For a broader discussion of the rationalist-constructivist debate and for further references, see the special issue of International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4 (Autumn 1998).
21. See Nicholas G. Onuf, World of Our Making (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1989), chap. 1; Audie Klotz, "Norms Reconstituting Interests: Global Racial Equality and U.S. Sanctions against South Africa," International Organization, Vol. 49, No. 3 (Summer 1995), pp. 451-478; Klotz and Lynch, "Conflicted Constructivism?" p. 7; Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, and Volker Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 158-167; Peter J. Katzenstein, "Introduction: Alternative Perspectives in National Security," in Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 1-32; Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter J. Katzenstein, "Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security," in ibid., pp. 33-75; Alexander Wendt and Raymond Duvall, "Institutions and International Order," in Ernst-Otto Czempiel and James N. Rosenau, eds., Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1989), pp. 51-73; Finnemore, National Interests in International Society, chap. 1; John Gerard Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity (London: Routledge, 1998), chap. 1; Mlada Bukovansky, "American Identity and Neutral Rights from Independence to the War of 1812," International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 2 (Spring 1997), pp. 207-243; and the special issue of Security Studies on the origins of national interests, Vol. 8, Nos. 2-3 (Winter-Spring 1999). For a broader discussion of the rationalist-constructivist debate and for further references, see the special issue of International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4 (Autumn 1998).
22. See Nicholas G. Onuf, World of Our Making (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1989), chap. 1; Audie Klotz, "Norms Reconstituting Interests: Global Racial Equality and U.S. Sanctions against South Africa," International Organization, Vol. 49, No. 3 (Summer 1995), pp. 451-478; Klotz and Lynch, "Conflicted Constructivism?" p. 7; Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, and Volker Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 158-167; Peter J. Katzenstein, "Introduction: Alternative Perspectives in National Security," in Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 1-32; Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter J. Katzenstein, "Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security," in ibid., pp. 33-75; Alexander Wendt and Raymond Duvall, "Institutions and International Order," in Ernst-Otto Czempiel and James N. Rosenau, eds., Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1989), pp. 51-73; Finnemore, National Interests in International Society, chap. 1; John Gerard Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity (London: Routledge, 1998), chap. 1; Mlada Bukovansky, "American Identity and Neutral Rights from Independence to the War of 1812," International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 2 (Spring 1997), pp. 207-243; and the special issue of Security Studies on the origins of national interests, Vol. 8, Nos. 2-3 (Winter-Spring 1999). For a broader discussion of the rationalist-constructivist debate and for further references, see the special issue of International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4 (Autumn 1998).
23. See Nicholas G. Onuf, World of Our Making (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1989), chap. 1; Audie Klotz, "Norms Reconstituting Interests: Global Racial Equality and U.S. Sanctions against South Africa," International Organization, Vol. 49, No. 3 (Summer 1995), pp. 451-478; Klotz and Lynch, "Conflicted Constructivism?" p. 7; Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, and Volker Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 158-167; Peter J. Katzenstein, "Introduction: Alternative Perspectives in National Security," in Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 1-32; Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter J. Katzenstein, "Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security," in ibid., pp. 33-75; Alexander Wendt and Raymond Duvall, "Institutions and International Order," in Ernst-Otto Czempiel and James N. Rosenau, eds., Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1989), pp. 51-73; Finnemore, National Interests in International Society, chap. 1; John Gerard Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity (London: Routledge, 1998), chap. 1; Mlada Bukovansky, "American Identity and Neutral Rights from Independence to the War of 1812," International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 2 (Spring 1997), pp. 207-243; and the special issue of Security Studies on the origins of national interests, Vol. 8, Nos. 2-3 (Winter-Spring 1999). For a broader discussion of the rationalist-constructivist debate and for further references, see the special issue of International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4 (Autumn 1998).
24. See Ted Hopf, "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Summer 1998), pp. 172-173; Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It"; Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State"; Adler, "Seizing the Middle Ground," pp 338-340; Bradley S. Klein, Strategic Studies and World Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), chaps. 1-2; Christian Reus-Smit, "The Constitutional Structure of International Society and the Nature of Fundamental Institutions," International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 4 (Autumn 1997), pp. 555-589; and Finnemore, National Interests in International Society, chap. 1.
25. See Ted Hopf, "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Summer 1998), pp. 172-173; Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It"; Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State"; Adler, "Seizing the Middle Ground," pp 338-340; Bradley S. Klein, Strategic Studies and World Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), chaps. 1-2; Christian Reus-Smit, "The Constitutional Structure of International Society and the Nature of Fundamental Institutions," International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 4 (Autumn 1997), pp. 555-589; and Finnemore, National Interests in International Society, chap. 1.
26. See Ted Hopf, "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Summer 1998), pp. 172-173; Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It"; Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State"; Adler, "Seizing the Middle Ground," pp 338-340; Bradley S. Klein, Strategic Studies and World Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), chaps. 1-2; Christian Reus-Smit, "The Constitutional Structure of International Society and the Nature of Fundamental Institutions," International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 4 (Autumn 1997), pp. 555-589; and Finnemore, National Interests in International Society, chap. 1.
27. See Ted Hopf, "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Summer 1998), pp. 172-173; Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It"; Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State"; Adler, "Seizing the Middle Ground," pp 338-340; Bradley S. Klein, Strategic Studies and World Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), chaps. 1-2; Christian Reus-Smit, "The Constitutional Structure of International Society and the Nature of Fundamental Institutions," International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 4 (Autumn 1997), pp. 555-589; and Finnemore, National Interests in International Society, chap. 1.
