Rigor or Rigor Mortis? Rational Choice and Security Studies

International Security

Volumn 23, Issue 4, 1999, Pages 5-48

  Walt, Stephen M ^a  

^a NONE

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0033426706     PISSN: 01622889     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/isec.23.4.5     Document Type: Article

References (200)

1. Seminal early applications of rational choice theory include Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, 1957); Gordon Tullock and James Buchanan, eds., The Calculus of Consent (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962); Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960); and Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 1965). Surveys of the basic literature include Dennis Mueller, ed., Public Choice II (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1989); James Alt and Kenneth Shepsle, eds., Perspectives on Positive Political Economy (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1990); and Peter C. Ordeshook, ed., Models of Strategic Choice in Politics (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1989). An excellent introductory textbook is James D. Morrow, Game Theory for Political Scientists (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995).
2. Seminal early applications of rational choice theory include Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, 1957); Gordon Tullock and James Buchanan, eds., The Calculus of Consent (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962); Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960); and Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 1965). Surveys of the basic literature include Dennis Mueller, ed., Public Choice II (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1989); James Alt and Kenneth Shepsle, eds., Perspectives on Positive Political Economy (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1990); and Peter C. Ordeshook, ed., Models of Strategic Choice in Politics (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1989). An excellent introductory textbook is James D. Morrow, Game Theory for Political Scientists (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995).
3. Seminal early applications of rational choice theory include Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, 1957); Gordon Tullock and James Buchanan, eds., The Calculus of Consent (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962); Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960); and Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 1965). Surveys of the basic literature include Dennis Mueller, ed., Public Choice II (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1989); James Alt and Kenneth Shepsle, eds., Perspectives on Positive Political Economy (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1990); and Peter C. Ordeshook, ed., Models of Strategic Choice in Politics (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1989). An excellent introductory textbook is James D. Morrow, Game Theory for Political Scientists (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995).
4. Seminal early applications of rational choice theory include Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, 1957); Gordon Tullock and James Buchanan, eds., The Calculus of Consent (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962); Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960); and Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 1965). Surveys of the basic literature include Dennis Mueller, ed., Public Choice II (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1989); James Alt and Kenneth Shepsle, eds., Perspectives on Positive Political Economy (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1990); and Peter C. Ordeshook, ed., Models of Strategic Choice in Politics (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1989). An excellent introductory textbook is James D. Morrow, Game Theory for Political Scientists (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995).
5. Seminal early applications of rational choice theory include Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, 1957); Gordon Tullock and James Buchanan, eds., The Calculus of Consent (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962); Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960); and Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 1965). Surveys of the basic literature include Dennis Mueller, ed., Public Choice II (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1989); James Alt and Kenneth Shepsle, eds., Perspectives on Positive Political Economy (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1990); and Peter C. Ordeshook, ed., Models of Strategic Choice in Politics (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1989). An excellent introductory textbook is James D. Morrow, Game Theory for Political Scientists (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995).
6. Seminal early applications of rational choice theory include Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, 1957); Gordon Tullock and James Buchanan, eds., The Calculus of Consent (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962); Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960); and Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 1965). Surveys of the basic literature include Dennis Mueller, ed., Public Choice II (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1989); James Alt and Kenneth Shepsle, eds., Perspectives on Positive Political Economy (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1990); and Peter C. Ordeshook, ed., Models of Strategic Choice in Politics (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1989). An excellent introductory textbook is James D. Morrow, Game Theory for Political Scientists (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995).
7. Seminal early applications of rational choice theory include Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, 1957); Gordon Tullock and James Buchanan, eds., The Calculus of Consent (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962); Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960); and Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 1965). Surveys of the basic literature include Dennis Mueller, ed., Public Choice II (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1989); James Alt and Kenneth Shepsle, eds., Perspectives on Positive Political Economy (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1990); and Peter C. Ordeshook, ed., Models of Strategic Choice in Politics (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1989). An excellent introductory textbook is James D. Morrow, Game Theory for Political Scientists (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995).
8. Seminal early applications of rational choice theory include Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, 1957); Gordon Tullock and James Buchanan, eds., The Calculus of Consent (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962); Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960); and Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 1965). Surveys of the basic literature include Dennis Mueller, ed., Public Choice II (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1989); James Alt and Kenneth Shepsle, eds., Perspectives on Positive Political Economy (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1990); and Peter C. Ordeshook, ed., Models of Strategic Choice in Politics (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1989). An excellent introductory textbook is James D. Morrow, Game Theory for Political Scientists (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995).
9. According to one estimate, rational choice scholarship now comprises nearly 40 percent of the published articles in the American Political Science Review, and another scholar reports that 22 percent of the APSR articles published between 1980 and 1993 were rational choice in orientation. Similarly, the annual report of the APSR's editor suggests that 15-20 percent of all ASPR submissions and published articles were rational choice in orientation. See Donald Green and Ian Shapiro, Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A Critique of Applications in Political Science (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1995), p. 2; Norman Schofield, "Rational Choice and Political Economy," Critical Review, Vol. 9, Nos. 1-2 (Winter-Spring 1995), p. 210, n. 10-12; and Ada W. Finifter, "Report of the Editor of the American Political Science Review, 1996-97," PS: Political Science and Politics, Vol. 30, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 783-791.
10. According to one estimate, rational choice scholarship now comprises nearly 40 percent of the published articles in the American Political Science Review, and another scholar reports that 22 percent of the APSR articles published between 1980 and 1993 were rational choice in orientation. Similarly, the annual report of the APSR's editor suggests that 15-20 percent of all ASPR submissions and published articles were rational choice in orientation. See Donald Green and Ian Shapiro, Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A Critique of Applications in Political Science (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1995), p. 2; Norman Schofield, "Rational Choice and Political Economy," Critical Review, Vol. 9, Nos. 1-2 (Winter-Spring 1995), p. 210, n. 10-12; and Ada W. Finifter, "Report of the Editor of the American Political Science Review, 1996-97," PS: Political Science and Politics, Vol. 30, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 783-791.
11. According to one estimate, rational choice scholarship now comprises nearly 40 percent of the published articles in the American Political Science Review, and another scholar reports that 22 percent of the APSR articles published between 1980 and 1993 were rational choice in orientation. Similarly, the annual report of the APSR's editor suggests that 15-20 percent of all ASPR submissions and published articles were rational choice in orientation. See Donald Green and Ian Shapiro, Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A Critique of Applications in Political Science (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1995), p. 2; Norman Schofield, "Rational Choice and Political Economy," Critical Review, Vol. 9, Nos. 1-2 (Winter-Spring 1995), p. 210, n. 10-12; and Ada W. Finifter, "Report of the Editor of the American Political Science Review, 1996-97," PS: Political Science and Politics, Vol. 30, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 783-791.
12. For example, the late William Riker once argued that social science laws "must be encased in a deductive theory," and suggested that rational choice models were the basis for the only successful social science theories. Similarly, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita argues that "formal, explicit theorizing takes intellectual precedence over empiricism," and Peter Ordeshook once claimed that "understanding politics requires sophisticated tools of deduction. . . . If mathematics is a necessary part of that analysis, then such mathematics is necessarily a part of political theory." See Riker, "Political Science and Rational Choice," in Alt and Shepsle, Perspectives on Positive Political Economy, pp. 168, 175-177; Bueno de Mesquita, "Toward a Scientific Understanding of International Conflict: A Personal View," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 29, No. 2 (June 1985), pp. 121-136; and Peter C. Ordeshook, "Introduction," in Ordeshook, Models of Strategic Choice in Politics, p. 2.
13. For example, the late William Riker once argued that social science laws "must be encased in a deductive theory," and suggested that rational choice models were the basis for the only successful social science theories. Similarly, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita argues that "formal, explicit theorizing takes intellectual precedence over empiricism," and Peter Ordeshook once claimed that "understanding politics requires sophisticated tools of deduction. . . . If mathematics is a necessary part of that analysis, then such mathematics is necessarily a part of political theory." See Riker, "Political Science and Rational Choice," in Alt and Shepsle, Perspectives on Positive Political Economy, pp. 168, 175-177; Bueno de Mesquita, "Toward a Scientific Understanding of International Conflict: A Personal View," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 29, No. 2 (June 1985), pp. 121-136; and Peter C. Ordeshook, "Introduction," in Ordeshook, Models of Strategic Choice in Politics, p. 2.
14. For example, the late William Riker once argued that social science laws "must be encased in a deductive theory," and suggested that rational choice models were the basis for the only successful social science theories. Similarly, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita argues that "formal, explicit theorizing takes intellectual precedence over empiricism," and Peter Ordeshook once claimed that "understanding politics requires sophisticated tools of deduction. . . . If mathematics is a necessary part of that analysis, then such mathematics is necessarily a part of political theory." See Riker, "Political Science and Rational Choice," in Alt and Shepsle, Perspectives on Positive Political Economy, pp. 168, 175-177; Bueno de Mesquita, "Toward a Scientific Understanding of International Conflict: A Personal View," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 29, No. 2 (June 1985), pp. 121-136; and Peter C. Ordeshook, "Introduction," in Ordeshook, Models of Strategic Choice in Politics, p. 2.
15. See Robert Bates, "Letter from the President: Area Studies and the Discipline," APSA-CP: Newsletter of the APSA Organized Section on Comparative Politics, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Winter 1996), pp. 1-2; Bates, "Area Studies and the Discipline: A Useful Controversy," PS: Political Science and Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2 (June 1997), pp. 166-169; and Bernard Grofman, "The Gentle Art of Rational Choice Bashing," in Grofman, ed., Information, Participation, and Choice (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993).
16. See Robert Bates, "Letter from the President: Area Studies and the Discipline," APSA-CP: Newsletter of the APSA Organized Section on Comparative Politics, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Winter 1996), pp. 1-2; Bates, "Area Studies and the Discipline: A Useful Controversy," PS: Political Science and Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2 (June 1997), pp. 166-169; and Bernard Grofman, "The Gentle Art of Rational Choice Bashing," in Grofman, ed., Information, Participation, and Choice (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993).
17. See Robert Bates, "Letter from the President: Area Studies and the Discipline," APSA-CP: Newsletter of the APSA Organized Section on Comparative Politics, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Winter 1996), pp. 1-2; Bates, "Area Studies and the Discipline: A Useful Controversy," PS: Political Science and Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2 (June 1997), pp. 166-169; and Bernard Grofman, "The Gentle Art of Rational Choice Bashing," in Grofman, ed., Information, Participation, and Choice (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993).
18. See Green and Shapiro, Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory; Raymond Wolfinger, "The Rational Citizen Faces Election Day, or What Rational Choice Theories Don't Tell You about American Elections," in M. Kent Jennings and Thomas E. Mann, eds., Elections at Home and Abroad: Essays in Honor of Warren E. Miller (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993); and Lars Udehn, The Limits of Public Choice: A Sociological Critique of the Economic Theory of Politics (New York: Routledge, 1996).
19. See Green and Shapiro, Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory; Raymond Wolfinger, "The Rational Citizen Faces Election Day, or What Rational Choice Theories Don't Tell You about American Elections," in M. Kent Jennings and Thomas E. Mann, eds., Elections at Home and Abroad: Essays in Honor of Warren E. Miller (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993); and Lars Udehn, The Limits of Public Choice: A Sociological Critique of the Economic Theory of Politics (New York: Routledge, 1996).
20. See Green and Shapiro, Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory; Raymond Wolfinger, "The Rational Citizen Faces Election Day, or What Rational Choice Theories Don't Tell You about American Elections," in M. Kent Jennings and Thomas E. Mann, eds., Elections at Home and Abroad: Essays in Honor of Warren E. Miller (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993); and Lars Udehn, The Limits of Public Choice: A Sociological Critique of the Economic Theory of Politics (New York: Routledge, 1996).
21. See, for example, Chalmers Johnson and E.B. Keehn, "A Disaster in the Making: Rational Choice and Asian Studies," National Interest, No. 36 (Summer 1994), pp. 14-22; and Johnson, "Preconception vs. Observation, or the Contributions of Rational Choice Theory and Area Studies to Contemporary Political Science," PS: Political Science and Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2 (June 1997), pp. 170-174.
22. See, for example, Chalmers Johnson and E.B. Keehn, "A Disaster in the Making: Rational Choice and Asian Studies," National Interest, No. 36 (Summer 1994), pp. 14-22; and Johnson, "Preconception vs. Observation, or the Contributions of Rational Choice Theory and Area Studies to Contemporary Political Science," PS: Political Science and Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2 (June 1997), pp. 170-174.
23. Past examples include the Methodonstreit among economic theorists in Germany in the nineteenth century, the struggle between institutional and neoclassical economists before and after World War II, and the "great debate" between so-called behavioralists and traditionalists in American political science (including international relations) in the 1960s. See Klaus Knorr and James N. Rosenau, Contending Approaches to International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1967); and Yuval P. Yonay, The Struggle over the Soul of Economics: Institutionalist and Neoclassical Economics in America between the Wars (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press 1998).
24. Past examples include the Methodonstreit among economic theorists in Germany in the nineteenth century, the struggle between institutional and neoclassical economists before and after World War II, and the "great debate" between so-called behavioralists and traditionalists in American political science (including international relations) in the 1960s. See Klaus Knorr and James N. Rosenau, Contending Approaches to International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1967); and Yuval P. Yonay, The Struggle over the Soul of Economics: Institutionalist and Neoclassical Economics in America between the Wars (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press 1998).
25. An exception to this observation is the special issue of Critical Review, Vol. 9, Nos. 1-2 (Winter-Spring 1995), entitled "Rational Choice Theory and Politics."
26. The same is true for fields that employ nonformal approaches, of course. The central point is simply that the content of a field of inquiry is inevitably shaped by the techniques and procedures that are used to study it.
27. Schelling, Strategy of Conflict, pp. 10-11, n. 4.
28. See David Lalman, Joe Oppenheimer, and Piotr Swistak, "Formal Rational Choice Theory: A Cumulative Science of Politics," in Ada W. Finifter, ed., Political Science: State of the Discipline II (Washington, D.C.: American Political Science Association, 1993), p. 78 (emphase in original).
29. Barry O'Neill makes a useful distinction between (1) "proto-game theory" (where formal ideas provide a convenient vocabulary or offer useful analogies), (2) "low game theory" (where solutions to specific games are used to analyze particular social interactions), and (3) "high game theory" (where scholars construct general proofs for whole classes of games). See O'Neill, "Game Theory and the Study of Deterrence in War," in Paul C. Stern, Robert Axelrod, Robert Jervis, and Roy Radner, eds., Perspectives on Deterrence (London: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 135. Prominent examples of proto-game theory include Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2 (January 1978), pp. 167-214; and Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984). This article focuses primarily on low game theory, which accurately describes the bulk of recent formal work in security studies.
