The banality of "Ethnic War"

International Security

Volumn 25, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 42-70

  Mueller, John ^a  

^a NONE

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0034417551     PISSN: 01622889     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/016228800560381     Document Type: Review

References (320)

1. I am concerned here with ethnic violence and warfare - a condition in which combatants arrayed along ethnic lines seek to kill each other - not particularly with ethnic hatreds. It is important to distinguish common, knee-jerk, and sometimes hateful ethnic slurs - no matter how unpleasant and politically incorrect their expression may often be - from prejudice that is expressed in violence. As James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin have pointed out, ethnic violence is actually exceedingly rare when one considers how many Archie Bunkers there are in the world and how many opportunities there are for it to occur. Fearon and Laitin, "Explaining Interethnic Cooperation," American Political Science Review, Vol. 90, No. 4 (December 1996), pp. 716-717. Some analysts argue that "conflicts among nations and ethnic groups are escalating." Samuel P. Huntington, "Why International Primacy Matters," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), p. 71. Others believe "there is a virtual epidemic of armed civil or intranational conflict." See David A. Hamburg, Preventing Contemporary Intergroup Violence (New York: Carnegie Corporation of New York, 1993). But such wars and conflicts did not increase in number or intensity in the 1990s. See Yahya Sadowski, The Myth of Global Chaos (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1998); Ernest J. Wilson and Ted Robert Gurr, "Fewer Nations Are Making War," Los Angeles Times, August 22, 1999, p. M2; Steven R. David, "Internal War: Causes and Cures," World Politics, Vol. 49, No. 4 (July 1997), pp. 552-576; and James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Weak States, Rough Terrain, and Large-Scale Ethnic Violence since 1945," paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, Georgia, September 25,1999. Rather, what is new is that some of these wars and conflicts have taken place in Europe, an area that had previously been free from substantial civil warfare for nearly half a century. However, militant nationalism - whether violent or not - may well already have had its day in Central and Eastern Europe. Hypernationalists (and even some that are not so hyper), who sometimes appeared threateningly formidable at the polls in the early 1990s, have been reduced in elections in many places to the point of extinguishment.
2. I am concerned here with ethnic violence and warfare - a condition in which combatants arrayed along ethnic lines seek to kill each other - not particularly with ethnic hatreds. It is important to distinguish common, knee-jerk, and sometimes hateful ethnic slurs - no matter how unpleasant and politically incorrect their expression may often be - from prejudice that is expressed in violence. As James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin have pointed out, ethnic violence is actually exceedingly rare when one considers how many Archie Bunkers there are in the world and how many opportunities there are for it to occur. Fearon and Laitin, "Explaining Interethnic Cooperation," American Political Science Review, Vol. 90, No. 4 (December 1996), pp. 716-717. Some analysts argue that "conflicts among nations and ethnic groups are escalating." Samuel P. Huntington, "Why International Primacy Matters," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), p. 71. Others believe "there is a virtual epidemic of armed civil or intranational conflict." See David A. Hamburg, Preventing Contemporary Intergroup Violence (New York: Carnegie Corporation of New York, 1993). But such wars and conflicts did not increase in number or intensity in the 1990s. See Yahya Sadowski, The Myth of Global Chaos (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1998); Ernest J. Wilson and Ted Robert Gurr, "Fewer Nations Are Making War," Los Angeles Times, August 22, 1999, p. M2; Steven R. David, "Internal War: Causes and Cures," World Politics, Vol. 49, No. 4 (July 1997), pp. 552-576; and James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Weak States, Rough Terrain, and Large-Scale Ethnic Violence since 1945," paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, Georgia, September 25,1999. Rather, what is new is that some of these wars and conflicts have taken place in Europe, an area that had previously been free from substantial civil warfare for nearly half a century. However, militant nationalism - whether violent or not - may well already have had its day in Central and Eastern Europe. Hypernationalists (and even some that are not so hyper), who sometimes appeared threateningly formidable at the polls in the early 1990s, have been reduced in elections in many places to the point of extinguishment.