28. See Ted Hopf, "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Summer 1998), pp. 172-173; Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It"; Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State"; Adler, "Seizing the Middle Ground," pp 338-340; Bradley S. Klein, Strategic Studies and World Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), chaps. 1-2; Christian Reus-Smit, "The Constitutional Structure of International Society and the Nature of Fundamental Institutions," International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 4 (Autumn 1997), pp. 555-589; and Finnemore, National Interests in International Society, chap. 1.
29. See Ted Hopf, "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Summer 1998), pp. 172-173; Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It"; Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State"; Adler, "Seizing the Middle Ground," pp 338-340; Bradley S. Klein, Strategic Studies and World Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), chaps. 1-2; Christian Reus-Smit, "The Constitutional Structure of International Society and the Nature of Fundamental Institutions," International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 4 (Autumn 1997), pp. 555-589; and Finnemore, National Interests in International Society, chap. 1.
30. See Ted Hopf, "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Summer 1998), pp. 172-173; Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It"; Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State"; Adler, "Seizing the Middle Ground," pp 338-340; Bradley S. Klein, Strategic Studies and World Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), chaps. 1-2; Christian Reus-Smit, "The Constitutional Structure of International Society and the Nature of Fundamental Institutions," International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 4 (Autumn 1997), pp. 555-589; and Finnemore, National Interests in International Society, chap. 1.
31. See Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luchmann, The Social Construction of Reality (New York: Anchor, 1966), p. 60; Richard K. Ashley, "The Poverty of Neorealism," in Robert O. Keohane ed., Neorealism, and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), pp. 255-300; Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It," p. 410; James Der Derian, "Introduction: Critical Investigations," in Der Derian, ed., International Theory (New York: New York University Press, 1995), pp. 4-9; Rodney Bruce Hall, "Moral Authority as a Power Resource," International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 4 (Autumn 1997), pp. 591-622; and Rey Koslowski and Friedrich V. Kratochwil, "Understanding Change in International Politics: The Soviet Empire's Demise and the International System," International Organization, Vol. 48, No. 2 (Spring 1994), pp. 215-247.
32. See Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luchmann, The Social Construction of Reality (New York: Anchor, 1966), p. 60; Richard K. Ashley, "The Poverty of Neorealism," in Robert O. Keohane ed., Neorealism, and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), pp. 255-300; Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It," p. 410; James Der Derian, "Introduction: Critical Investigations," in Der Derian, ed., International Theory (New York: New York University Press, 1995), pp. 4-9; Rodney Bruce Hall, "Moral Authority as a Power Resource," International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 4 (Autumn 1997), pp. 591-622; and Rey Koslowski and Friedrich V. Kratochwil, "Understanding Change in International Politics: The Soviet Empire's Demise and the International System," International Organization, Vol. 48, No. 2 (Spring 1994), pp. 215-247.
33. See Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luchmann, The Social Construction of Reality (New York: Anchor, 1966), p. 60; Richard K. Ashley, "The Poverty of Neorealism," in Robert O. Keohane ed., Neorealism, and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), pp. 255-300; Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It," p. 410; James Der Derian, "Introduction: Critical Investigations," in Der Derian, ed., International Theory (New York: New York University Press, 1995), pp. 4-9; Rodney Bruce Hall, "Moral Authority as a Power Resource," International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 4 (Autumn 1997), pp. 591-622; and Rey Koslowski and Friedrich V. Kratochwil, "Understanding Change in International Politics: The Soviet Empire's Demise and the International System," International Organization, Vol. 48, No. 2 (Spring 1994), pp. 215-247.
34. See Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luchmann, The Social Construction of Reality (New York: Anchor, 1966), p. 60; Richard K. Ashley, "The Poverty of Neorealism," in Robert O. Keohane ed., Neorealism, and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), pp. 255-300; Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It," p. 410; James Der Derian, "Introduction: Critical Investigations," in Der Derian, ed., International Theory (New York: New York University Press, 1995), pp. 4-9; Rodney Bruce Hall, "Moral Authority as a Power Resource," International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 4 (Autumn 1997), pp. 591-622; and Rey Koslowski and Friedrich V. Kratochwil, "Understanding Change in International Politics: The Soviet Empire's Demise and the International System," International Organization, Vol. 48, No. 2 (Spring 1994), pp. 215-247.
35. See Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luchmann, The Social Construction of Reality (New York: Anchor, 1966), p. 60; Richard K. Ashley, "The Poverty of Neorealism," in Robert O. Keohane ed., Neorealism, and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), pp. 255-300; Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It," p. 410; James Der Derian, "Introduction: Critical Investigations," in Der Derian, ed., International Theory (New York: New York University Press, 1995), pp. 4-9; Rodney Bruce Hall, "Moral Authority as a Power Resource," International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 4 (Autumn 1997), pp. 591-622; and Rey Koslowski and Friedrich V. Kratochwil, "Understanding Change in International Politics: The Soviet Empire's Demise and the International System," International Organization, Vol. 48, No. 2 (Spring 1994), pp. 215-247.
36. See Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luchmann, The Social Construction of Reality (New York: Anchor, 1966), p. 60; Richard K. Ashley, "The Poverty of Neorealism," in Robert O. Keohane ed., Neorealism, and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), pp. 255-300; Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It," p. 410; James Der Derian, "Introduction: Critical Investigations," in Der Derian, ed., International Theory (New York: New York University Press, 1995), pp. 4-9; Rodney Bruce Hall, "Moral Authority as a Power Resource," International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 4 (Autumn 1997), pp. 591-622; and Rey Koslowski and Friedrich V. Kratochwil, "Understanding Change in International Politics: The Soviet Empire's Demise and the International System," International Organization, Vol. 48, No. 2 (Spring 1994), pp. 215-247.