30. Barry O'Neill makes a useful distinction between (1) "proto-game theory" (where formal ideas provide a convenient vocabulary or offer useful analogies), (2) "low game theory" (where solutions to specific games are used to analyze particular social interactions), and (3) "high game theory" (where scholars construct general proofs for whole classes of games). See O'Neill, "Game Theory and the Study of Deterrence in War," in Paul C. Stern, Robert Axelrod, Robert Jervis, and Roy Radner, eds., Perspectives on Deterrence (London: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 135. Prominent examples of proto-game theory include Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2 (January 1978), pp. 167-214; and Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984). This article focuses primarily on low game theory, which accurately describes the bulk of recent formal work in security studies.
31. Barry O'Neill makes a useful distinction between (1) "proto-game theory" (where formal ideas provide a convenient vocabulary or offer useful analogies), (2) "low game theory" (where solutions to specific games are used to analyze particular social interactions), and (3) "high game theory" (where scholars construct general proofs for whole classes of games). See O'Neill, "Game Theory and the Study of Deterrence in War," in Paul C. Stern, Robert Axelrod, Robert Jervis, and Roy Radner, eds., Perspectives on Deterrence (London: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 135. Prominent examples of proto-game theory include Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2 (January 1978), pp. 167-214; and Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984). This article focuses primarily on low game theory, which accurately describes the bulk of recent formal work in security studies.
32. I have not examined the extensive use of operations research and other decision-theoretic techniques in the analysis of military policy, largely because this work has had less impact in the social sciences. An encyclopedic survey is Barry O'Neill, "Game Theory Models of War and Peace," in Robert Aumann and Sergiu Hart, eds., Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Volume 2 (Amsterdam: Elsevier Science, 1994).
33. A more demanding condition is that the actors' utility functions are consistent with the Von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility theorem. This theorem imposes additional constraints (such as the exclusion of infinite utilities), but is not necessary in simple contexts. See Morrow, Game Theory for Political Scientists, chap. 2.
34. More precisely, this is the definition of a "Nash equilibrium," first established by John Nash. See ibid., pp. 91-98. For a formal discussion, see David M. Kreps, "Nash Equilibrium," in John Eatwell, Murray Milgate, and Peter Newman, eds., The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics: Game Theory (New York: W.W. Norton, 1989), pp. 167-177.
35. More precisely, this is the definition of a "Nash equilibrium," first established by John Nash. See ibid., pp. 91-98. For a formal discussion, see David M. Kreps, "Nash Equilibrium," in John Eatwell, Murray Milgate, and Peter Newman, eds., The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics: Game Theory (New York: W.W. Norton, 1989), pp. 167-177.
36. More precisely, this is the definition of a "Nash equilibrium," first established by John Nash. See ibid., pp. 91-98. For a formal discussion, see David M. Kreps, "Nash Equilibrium," in John Eatwell, Murray Milgate, and Peter Newman, eds., The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics: Game Theory (New York: W.W. Norton, 1989), pp. 167-177.
37. As William Riker puts it, "Equilibria are valuable, indeed essential in theory in social science because they are identified consequences of decisions that are necessary and sufficient to bring them about. An explanation is . . . the assurance that an outcome must be the way it is because of antecedent conditions. This is precisely what an equilibrium provides." See Riker, "Political Science and Rational Choice," p. 175.
38. The question is whether the actors must consciously select the course of action that will maximize their expected utility through a process of reasoning that is at least roughly consistent with the logic of the model. According to Jon Elster, a proper rational choice explanation requires that "the action must not only be rationalized by the desire and the belief, but it must also be caused by them and, moreover, caused 'in the right way.'" See his "Introduction," in Elster, ed., Rational Choice (New York: New York University Press, 1986), p. 16; and Terry Moe, "On the Scientific Status of Rational Choice Theory," American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 23, No. 1 (February 1979), pp. 215-243.
39. The question is whether the actors must consciously select the course of action that will maximize their expected utility through a process of reasoning that is at least roughly consistent with the logic of the model. According to Jon Elster, a proper rational choice explanation requires that "the action must not only be rationalized by the desire and the belief, but it must also be caused by them and, moreover, caused 'in the right way.'" See his "Introduction," in Elster, ed., Rational Choice (New York: New York University Press, 1986), p. 16; and Terry Moe, "On the Scientific Status of Rational Choice Theory," American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 23, No. 1 (February 1979), pp. 215-243.
40. A good summary of these issues is found in Green and Shapiro, Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory.
41. Famous examples of especially original and fruitful theories include Darwin's theory of natural selection, Newton's mechanics, and Einstein's theory of relativity. In the social sciences, one might point to Keynesian economic theory, collective goods theory, deterrence theory, the theory of bureaucratic politics, and the application of cognitive and social psychology to international conflict. Although some of these theories later fell from favor, each was properly regarded as a creative and potentially valuable conceptual vision, and each spawned a large and influential n literature.
42. On these methods of theory testing, see Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997).
43. Thus Christopher Achen and Duncan Snidal argue that the first wave of rational deterrence theory was "astonishingly fecund, both for theory and for policy," and of "immense practical importance." Yet the theory was not developed through formal modeling and contains many features that Achen and Snidal judge to be "woefully undercoceptualized." See Achen and Snidal, "Rational Deterrence Theory and Comparative Case Studies," World Politics, Vol. 41, No. 2 (January 1989), pp. 153, 159.
44. See Morrow, Game Theory for Political Scientists, p. 6 (emphasis added).
45. Bueno de Mesquita, "Toward a Scientific Understanding of International Conflict," p. 128. See also Steven Brams and D. Marc Kilgour, Game Theory and National Security (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1988), p. 2. The mathematical economist Gerard Debreu offers a similar defense of abstract modeling, arguing that "economic theory has had to adhere to the rules of logical discourse and must renounce the facility of internal inconsistency. A deductive structure that tolerates a contradiction does so under the penalty of being useless, since any statement can be derived flawlessly and flawlessly and immediately from that contradiction." See Debreu, "The Mathematization of Economic Theory," American Economic Review, Vol. 81, No. 1 (March 1991), pp. 2-3. For a typically witty rebuttal of Debreu's claims, see Deidre N. McCloskey, The Vices of Economics - The Virtues of the Bourgeoisie (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 1996), pp. 78-81.
46. Bueno de Mesquita, "Toward a Scientific Understanding of International Conflict," p. 128. See also Steven Brams and D. Marc Kilgour, Game Theory and National Security (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1988), p. 2. The mathematical economist Gerard Debreu offers a similar defense of abstract modeling, arguing that "economic theory has had to adhere to the rules of logical discourse and must renounce the facility of internal inconsistency. A deductive structure that tolerates a contradiction does so under the penalty of being useless, since any statement can be derived flawlessly and flawlessly and immediately from that contradiction." See Debreu, "The Mathematization of Economic Theory," American Economic Review, Vol. 81, No. 1 (March 1991), pp. 2-3. For a typically witty rebuttal of Debreu's claims, see Deidre N. McCloskey, The Vices of Economics - The Virtues of the Bourgeoisie (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 1996), pp. 78-81.
47. Bueno de Mesquita, "Toward a Scientific Understanding of International Conflict," p. 128. See also Steven Brams and D. Marc Kilgour, Game Theory and National Security (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1988), p. 2. The mathematical economist Gerard Debreu offers a similar defense of abstract modeling, arguing that "economic theory has had to adhere to the rules of logical discourse and must renounce the facility of internal inconsistency. A deductive structure that tolerates a contradiction does so under the penalty of being useless, since any statement can be derived flawlessly and flawlessly and immediately from that contradiction." See Debreu, "The Mathematization of Economic Theory," American Economic Review, Vol. 81, No. 1 (March 1991), pp. 2-3. For a typically witty rebuttal of Debreu's claims, see Deidre N. McCloskey, The Vices of Economics - The Virtues of the Bourgeoisie (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 1996), pp. 78-81.
48. Bueno de Mesquita, "Toward a Scientific Understanding of International Conflict," p. 128. See also Steven Brams and D. Marc Kilgour, Game Theory and National Security (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1988), p. 2. The mathematical economist Gerard Debreu offers a similar defense of abstract modeling, arguing that "economic theory has had to adhere to the rules of logical discourse and must renounce the facility of internal inconsistency. A deductive structure that tolerates a contradiction does so under the penalty of being useless, since any statement can be derived flawlessly and flawlessly and immediately from that contradiction." See Debreu, "The Mathematization of Economic Theory," American Economic Review, Vol. 81, No. 1 (March 1991), pp. 2-3. For a typically witty rebuttal of Debreu's claims, see Deidre N. McCloskey, The Vices of Economics - The Virtues of the Bourgeoisie (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 1996), pp. 78-81.
49. Kenneth Arrow offered a similar assessment more than four decades ago, writing that "mathematics . . . is distinguished from the other languages habitually used by the social scientists chiefly by its superior clarity and consistency." Arrow, "Mathematical Models in the Social Sciences," in Daniel Lerner and Harold D. Lasswell, eds., The Policy Sciences (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1951), p. 129. See also David M. Kreps, Game Theory and Economic Modelling (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 6-7.
50. Kenneth Arrow offered a similar assessment more than four decades ago, writing that "mathematics . . . is distinguished from the other languages habitually used by the social scientists chiefly by its superior clarity and consistency." Arrow, "Mathematical Models in the Social Sciences," in Daniel Lerner and Harold D. Lasswell, eds., The Policy Sciences (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1951), p. 129. See also David M. Kreps, Game Theory and Economic Modelling (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 6-7.
51. See Robert Powell, Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Search for Credibility (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
52. James D. Fearon, "Signaling versus the Balance of Power and Interests: An Empirical Test of a Crisis Bargaining Model," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 38, No. 2 (June 1994), pp. 236-269. Strictly speaking, one does not need a formal model to recognize that selection effects should be taken into account when interpreting the success or failure of deterrence. For a nonformal discussion of the same point, see Jack Levy, "Quantitative Studies of Deterrence Success and Failure," in Stern et al., Perspectives on Deterrence, pp. 117-120.
53. James D. Fearon, "Signaling versus the Balance of Power and Interests: An Empirical Test of a Crisis Bargaining Model," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 38, No. 2 (June 1994), pp. 236-269. Strictly speaking, one does not need a formal model to recognize that selection effects should be taken into account when interpreting the success or failure of deterrence. For a nonformal discussion of the same point, see Jack Levy, "Quantitative Studies of Deterrence Success and Failure," in Stern et al., Perspectives on Deterrence, pp. 117-120.
54. Examples from the social sciences include Benjamin Cohen's restatements of the various strands of Marxist theory in Cohen, The Question of Imperialism: The Political Economy of Dominance and Dependence (New York: Basic Books, 1973); Andrew J.R. Mack, "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict," World Politics, Vol. 27, No. 2 (January 1975), pp. 175- 200; Stanislav Andreski, Military Organization and Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971); Ronald Rogowski, Commerce and Coalitions: How Trade Affects Domestic Political Alignments (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989;) John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983); Robert D. Putnam with Robert Leonardi and Rafaella Y. Nanetti, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993); Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univesity Press, 1996); Norman H. Nie, Jane Junn, and Ken Stehlik-Berry, Education and Democratic Citizenship in America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997); and Chaim D. Kaufmann, "Out of the Lab and Into the Archives: A Method for Testing Psychological Explanations of Political Decision Making," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 38, No. 4 (December 1994), pp. 557-586.
55. Examples from the social sciences include Benjamin Cohen's restatements of the various strands of Marxist theory in Cohen, The Question of Imperialism: The Political Economy of Dominance and Dependence (New York: Basic Books, 1973); Andrew J.R. Mack, "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict," World Politics, Vol. 27, No. 2 (January 1975), pp. 175-200; Stanislav Andreski, Military Organization and Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971); Ronald Rogowski, Commerce and Coalitions: How Trade Affects Domestic Political Alignments (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989;) John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983); Robert D. Putnam with Robert Leonardi and Rafaella Y. Nanetti, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993); Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univesity Press, 1996); Norman H. Nie, Jane Junn, and Ken Stehlik-Berry, Education and Democratic Citizenship in America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997); and Chaim D. Kaufmann, "Out of the Lab and Into the Archives: A Method for Testing Psychological Explanations of Political Decision Making," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 38, No. 4 (December 1994), pp. 557-586.
56. Examples from the social sciences include Benjamin Cohen's restatements of the various strands of Marxist theory in Cohen, The Question of Imperialism: The Political Economy of Dominance and Dependence (New York: Basic Books, 1973); Andrew J.R. Mack, "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict," World Politics, Vol. 27, No. 2 (January 1975), pp. 175- 200; Stanislav Andreski, Military Organization and Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971); Ronald Rogowski, Commerce and Coalitions: How Trade Affects Domestic Political Alignments (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989;) John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983); Robert D. Putnam with Robert Leonardi and Rafaella Y. Nanetti, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993); Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univesity Press, 1996); Norman H. Nie, Jane Junn, and Ken Stehlik-Berry, Education and Democratic Citizenship in America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997); and Chaim D. Kaufmann, "Out of the Lab and Into the Archives: A Method for Testing Psychological Explanations of Political Decision Making," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 38, No. 4 (December 1994), pp. 557-586.
57. Examples from the social sciences include Benjamin Cohen's restatements of the various strands of Marxist theory in Cohen, The Question of Imperialism: The Political Economy of Dominance and Dependence (New York: Basic Books, 1973); Andrew J.R. Mack, "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict," World Politics, Vol. 27, No. 2 (January 1975), pp. 175- 200; Stanislav Andreski, Military Organization and Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971); Ronald Rogowski, Commerce and Coalitions: How Trade Affects Domestic Political Alignments (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989;) John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983); Robert D. Putnam with Robert Leonardi and Rafaella Y. Nanetti, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993); Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univesity Press, 1996); Norman H. Nie, Jane Junn, and Ken Stehlik-Berry, Education and Democratic Citizenship in America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997); and Chaim D. Kaufmann, "Out of the Lab and Into the Archives: A Method for Testing Psychological Explanations of Political Decision Making," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 38, No. 4 (December 1994), pp. 557-586.