3. I am concerned here with ethnic violence and warfare - a condition in which combatants arrayed along ethnic lines seek to kill each other - not particularly with ethnic hatreds. It is important to distinguish common, knee-jerk, and sometimes hateful ethnic slurs - no matter how unpleasant and politically incorrect their expression may often be - from prejudice that is expressed in violence. As James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin have pointed out, ethnic violence is actually exceedingly rare when one considers how many Archie Bunkers there are in the world and how many opportunities there are for it to occur. Fearon and Laitin, "Explaining Interethnic Cooperation," American Political Science Review, Vol. 90, No. 4 (December 1996), pp. 716-717. Some analysts argue that "conflicts among nations and ethnic groups are escalating." Samuel P. Huntington, "Why International Primacy Matters," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), p. 71. Others believe "there is a virtual epidemic of armed civil or intranational conflict." See David A. Hamburg, Preventing Contemporary Intergroup Violence (New York: Carnegie Corporation of New York, 1993). But such wars and conflicts did not increase in number or intensity in the 1990s. See Yahya Sadowski, The Myth of Global Chaos (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1998); Ernest J. Wilson and Ted Robert Gurr, "Fewer Nations Are Making War," Los Angeles Times, August 22, 1999, p. M2; Steven R. David, "Internal War: Causes and Cures," World Politics, Vol. 49, No. 4 (July 1997), pp. 552-576; and James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Weak States, Rough Terrain, and Large-Scale Ethnic Violence since 1945," paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, Georgia, September 25,1999. Rather, what is new is that some of these wars and conflicts have taken place in Europe, an area that had previously been free from substantial civil warfare for nearly half a century. However, militant nationalism - whether violent or not - may well already have had its day in Central and Eastern Europe. Hypernationalists (and even some that are not so hyper), who sometimes appeared threateningly formidable at the polls in the early 1990s, have been reduced in elections in many places to the point of extinguishment.
4. I am concerned here with ethnic violence and warfare - a condition in which combatants arrayed along ethnic lines seek to kill each other - not particularly with ethnic hatreds. It is important to distinguish common, knee-jerk, and sometimes hateful ethnic slurs - no matter how unpleasant and politically incorrect their expression may often be - from prejudice that is expressed in violence. As James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin have pointed out, ethnic violence is actually exceedingly rare when one considers how many Archie Bunkers there are in the world and how many opportunities there are for it to occur. Fearon and Laitin, "Explaining Interethnic Cooperation," American Political Science Review, Vol. 90, No. 4 (December 1996), pp. 716-717. Some analysts argue that "conflicts among nations and ethnic groups are escalating." Samuel P. Huntington, "Why International Primacy Matters," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), p. 71. Others believe "there is a virtual epidemic of armed civil or intranational conflict." See David A. Hamburg, Preventing Contemporary Intergroup Violence (New York: Carnegie Corporation of New York, 1993). But such wars and conflicts did not increase in number or intensity in the 1990s. See Yahya Sadowski, The Myth of Global Chaos (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1998); Ernest J. Wilson and Ted Robert Gurr, "Fewer Nations Are Making War," Los Angeles Times, August 22, 1999, p. M2; Steven R. David, "Internal War: Causes and Cures," World Politics, Vol. 49, No. 4 (July 1997), pp. 552-576; and James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Weak States, Rough Terrain, and Large-Scale Ethnic Violence since 1945," paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, Georgia, September 25,1999. Rather, what is new is that some of these wars and conflicts have taken place in Europe, an area that had previously been free from substantial civil warfare for nearly half a century. However, militant nationalism - whether violent or not - may well already have had its day in Central and Eastern Europe. Hypernationalists (and even some that are not so hyper), who sometimes appeared threateningly formidable at the polls in the early 1990s, have been reduced in elections in many places to the point of extinguishment.
5. I am concerned here with ethnic violence and warfare - a condition in which combatants arrayed along ethnic lines seek to kill each other - not particularly with ethnic hatreds. It is important to distinguish common, knee-jerk, and sometimes hateful ethnic slurs - no matter how unpleasant and politically incorrect their expression may often be - from prejudice that is expressed in violence. As James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin have pointed out, ethnic violence is actually exceedingly rare when one considers how many Archie Bunkers there are in the world and how many opportunities there are for it to occur. Fearon and Laitin, "Explaining Interethnic Cooperation," American Political Science Review, Vol. 90, No. 4 (December 1996), pp. 716-717. Some analysts argue that "conflicts among nations and ethnic groups are escalating." Samuel P. Huntington, "Why International Primacy Matters," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), p. 71. Others believe "there is a virtual epidemic of armed civil or intranational conflict." See David A. Hamburg, Preventing Contemporary Intergroup Violence (New York: Carnegie Corporation of New York, 1993). But such wars and conflicts did not increase in number or intensity in the 1990s. See Yahya Sadowski, The Myth of Global Chaos (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1998); Ernest J. Wilson and Ted Robert Gurr, "Fewer Nations Are Making War," Los Angeles Times, August 22, 1999, p. M2; Steven R. David, "Internal War: Causes and Cures," World Politics, Vol. 49, No. 4 (July 1997), pp. 552-576; and James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Weak States, Rough Terrain, and Large-Scale Ethnic Violence since 1945," paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, Georgia, September 25,1999. Rather, what is new is that some of these wars and conflicts have taken place in Europe, an area that had previously been free from substantial civil warfare for nearly half a century. However, militant nationalism - whether violent or not - may well already have had its day in Central and Eastern Europe. Hypernationalists (and even some that are not so hyper), who sometimes appeared threateningly formidable at the polls in the early 1990s, have been reduced in elections in many places to the point of extinguishment.