37. In earlier work, Wendt himself comes close to this more extreme contructivist line. Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It," p. 401; and Wendt, "Constructing International Politics," p. 73. On the idea that material structures gaintheir meaning only through discursive practices, see Bukovansky, "American Identity," p. 218; Finnemore, National Interests in International Society, pp. 6, 128; and David Dessler, "What's at Stake in the Agent-Structure Debate?" International Organization, Vol. 43, No. 3 (Summer 1989), pp. 473, 461.
38. In earlier work, Wendt himself comes close to this more extreme contructivist line. Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It," p. 401; and Wendt, "Constructing International Politics," p. 73. On the idea that material structures gaintheir meaning only through discursive practices, see Bukovansky, "American Identity," p. 218; Finnemore, National Interests in International Society, pp. 6, 128; and David Dessler, "What's at Stake in the Agent-Structure Debate?" International Organization, Vol. 43, No. 3 (Summer 1989), pp. 473, 461.
39. In earlier work, Wendt himself comes close to this more extreme contructivist line. Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It," p. 401; and Wendt, "Constructing International Politics," p. 73. On the idea that material structures gaintheir meaning only through discursive practices, see Bukovansky, "American Identity," p. 218; Finnemore, National Interests in International Society, pp. 6, 128; and David Dessler, "What's at Stake in the Agent-Structure Debate?" International Organization, Vol. 43, No. 3 (Summer 1989), pp. 473, 461.
40. In earlier work, Wendt himself comes close to this more extreme contructivist line. Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It," p. 401; and Wendt, "Constructing International Politics," p. 73. On the idea that material structures gaintheir meaning only through discursive practices, see Bukovansky, "American Identity," p. 218; Finnemore, National Interests in International Society, pp. 6, 128; and David Dessler, "What's at Stake in the Agent-Structure Debate?" International Organization, Vol. 43, No. 3 (Summer 1989), pp. 473, 461.
41. In earlier work, Wendt himself comes close to this more extreme contructivist line. Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It," p. 401; and Wendt, "Constructing International Politics," p. 73. On the idea that material structures gaintheir meaning only through discursive practices, see Bukovansky, "American Identity," p. 218; Finnemore, National Interests in International Society, pp. 6, 128; and David Dessler, "What's at Stake in the Agent-Structure Debate?" International Organization, Vol. 43, No. 3 (Summer 1989), pp. 473, 461.
42. For a recent discussion of the more philosophical aspects of the book, see the essays by Robert O. Keohane, Stephen D. Krasner, Roxanne Lynn Doty, Hayward R. Alker, and Steve Smith, and Wendt's reply, in Review of International Studies, Vol. 26, No. 1 (January 2000), pp. 123-180.
43. Going beyond his previous work, and borrowing from James D. Fearon, Wendt also includes another form of identity that is intrinsic to the state - its "type" identity as a particular form of sovereign actor (e.g., being a "democracy," a "fascist" state, etc.). See Fearon, "What Is Identity (As We Now Use the Word)?" unpublished manuscript, University of Chicago, 1997.
44. On social identity theory, see Jonathan Mercer, "Anarchy and Identity," International Organization, Vol. 49, No. 2 (Spring 1995), pp. 229-252.
45. Wendt's argument here extends earlier work by Randall L. Schweller, Andrew Moravcsik, and Arthur A. Stein. See Schweller, "Neorealism's Status Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?" Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Spring 1996), pp. 90-121; Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics," International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 4 (Autumn 1997), pp. 513- 555; and Stein, Why Nations Cooperate: Circumstance and Choice in International Relations (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990).
46. Wendt's argument here extends earlier work by Randall L. Schweller, Andrew Moravcsik, and Arthur A. Stein. See Schweller, "Neorealism's Status Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?" Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Spring 1996), pp. 90-121; Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics," International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 4 (Autumn 1997), pp. 513-555; and Stein, Why Nations Cooperate: Circumstance and Choice in International Relations (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990).
47. Wendt's argument here extends earlier work by Randall L. Schweller, Andrew Moravcsik, and Arthur A. Stein. See Schweller, "Neorealism's Status Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?" Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Spring 1996), pp. 90-121; Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics," International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 4 (Autumn 1997), pp. 513- 555; and Stein, Why Nations Cooperate: Circumstance and Choice in International Relations (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990).
48. See Moravcsik's summary, "Taking Preferences Seriously."
49. Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984); Stephen D. Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983); Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes; and Volker Rittberger, ed., Regime Theory and International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).
50. Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984); Stephen D. Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983); Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes; and Volker Rittberger, ed., Regime Theory and International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).
51. Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984); Stephen D. Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983); Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes; and Volker Rittberger, ed., Regime Theory and International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).
52. Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984); Stephen D. Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983); Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes; and Volker Rittberger, ed., Regime Theory and International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).
53. In doing so, Wendt is also challenging domestic-level constructivists.
54. Georce Herbert Mead, Mind, Self, and Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934), chap. 3 On Mead's significant influence on Wendt's thinking, see Social Theory of International Politics, pp 327-316, 170-171, 264-265; and Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It."
55. Georce Herbert Mead, Mind, Self, and Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934), chap. 3 On Mead's significant influence on Wendt's thinking, see Social Theory of International Politics, pp 327-316, 170-171, 264-265; and Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It."