58. Examples from the social sciences include Benjamin Cohen's restatements of the various strands of Marxist theory in Cohen, The Question of Imperialism: The Political Economy of Dominance and Dependence (New York: Basic Books, 1973); Andrew J.R. Mack, "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict," World Politics, Vol. 27, No. 2 (January 1975), pp. 175- 200; Stanislav Andreski, Military Organization and Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971); Ronald Rogowski, Commerce and Coalitions: How Trade Affects Domestic Political Alignments (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989;) John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983); Robert D. Putnam with Robert Leonardi and Rafaella Y. Nanetti, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993); Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univesity Press, 1996); Norman H. Nie, Jane Junn, and Ken Stehlik-Berry, Education and Democratic Citizenship in America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997); and Chaim D. Kaufmann, "Out of the Lab and Into the Archives: A Method for Testing Psychological Explanations of Political Decision Making," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 38, No. 4 (December 1994), pp. 557-586.
59. Examples from the social sciences include Benjamin Cohen's restatements of the various strands of Marxist theory in Cohen, The Question of Imperialism: The Political Economy of Dominance and Dependence (New York: Basic Books, 1973); Andrew J.R. Mack, "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict," World Politics, Vol. 27, No. 2 (January 1975), pp. 175- 200; Stanislav Andreski, Military Organization and Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971); Ronald Rogowski, Commerce and Coalitions: How Trade Affects Domestic Political Alignments (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989;) John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983); Robert D. Putnam with Robert Leonardi and Rafaella Y. Nanetti, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993); Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univesity Press, 1996); Norman H. Nie, Jane Junn, and Ken Stehlik-Berry, Education and Democratic Citizenship in America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997); and Chaim D. Kaufmann, "Out of the Lab and Into the Archives: A Method for Testing Psychological Explanations of Political Decision Making," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 38, No. 4 (December 1994), pp. 557-586.
60. Examples from the social sciences include Benjamin Cohen's restatements of the various strands of Marxist theory in Cohen, The Question of Imperialism: The Political Economy of Dominance and Dependence (New York: Basic Books, 1973); Andrew J.R. Mack, "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict," World Politics, Vol. 27, No. 2 (January 1975), pp. 175- 200; Stanislav Andreski, Military Organization and Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971); Ronald Rogowski, Commerce and Coalitions: How Trade Affects Domestic Political Alignments (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989;) John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983); Robert D. Putnam with Robert Leonardi and Rafaella Y. Nanetti, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993); Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univesity Press, 1996); Norman H. Nie, Jane Junn, and Ken Stehlik-Berry, Education and Democratic Citizenship in America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997); and Chaim D. Kaufmann, "Out of the Lab and Into the Archives: A Method for Testing Psychological Explanations of Political Decision Making," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 38, No. 4 (December 1994), pp. 557-586.
61. Examples from the social sciences include Benjamin Cohen's restatements of the various strands of Marxist theory in Cohen, The Question of Imperialism: The Political Economy of Dominance and Dependence (New York: Basic Books, 1973); Andrew J.R. Mack, "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict," World Politics, Vol. 27, No. 2 (January 1975), pp. 175- 200; Stanislav Andreski, Military Organization and Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971); Ronald Rogowski, Commerce and Coalitions: How Trade Affects Domestic Political Alignments (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989;) John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983); Robert D. Putnam with Robert Leonardi and Rafaella Y. Nanetti, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993); Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univesity Press, 1996); Norman H. Nie, Jane Junn, and Ken Stehlik-Berry, Education and Democratic Citizenship in America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997); and Chaim D. Kaufmann, "Out of the Lab and Into the Archives: A Method for Testing Psychological Explanations of Political Decision Making," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 38, No. 4 (December 1994), pp. 557-586.
62. Examples from the social sciences include Benjamin Cohen's restatements of the various strands of Marxist theory in Cohen, The Question of Imperialism: The Political Economy of Dominance and Dependence (New York: Basic Books, 1973); Andrew J.R. Mack, "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict," World Politics, Vol. 27, No. 2 (January 1975), pp. 175- 200; Stanislav Andreski, Military Organization and Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971); Ronald Rogowski, Commerce and Coalitions: How Trade Affects Domestic Political Alignments (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989;) John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983); Robert D. Putnam with Robert Leonardi and Rafaella Y. Nanetti, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993); Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univesity Press, 1996); Norman H. Nie, Jane Junn, and Ken Stehlik-Berry, Education and Democratic Citizenship in America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997); and Chaim D. Kaufmann, "Out of the Lab and Into the Archives: A Method for Testing Psychological Explanations of Political Decision Making," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 38, No. 4 (December 1994), pp. 557-586.
63. Moreover, Darwinians remained deeply divided over a number of central features of natural selection, such as the inheritability of acquired characteristics. See Robert J. Richards, Darwin and the Emergence of Evolutionary Theories of Mind and Behavior (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987).
64. Laudan goes on to say that "the only conceivable response to a conceptual problem of this kind is to refuse to accept the offending theory until the inconsistency is corrected," but he cautions that "the refusal to accept an inconsistent theory need not require that one cease working on such a theory." See Laudan, Progress and Its Problems: Towards a Theory of Scientific Growth (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), pp. 49-50, 230 n. 5 (emphasis in origianl).
65. Commenting on a study of the the psychological traits of scientists, the biologist and philosopher of science David L. Hull points out that "in deductive logic reasoning from 'if p the q' and 'q' to 'p' is fallacious. . . . When scientist and nonscientists were tested, scientists tended to commit this error more frequently than ordinary people. They also tended to reason quite rapidly from minimal data to possible explanations. . . . After all, scientists are involved primarily in nondemonstrative forms of inference, and by definition nondemonstrative inferences fail the canons of deductive logic. As fallacious as affirming the consequent may be in deductive logic, it is central to science." See David L. Hull, Science as a Process: An Evolutionary Account of the Social and Conceptual Development of Science (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), p. 301 (emphasis added).
66. See Marc Trachtenberg, "Keynes Triumphant: A Study of the Social History of Economic Ideas," in Robert Alun Jones and Henrika Kuklick, eds., Knowledge and Society: Studies in the Sociology of Culture Past and Present (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1983).
67. For example, Olson argued that small groups are more likely to provide a collective good than are larger groups, based on the claim that each member's share of the good will decline as group size increases, thereby decreasing the individual incentive to contribute. This argument assumes that the collective good is not in "joint supply" (meaning that consumption by one actor does not reduce the amount available to others), and ignores the possibility that certain collective goods (such as the ability to lobby legislators on behalf of some position) may require a large membership to be effective. See Russell Hardin, Collective Action (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), chap. 3.
68. A good critique of the utility assumptions common to rational choice theory is Amitai Etzioni, The Moral Dimension: Toward a New Economics (New York: Free Press, 1988). I am indebted to Robert Jervis for bringing this source to my attention.
69. Of course, such theories may do a better job of explaining and predicting than do rival theories. This is an empirical issue, however, which is one of the main reasons why it is necessary to subject rational choice models to careful empirical testing.
70. More sophisticated models also make heroic assumptions about the ability of actors to perform complex calculations to determine what course of action to take. This implicit assumption reveals a modest irony: formal modelers are admired because they are able to devise elaborate games and work out increasingly complicated solutions, yet the games themselves are supposed to describe the behavior of ordinary human beings (or collectivities) who have never had a course in game neory and may not even understand simple algebra.
71. Bayes's rule states that the probability that a particular state of the world is true given the occurrence of a particular event is the probability that both the state and the event will occur, divided by the probability that the event will occur independent of the actual state of the world. Formally, if there are two possible states of the world (X and Y), and an event A, Bayes's rule can be written as p(X/A) = p(X)p(A/X)/p(X)p(A/X)+p(Y)p(A/Y).
72. See Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, "On the Psychology of Prediction," Psychological Review, Vol. 80, No. 4 (July 1973), pp. 237-2351; David Grether, "Bayes Rule as a Descriptive Model: The Representativeness Heuristic," Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 95, No. 3 (November 1980), pp. 537-557; and Maya Bar-Hillel, "Similarity and Probability," Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, Vol. 11, No. 2 (April 1974), pp. 277-282. For general discussions of the rationality assumption in economics, see Robin M. Hogarth and Melvin W. Reder, eds., Rational Choice: The Contrast between Economics and Psychology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987); and Karen Schweers Cook and Margaret Levi, eds., The Limits of Rationality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990). A critical assesment of the use of Bayesian assumptions in game theory is Ken Binmore, "DeBayesing Game Theory," in Binmore, Alan Kirman, and Piero Tani, eds., Frontiers of Game Theory (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1993).
73. See Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, "On the Psychology of Prediction," Psychological Review, Vol. 80, No. 4 (July 1973), pp. 237-2351; David Grether, "Bayes Rule as a Descriptive Model: The Representativeness Heuristic," Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 95, No. 3 (November 1980), pp. 537-557; and Maya Bar-Hillel, "Similarity and Probability," Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, Vol. 11, No. 2 (April 1974), pp. 277-282. For general discussions of the rationality assumption in economics, see Robin M. Hogarth and Melvin W. Reder, eds., Rational Choice: The Contrast between Economics and Psychology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987); and Karen Schweers Cook and Margaret Levi, eds., The Limits of Rationality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990). A critical assesment of the use of Bayesian assumptions in game theory is Ken Binmore, "DeBayesing Game Theory," in Binmore, Alan Kirman, and Piero Tani, eds., Frontiers of Game Theory (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1993).
74. See Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, "On the Psychology of Prediction," Psychological Review, Vol. 80, No. 4 (July 1973), pp. 237-2351; David Grether, "Bayes Rule as a Descriptive Model: The Representativeness Heuristic," Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 95, No. 3 (November 1980), pp. 537-557; and Maya Bar-Hillel, "Similarity and Probability," Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, Vol. 11, No. 2 (April 1974), pp. 277-282. For general discussions of the rationality assumption in economics, see Robin M. Hogarth and Melvin W. Reder, eds., Rational Choice: The Contrast between Economics and Psychology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987); and Karen Schweers Cook and Margaret Levi, eds., The Limits of Rationality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990). A critical assesment of the use of Bayesian assumptions in game theory is Ken Binmore, "DeBayesing Game Theory," in Binmore, Alan Kirman, and Piero Tani, eds., Frontiers of Game Theory (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1993).
75. See Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, "On the Psychology of Prediction," Psychological Review, Vol. 80, No. 4 (July 1973), pp. 237-2351; David Grether, "Bayes Rule as a Descriptive Model: The Representativeness Heuristic," Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 95, No. 3 (November 1980), pp. 537-557; and Maya Bar-Hillel, "Similarity and Probability," Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, Vol. 11, No. 2 (April 1974), pp. 277-282. For general discussions of the rationality assumption in economics, see Robin M. Hogarth and Melvin W. Reder, eds., Rational Choice: The Contrast between Economics and Psychology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987); and Karen Schweers Cook and Margaret Levi, eds., The Limits of Rationality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990). A critical assesment of the use of Bayesian assumptions in game theory is Ken Binmore, "DeBayesing Game Theory," in Binmore, Alan Kirman, and Piero Tani, eds., Frontiers of Game Theory (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1993).
76. See Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, "On the Psychology of Prediction," Psychological Review, Vol. 80, No. 4 (July 1973), pp. 237-2351; David Grether, "Bayes Rule as a Descriptive Model: The Representativeness Heuristic," Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 95, No. 3 (November 1980), pp. 537-557; and Maya Bar-Hillel, "Similarity and Probability," Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, Vol. 11, No. 2 (April 1974), pp. 277-282. For general discussions of the rationality assumption in economics, see Robin M. Hogarth and Melvin W. Reder, eds., Rational Choice: The Contrast between Economics and Psychology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987); and Karen Schweers Cook and Margaret Levi, eds., The Limits of Rationality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990). A critical assesment of the use of Bayesian assumptions in game theory is Ken Binmore, "DeBayesing Game Theory," in Binmore, Alan Kirman, and Piero Tani, eds., Frontiers of Game Theory (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1993).
77. See Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, "On the Psychology of Prediction," Psychological Review, Vol. 80, No. 4 (July 1973), pp. 237-2351; David Grether, "Bayes Rule as a Descriptive Model: The Representativeness Heuristic," Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 95, No. 3 (November 1980), pp. 537-557; and Maya Bar-Hillel, "Similarity and Probability," Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, Vol. 11, No. 2 (April 1974), pp. 277-282. For general discussions of the rationality assumption in economics, see Robin M. Hogarth and Melvin W. Reder, eds., Rational Choice: The Contrast between Economics and Psychology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987); and Karen Schweers Cook and Margaret Levi, eds., The Limits of Rationality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990). A critical assesment of the use of Bayesian assumptions in game theory is Ken Binmore, "DeBayesing Game Theory," in Binmore, Alan Kirman, and Piero Tani, eds., Frontiers of Game Theory (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1993).
78. For example, Harrison Wagner's 1992 article on rationality and misperception presents a two-stage game in which a potential challenger is uncertain about the willingness of the defender to retaliate. Wagner shows that there is an equilibrium in which a strong defender always retaliates in the first stage (so as to deter a challenge in stage 2), while a weak deterrer retaliates only occasionally, and the challenger is more likely to be deterred in stage 2. But as Barry O'Neill has pointed out, the the model contains another equilibrium in which neither strong nor weak deterrers retaliate to stage 1, and the challenger always challenges in the second. See R. Harrison Wagner, "Rationality and Misperceptions in Deterrence Theory," Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol. 4, No. 2 (April 1992), pp. 115-142; and Barry O'Neill, "Are Game Models of Deterrence Biased towards Arms-Building?: Wagner on Rationality and Misperception," Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol. 4, No. 4 (October 1992), pp. 472-473.
79. For example, Harrison Wagner's 1992 article on rationality and misperception presents a two-stage game in which a potential challenger is uncertain about the willingness of the defender to retaliate. Wagner shows that there is an equilibrium in which a strong defender always retaliates in the first stage (so as to deter a challenge in stage 2), while a weak deterrer retaliates only occasionally, and the challenger is more likely to be deterred in stage 2. But as Barry O'Neill has pointed out, the the model contains another equilibrium in which neither strong nor weak deterrers retaliate to stage 1, and the challenger always challenges in the second. See R. Harrison Wagner, "Rationality and Misperceptions in Deterrence Theory," Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol. 4, No. 2 (April 1992), pp. 115-142; and Barry O'Neill, "Are Game Models of Deterrence Biased towards Arms-Building?: Wagner on Rationality and Misperception," Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol. 4, No. 4 (October 1992), pp. 472-473.
80. See Drew Fudenberg and Eric Maskin, "The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Vol. 54, No. 3 (May 1986), pp. 533-554.