6. I am concerned here with ethnic violence and warfare - a condition in which combatants arrayed along ethnic lines seek to kill each other - not particularly with ethnic hatreds. It is important to distinguish common, knee-jerk, and sometimes hateful ethnic slurs - no matter how unpleasant and politically incorrect their expression may often be - from prejudice that is expressed in violence. As James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin have pointed out, ethnic violence is actually exceedingly rare when one considers how many Archie Bunkers there are in the world and how many opportunities there are for it to occur. Fearon and Laitin, "Explaining Interethnic Cooperation," American Political Science Review, Vol. 90, No. 4 (December 1996), pp. 716-717. Some analysts argue that "conflicts among nations and ethnic groups are escalating." Samuel P. Huntington, "Why International Primacy Matters," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), p. 71. Others believe "there is a virtual epidemic of armed civil or intranational conflict." See David A. Hamburg, Preventing Contemporary Intergroup Violence (New York: Carnegie Corporation of New York, 1993). But such wars and conflicts did not increase in number or intensity in the 1990s. See Yahya Sadowski, The Myth of Global Chaos (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1998); Ernest J. Wilson and Ted Robert Gurr, "Fewer Nations Are Making War," Los Angeles Times, August 22, 1999, p. M2; Steven R. David, "Internal War: Causes and Cures," World Politics, Vol. 49, No. 4 (July 1997), pp. 552-576; and James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Weak States, Rough Terrain, and Large-Scale Ethnic Violence since 1945," paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, Georgia, September 25,1999. Rather, what is new is that some of these wars and conflicts have taken place in Europe, an area that had previously been free from substantial civil warfare for nearly half a century. However, militant nationalism - whether violent or not - may well already have had its day in Central and Eastern Europe. Hypernationalists (and even some that are not so hyper), who sometimes appeared threateningly formidable at the polls in the early 1990s, have been reduced in elections in many places to the point of extinguishment.
7. I am concerned here with ethnic violence and warfare - a condition in which combatants arrayed along ethnic lines seek to kill each other - not particularly with ethnic hatreds. It is important to distinguish common, knee-jerk, and sometimes hateful ethnic slurs - no matter how unpleasant and politically incorrect their expression may often be - from prejudice that is expressed in violence. As James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin have pointed out, ethnic violence is actually exceedingly rare when one considers how many Archie Bunkers there are in the world and how many opportunities there are for it to occur. Fearon and Laitin, "Explaining Interethnic Cooperation," American Political Science Review, Vol. 90, No. 4 (December 1996), pp. 716-717. Some analysts argue that "conflicts among nations and ethnic groups are escalating." Samuel P. Huntington, "Why International Primacy Matters," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), p. 71. Others believe "there is a virtual epidemic of armed civil or intranational conflict." See David A. Hamburg, Preventing Contemporary Intergroup Violence (New York: Carnegie Corporation of New York, 1993). But such wars and conflicts did not increase in number or intensity in the 1990s. See Yahya Sadowski, The Myth of Global Chaos (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1998); Ernest J. Wilson and Ted Robert Gurr, "Fewer Nations Are Making War," Los Angeles Times, August 22, 1999, p. M2; Steven R. David, "Internal War: Causes and Cures," World Politics, Vol. 49, No. 4 (July 1997), pp. 552-576; and James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Weak States, Rough Terrain, and Large-Scale Ethnic Violence since 1945," paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, Georgia, September 25,1999. Rather, what is new is that some of these wars and conflicts have taken place in Europe, an area that had previously been free from substantial civil warfare for nearly half a century. However, militant nationalism - whether violent or not - may well already have had its day in Central and Eastern Europe. Hypernationalists (and even some that are not so hyper), who sometimes appeared threateningly formidable at the polls in the early 1990s, have been reduced in elections in many places to the point of extinguishment.