56. Georce Herbert Mead, Mind, Self, and Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934), chap. 3 On Mead's significant influence on Wendt's thinking, see Social Theory of International Politics, pp 327-316, 170-171, 264-265; and Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It."
57. On the conditions for change in collective ideas, see Jeffrey W. Legro, "The Transformation of Policy Ideas," American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 44, No. 3 (July 2000), pp. 419-432.
58. The primary target here is Waltz, Theory of International Politics, but also implicitly offensive realists such as John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 5-49, and Eric Labs, "Beyond Victory: Offensive Realism and the Expansion of War Aims," Security Studies, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Summer 1997), pp. 1-49. Scholars in the defensive realist camp of structural realism are typically less pessimistic, because they believe that certain forms of soft-line diplomacy can mitigate, although not eliminate, the security dilemma. See especially Charles L. Glaser, "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 50-90; Sean M. Lynn-Jones, "Realism and America's Rise: A Review Essay," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Fall 1998), pp. 157-182; Robert Jervis, "Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate," International Security, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Summer 1999), pp. 42-63; Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987); and Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War: The Structure of Power and the Roots of War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1999). On the debate between offensive and defensive realists, which Wendt does not discuss, see Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, "Preface," in Michael E. Brown, Lynn-Jones, and Miller, eds., Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1995), pp. ix-xiii; Benjamin Frankel, "Restating the Realist Case: An Introduction," Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Spring 1996), pp. xiv- xx; and Jervis, "Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation," pp. 48-50.
59. The primary target here is Waltz, Theory of International Politics, but also implicitly offensive realists such as John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 5-49, and Eric Labs, "Beyond Victory: Offensive Realism and the Expansion of War Aims," Security Studies, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Summer 1997), pp. 1-49. Scholars in the defensive realist camp of structural realism are typically less pessimistic, because they believe that certain forms of soft-line diplomacy can mitigate, although not eliminate, the security dilemma. See especially Charles L. Glaser, "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 50-90; Sean M. Lynn-Jones, "Realism and America's Rise: A Review Essay," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Fall 1998), pp. 157-182; Robert Jervis, "Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate," International Security, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Summer 1999), pp. 42-63; Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987); and Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War: The Structure of Power and the Roots of War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1999). On the debate between offensive and defensive realists, which Wendt does not discuss, see Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, "Preface," in Michael E. Brown, Lynn-Jones, and Miller, eds., Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1995), pp. ix-xiii; Benjamin Frankel, "Restating the Realist Case: An Introduction," Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Spring 1996), pp. xiv- xx; and Jervis, "Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation," pp. 48-50.
60. The primary target here is Waltz, Theory of International Politics, but also implicitly offensive realists such as John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 5-49, and Eric Labs, "Beyond Victory: Offensive Realism and the Expansion of War Aims," Security Studies, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Summer 1997), pp. 1-49. Scholars in the defensive realist camp of structural realism are typically less pessimistic, because they believe that certain forms of soft-line diplomacy can mitigate, although not eliminate, the security dilemma. See especially Charles L. Glaser, "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 50-90; Sean M. Lynn-Jones, "Realism and America's Rise: A Review Essay," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Fall 1998), pp. 157-182; Robert Jervis, "Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate," International Security, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Summer 1999), pp. 42-63; Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987); and Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War: The Structure of Power and the Roots of War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1999). On the debate between offensive and defensive realists, which Wendt does not discuss, see Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, "Preface," in Michael E. Brown, Lynn-Jones, and Miller, eds., Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1995), pp. ix-xiii; Benjamin Frankel, "Restating the Realist Case: An Introduction," Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Spring 1996), pp. xiv- xx; and Jervis, "Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation," pp. 48-50.
61. The primary target here is Waltz, Theory of International Politics, but also implicitly offensive realists such as John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 5-49, and Eric Labs, "Beyond Victory: Offensive Realism and the Expansion of War Aims," Security Studies, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Summer 1997), pp. 1-49. Scholars in the defensive realist camp of structural realism are typically less pessimistic, because they believe that certain forms of soft-line diplomacy can mitigate, although not eliminate, the security dilemma. See especially Charles L. Glaser, "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 50-90; Sean M. Lynn-Jones, "Realism and America's Rise: A Review Essay," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Fall 1998), pp. 157-182; Robert Jervis, "Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate," International Security, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Summer 1999), pp. 42-63; Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987); and Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War: The Structure of Power and the Roots of War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1999). On the debate between offensive and defensive realists, which Wendt does not discuss, see Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, "Preface," in Michael E. Brown, Lynn-Jones, and Miller, eds., Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1995), pp. ix-xiii; Benjamin Frankel, "Restating the Realist Case: An Introduction," Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Spring 1996), pp. xiv- xx; and Jervis, "Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation," pp. 48-50.
62. The primary target here is Waltz, Theory of International Politics, but also implicitly offensive realists such as John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 5-49, and Eric Labs, "Beyond Victory: Offensive Realism and the Expansion of War Aims," Security Studies, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Summer 1997), pp. 1-49. Scholars in the defensive realist camp of structural realism are typically less pessimistic, because they believe that certain forms of soft-line diplomacy can mitigate, although not eliminate, the security dilemma. See especially Charles L. Glaser, "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 50-90; Sean M. Lynn-Jones, "Realism and America's Rise: A Review Essay," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Fall 1998), pp. 157-182; Robert Jervis, "Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate," International Security, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Summer 1999), pp. 42-63; Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987); and Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War: The Structure of Power and the Roots of War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1999). On the debate between offensive and defensive realists, which Wendt does not discuss, see Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, "Preface," in Michael E. Brown, Lynn-Jones, and Miller, eds., Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1995), pp. ix-xiii; Benjamin Frankel, "Restating the Realist Case: An Introduction," Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Spring 1996), pp. xiv- xx; and Jervis, "Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation," pp. 48-50.