81. Kreps, Game Theory and Economic Modelling, p. 101. The inability of some formal models to identify clear predictions has led some formal theorists to invoke ideas, institutions, or culture as exogenous, ad hoc variables in order to explain which of the various equilibria is chosen. In these accounts, however, the exogenous variables are doing the real work of explaining the outcomes; the game itself is essentially a descriptive framework in which to embed the narrative. See, for example, David Kreps, "Game Theory and Corporate Culture," in Alt and Shepsle, Perspectives on Positive Political Economy; Geoffrey Garrett and Barry R. Weingast, "Ideas, Interests, and Institutions: Constructing the European Community's Internal Market," in Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, eds., Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993); and Mark Blyth, "'Any More Bright Ideas?': The Ideational Turn in Comparative Political Economy," Comparative Politics, Vol. 29, No. 2 (January 1997), pp. 229-250.
82. Kreps, Game Theory and Economic Modelling, p. 101. The inability of some formal models to identify clear predictions has led some formal theorists to invoke ideas, institutions, or culture as exogenous, ad hoc variables in order to explain which of the various equilibria is chosen. In these accounts, however, the exogenous variables are doing the real work of explaining the outcomes; the game itself is essentially a descriptive framework in which to embed the narrative. See, for example, David Kreps, "Game Theory and Corporate Culture," in Alt and Shepsle, Perspectives on Positive Political Economy; Geoffrey Garrett and Barry R. Weingast, "Ideas, Interests, and Institutions: Constructing the European Community's Internal Market," in Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, eds., Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993); and Mark Blyth, "'Any More Bright Ideas?': The Ideational Turn in Comparative Political Economy," Comparative Politics, Vol. 29, No. 2 (January 1997), pp. 229-250.
83. Kreps, Game Theory and Economic Modelling, p. 101. The inability of some formal models to identify clear predictions has led some formal theorists to invoke ideas, institutions, or culture as exogenous, ad hoc variables in order to explain which of the various equilibria is chosen. In these accounts, however, the exogenous variables are doing the real work of explaining the outcomes; the game itself is essentially a descriptive framework in which to embed the narrative. See, for example, David Kreps, "Game Theory and Corporate Culture," in Alt and Shepsle, Perspectives on Positive Political Economy; Geoffrey Garrett and Barry R. Weingast, "Ideas, Interests, and Institutions: Constructing the European Community's Internal Market," in Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, eds., Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993); and Mark Blyth, "'Any More Bright Ideas?': The Ideational Turn in Comparative Political Economy," Comparative Politics, Vol. 29, No. 2 (January 1997), pp. 229-250.
84. Kreps, Game Theory and Economic Modelling, p. 101. The inability of some formal models to identify clear predictions has led some formal theorists to invoke ideas, institutions, or culture as exogenous, ad hoc variables in order to explain which of the various equilibria is chosen. In these accounts, however, the exogenous variables are doing the real work of explaining the outcomes; the game itself is essentially a descriptive framework in which to embed the narrative. See, for example, David Kreps, "Game Theory and Corporate Culture," in Alt and Shepsle, Perspectives on Positive Political Economy; Geoffrey Garrett and Barry R. Weingast, "Ideas, Interests, and Institutions: Constructing the European Community's Internal Market," in Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, eds., Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993); and Mark Blyth, "'Any More Bright Ideas?': The Ideational Turn in Comparative Political Economy," Comparative Politics, Vol. 29, No. 2 (January 1997), pp. 229-250.
85. The search for increasingly refined solution concepts may be going out of fashion among pure game theorists, in part because there is no good way to determine which concepts should be preferred. I am indebted to Michael Chwe for discussion on this point.
86. This point is nicely made in Barry Nalebuff's 1991 article on reputation building. Like the Wagner article just discussed, Nalebuff's model depicts situations where a state is contemplating intervention in one area to deter subsequent interventions elsewhere. The problem is that it is not clear how other actors will interpret different responses. Intervening could be seen as a sign of weakness ("I will intervene now because I cannot meet a later challenge and am therefore trying to bluff"), or it could be seen as a sign of strength ("I will intervene now to demonstrate how strong I am"). The model generates multiple equilibria - for example, there is an equilibrium in which all states intervene whether they are strong or weak, and another where no states intervene - and Nalebuff goes on to show that the question of whether intervention is "rational" depends on the solution concept that is employed. See Nalebuff, "Rational Deterrence in an Imperfect World," World Politics, Vol. 43, No. 3 (April 1991), p. 329.
87. See Donald N. McCloskey, The Rhetoric of Economics (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985); and McCloskey, Knowledge and Persuasion in Economics (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1994), especially chap. 9.
88. See Donald N. McCloskey, The Rhetoric of Economics (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985); and McCloskey, Knowledge and Persuasion in Economics (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1994), especially chap. 9.
89. This principle is not limited to scholarship using mathematics or other technical tools. If qualitative work is written in obscure and inaccessible jargon, or it is based on source materials that are not available to other scholars, this will inhibit critical evaluation and make it easier for dubious work to evade challenge.
90. See Thomas Mayer, Truth versus Precision in Economics (Aldershot, U.K.: Edward Elgar, Edward Elgar, 1993), pp. 123-127.
91. James D. Morrow, "Capabilities, Uncertainty, and Resolved: A Limited Information Model of Crisis Bargaining," American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 33, No. 4 (November 1989), pp. 941-972. Subsequent references to works discussed appear in parentheses in the text.
92. Jeffrey S. Banks, "Equilibrium Behavior in Crisis Bargaining Games," American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 34, No. 3 (August 1990), pp. 599-614.
93. It is worth noting that this article does not offer any empirical support for its claims.
94. D. Marc Kilgour and Frank C. Zagare, "Credibility, Uncertainty, and Deterrence," American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 35, No. 2 (May 1991), pp. 305-334.
95. Interestingly, Kilgour and Zagare's model produces results different from Morrow's model described above. Morrow's central finding was the impossibility of war in the absence of some form of uncertainty, whereas Kilgour and Zagare find that "misperception is neither necessary nor sufficient for the failure of mutual deterrence." Ibid., p. 317. Among other things, this shows that modeling alone does not ensure truth, as one can create a model to produce any particular conclusion that one might want.
96. David Lalman and David Newman, "Alliance Formation and National Security," International Interactions, Vol. 16, No. 4 (1991), pp. 239-254.
97. James D. Morrow, "Alliances, Credibility, and Peacetime Costs," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 38, No. 2 (June 1994), pp. 270-297.
98. Needless to say, formal theorists are not the only social scientists who engage in this practice.
99. Robert Powell, "Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory," American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 4 (December 1991), pp. 1303-1320.
100. Grieco distinguished between two types of states with different preferences: those that cared about "relative" gains (which he called "defensive positionalists") and those that did not (or "rational egoists"). By contrast, Powell assumes that all states have similar preferences, but their behavior varies with the external constraints they face. This formulation is simpler and more consistent with realist premises than Grieco's. See Joseph Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation," in David Baldwin, eds., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); Grieco, Cooperation among Nations: Europe, America, and the Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990); and Robert Powell, "The Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate," International Organization, Vol. 48, No. 2 (Spring 1994), especially pp. 334-338.
101. Grieco distinguished between two types of states with different preferences: those that cared about "relative" gains (which he called "defensive positionalists") and those that did not (or "rational egoists"). By contrast, Powell assumes that all states have similar preferences, but their behavior varies with the external constraints they face. This formulation is simpler and more consistent with realist premises than Grieco's. See Joseph Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation," in David Baldwin, eds., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); Grieco, Cooperation among Nations: Europe, America, and the Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990); and Robert Powell, "The Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate," International Organization, Vol. 48, No. 2 (Spring 1994), especially pp. 334-338.
102. Grieco distinguished between two types of states with different preferences: those that cared about "relative" gains (which he called "defensive positionalists") and those that did not (or "rational egoists"). By contrast, Powell assumes that all states have similar preferences, but their behavior varies with the external constraints they face. This formulation is simpler and more consistent with realist premises than Grieco's. See Joseph Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation," in David Baldwin, eds., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); Grieco, Cooperation among Nations: Europe, America, and the Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990); and Robert Powell, "The Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate," International Organization, Vol. 48, No. 2 (Spring 1994), especially pp. 334-338.
103. See Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," p. 187.
104. James D. Fearon, "Rationalist Theories of War," International Organization, Vol. 49, No. 3 (Summer 1995), pp. 379-414.
105. The logic of this argument is similar to the theory of industrial disputes advanced by John Hicks in the 1930s. In Hicks's case, the question is why labor and management cannot reach agreement on a contract solely via negotiation, thereby avoiding the costs of a strike. See Hicks, The Theory of Wages (London: Macmillan, 1932), chap. 7.
106. Fearon's argument applies only to the final decision to wage war, once there is a concrete dispute between two states. It does not address the other conditions that might operate to make war more likely, such as ideological differences, shifting balances of power, the perceived weakness of a particular regime, or the domestic incentives that might drive a particular regime to seek war for its own sake.
107. See Robert Art and Robert Jervis, "Introduction," in Art and Jervis, International Politics, 1st ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1976), p. 2 (emphasis added); and Kenneth A. Oye, ed., Cooperation under Anarchy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985), p. 1 (emphasis added).
108. See Robert Art and Robert Jervis, "Introduction," in Art and Jervis, International Politics, 1st ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1976), p. 2 (emphasis added); and Kenneth A. Oye, ed., Cooperation under Anarchy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985), p. 1 (emphasis added).
109. Unlike some forms of secrecy (such as number of weapons, for example), "private information" includes information (such as a player's level of resolve) that could not be reliably revealed to the other side even if one wanted to.
110. Fearon's discussion of "rationalist" theories does not explain when war will or will not occur. As he notes at the end of the article, both the problem of "private information" and the "commitment problem" created by anarchy are constant features of international politics and thus cannot explain why war occurs in some circumstances but not in others. See Fearon, "Rationalist Theories of War," p. 410.
111. Of this large and growing literature, see especially Reinhard Selten, "The Chain-Store Paradox," Theory and Decision, Vol. 9, No. 2 (April 1978), pp. 127-159; David M. Kreps, Paul Milgrom, John Roberts, and Robert Wilson, "Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma," pp. 245-252; Kreps and Wilson, "Reputation and Imperfect Information," pp. 253-279; and Milgrom and Roberts, "Predation, Reputation, and Entry Deterrence," pp. 280-312. All appear in Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 27, No. 2 (August 1982). See also Wilson, "Deterrence in Oligopolistic Competition," in Stern et al., Perspectives on Deterrence; and Wilson, "Reputations in Games and Markets," in Alvin E. Roth, Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1985).
112. Of this large and growing literature, see especially Reinhard Selten, "The Chain-Store Paradox," Theory and Decision, Vol. 9, No. 2 (April 1978), pp. 127-159; David M. Kreps, Paul Milgrom, John Roberts, and Robert Wilson, "Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma," pp. 245-252; Kreps and Wilson, "Reputation and Imperfect Information," pp. 253-279; and Milgrom and Roberts, "Predation, Reputation, and Entry Deterrence," pp. 280-312. All appear in Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 27, No. 2 (August 1982). See also Wilson, "Deterrence in Oligopolistic Competition," in Stern et al., Perspectives on Deterrence; and Wilson, "Reputations in Games and Markets," in Alvin E. Roth, Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1985).
113. Of this large and growing literature, see especially Reinhard Selten, "The Chain-Store Paradox," Theory and Decision, Vol. 9, No. 2 (April 1978), pp. 127-159; David M. Kreps, Paul Milgrom, John Roberts, and Robert Wilson, "Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma," pp. 245-252; Kreps and Wilson, "Reputation and Imperfect Information," pp. 253-279; and Milgrom and Roberts, "Predation, Reputation, and Entry Deterrence," pp. 280-312. All appear in Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 27, No. 2 (August 1982). See also Wilson, "Deterrence in Oligopolistic Competition," in Stern et al., Perspectives on Deterrence; and Wilson, "Reputations in Games and Markets," in Alvin E. Roth, Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1985).
114. Of this large and growing literature, see especially Reinhard Selten, "The Chain-Store Paradox," Theory and Decision, Vol. 9, No. 2 (April 1978), pp. 127-159; David M. Kreps, Paul Milgrom, John Roberts, and Robert Wilson, "Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma," pp. 245-252; Kreps and Wilson, "Reputation and Imperfect Information," pp. 253-279; and Milgrom and Roberts, "Predation, Reputation, and Entry Deterrence," pp. 280-312. All appear in Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 27, No. 2 (August 1982). See also Wilson, "Deterrence in Oligopolistic Competition," in Stern et al., Perspectives on Deterrence; and Wilson, "Reputations in Games and Markets," in Alvin E. Roth, Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1985).
115. Of this large and growing literature, see especially Reinhard Selten, "The Chain-Store Paradox," Theory and Decision, Vol. 9, No. 2 (April 1978), pp. 127-159; David M. Kreps, Paul Milgrom, John Roberts, and Robert Wilson, "Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma," pp. 245-252; Kreps and Wilson, "Reputation and Imperfect Information," pp. 253-279; and Milgrom and Roberts, "Predation, Reputation, and Entry Deterrence," pp. 280-312. All appear in Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 27, No. 2 (August 1982). See also Wilson, "Deterrence in Oligopolistic Competition," in Stern et al., Perspectives on Deterrence; and Wilson, "Reputations in Games and Markets," in Alvin E. Roth, Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1985).
116. Of this large and growing literature, see especially Reinhard Selten, "The Chain-Store Paradox," Theory and Decision, Vol. 9, No. 2 (April 1978), pp. 127-159; David M. Kreps, Paul Milgrom, John Roberts, and Robert Wilson, "Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma," pp. 245-252; Kreps and Wilson, "Reputation and Imperfect Information," pp. 253-279; and Milgrom and Roberts, "Predation, Reputation, and Entry Deterrence," pp. 280-312. All appear in Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 27, No. 2 (August 1982). See also Wilson, "Deterrence in Oligopolistic Competition," in Stern et al., Perspectives on Deterrence; and Wilson, "Reputations in Games and Markets," in Alvin E. Roth, Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1985).
117. Examples include Nalebuff, "Rational Deterrence in an Imperfect World"; Wagner, "Rationality and Misperception in Deterrence"; D. Marc Kilgour, "Domestic Political Structure and War Behavior: A Game-Theoretic Approach," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 35, No. 2 (June 1991), pp. 266- 284; and Andrew Kydd, "Game Theory and the Spiral Model," World Politics, Vol. 49, No. 3 (April 1997), pp. 371-400.