8. Robert D. Kaplan, "A Reader's Guide to the Balkans," New York Times Book Review, April 18, 1993, pp. 1, 30-32. See also Robert D. Kaplan, "History's Cauldron," Atlantic Monthly, June 1991, pp. 93-104; and Kaplan, Balkan Ghosts: A Journey through History (New York: St. Martin's, 1993). For Kaplan's more recent doomsaying, now focused also on Africa, see his "The Coming Anarchy," Atlantic, February 1994, pp. 44-76. For a devastating critique of the argument, see Noel Malcolm, "Seeing Ghosts," National Intetest, Summer 1993, pp. 83-88. See also V.P. Gagnon, Jr., "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia," International Security, Vo. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 133-134; Russell Hardin, One for All: The Logic of Group Conflict (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995), chap. 6; Sadowski, Myth of Global Chaos; and Brian Hall, "Rebecca West's War," New Yorker, April 15, 1996, p. 83. For Kaplan's more recent reflections, see his "Reading Too Much into a Book," New York Times, June 13, 1999, p. 4-17.
9. Robert D. Kaplan, "A Reader's Guide to the Balkans," New York Times Book Review, April 18, 1993, pp. 1, 30-32. See also Robert D. Kaplan, "History's Cauldron," Atlantic Monthly, June 1991, pp. 93-104; and Kaplan, Balkan Ghosts: A Journey through History (New York: St. Martin's, 1993). For Kaplan's more recent doomsaying, now focused also on Africa, see his "The Coming Anarchy," Atlantic, February 1994, pp. 44-76. For a devastating critique of the argument, see Noel Malcolm, "Seeing Ghosts," National Intetest, Summer 1993, pp. 83-88. See also V.P. Gagnon, Jr., "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia," International Security, Vo. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 133-134; Russell Hardin, One for All: The Logic of Group Conflict (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995), chap. 6; Sadowski, Myth of Global Chaos; and Brian Hall, "Rebecca West's War," New Yorker, April 15, 1996, p. 83. For Kaplan's more recent reflections, see his "Reading Too Much into a Book," New York Times, June 13, 1999, p. 4-17.
10. Robert D. Kaplan, "A Reader's Guide to the Balkans," New York Times Book Review, April 18, 1993, pp. 1, 30-32. See also Robert D. Kaplan, "History's Cauldron," Atlantic Monthly, June 1991, pp. 93-104; and Kaplan, Balkan Ghosts: A Journey through History (New York: St. Martin's, 1993). For Kaplan's more recent doomsaying, now focused also on Africa, see his "The Coming Anarchy," Atlantic, February 1994, pp. 44-76. For a devastating critique of the argument, see Noel Malcolm, "Seeing Ghosts," National Intetest, Summer 1993, pp. 83-88. See also V.P. Gagnon, Jr., "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia," International Security, Vo. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 133-134; Russell Hardin, One for All: The Logic of Group Conflict (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995), chap. 6; Sadowski, Myth of Global Chaos; and Brian Hall, "Rebecca West's War," New Yorker, April 15, 1996, p. 83. For Kaplan's more recent reflections, see his "Reading Too Much into a Book," New York Times, June 13, 1999, p. 4-17.
11. Robert D. Kaplan, "A Reader's Guide to the Balkans," New York Times Book Review, April 18, 1993, pp. 1, 30-32. See also Robert D. Kaplan, "History's Cauldron," Atlantic Monthly, June 1991, pp. 93-104; and Kaplan, Balkan Ghosts: A Journey through History (New York: St. Martin's, 1993). For Kaplan's more recent doomsaying, now focused also on Africa, see his "The Coming Anarchy," Atlantic, February 1994, pp. 44-76. For a devastating critique of the argument, see Noel Malcolm, "Seeing Ghosts," National Intetest, Summer 1993, pp. 83-88. See also V.P. Gagnon, Jr., "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia," International Security, Vo. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 133-134; Russell Hardin, One for All: The Logic of Group Conflict (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995), chap. 6; Sadowski, Myth of Global Chaos; and Brian Hall, "Rebecca West's War," New Yorker, April 15, 1996, p. 83. For Kaplan's more recent reflections, see his "Reading Too Much into a Book," New York Times, June 13, 1999, p. 4-17.