63. The primary target here is Waltz, Theory of International Politics, but also implicitly offensive realists such as John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 5-49, and Eric Labs, "Beyond Victory: Offensive Realism and the Expansion of War Aims," Security Studies, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Summer 1997), pp. 1-49. Scholars in the defensive realist camp of structural realism are typically less pessimistic, because they believe that certain forms of soft-line diplomacy can mitigate, although not eliminate, the security dilemma. See especially Charles L. Glaser, "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 50-90; Sean M. Lynn-Jones, "Realism and America's Rise: A Review Essay," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Fall 1998), pp. 157-182; Robert Jervis, "Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate," International Security, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Summer 1999), pp. 42-63; Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987); and Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War: The Structure of Power and the Roots of War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1999). On the debate between offensive and defensive realists, which Wendt does not discuss, see Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, "Preface," in Michael E. Brown, Lynn-Jones, and Miller, eds., Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1995), pp. ix-xiii; Benjamin Frankel, "Restating the Realist Case: An Introduction," Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Spring 1996), pp. xiv- xx; and Jervis, "Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation," pp. 48-50.
64. The primary target here is Waltz, Theory of International Politics, but also implicitly offensive realists such as John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 5-49, and Eric Labs, "Beyond Victory: Offensive Realism and the Expansion of War Aims," Security Studies, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Summer 1997), pp. 1-49. Scholars in the defensive realist camp of structural realism are typically less pessimistic, because they believe that certain forms of soft-line diplomacy can mitigate, although not eliminate, the security dilemma. See especially Charles L. Glaser, "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 50-90; Sean M. Lynn-Jones, "Realism and America's Rise: A Review Essay," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Fall 1998), pp. 157-182; Robert Jervis, "Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate," International Security, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Summer 1999), pp. 42-63; Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987); and Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War: The Structure of Power and the Roots of War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1999). On the debate between offensive and defensive realists, which Wendt does not discuss, see Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, "Preface," in Michael E. Brown, Lynn-Jones, and Miller, eds., Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1995), pp. ix-xiii; Benjamin Frankel, "Restating the Realist Case: An Introduction," Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Spring 1996), pp. xiv- xx; and Jervis, "Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation," pp. 48-50.
65. The primary target here is Waltz, Theory of International Politics, but also implicitly offensive realists such as John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 5-49, and Eric Labs, "Beyond Victory: Offensive Realism and the Expansion of War Aims," Security Studies, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Summer 1997), pp. 1-49. Scholars in the defensive realist camp of structural realism are typically less pessimistic, because they believe that certain forms of soft-line diplomacy can mitigate, although not eliminate, the security dilemma. See especially Charles L. Glaser, "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 50-90; Sean M. Lynn-Jones, "Realism and America's Rise: A Review Essay," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Fall 1998), pp. 157-182; Robert Jervis, "Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate," International Security, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Summer 1999), pp. 42-63; Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987); and Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War: The Structure of Power and the Roots of War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1999). On the debate between offensive and defensive realists, which Wendt does not discuss, see Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, "Preface," in Michael E. Brown, Lynn-Jones, and Miller, eds., Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1995), pp. ix-xiii; Benjamin Frankel, "Restating the Realist Case: An Introduction," Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Spring 1996), pp. xiv- xx; and Jervis, "Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation," pp. 48-50.
66. The primary target here is Waltz, Theory of International Politics, but also implicitly offensive realists such as John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 5-49, and Eric Labs, "Beyond Victory: Offensive Realism and the Expansion of War Aims," Security Studies, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Summer 1997), pp. 1-49. Scholars in the defensive realist camp of structural realism are typically less pessimistic, because they believe that certain forms of soft-line diplomacy can mitigate, although not eliminate, the security dilemma. See especially Charles L. Glaser, "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 50-90; Sean M. Lynn-Jones, "Realism and America's Rise: A Review Essay," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Fall 1998), pp. 157-182; Robert Jervis, "Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate," International Security, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Summer 1999), pp. 42-63; Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987); and Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War: The Structure of Power and the Roots of War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1999). On the debate between offensive and defensive realists, which Wendt does not discuss, see Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, "Preface," in Michael E. Brown, Lynn-Jones, and Miller, eds., Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1995), pp. ix-xiii; Benjamin Frankel, "Restating the Realist Case: An Introduction," Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Spring 1996), pp. xiv- xx; and Jervis, "Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation," pp. 48-50.
67. The primary target here is Waltz, Theory of International Politics, but also implicitly offensive realists such as John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 5-49, and Eric Labs, "Beyond Victory: Offensive Realism and the Expansion of War Aims," Security Studies, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Summer 1997), pp. 1-49. Scholars in the defensive realist camp of structural realism are typically less pessimistic, because they believe that certain forms of soft-line diplomacy can mitigate, although not eliminate, the security dilemma. See especially Charles L. Glaser, "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 50-90; Sean M. Lynn-Jones, "Realism and America's Rise: A Review Essay," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Fall 1998), pp. 157-182; Robert Jervis, "Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate," International Security, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Summer 1999), pp. 42-63; Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987); and Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War: The Structure of Power and the Roots of War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1999). On the debate between offensive and defensive realists, which Wendt does not discuss, see Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, "Preface," in Michael E. Brown, Lynn-Jones, and Miller, eds., Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1995), pp. ix-xiii; Benjamin Frankel, "Restating the Realist Case: An Introduction," Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Spring 1996), pp. xiv-xx; and Jervis, "Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation," pp. 48-50.