118. Examples include Nalebuff, "Rational Deterrence in an Imperfect World"; Wagner, "Rationality and Misperception in Deterrence"; D. Marc Kilgour, "Domestic Political Structure and War Behavior: A Game-Theoretic Approach," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 35, No. 2 (June 1991), pp. 266- 284; and Andrew Kydd, "Game Theory and the Spiral Model," World Politics, Vol. 49, No. 3 (April 1997), pp. 371-400.
119. Examples include Nalebuff, "Rational Deterrence in an Imperfect World"; Wagner, "Rationality and Misperception in Deterrence"; D. Marc Kilgour, "Domestic Political Structure and War Behavior: A Game-Theoretic Approach," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 35, No. 2 (June 1991), pp. 266-284; and Andrew Kydd, "Game Theory and the Spiral Model," World Politics, Vol. 49, No. 3 (April 1997), pp. 371-400.
120. Examples include Nalebuff, "Rational Deterrence in an Imperfect World"; Wagner, "Rationality and Misperception in Deterrence"; D. Marc Kilgour, "Domestic Political Structure and War Behavior: A Game-Theoretic Approach," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 35, No. 2 (June 1991), pp. 266- 284; and Andrew Kydd, "Game Theory and the Spiral Model," World Politics, Vol. 49, No. 3 (April 1997), pp. 371-400.
121. See Robert Jervis, The Logic of Images in International Relations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970), pp. 21, 26. For a discussion of the relationship between his early work and recent economic work on reputation, see Jervis, "Drawing Inferences and Projecting Images," paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, San Diego, California, April 1996.
122. See Robert Jervis, The Logic of Images in International Relations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970), pp. 21, 26. For a discussion of the relationship between his early work and recent economic work on reputation, see Jervis, "Drawing Inferences and Projecting Images," paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, San Diego, California, April 1996.
123. For a fair-minded critique of the formal literature on reputation, see Jonathan Mercer, Reputation and International Politics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996), pp. 28-42.
124. The seminal piece is Mancur Olson and Richard Zeckhauser, "An Economic Theory of Alliances," Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 48, No. 2 (August 1966), pp. 266-279.
125. Strictly speaking, Axelrod's results emerged from a computer simulation rather than from a formal model. His argument rests on the logic of the iterated prisoner's dilemma, however, and helps highlight the importance of these games for the formal analysis of cooperation. Given that some parts of Axelrod's argument did not stand up to careful formal scrutiny, this example also supports the claim that creativity and theoretical fertility are more important than strict logical consistency. See Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984).
126. See George Downs and David Rocke, Tacit Bargaining and Arms Control (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1989); and Downs and Rocke, Optimal Imperfection?: Domestic Uncertainty and Institutions in International Relations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995).
127. See George Downs and David Rocke, Tacit Bargaining and Arms Control (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1989); and Downs and Rocke, Optimal Imperfection?: Domestic Uncertainty and Institutions in International Relations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995).
128. For a nuanced appreciation of the contributions and limitations of rational choice theorizing, see James B. Rule, Theory and Progress in Social Science (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1997), chap. 3.
129. It is worth noting that some of the most interesting and important theoretical innovations in security studies over the past two decades have come from nonformal theoretist. For example, John Steinbruner and Bruce Blair made a major contribution to deterrence theory by highlighting the importance of organizational and operational considerations; Robert Jervis offered a comprehensive inventory of the ways that psychological biases could affect foreign policy decisionmakers; John Mearsheimer developed and tested a simple theory of conventional deterrence; Barry Posen showed how external conditions and organization theory could explain key elements of great power military doctrine; and Robert Pape constructed and tested a theory of military coercion. More recently, scholars like Peter Katzenstein, Elizabeth Kier, and Alastair Iain Johnston have applied cultural and constructivist approaches to security studies, all of them based on extensive empirical work. One need not be persuaded by all of these works to recognize that they were important efforts to bring social science to bear on important security problems. For a useful survey, see Richard K. Betts, "Should Strategic Studies Survive?" World Politics, Vol. 50, No. 1 (October 1997), pp. 7-33.
130. See Ian Hacking, Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 154-158, 248-249;
131. and Stephen Toulmin, Human Understanding Volume 1: The Collective Use and Evolution of Concepts (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1972), pp. 189-190.
132. On this point, see O'Neill, "Game Theory Models of War and Peace," pp. 1010-1013.
133. See Bernard Brodie, ed., The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1946); A.J. Wohlstetter, F.S. Hoffman, R.J. Lutz, and H.S. Rowen, Selection and Use of Strategic Air Bases, RAND Report P-266 (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1962); and Marc Trachtenberg, History and Strategy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1991), pp. 29-31.
134. See Bernard Brodie, ed., The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1946); A.J. Wohlstetter, F.S. Hoffman, R.J. Lutz, and H.S. Rowen, Selection and Use of Strategic Air Bases, RAND Report P-266 (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1962); and Marc Trachtenberg, History and Strategy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1991), pp. 29-31.
135. See Bernard Brodie, ed., The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1946); A.J. Wohlstetter, F.S. Hoffman, R.J. Lutz, and H.S. Rowen, Selection and Use of Strategic Air Bases, RAND Report P-266 (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1962); and Marc Trachtenberg, History and Strategy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1991), pp. 29-31.
136. On the latter point, see Bruce Russett, "International Behavior Research: Case Studies and Cumulation," in Russett, Power and Community in World Politics (San Francisco, Calif.: W.H. Freeman, 1974), pp. 16-17.
137. Quoted in Mayer, Truth versus Precision in Economics, p. 27. Albert Einstein shared this view. He praised Johannes Kepler for recognizing that "even the most lucidly logical mathematical theory was of itself no guarantee of truth, becoming meaningless unless it was checked against the most exacting observations in natural science." And Einstein called Galileo Galilei "the father of modern physics" because Galileo realized that "pure logical thinking cannot yield us any knowledge of the empirical world. . . . Propositions arrived at by purely logical means are completely empty as regards reality." Quoted in Timothy Ferris, The Whole Shebang: A State of the Universe(s) Report (New York: Touchstone, 1997), p. 28. Gary King, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba offer a similar appraisal, writing that "formal models do not constitute verified explanations without empirical evaluation of their predictions." See King, Keohane, and Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 105-106.
138. Quoted in Mayer, Truth versus Precision in Economics, p. 27. Albert Einstein shared this view. He praised Johannes Kepler for recognizing that "even the most lucidly logical mathematical theory was of itself no guarantee of truth, becoming meaningless unless it was checked against the most exacting observations in natural science." And Einstein called Galileo Galilei "the father of modern physics" because Galileo realized that "pure logical thinking cannot yield us any knowledge of the empirical world. . . . Propositions arrived at by purely logical means are completely empty as regards reality." Quoted in Timothy Ferris, The Whole Shebang: A State of the Universe(s) Report (New York: Touchstone, 1997), p. 28. Gary King, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba offer a similar appraisal, writing that "formal models do not constitute verified explanations without empirical evaluation of their predictions." See King, Keohane, and Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 105-106.
139. Quoted in Mayer, Truth versus Precision in Economics, p. 27. Albert Einstein shared this view. He praised Johannes Kepler for recognizing that "even the most lucidly logical mathematical theory was of itself no guarantee of truth, becoming meaningless unless it was checked against the most exacting observations in natural science." And Einstein called Galileo Galilei "the father of modern physics" because Galileo realized that "pure logical thinking cannot yield us any knowledge of the empirical world. . . . Propositions arrived at by purely logical means are completely empty as regards reality." Quoted in Timothy Ferris, The Whole Shebang: A State of the Universe(s) Report (New York: Touchstone, 1997), p. 28. Gary King, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba offer a similar appraisal, writing that "formal models do not constitute verified explanations without empirical evaluation of their predictions." See King, Keohane, and Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 105-106.
140. For example, the following formal works contain no empirical evidence, and rely entirely on formal deduction: Powell, Nuclear Deterrence Theory; Powell, "Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory"; Powell, "Guns, Butter, and Anarchy," American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 1 (March 1993), pp. 115-132; Powell, "Stability and the Distribution of Power," World Politics, Vol. 48, No. 2 (January 1996), pp. 239-267; Fearon, "Rationalist Theories of War"; Banks, "Equilibrium Behavior in Crisis Bargaining Games"; James D. Morrow, "A Spatial Model of International Conflict," American Political Science Review, Vol. 80, No. 4 (December 1986), pp. 1131-1150; R. Harrison Wagner, "Deterrence and Bargaining," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 26, No. 2 (June 1982), pp. 329-358; Wagner, "Rationality and Misperception in Deterrence"; Wagner, "Nuclear Deterrence, Counterforce Strategies, and the Incentive to Strike First," American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 3 (September 1991), pp. 727-749; Kilgour and Zagare, "Credibility, Uncertainty, and Deterrence"; Kilgour," Domestic Political Structure and War Behavior"; Morrow, "Alliances, Credibility, and Peactime Costs"; Nalebuff, "Rational Deterrence in an Imperfect World"; Nalebuff, "Minimal Nuclear Deterrence," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 32, No. 3 (September 1988); Nalebuff, Brickmanship and Nuclear Deterrence: The Neutrality of Escalation," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Spring 1986), pp. 19-30; Alasdair Smith, "Diversionary Foreign Policy in Democratic Systems," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 40, No. 1 (March 1996), pp. 133-153; Smith, "Alliance Formation and War," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 39, No. 4 (December 1995), pp. 405-425; Smith, "International Crises and Domestic Politics," American Political Science Review, Vol. 92, No. 3 (September 1998), pp. 623-638; and Kydd, "Game Theory and the Spiral Model."
141. For example, the following formal works contain no empirical evidence, and rely entirely on formal deduction: Powell, Nuclear Deterrence Theory; Powell, "Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory"; Powell, "Guns, Butter, and Anarchy," American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 1 (March 1993), pp. 115-132; Powell, "Stability and the Distribution of Power," World Politics, Vol. 48, No. 2 (January 1996), pp. 239-267; Fearon, "Rationalist Theories of War"; Banks, "Equilibrium Behavior in Crisis Bargaining Games"; James D. Morrow, "A Spatial Model of International Conflict," American Political Science Review, Vol. 80, No. 4 (December 1986), pp. 1131-1150; R. Harrison Wagner, "Deterrence and Bargaining," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 26, No. 2 (June 1982), pp. 329-358; Wagner, "Rationality and Misperception in Deterrence"; Wagner, "Nuclear Deterrence, Counterforce Strategies, and the Incentive to Strike First," American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 3 (September 1991), pp. 727-749; Kilgour and Zagare, "Credibility, Uncertainty, and Deterrence"; Kilgour," Domestic Political Structure and War Behavior"; Morrow, "Alliances, Credibility, and Peactime Costs"; Nalebuff, "Rational Deterrence in an Imperfect World"; Nalebuff, "Minimal Nuclear Deterrence," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 32, No. 3 (September 1988); Nalebuff, Brickmanship and Nuclear Deterrence: The Neutrality of Escalation," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Spring 1986), pp. 19-30; Alasdair Smith, "Diversionary Foreign Policy in Democratic Systems," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 40, No. 1 (March 1996), pp. 133-153; Smith, "Alliance Formation and War," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 39, No. 4 (December 1995), pp. 405-425; Smith, "International Crises and Domestic Politics," American Political Science Review, Vol. 92, No. 3 (September 1998), pp. 623-638; and Kydd, "Game Theory and the Spiral Model."
142. For example, the following formal works contain no empirical evidence, and rely entirely on formal deduction: Powell, Nuclear Deterrence Theory; Powell, "Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory"; Powell, "Guns, Butter, and Anarchy," American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 1 (March 1993), pp. 115-132; Powell, "Stability and the Distribution of Power," World Politics, Vol. 48, No. 2 (January 1996), pp. 239-267; Fearon, "Rationalist Theories of War"; Banks, "Equilibrium Behavior in Crisis Bargaining Games"; James D. Morrow, "A Spatial Model of International Conflict," American Political Science Review, Vol. 80, No. 4 (December 1986), pp. 1131-1150; R. Harrison Wagner, "Deterrence and Bargaining," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 26, No. 2 (June 1982), pp. 329-358; Wagner, "Rationality and Misperception in Deterrence"; Wagner, "Nuclear Deterrence, Counterforce Strategies, and the Incentive to Strike First," American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 3 (September 1991), pp. 727-749; Kilgour and Zagare, "Credibility, Uncertainty, and Deterrence"; Kilgour," Domestic Political Structure and War Behavior"; Morrow, "Alliances, Credibility, and Peactime Costs"; Nalebuff, "Rational Deterrence in an Imperfect World"; Nalebuff, "Minimal Nuclear Deterrence," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 32, No. 3 (September 1988); Nalebuff, Brickmanship and Nuclear Deterrence: The Neutrality of Escalation," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Spring 1986), pp. 19-30; Alasdair Smith, "Diversionary Foreign Policy in Democratic Systems," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 40, No. 1 (March 1996), pp. 133-153; Smith, "Alliance Formation and War," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 39, No. 4 (December 1995), pp. 405-425; Smith, "International Crises and Domestic Politics," American Political Science Review, Vol. 92, No. 3 (September 1998), pp. 623-638; and Kydd, "Game Theory and the Spiral Model."
143. For example, the following formal works contain no empirical evidence, and rely entirely on formal deduction: Powell, Nuclear Deterrence Theory; Powell, "Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory"; Powell, "Guns, Butter, and Anarchy," American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 1 (March 1993), pp. 115-132; Powell, "Stability and the Distribution of Power," World Politics, Vol. 48, No. 2 (January 1996), pp. 239-267; Fearon, "Rationalist Theories of War"; Banks, "Equilibrium Behavior in Crisis Bargaining Games"; James D. Morrow, "A Spatial Model of International Conflict," American Political Science Review, Vol. 80, No. 4 (December 1986), pp. 1131-1150; R. Harrison Wagner, "Deterrence and Bargaining," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 26, No. 2 (June 1982), pp. 329-358; Wagner, "Rationality and Misperception in Deterrence"; Wagner, "Nuclear Deterrence, Counterforce Strategies, and the Incentive to Strike First," American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 3 (September 1991), pp. 727-749; Kilgour and Zagare, "Credibility, Uncertainty, and Deterrence"; Kilgour," Domestic Political Structure and War Behavior"; Morrow, "Alliances, Credibility, and Peactime Costs"; Nalebuff, "Rational Deterrence in an Imperfect World"; Nalebuff, "Minimal Nuclear Deterrence," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 32, No. 3 (September 1988); Nalebuff, Brickmanship and Nuclear Deterrence: The Neutrality of Escalation," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Spring 1986), pp. 19-30; Alasdair Smith, "Diversionary Foreign Policy in Democratic Systems," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 40, No. 1 (March 1996), pp. 133-153; Smith, "Alliance Formation and War," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 39, No. 4 (December 1995), pp. 405-425; Smith, "International Crises and Domestic Politics," American Political Science Review, Vol. 92, No. 3 (September 1998), pp. 623-638; and Kydd, "Game Theory and the Spiral Model."
144. For example, the following formal works contain no empirical evidence, and rely entirely on formal deduction: Powell, Nuclear Deterrence Theory; Powell, "Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory"; Powell, "Guns, Butter, and Anarchy," American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 1 (March 1993), pp. 115-132; Powell, "Stability and the Distribution of Power," World Politics, Vol. 48, No. 2 (January 1996), pp. 239-267; Fearon, "Rationalist Theories of War"; Banks, "Equilibrium Behavior in Crisis Bargaining Games"; James D. Morrow, "A Spatial Model of International Conflict," American Political Science Review, Vol. 80, No. 4 (December 1986), pp. 1131-1150; R. Harrison Wagner, "Deterrence and Bargaining," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 26, No. 2 (June 1982), pp. 329-358; Wagner, "Rationality and Misperception in Deterrence"; Wagner, "Nuclear Deterrence, Counterforce Strategies, and the Incentive to Strike First," American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 3 (September 1991), pp. 727-749; Kilgour and Zagare, "Credibility, Uncertainty, and Deterrence"; Kilgour," Domestic Political Structure and War Behavior"; Morrow, "Alliances, Credibility, and Peactime Costs"; Nalebuff, "Rational Deterrence in an Imperfect World"; Nalebuff, "Minimal Nuclear Deterrence," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 32, No. 3 (September 1988); Nalebuff, Brickmanship and Nuclear Deterrence: The Neutrality of Escalation," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Spring 1986), pp. 19-30; Alasdair Smith, "Diversionary Foreign Policy in Democratic Systems," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 40, No. 1 (March 1996), pp. 133-153; Smith, "Alliance Formation and War," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 39, No. 4 (December 1995), pp. 405-425; Smith, "International Crises and Domestic Politics," American Political Science Review, Vol. 92, No. 3 (September 1998), pp. 623-638; and Kydd, "Game Theory and the Spiral Model."
145. For example, the following formal works contain no empirical evidence, and rely entirely on formal deduction: Powell, Nuclear Deterrence Theory; Powell, "Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory"; Powell, "Guns, Butter, and Anarchy," American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 1 (March 1993), pp. 115-132; Powell, "Stability and the Distribution of Power," World Politics, Vol. 48, No. 2 (January 1996), pp. 239-267; Fearon, "Rationalist Theories of War"; Banks, "Equilibrium Behavior in Crisis Bargaining Games"; James D. Morrow, "A Spatial Model of International Conflict," American Political Science Review, Vol. 80, No. 4 (December 1986), pp. 1131-1150; R. Harrison Wagner, "Deterrence and Bargaining," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 26, No. 2 (June 1982), pp. 329-358; Wagner, "Rationality and Misperception in Deterrence"; Wagner, "Nuclear Deterrence, Counterforce Strategies, and the Incentive to Strike First," American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 3 (September 1991), pp. 727-749; Kilgour and Zagare, "Credibility, Uncertainty, and Deterrence"; Kilgour," Domestic Political Structure and War Behavior"; Morrow, "Alliances, Credibility, and Peactime Costs"; Nalebuff, "Rational Deterrence in an Imperfect World"; Nalebuff, "Minimal Nuclear Deterrence," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 32, No. 3 (September 1988); Nalebuff, Brickmanship and Nuclear Deterrence: The Neutrality of Escalation," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Spring 1986), pp. 19-30; Alasdair Smith, "Diversionary Foreign Policy in Democratic Systems," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 40, No. 1 (March 1996), pp. 133-153; Smith, "Alliance Formation and War," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 39, No. 4 (December 1995), pp. 405-425; Smith, "International Crises and Domestic Politics," American Political Science Review, Vol. 92, No. 3 (September 1998), pp. 623-638; and Kydd, "Game Theory and the Spiral Model."
146. For example, the following formal works contain no empirical evidence, and rely entirely on formal deduction: Powell, Nuclear Deterrence Theory; Powell, "Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory"; Powell, "Guns, Butter, and Anarchy," American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 1 (March 1993), pp. 115-132; Powell, "Stability and the Distribution of Power," World Politics, Vol. 48, No. 2 (January 1996), pp. 239-267; Fearon, "Rationalist Theories of War"; Banks, "Equilibrium Behavior in Crisis Bargaining Games"; James D. Morrow, "A Spatial Model of International Conflict," American Political Science Review, Vol. 80, No. 4 (December 1986), pp. 1131-1150; R. Harrison Wagner, "Deterrence and Bargaining," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 26, No. 2 (June 1982), pp. 329-358; Wagner, "Rationality and Misperception in Deterrence"; Wagner, "Nuclear Deterrence, Counterforce Strategies, and the Incentive to Strike First," American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 3 (September 1991), pp. 727-749; Kilgour and Zagare, "Credibility, Uncertainty, and Deterrence"; Kilgour," Domestic Political Structure and War Behavior"; Morrow, "Alliances, Credibility, and Peactime Costs"; Nalebuff, "Rational Deterrence in an Imperfect World"; Nalebuff, "Minimal Nuclear Deterrence," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 32, No. 3 (September 1988); Nalebuff, Brickmanship and Nuclear Deterrence: The Neutrality of Escalation," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Spring 1986), pp. 19-30; Alasdair Smith, "Diversionary Foreign Policy in Democratic Systems," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 40, No. 1 (March 1996), pp. 133-153; Smith, "Alliance Formation and War," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 39, No. 4 (December 1995), pp. 405-425; Smith, "International Crises and Domestic Politics," American Political Science Review, Vol. 92, No. 3 (September 1998), pp. 623-638; and Kydd, "Game Theory and the Spiral Model."
147. For example, the following formal works contain no empirical evidence, and rely entirely on formal deduction: Powell, Nuclear Deterrence Theory; Powell, "Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory"; Powell, "Guns, Butter, and Anarchy," American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 1 (March 1993), pp. 115-132; Powell, "Stability and the Distribution of Power," World Politics, Vol. 48, No. 2 (January 1996), pp. 239-267; Fearon, "Rationalist Theories of War"; Banks, "Equilibrium Behavior in Crisis Bargaining Games"; James D. Morrow, "A Spatial Model of International Conflict," American Political Science Review, Vol. 80, No. 4 (December 1986), pp. 1131-1150; R. Harrison Wagner, "Deterrence and Bargaining," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 26, No. 2 (June 1982), pp. 329-358; Wagner, "Rationality and Misperception in Deterrence"; Wagner, "Nuclear Deterrence, Counterforce Strategies, and the Incentive to Strike First," American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 3 (September 1991), pp. 727-749; Kilgour and Zagare, "Credibility, Uncertainty, and Deterrence"; Kilgour," Domestic Political Structure and War Behavior"; Morrow, "Alliances, Credibility, and Peactime Costs"; Nalebuff, "Rational Deterrence in an Imperfect World"; Nalebuff, "Minimal Nuclear Deterrence," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 32, No. 3 (September 1988); Nalebuff, Brickmanship and Nuclear Deterrence: The Neutrality of Escalation," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Spring 1986), pp. 19-30; Alasdair Smith, "Diversionary Foreign Policy in Democratic Systems," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 40, No. 1 (March 1996), pp. 133-153; Smith, "Alliance Formation and War," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 39, No. 4 (December 1995), pp. 405-425; Smith, "International Crises and Domestic Politics," American Political Science Review, Vol. 92, No. 3 (September 1998), pp. 623-638; and Kydd, "Game Theory and the Spiral Model."
148. For example, the following formal works contain no empirical evidence, and rely entirely on formal deduction: Powell, Nuclear Deterrence Theory; Powell, "Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory"; Powell, "Guns, Butter, and Anarchy," American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 1 (March 1993), pp. 115-132; Powell, "Stability and the Distribution of Power," World Politics, Vol. 48, No. 2 (January 1996), pp. 239-267; Fearon, "Rationalist Theories of War"; Banks, "Equilibrium Behavior in Crisis Bargaining Games"; James D. Morrow, "A Spatial Model of International Conflict," American Political Science Review, Vol. 80, No. 4 (December 1986), pp. 1131-1150; R. Harrison Wagner, "Deterrence and Bargaining," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 26, No. 2 (June 1982), pp. 329-358; Wagner, "Rationality and Misperception in Deterrence"; Wagner, "Nuclear Deterrence, Counterforce Strategies, and the Incentive to Strike First," American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 3 (September 1991), pp. 727-749; Kilgour and Zagare, "Credibility, Uncertainty, and Deterrence"; Kilgour," Domestic Political Structure and War Behavior"; Morrow, "Alliances, Credibility, and Peactime Costs"; Nalebuff, "Rational Deterrence in an Imperfect World"; Nalebuff, "Minimal Nuclear Deterrence," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 32, No. 3 (September 1988); Nalebuff, Brickmanship and Nuclear Deterrence: The Neutrality of Escalation," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Spring 1986), pp. 19-30; Alasdair Smith, "Diversionary Foreign Policy in Democratic Systems," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 40, No. 1 (March 1996), pp. 133-153; Smith, "Alliance Formation and War," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 39, No. 4 (December 1995), pp. 405-425; Smith, "International Crises and Domestic Politics," American Political Science Review, Vol. 92, No. 3 (September 1998), pp. 623-638; and Kydd, "Game Theory and the Spiral Model."
149. For example, the following formal works contain no empirical evidence, and rely entirely on formal deduction: Powell, Nuclear Deterrence Theory; Powell, "Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory"; Powell, "Guns, Butter, and Anarchy," American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 1 (March 1993), pp. 115-132; Powell, "Stability and the Distribution of Power," World Politics, Vol. 48, No. 2 (January 1996), pp. 239-267; Fearon, "Rationalist Theories of War"; Banks, "Equilibrium Behavior in Crisis Bargaining Games"; James D. Morrow, "A Spatial Model of International Conflict," American Political Science Review, Vol. 80, No. 4 (December 1986), pp. 1131-1150; R. Harrison Wagner, "Deterrence and Bargaining," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 26, No. 2 (June 1982), pp. 329-358; Wagner, "Rationality and Misperception in Deterrence"; Wagner, "Nuclear Deterrence, Counterforce Strategies, and the Incentive to Strike First," American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 3 (September 1991), pp. 727-749; Kilgour and Zagare, "Credibility, Uncertainty, and Deterrence"; Kilgour," Domestic Political Structure and War Behavior"; Morrow, "Alliances, Credibility, and Peactime Costs"; Nalebuff, "Rational Deterrence in an Imperfect World"; Nalebuff, "Minimal Nuclear Deterrence," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 32, No. 3 (September 1988); Nalebuff, Brickmanship and Nuclear Deterrence: The Neutrality of Escalation," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Spring 1986), pp. 19-30; Alasdair Smith, "Diversionary Foreign Policy in Democratic Systems," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 40, No. 1 (March 1996), pp. 133-153; Smith, "Alliance Formation and War," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 39, No. 4 (December 1995), pp. 405-425; Smith, "International Crises and Domestic Politics," American Political Science Review, Vol. 92, No. 3 (September 1998), pp. 623-638; and Kydd, "Game Theory and the Spiral Model."
150. For example, the following formal works contain no empirical evidence, and rely entirely on formal deduction: Powell, Nuclear Deterrence Theory; Powell, "Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory"; Powell, "Guns, Butter, and Anarchy," American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 1 (March 1993), pp. 115-132; Powell, "Stability and the Distribution of Power," World Politics, Vol. 48, No. 2 (January 1996), pp. 239-267; Fearon, "Rationalist Theories of War"; Banks, "Equilibrium Behavior in Crisis Bargaining Games"; James D. Morrow, "A Spatial Model of International Conflict," American Political Science Review, Vol. 80, No. 4 (December 1986), pp. 1131-1150; R. Harrison Wagner, "Deterrence and Bargaining," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 26, No. 2 (June 1982), pp. 329-358; Wagner, "Rationality and Misperception in Deterrence"; Wagner, "Nuclear Deterrence, Counterforce Strategies, and the Incentive to Strike First," American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 3 (September 1991), pp. 727-749; Kilgour and Zagare, "Credibility, Uncertainty, and Deterrence"; Kilgour," Domestic Political Structure and War Behavior"; Morrow, "Alliances, Credibility, and Peactime Costs"; Nalebuff, "Rational Deterrence in an Imperfect World"; Nalebuff, "Minimal Nuclear Deterrence," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 32, No. 3 (September 1988); Nalebuff, Brickmanship and Nuclear Deterrence: The Neutrality of Escalation," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Spring 1986), pp. 19-30; Alasdair Smith, "Diversionary Foreign Policy in Democratic Systems," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 40, No. 1 (March 1996), pp. 133-153; Smith, "Alliance Formation and War," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 39, No. 4 (December 1995), pp. 405-425; Smith, "International Crises and Domestic Politics," American Political Science Review, Vol. 92, No. 3 (September 1998), pp. 623-638; and Kydd, "Game Theory and the Spiral Model."