68. The primary target here is Waltz, Theory of International Politics, but also implicitly offensive realists such as John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 5-49, and Eric Labs, "Beyond Victory: Offensive Realism and the Expansion of War Aims," Security Studies, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Summer 1997), pp. 1-49. Scholars in the defensive realist camp of structural realism are typically less pessimistic, because they believe that certain forms of soft-line diplomacy can mitigate, although not eliminate, the security dilemma. See especially Charles L. Glaser, "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 50-90; Sean M. Lynn-Jones, "Realism and America's Rise: A Review Essay," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Fall 1998), pp. 157-182; Robert Jervis, "Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate," International Security, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Summer 1999), pp. 42-63; Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987); and Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War: The Structure of Power and the Roots of War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1999). On the debate between offensive and defensive realists, which Wendt does not discuss, see Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, "Preface," in Michael E. Brown, Lynn-Jones, and Miller, eds., Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1995), pp. ix-xiii; Benjamin Frankel, "Restating the Realist Case: An Introduction," Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Spring 1996), pp. xiv- xx; and Jervis, "Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation," pp. 48-50.
69. For ease of exposition, below I use the terms "intentions" and "motives" largely synonymously. Although intentions is the more commonly used term, motives more accurately captures what is at stake, namely, whether states differ in their core reasons for acting - either for security or nonsecurity objectives. See Charles L. Glaser, "Political Consequences of Military Strategy: Expanding and Refining the Spiral and Deterrence Models," World Politics, Vol. 44, No. 2 (July 1992), pp. 497-538.
70. See, inter alia, Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2 (January 1978), pp. 167-214; and Charles L. Glaser, "The Security Dilemma Revisited," World Politics, Vol. 50, No. 1 (October 1997), pp. 171-201. As Andrew Kydd notes, uncertainty over the other's motives is an essential component of any structural realist argument drawn from the security dilemma. Kydd, "Sheep in Sheep's Clothing: Why Security-Seekers Do Not Fight Each Other," Security Studies, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Autumn 1997), pp. 125-126.
71. See, inter alia, Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2 (January 1978), pp. 167-214; and Charles L. Glaser, "The Security Dilemma Revisited," World Politics, Vol. 50, No. 1 (October 1997), pp. 171-201. As Andrew Kydd notes, uncertainty over the other's motives is an essential component of any structural realist argument drawn from the security dilemma. Kydd, "Sheep in Sheep's Clothing: Why Security-Seekers Do Not Fight Each Other," Security Studies, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Autumn 1997), pp. 125-126.
72. See, inter alia, Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2 (January 1978), pp. 167-214; and Charles L. Glaser, "The Security Dilemma Revisited," World Politics, Vol. 50, No. 1 (October 1997), pp. 171-201. As Andrew Kydd notes, uncertainty over the other's motives is an essential component of any structural realist argument drawn from the security dilemma. Kydd, "Sheep in Sheep's Clothing: Why Security-Seekers Do Not Fight Each Other," Security Studies, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Autumn 1997), pp. 125-126.
73. Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 62; Robert Jervis and Robert J. Art, "The Meaning of Anarchy," in Art and Jervis, eds., International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues (Boston: Little, Brown, 1985), p. 3; and Mearsheimer, "False Promise of International Institutions," p. 10. Defensive realists tend to put more emphasis on uncertainty about present intentions, whereas offensive realists stress the problem of future intentions and the consequent need to increase power as a hedge against future threats. Compare especially defensive realists such as Glaser, "Realists as Optimists," and Walt, Origins of Alliances, to offensive realists such as Mearsheimer, "False Promise of International Institutions."
74. Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 62; Robert Jervis and Robert J. Art, "The Meaning of Anarchy," in Art and Jervis, eds., International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues (Boston: Little, Brown, 1985), p. 3; and Mearsheimer, "False Promise of International Institutions," p. 10. Defensive realists tend to put more emphasis on uncertainty about present intentions, whereas offensive realists stress the problem of future intentions and the consequent need to increase power as a hedge against future threats. Compare especially defensive realists such as Glaser, "Realists as Optimists," and Walt, Origins of Alliances, to offensive realists such as Mearsheimer, "False Promise of International Institutions."
75. Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 62; Robert Jervis and Robert J. Art, "The Meaning of Anarchy," in Art and Jervis, eds., International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues (Boston: Little, Brown, 1985), p. 3; and Mearsheimer, "False Promise of International Institutions," p. 10. Defensive realists tend to put more emphasis on uncertainty about present intentions, whereas offensive realists stress the problem of future intentions and the consequent need to increase power as a hedge against future threats. Compare especially defensive realists such as Glaser, "Realists as Optimists," and Walt, Origins of Alliances, to offensive realists such as Mearsheimer, "False Promise of International Institutions."
76. Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 62; Robert Jervis and Robert J. Art, "The Meaning of Anarchy," in Art and Jervis, eds., International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues (Boston: Little, Brown, 1985), p. 3; and Mearsheimer, "False Promise of International Institutions," p. 10. Defensive realists tend to put more emphasis on uncertainty about present intentions, whereas offensive realists stress the problem of future intentions and the consequent need to increase power as a hedge against future threats. Compare especially defensive realists such as Glaser, "Realists as Optimists," and Walt, Origins of Alliances, to offensive realists such as Mearsheimer, "False Promise of International Institutions."
77. Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 62; Robert Jervis and Robert J. Art, "The Meaning of Anarchy," in Art and Jervis, eds., International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues (Boston: Little, Brown, 1985), p. 3; and Mearsheimer, "False Promise of International Institutions," p. 10. Defensive realists tend to put more emphasis on uncertainty about present intentions, whereas offensive realists stress the problem of future intentions and the consequent need to increase power as a hedge against future threats. Compare especially defensive realists such as Glaser, "Realists as Optimists," and Walt, Origins of Alliances, to offensive realists such as Mearsheimer, "False Promise of International Institutions."
78. Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 62; Robert Jervis and Robert J. Art, "The Meaning of Anarchy," in Art and Jervis, eds., International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues (Boston: Little, Brown, 1985), p. 3; and Mearsheimer, "False Promise of International Institutions," p. 10. Defensive realists tend to put more emphasis on uncertainty about present intentions, whereas offensive realists stress the problem of future intentions and the consequent need to increase power as a hedge against future threats. Compare especially defensive realists such as Glaser, "Realists as Optimists," and Walt, Origins of Alliances, to offensive realists such as Mearsheimer, "False Promise of International Institutions."
79. Consider Wendt's statement that "Ego's ideas about Alter, right or wrong, are not merely passive perceptions of something that exists independent of Ego, but actively and on-goingly constitutive of Alter's role vis-à-vis Ego" (p. 335, emphasis added). His subsequent discussion offers no insights into how Ego would be able to learn that its ideas about Alter were mdeed right or wrong.
80. See James D. Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War" International Organization, Vol. 49, No. 3 (Summer 1995), pp. 379-414; Glaser, "Realists as Optimists"; Andrew Kydd, "Game Theory and the Spiral Model," World Politics, Vol. 49, No. 3 (April 1997), pp. 371-400; Kydd, "Sheep in Sheep's Clothing," pp. 139-147; and Dale C. Copeland, "Trade Expectations and the Outbreak of Peace: Détente 1970-74 and the End of the Cold War 1985-91," Security Studies, Vol. 9, Nos. 1/2 (Autumn 1999-Winter 2000), pp. 15-58. When discussing game theory, Wendt's book considers only games of complete information, in which actors are certain about the other's preferences and type (pp. 106-107, 148, 159-160, 167, 183, 315).
81. See James D. Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War" International Organization, Vol. 49, No. 3 (Summer 1995), pp. 379-414; Glaser, "Realists as Optimists"; Andrew Kydd, "Game Theory and the Spiral Model," World Politics, Vol. 49, No. 3 (April 1997), pp. 371-400; Kydd, "Sheep in Sheep's Clothing," pp. 139-147; and Dale C. Copeland, "Trade Expectations and the Outbreak of Peace: Détente 1970-74 and the End of the Cold War 1985-91," Security Studies, Vol. 9, Nos. 1/2 (Autumn 1999-Winter 2000), pp. 15-58. When discussing game theory, Wendt's book considers only games of complete information, in which actors are certain about the other's preferences and type (pp. 106-107, 148, 159-160, 167, 183, 315).
82. See James D. Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War" International Organization, Vol. 49, No. 3 (Summer 1995), pp. 379-414; Glaser, "Realists as Optimists"; Andrew Kydd, "Game Theory and the Spiral Model," World Politics, Vol. 49, No. 3 (April 1997), pp. 371-400; Kydd, "Sheep in Sheep's Clothing," pp. 139-147; and Dale C. Copeland, "Trade Expectations and the Outbreak of Peace: Détente 1970-74 and the End of the Cold War 1985-91," Security Studies, Vol. 9, Nos. 1/2 (Autumn 1999-Winter 2000), pp. 15-58. When discussing game theory, Wendt's book considers only games of complete information, in which actors are certain about the other's preferences and type (pp. 106-107, 148, 159-160, 167, 183, 315).
83. See James D. Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War" International Organization, Vol. 49, No. 3 (Summer 1995), pp. 379-414; Glaser, "Realists as Optimists"; Andrew Kydd, "Game Theory and the Spiral Model," World Politics, Vol. 49, No. 3 (April 1997), pp. 371-400; Kydd, "Sheep in Sheep's Clothing," pp. 139-147; and Dale C. Copeland, "Trade Expectations and the Outbreak of Peace: Détente 1970-74 and the End of the Cold War 1985-91," Security Studies, Vol. 9, Nos. 1/2 (Autumn 1999-Winter 2000), pp. 15-58. When discussing game theory, Wendt's book considers only games of complete information, in which actors are certain about the other's preferences and type (pp. 106-107, 148, 159-160, 167, 183, 315).
84. See James D. Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War" International Organization, Vol. 49, No. 3 (Summer 1995), pp. 379-414; Glaser, "Realists as Optimists"; Andrew Kydd, "Game Theory and the Spiral Model," World Politics, Vol. 49, No. 3 (April 1997), pp. 371-400; Kydd, "Sheep in Sheep's Clothing," pp. 139-147; and Dale C. Copeland, "Trade Expectations and the Outbreak of Peace: Détente 1970-74 and the End of the Cold War 1985-91," Security Studies, Vol. 9, Nos. 1/2 (Autumn 1999-Winter 2000), pp. 15-58. When discussing game theory, Wendt's book considers only games of complete information, in which actors are certain about the other's preferences and type (pp. 106-107, 148, 159-160, 167, 183, 315).