151. For example, the following formal works contain no empirical evidence, and rely entirely on formal deduction: Powell, Nuclear Deterrence Theory; Powell, "Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory"; Powell, "Guns, Butter, and Anarchy," American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 1 (March 1993), pp. 115-132; Powell, "Stability and the Distribution of Power," World Politics, Vol. 48, No. 2 (January 1996), pp. 239-267; Fearon, "Rationalist Theories of War"; Banks, "Equilibrium Behavior in Crisis Bargaining Games"; James D. Morrow, "A Spatial Model of International Conflict," American Political Science Review, Vol. 80, No. 4 (December 1986), pp. 1131-1150; R. Harrison Wagner, "Deterrence and Bargaining," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 26, No. 2 (June 1982), pp. 329-358; Wagner, "Rationality and Misperception in Deterrence"; Wagner, "Nuclear Deterrence, Counterforce Strategies, and the Incentive to Strike First," American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 3 (September 1991), pp. 727-749; Kilgour and Zagare, "Credibility, Uncertainty, and Deterrence"; Kilgour," Domestic Political Structure and War Behavior"; Morrow, "Alliances, Credibility, and Peactime Costs"; Nalebuff, "Rational Deterrence in an Imperfect World"; Nalebuff, "Minimal Nuclear Deterrence," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 32, No. 3 (September 1988); Nalebuff, Brickmanship and Nuclear Deterrence: The Neutrality of Escalation," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Spring 1986), pp. 19-30; Alasdair Smith, "Diversionary Foreign Policy in Democratic Systems," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 40, No. 1 (March 1996), pp. 133-153; Smith, "Alliance Formation and War," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 39, No. 4 (December 1995), pp. 405-425; Smith, "International Crises and
152. For example, the following formal works contain no empirical evidence, and rely entirely on formal deduction: Powell, Nuclear Deterrence Theory; Powell, "Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory"; Powell, "Guns, Butter, and Anarchy," American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 1 (March 1993), pp. 115-132; Powell, "Stability and the Distribution of Power," World Politics, Vol. 48, No. 2 (January 1996), pp. 239-267; Fearon, "Rationalist Theories of War"; Banks, "Equilibrium Behavior in Crisis Bargaining Games"; James D. Morrow, "A Spatial Model of International Conflict," American Political Science Review, Vol. 80, No. 4 (December 1986), pp. 1131-1150; R. Harrison Wagner, "Deterrence and Bargaining," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 26, No. 2 (June 1982), pp. 329-358; Wagner, "Rationality and Misperception in Deterrence"; Wagner, "Nuclear Deterrence, Counterforce Strategies, and the Incentive to Strike First," American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 3 (September 1991), pp. 727-749; Kilgour and Zagare, "Credibility, Uncertainty, and Deterrence"; Kilgour," Domestic Political Structure and War Behavior"; Morrow, "Alliances, Credibility, and Peactime Costs"; Nalebuff, "Rational Deterrence in an Imperfect World"; Nalebuff, "Minimal Nuclear Deterrence," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 32, No. 3 (September 1988); Nalebuff, Brickmanship and Nuclear Deterrence: The Neutrality of Escalation," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Spring 1986), pp. 19-30; Alasdair Smith, "Diversionary Foreign Policy in Democratic Systems," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 40, No. 1 (March 1996), pp. 133-153; Smith, "Alliance Formation and War," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 39, No. 4 (December 1995), pp. 405-425; Smith, "International Crises and Domestic Politics," American Political Science Review, Vol. 92, No. 3 (September 1998), pp. 623-638; and Kydd, "Game Theory and the Spiral Model."
153. For example, the following formal works contain no empirical evidence, and rely entirely on formal deduction: Powell, Nuclear Deterrence Theory; Powell, "Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory"; Powell, "Guns, Butter, and Anarchy," American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 1 (March 1993), pp. 115-132; Powell, "Stability and the Distribution of Power," World Politics, Vol. 48, No. 2 (January 1996), pp. 239-267; Fearon, "Rationalist Theories of War"; Banks, "Equilibrium Behavior in Crisis Bargaining Games"; James D. Morrow, "A Spatial Model of International Conflict," American Political Science Review, Vol. 80, No. 4 (December 1986), pp. 1131-1150; R. Harrison Wagner, "Deterrence and Bargaining," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 26, No. 2 (June 1982), pp. 329-358; Wagner, "Rationality and Misperception in Deterrence"; Wagner, "Nuclear Deterrence, Counterforce Strategies, and the Incentive to Strike First," American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 3 (September 1991), pp. 727-749; Kilgour and Zagare, "Credibility, Uncertainty, and Deterrence"; Kilgour," Domestic Political Structure and War Behavior"; Morrow, "Alliances, Credibility, and Peactime Costs"; Nalebuff, "Rational Deterrence in an Imperfect World"; Nalebuff, "Minimal Nuclear Deterrence," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 32, No. 3 (September 1988); Nalebuff, Brickmanship and Nuclear Deterrence: The Neutrality of Escalation," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Spring 1986), pp. 19-30; Alasdair Smith, "Diversionary Foreign Policy in Democratic Systems," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 40, No. 1 (March 1996), pp. 133-153; Smith, "Alliance Formation and War," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 39, No. 4 (December 1995), pp. 405-425; Smith, "International Crises and Domestic Politics," American Political Science Review, Vol. 92, No. 3 (September 1998), pp. 623-638; and Kydd, "Game Theory and the Spiral Model."
154. For example, the following formal works contain no empirical evidence, and rely entirely on formal deduction: Powell, Nuclear Deterrence Theory; Powell, "Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory"; Powell, "Guns, Butter, and Anarchy," American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 1 (March 1993), pp. 115-132; Powell, "Stability and the Distribution of Power," World Politics, Vol. 48, No. 2 (January 1996), pp. 239-267; Fearon, "Rationalist Theories of War"; Banks, "Equilibrium Behavior in Crisis Bargaining Games"; James D. Morrow, "A Spatial Model of International Conflict," American Political Science Review, Vol. 80, No. 4 (December 1986), pp. 1131-1150; R. Harrison Wagner, "Deterrence and Bargaining," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 26, No. 2 (June 1982), pp. 329-358; Wagner, "Rationality and Misperception in Deterrence"; Wagner, "Nuclear Deterrence, Counterforce Strategies, and the Incentive to Strike First," American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 3 (September 1991), pp. 727-749; Kilgour and Zagare, "Credibility, Uncertainty, and Deterrence"; Kilgour," Domestic Political Structure and War Behavior"; Morrow, "Alliances, Credibility, and Peactime Costs"; Nalebuff, "Rational Deterrence in an Imperfect World"; Nalebuff, "Minimal Nuclear Deterrence," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 32, No. 3 (September 1988); Nalebuff, Brickmanship and Nuclear Deterrence: The Neutrality of Escalation," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Spring 1986), pp. 19-30; Alasdair Smith, "Diversionary Foreign Policy in Democratic Systems," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 40, No. 1 (March 1996), pp. 133-153; Smith, "Alliance Formation and War," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 39, No. 4 (December 1995), pp. 405-425; Smith, "International Crises and Domestic Politics," American Political Science Review, Vol. 92, No. 3 (September 1998), pp. 623-638; and Kydd, "Game Theory and the Spiral Model."
155. For example, the following formal works contain no empirical evidence, and rely entirely on formal deduction: Powell, Nuclear Deterrence Theory; Powell, "Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory"; Powell, "Guns, Butter, and Anarchy," American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 1 (March 1993), pp. 115-132; Powell, "Stability and the Distribution of Power," World Politics, Vol. 48, No. 2 (January 1996), pp. 239-267; Fearon, "Rationalist Theories of War"; Banks, "Equilibrium Behavior in Crisis Bargaining Games"; James D. Morrow, "A Spatial Model of International Conflict," American Political Science Review, Vol. 80, No. 4 (December 1986), pp. 1131-1150; R. Harrison Wagner, "Deterrence and Bargaining," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 26, No. 2 (June 1982), pp. 329-358; Wagner, "Rationality and Misperception in Deterrence"; Wagner, "Nuclear Deterrence, Counterforce Strategies, and the Incentive to Strike First," American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 3 (September 1991), pp. 727-749; Kilgour and Zagare, "Credibility, Uncertainty, and Deterrence"; Kilgour," Domestic Political Structure and War Behavior"; Morrow, "Alliances, Credibility, and Peactime Costs"; Nalebuff, "Rational Deterrence in an Imperfect World"; Nalebuff, "Minimal Nuclear Deterrence," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 32, No. 3 (September 1988); Nalebuff, Brickmanship and Nuclear Deterrence: The Neutrality of Escalation," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Spring 1986), pp. 19-30; Alasdair Smith, "Diversionary Foreign Policy in Democratic Systems," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 40, No. 1 (March 1996), pp. 133-153; Smith, "Alliance Formation and War," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 39, No. 4 (December 1995), pp. 405-425; Smith, "International Crises and Domestic Politics," American Political Science Review, Vol. 92, No. 3 (September 1998), pp. 623-638; and Kydd, "Game Theory and the Spiral Model."
156. For example, the following formal works contain no empirical evidence, and rely entirely on formal deduction: Powell, Nuclear Deterrence Theory; Powell, "Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory"; Powell, "Guns, Butter, and Anarchy," American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 1 (March 1993), pp. 115-132; Powell, "Stability and the Distribution of Power," World Politics, Vol. 48, No. 2 (January 1996), pp. 239-267; Fearon, "Rationalist Theories of War"; Banks, "Equilibrium Behavior in Crisis Bargaining Games"; James D. Morrow, "A Spatial Model of International Conflict," American Political Science Review, Vol. 80, No. 4 (December 1986), pp. 1131-1150; R. Harrison Wagner, "Deterrence and Bargaining," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 26, No. 2 (June 1982), pp. 329-358; Wagner, "Rationality and Misperception in Deterrence"; Wagner, "Nuclear Deterrence, Counterforce Strategies, and the Incentive to Strike First," American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 3 (September 1991), pp. 727-749; Kilgour and Zagare, "Credibility, Uncertainty, and Deterrence"; Kilgour," Domestic Political Structure and War Behavior"; Morrow, "Alliances, Credibility, and Peactime Costs"; Nalebuff, "Rational Deterrence in an Imperfect World"; Nalebuff, "Minimal Nuclear Deterrence," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 32, No. 3 (September 1988); Nalebuff, Brickmanship and Nuclear Deterrence: The Neutrality of Escalation," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Spring 1986), pp. 19-30; Alasdair Smith, "Diversionary Foreign Policy in Democratic Systems," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 40, No. 1 (March 1996), pp. 133-153; Smith, "Alliance Formation and War," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 39, No. 4 (December 1995), pp. 405-425; Smith, "International Crises and Domestic Politics," American Political Science Review, Vol. 92, No. 3 (September 1998), pp. 623-638; and Kydd, "Game Theory and the Spiral Model."
157. For example, the following formal works contain no empirical evidence, and rely entirely on formal deduction: Powell, Nuclear Deterrence Theory; Powell, "Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory"; Powell, "Guns, Butter, and Anarchy," American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 1 (March 1993), pp. 115-132; Powell, "Stability and the Distribution of Power," World Politics, Vol. 48, No. 2 (January 1996), pp. 239-267; Fearon, "Rationalist Theories of War"; Banks, "Equilibrium Behavior in Crisis Bargaining Games"; James D. Morrow, "A Spatial Model of International Conflict," American Political Science Review, Vol. 80, No. 4 (December 1986), pp. 1131-1150; R. Harrison Wagner, "Deterrence and Bargaining," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 26, No. 2 (June 1982), pp. 329-358; Wagner, "Rationality and Misperception in Deterrence"; Wagner, "Nuclear Deterrence, Counterforce Strategies, and the Incentive to Strike First," American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 3 (September 1991), pp. 727-749; Kilgour and Zagare, "Credibility, Uncertainty, and Deterrence"; Kilgour," Domestic Political Structure and War Behavior"; Morrow, "Alliances, Credibility, and Peactime Costs"; Nalebuff, "Rational Deterrence in an Imperfect World"; Nalebuff, "Minimal Nuclear Deterrence," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 32, No. 3 (September 1988); Nalebuff, Brickmanship and Nuclear Deterrence: The Neutrality of Escalation," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Spring 1986), pp. 19-30; Alasdair Smith, "Diversionary Foreign Policy in Democratic Systems," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 40, No. 1 (March 1996), pp. 133-153; Smith, "Alliance Formation and War," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 39, No. 4 (December 1995), pp. 405-425; Smith, "International Crises and Domestic Politics," American Political Science Review, Vol. 92, No. 3 (September 1998), pp. 623-638; and Kydd, "Game Theory and the Spiral Model."
158. For example, the following formal works contain no empirical evidence, and rely entirely on formal deduction: Powell, Nuclear Deterrence Theory; Powell, "Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory"; Powell, "Guns, Butter, and Anarchy," American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 1 (March 1993), pp. 115-132; Powell, "Stability and the Distribution of Power," World Politics, Vol. 48, No. 2 (January 1996), pp. 239-267; Fearon, "Rationalist Theories of War"; Banks, "Equilibrium Behavior in Crisis Bargaining Games"; James D. Morrow, "A Spatial Model of International Conflict," American Political Science Review, Vol. 80, No. 4 (December 1986), pp. 1131-1150; R. Harrison Wagner, "Deterrence and Bargaining," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 26, No. 2 (June 1982), pp. 329-358; Wagner, "Rationality and Misperception in Deterrence"; Wagner, "Nuclear Deterrence, Counterforce Strategies, and the Incentive to Strike First," American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 3 (September 1991), pp. 727-749; Kilgour and Zagare, "Credibility, Uncertainty, and Deterrence"; Kilgour," Domestic Political Structure and War Behavior"; Morrow, "Alliances, Credibility, and Peactime Costs"; Nalebuff, "Rational Deterrence in an Imperfect World"; Nalebuff, "Minimal Nuclear Deterrence," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 32, No. 3 (September 1988); Nalebuff, Brickmanship and Nuclear Deterrence: The Neutrality of Escalation," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Spring 1986), pp. 19-30; Alasdair Smith, "Diversionary Foreign Policy in Democratic Systems," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 40, No. 1 (March 1996), pp. 133-153; Smith, "Alliance Formation and War," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 39, No. 4 (December 1995), pp. 405-425; Smith, "International Crises and Domestic Politics," American Political Science Review, Vol. 92, No. 3 (September 1998), pp. 623-638; and Kydd, "Game Theory and the Spiral Model."
159. Examples of these approaches to testing include Jean-Pierre Langlois, "Rational Deterrence and Crisis Stability," American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 35, No. 4 (November 1991), pp. 801-832; Downs and Rocke, Tacit Bargaining and Arms Control; Downs and Rocke, Optimal Imperfection?; and Morrow, "Capabilities, Uncertainty, and Resolve."
160. Examples of these approaches to testing include Jean-Pierre Langlois, "Rational Deterrence and Crisis Stability," American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 35, No. 4 (November 1991), pp. 801-832; Downs and Rocke, Tacit Bargaining and Arms Control; Downs and Rocke, Optimal Imperfection?; and Morrow, "Capabilities, Uncertainty, and Resolve."