85. See especially Erving Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1959), chap. 6.
86. These actions are what game theorists would call efforts at "strategic misrepresentation." On the instrumental manipulation of norms for self-interested reasons, see Paul Kowert and Jeffrey W. Legro, "Norms, Identity, and Their Limits: A Theoretical Reprise," in Katzenstein, Culture of National Security, pp. 492-493.
87. This problem is especially pernicious in Wendt's Lockean and Kantian worlds, where states do seem to be following norms of self-restraint. But even in a Hobbesian world, it is highly likely that Ego may believe that Alter is an "enemy" even when Alter does not accept this assessment. It is not enough for Wendt to say that they both intersubjectively share the view that the other is an enemy (pp. 260-263). In fact, in a spiraling security dilemma, there are two separate beliefs that do not overlap: Ego thinks Alter is an aggressive enemy, when Alter knows that it is not; and Alter likewise thinks Ego is an aggressive enemy, when Ego knows that it is not. Again, it is what is not shared - the uncertainty in the system - that is problematic.
88. Costly signaling games in rational choice game theory again provide a mechanism by which states can evaluate valid versus potentially deceptive gestures.
89. See Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, pp. 224-233; and Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation."
90. See Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, pp. 224-233; and Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation."
91. For Wendt's earlier twofold distinction between corporate and role identities, see Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation."
92. See Dale C. Copeland, The Origins of Major War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2000), chaps. 1-2; Van Evera, Causes of War, chap. 5; and Jack S. Levy, "Declining Power and the Preventive Motive for War, World Politics, Vol. 40, No. 1 (October 1987), pp. 82-107.
93. See Dale C. Copeland, The Origins of Major War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2000), chaps. 1-2; Van Evera, Causes of War, chap. 5; and Jack S. Levy, "Declining Power and the Preventive Motive for War, World Politics, Vol. 40, No. 1 (October 1987), pp. 82-107.
94. See Dale C. Copeland, The Origins of Major War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2000), chaps. 1-2; Van Evera, Causes of War, chap. 5; and Jack S. Levy, "Declining Power and the Preventive Motive for War, World Politics, Vol. 40, No. 1 (October 1987), pp. 82-107.
95. This problem is reinforced by the fact that intentions can change "overnight" (as a result of a coup or revolution, for example), whereas significant changes in relative power take many years to effect. Allowing oneself to fall behind in power, hoping that the other will always stay peaceful, is thus fraught with risks.
96. Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It," pp. 401-402, 406-107, 410; and Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 91.
97. Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It," pp. 401-402, 406-107, 410; and Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 91.
98. Note that actors here are not automatically assuming "worst case," namely, that policies must reflect the mere possibility that the other might later aggress. Rather security maximizers, if they are rational, will always calculate according to the probabilities of certain undesirable things coming to pass. Given uncertainty, however, estimates of these probabilities will often be high. Cf. Stephen G. Brooks, "Dueling Realisms," International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 3 (Summer 1997), pp. 445-477. For a model of rational decisionmaking that develops this defensive realist notion, see Copeland, Origins of Major War, chap. 2.
99. Note that actors here are not automatically assuming "worst case," namely, that policies must reflect the mere possibility that the other might later aggress. Rather security maximizers, if they are rational, will always calculate according to the probabilities of certain undesirable things coming to pass. Given uncertainty, however, estimates of these probabilities will often be high. Cf. Stephen G. Brooks, "Dueling Realisms," International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 3 (Summer 1997), pp. 445- 477. For a model of rational decisionmaking that develops this defensive realist notion, see Copeland, Origins of Major War, chap. 2.
100. As noted, realists employ costly signaling models to show how actors can rationally update their estimates of the other's character and motives, based on its past behavior.
101. This does not mean that constructivism does not deal with the problem of uncertainty. But it does so by looking at how socialized notions of self and other shape actors' views of the future possibilities. The causal story remains one of historical discursive practices molding current mindsets; actors see the future only through the strong filter of past socialization. See Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, eds., Security Communities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), chaps. 1, 2, 13. The realist view of the future focuses on the things that might occur independent of an actor's past interaction with the other. So while realists accept that historical interaction can reduce uncertainty about the other's character and motives, they argue that prudent actors can never ignore the many exogenous determinants of the other's future behavior. The security dilemma can be moderated, but never eliminated.
102. Note that this is not even a "first contact," because Egypt does not yet know of Assyria's existence. Cf. Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It," pp. 403-407.
103. See Wendt Social Theory of International Politics, pp. 303-305, where he notes that Kantian cooperative behavior at the first and second degrees is purely instrumental. States are treating each other as "friends" only in form, not in substance: "For egoistic states friendship might be nothing more than a hat they try on each morning for their own reasons, one that they will take off as soon as the costs outweigh the benefits, but until that happens they will be friends in fact even if not in principle" (p. 305).
104. Wendt's empirical task is complicated by his assertion that the recent shift to cooperation was furthered by such "master variables" as interdependence and common fate (pp. 344-353). These variables are largely material in nature - depending as they do on globalization, increased trade, and the destructive qualities of modern weaponry (especially nuclear weapons). Wendt lays out a two-stage process toward cooperation: Initially, states respond to the external conditions out of self-interest but later they may move beyond this to more other-regarding stances (pp. 345-346, 350, 360-361; see also pp. 303 and 311). Yet Wendt offers little evidence that cooperation between modern great powers such as the United States, China, and Russia has gone beyond this self-interested first step.