161. Examples of these approaches to testing include Jean-Pierre Langlois, "Rational Deterrence and Crisis Stability," American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 35, No. 4 (November 1991), pp. 801-832; Downs and Rocke, Tacit Bargaining and Arms Control; Downs and Rocke, Optimal Imperfection?; and Morrow, "Capabilities, Uncertainty, and Resolve."
162. Examples of these approaches to testing include Jean-Pierre Langlois, "Rational Deterrence and Crisis Stability," American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 35, No. 4 (November 1991), pp. 801-832; Downs and Rocke, Tacit Bargaining and Arms Control; Downs and Rocke, Optimal Imperfection?; and Morrow, "Capabilities, Uncertainty, and Resolve."
163. Between 1989 and 1998, for example, World Politics published twelve articles that contained a formal model. Of these, only five contained systematic empirical evidence. The Journal of Conflict Resolution published thirty-seven formal articles in the same period (excluding articles dealing solely with technical aspects of game theory), of which thirteen contained empirical support for the model. International Studies Quarterly contained twenty-six formal articles in this period, but only ten contained empirical evidence, and International Organization published fourteen, seven of which provided empirical support for the model. Overall, roughly 60 percent of these articles relied solely on formal deduction and anecdotal illustration, rather than systematic empirical testing. Similarly, a total of ninety-four formal theory manuscripts were submitted to the American Political Science Review between August 1996 and August 1997, but only twenty-five of them (26 percent) contained systematic empirical evidence. See Finifter, "Report of the Editor of the APSR," p. 784.
164. James D. Fearon, "Domestic Audience Costs and the Escalation of International Disputes," American Political Science Review, Vol. 88, No. 3 (September 1994), pp. 577-592.
165. The idea that relative audience costs will affect bargaining power is not new. As far as I know, the idea was first articulated by Thomas Schelling, who also suggested that democratic and nondemocratic states might differ on this dimension. See Schelling, Strategy of Conflict, pp. 27-29.
166. The personal cost to a deposed tyrant could be higher on average than the cost to a democratic incumbent who risk losing the next election, and authoritarian leaders often face other domestic pressures that limit their ability to back down once a crisis is under way. For example, the belief that the Hapsburg monarchy faced internal revolt unless it eliminated the threat from Serbia drove Austro-Hungarian decisions in the July crisis that led to World War I, and the three authoritarian states involved in the July crisis (Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Russia) were clearly less willing to compromise than were democratic Britain and France.
167. As Fearon notes, "The idea that democratic leaders on average have an easier time generating Audience Costs," p. 582.
168. A further compliance arises if neither leaders nor publics know how resolved they are until after the crisis is under way. As a result, a particular leader may adopt a hard-line position at first, based on the belief that it is in the "objective" interest of the state and that this position has popular backing. As the crisis continues, however, the citizenry may become alarmed by the danger of war and eager for a peaceful resolution. A democratic leader who backed down at this point might be rewarded rather than penalized, whereas a leader who continued to escalate might be punished for adventurism.
169. A recent quantitative study that supports some of Fearon's predictions is Joe Eyerman and Robert A. Hart, Jr., "An Empirical Test of the Audience Cost Proposition: Democracy Speaks Louder Than Words," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 40, No. 4 (December 1996), pp. 597-616.
170. Robert A. Pape argues that Soviet nuclear threats played a critical role in convincing British leaders to withdraw from Egypt after the Suez invasion, but other scholars have reached different conclusions. See Pape, "Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work," International Security, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Fall 1997), pp. 115-117; and James G. Richter, Khrushchev's Double Bind: International Pressures and Domestic Coalition Politics (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), p. 93.
171. Robert A. Pape argues that Soviet nuclear threats played a critical role in convincing British leaders to withdraw from Egypt after the Suez invasion, but other scholars have reached different conclusions. See Pape, "Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work," International Security, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Fall 1997), pp. 115-117; and James G. Richter, Khrushchev's Double Bind: International Pressures and Domestic Coalition Politics (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), p. 93.
172. See Christopher Layne, "Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 2 (Fall 1994), pp. 5-49.
173. Israel's decision to preempt in 1967 is consistent with Fearon's model, insofar as the model suggests that democracies will escalate more readily once a crisis is under way. But domestic audience costs did not play a key role in either state's decisions to escalate the crisis or in the final decision to go to war. Both Egypt and Israel seem to have been equally resolute, in part because both believed they were ready for war. Nasser's reluctance to back down was based in part on his concerns about external audience costs (and especially the loss of prestige in the Arab world), which underscores the unimportance of relative domestic costs in this case. Similarly, nondemocratic Egypt gained a tactical victory over democratic Israel during the 1969-70 War of Attrition, in part because Israeli resolve waned as the conflict continued and in part because the fear of escalation led the superpowers to impose terms that were favorable to Egypt. See Jonathan Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence: Border Warfare from 1953 to 1970 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1988), pp. 169-171.
174. These concerns are not unrelated, of course, because failure to preserve one's external reputation is one reason why a domestic audience might seek to remove a particular leader. Nonetheless, the two concerns are conceptually and empirically distinct.
175. For example, Frank Zagare's review of War and Reason in the American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 3 (September 1993), p. 811, praised it as "the most significant application to date of game theory to the question of war and peace," and Glenn Snyder called The Balance of Power "a valuable, ground-breaking effort" that "blazes a useful trail." See Snyder, "Alliances, Balance, and Stability," International Organization, Vol. 43, No. 1 (Winter 1991), pp. 140, 142.
176. For example, Frank Zagare's review of War and Reason in the American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 3 (September 1993), p. 811, praised it as "the most significant application to date of game theory to the question of war and peace," and Glenn Snyder called The Balance of Power "a valuable, ground-breaking effort" that "blazes a useful trail." See Snyder, "Alliances, Balance, and Stability," International Organization, Vol. 43, No. 1 (Winter 1991), pp. 140, 142.
177. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman, War and Reason: Domestic and International Imperatives (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1992).
178. As with some of the other formal work discussed above, many of the results derived from the model are rather trivial. After deriving and testing more than twenty hypotheses, for example, Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman offer the following general conclusions: "To state it crudely: national leaders wage war when the expected gains minus the expected costs of doing so outweigh the net expected consequences of alternative choices. War can stumbled into when one nation judges the intentions of a rival too optimistically. War can begin even with full information if it is motivated by a fear of ceding any advantage that is attached to the first use of force. The anticipated net gains from war may be real and tangible acquisitions, or they may be the avoidance o of a future expected to be worse than the one anticipated through warfare." They also find that war will not occur if two states prefer negotiation to using force, and if both sides know this with 100 percent confidence. In other words, if both sides would rather talk than fight and if both sides know this, they do not fight. See Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, War and Reason, p. 250.
179. B and the predicted outcome) actually occured. Collapsing categories in this way thus masks the unsuccessful predictions. See Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, War and Reason, pp. 81-85; and Curtis S. Signorino, "Estimation and Strategic Interaction in Discrete Choice Models of International Conflict," Occasional Paper No. 98-4 (Cambridge, Mass.: Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1998), pp. 20-23.
180. B and the predicted outcome) actually occured. Collapsing categories in this way thus masks the unsuccessful predictions. See Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, War and Reason, pp. 81-85; and Curtis S. Signorino, "Estimation and Strategic Interaction in Discrete Choice Models of International Conflict," Occasional Paper No. 98-4 (Cambridge, Mass.: Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1998), pp. 20-23.
181. Bueno de Mesquita has previously emphasized the problem of internal validity in large-N research, noting that "the close scrutiny of individual decisions yields better estimates of utilities t han do gross applications of general evaluative criteria." See Bueno de Mesquita, "Toward a Scientific Understanding," p. 133.
182. As they elaborate: "If the first-strike advantage is large enough, A will prefer to initiate the use of force rather than risk being compelled to capitulate or to fight under the most adverse conditions. Thus, A's democratic institutions make it susceptible to exploitation and incline it toward preemption." See Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, War and Reason, pp. 159-160.
183. See Randall L. Schweller, "Domestic Structure and Preventive War: Are the Democratic Sates More Pacific?" World Politics, Vol. 44, No, 1 (January 1992), pp. 235-269; and Dan Reiter, "Exploding the Powder Keg Myth: Preemptive Wars Almost Never Happen," International Security, vol. 20, No. 2 (Fall 1995), pp. 5-34.
184. See Randall L. Schweller, "Domestic Structure and Preventive War: Are the Democratic Sates More Pacific?" World Politics, Vol. 44, No, 1 (January 1992), pp. 235-269; and Dan Reiter, "Exploding the Powder Keg Myth: Preemptive Wars Almost Never Happen," International Security, vol. 20, No. 2 (Fall 1995), pp. 5-34.
185. See, in particular, Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univesity Press, 1995), pp. 86-93, 119-120; and Joanne Gowa, Ballots and Bullets (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, forthcoming).
186. See, in particular, Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univesity Press, 1995), pp. 86-93, 119-120; and Joanne Gowa, Ballots and Bullets (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, forthcoming).
187. On Fashoda, see Christopher Layne, Kant or Cant"; and Susan Peterson, "The Lessons of the Fashoda Crisis for Democratic Peace Theory," Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Autumn 1995), pp. 3-37.
188. On Fashoda, see Christopher Layne, Kant or Cant"; and Susan Peterson, "The Lessons of the Fashoda Crisis for Democratic Peace Theory," Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Autumn 1995), pp. 3-37.
189. Emerson M.S. Niou, Peter C. Ordeshook, and Gregory F. Rose, The Balance of Power: Stability in International Systems (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
190. In cooperative game theory, players can communicate and make binding agreement; in noncooperative game theory, binding agreements are forbidden and communication may or may not be permitted. A central question for cooperative geme theory is what types of coalitions are likely to form among the players, as each seeks an arrangment that will maximize their own utility.
191. A system that is "resource stable" is also "system stable" (after all, eliminating an essential actor would by definition alter the distribution of resources), but it may be possible to alter the distribution of resources without eliminating an essential member.
192. In contrast to their behavior in the 1909 Bosnian crisis, German officials repeatedly pressed Austria to inflict harsh measures on Serbia in 1914. Key German officials were also obsessed with the specter of rising Russian power and the growing cohesion of the Triple Entente. As Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg put it in 1909, "The future belongs to Russia, as it grows and weighs upon us like an ever-deepening nightmare." See David G. Hermann, The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996), p. 214.
193. The field of economics offers a cautionary tale. A 1990 survey of elite economics graduate programs reported that 68 percent of the students believed a "thorough knowledge of the economy" was unimportant for professional success; indeed, only 3.4 percent thought such knowledge was "very important." Similarly, the American Economic Association's commission on graduate education warned in 1988 of "the extent to which graduate education in economics may have become too removed from real economic problems. . . . graduate programs may be turning out a generation with too many idiots savants, skilled in technique but innocent of real economic issues." See Arjo Klamer and David Colander, The Making of Economists (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1990), p. 18; and Mayer, Truth versus Precision in Economics, p. 159.
194. The field of economics offers a cautionary tale. A 1990 survey of elite economics graduate programs reported that 68 percent of the students believed a "thorough knowledge of the economy" was unimportant for professional success; indeed, only 3.4 percent thought such knowledge was "very important." Similarly, the American Economic Association's commission on graduate education warned in 1988 of "the extent to which graduate education in economics may have become too removed from real economic problems. . . . graduate programs may be turning out a generation with too many idiots savants, skilled in technique but innocent of real economic issues." See Arjo Klamer and David Colander, The Making of Economists (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1990), p. 18; and Mayer, Truth versus Precision in Economics, p. 159.
195. Even the mathematical economist Gerard Debreu, in a speech extolling the virtues of formalization, has warned that "the values imprinted on an economist by his study of mathematics . . . do not play a silent role: they may play a decisive role. The very choice of the question to which [a mathematical economist] tries to find answers is influenced by his mathematical background. Thus the danger is ever present that the part of economics will become secondary, if not marginal to that judgement." See Debreu, "Mathematization of Economic Theory," pp. 4-5 (emphasis added).
196. For a practitioner's views, see David Newsom, "Foreign Policy and Academia," Foreign Policy, No. 101 (Winter 1995-96), pp. 52-67.
197. An interesting example of this tendency is Rui J.P. de Figueiredo, Jr., and Barry R. Weingast, "The Rationality of Fear: Political Opportunism and Ethnic Conflict," in Barbara F. Walter and Jack L. Snyder, eds., Civil War, Insecurity, and Intervention (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), which formalizes several earlier writings on the origins of ethnic conflict. Their model implies that ethnic conflict is more likely when (1) endangered elites "gamble for resurrection" by stirring up ethnic hatred, (2) when the opposing groups act in ways that appear to confirm the elites' claims that they are a threat, and (3) when the perceived cost of failing to heed these warnings is high. In other words, ethnic conflict is more likely when one ethnic group has reason to believe that the another group is hostile and that ignoring the potential threat might be fatal.
198. Hacking once again provides the appropriate caution: "What is scientific method? Is it the experimental method? The question is wrongly posed. Why should there be the method of science? There is not just one way to build a house, or even to grow tomatoes. We should not expect something as motley as the growth of knowledge to be strapped to one methodology." See Hacking, Representing and Intervening, p. 152.
199. As Peter C. Ordeshook has observed, "Regardless of the mathematical rigor of our models, we need to drop the view of science as an enterprise directed by academics armed with theorems and lemmas or by experimentalists scurrying about in white smocks. Science proceeds less coherently, through induction and deduction informed by attempts to be practical and to manipulate real things, where those manipulations rely as much on experience, intuition, and creative insight as on theory." See Ordeshook, "Engineering or Science: What Is the Study of Politics?" in Critical Review, Vol. 9, Nos. 1-2 (Winter-Spring 1995), p. 180. See also the defense of methodological pluralism offered by Gabriel A. Almond in "Separate Tables: Schools and Sects in Political Science," PS: Political Science and Politics, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Fall 1988), pp. 828-842.
200. As Peter C. Ordeshook has observed, "Regardless of the mathematical rigor of our models, we need to drop the view of science as an enterprise directed by academics armed with theorems and lemmas or by experimentalists scurrying about in white smocks. Science proceeds less coherently, through induction and deduction informed by attempts to be practical and to manipulate real things, where those manipulations rely as much on experience, intuition, and creative insight as on theory." See Ordeshook, "Engineering or Science: What Is the Study of Politics?" in Critical Review, Vol. 9, Nos. 1-2 (Winter-Spring 1995), p. 180. See also the defense of methodological pluralism offered by Gabriel A. Almond in "Separate Tables: Schools and Sects in Political Science," PS: Political Science and Politics, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Fall 1988), pp. 828-842.