12. Robert D. Kaplan, "A Reader's Guide to the Balkans," New York Times Book Review, April 18, 1993, pp. 1, 30-32. See also Robert D. Kaplan, "History's Cauldron," Atlantic Monthly, June 1991, pp. 93-104; and Kaplan, Balkan Ghosts: A Journey through History (New York: St. Martin's, 1993). For Kaplan's more recent doomsaying, now focused also on Africa, see his "The Coming Anarchy," Atlantic, February 1994, pp. 44-76. For a devastating critique of the argument, see Noel Malcolm, "Seeing Ghosts," National Intetest, Summer 1993, pp. 83-88. See also V.P. Gagnon, Jr., "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia," International Security, Vo. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 133-134; Russell Hardin, One for All: The Logic of Group Conflict (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995), chap. 6; Sadowski, Myth of Global Chaos; and Brian Hall, "Rebecca West's War," New Yorker, April 15, 1996, p. 83. For Kaplan's more recent reflections, see his "Reading Too Much into a Book," New York Times, June 13, 1999, p. 4-17.
13. Robert D. Kaplan, "A Reader's Guide to the Balkans," New York Times Book Review, April 18, 1993, pp. 1, 30-32. See also Robert D. Kaplan, "History's Cauldron," Atlantic Monthly, June 1991, pp. 93-104; and Kaplan, Balkan Ghosts: A Journey through History (New York: St. Martin's, 1993). For Kaplan's more recent doomsaying, now focused also on Africa, see his "The Coming Anarchy," Atlantic, February 1994, pp. 44-76. For a devastating critique of the argument, see Noel Malcolm, "Seeing Ghosts," National Intetest, Summer 1993, pp. 83-88. See also V.P. Gagnon, Jr., "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia," International Security, Vo. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 133-134; Russell Hardin, One for All: The Logic of Group Conflict (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995), chap. 6; Sadowski, Myth of Global Chaos; and Brian Hall, "Rebecca West's War," New Yorker, April 15, 1996, p. 83. For Kaplan's more recent reflections, see his "Reading Too Much into a Book," New York Times, June 13, 1999, p. 4-17.
14. Robert D. Kaplan, "A Reader's Guide to the Balkans," New York Times Book Review, April 18, 1993, pp. 1, 30-32. See also Robert D. Kaplan, "History's Cauldron," Atlantic Monthly, June 1991, pp. 93-104; and Kaplan, Balkan Ghosts: A Journey through History (New York: St. Martin's, 1993). For Kaplan's more recent doomsaying, now focused also on Africa, see his "The Coming Anarchy," Atlantic, February 1994, pp. 44-76. For a devastating critique of the argument, see Noel Malcolm, "Seeing Ghosts," National Intetest, Summer 1993, pp. 83-88. See also V.P. Gagnon, Jr., "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia," International Security, Vo. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 133-134; Russell Hardin, One for All: The Logic of Group Conflict (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995), chap. 6; Sadowski, Myth of Global Chaos; and Brian Hall, "Rebecca West's War," New Yorker, April 15, 1996, p. 83. For Kaplan's more recent reflections, see his "Reading Too Much into a Book," New York Times, June 13, 1999, p. 4-17.
15. Robert D. Kaplan, "A Reader's Guide to the Balkans," New York Times Book Review, April 18, 1993, pp. 1, 30-32. See also Robert D. Kaplan, "History's Cauldron," Atlantic Monthly, June 1991, pp. 93-104; and Kaplan, Balkan Ghosts: A Journey through History (New York: St. Martin's, 1993). For Kaplan's more recent doomsaying, now focused also on Africa, see his "The Coming Anarchy," Atlantic, February 1994, pp. 44-76. For a devastating critique of the argument, see Noel Malcolm, "Seeing Ghosts," National Intetest, Summer 1993, pp. 83-88. See also V.P. Gagnon, Jr., "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia," International Security, Vo. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 133-134; Russell Hardin, One for All: The Logic of Group Conflict (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995), chap. 6; Sadowski, Myth of Global Chaos; and Brian Hall, "Rebecca West's War," New Yorker, April 15, 1996, p. 83. For Kaplan's more recent reflections, see his "Reading Too Much into a Book," New York Times, June 13, 1999, p. 4-17.
16. Robert D. Kaplan, "A Reader's Guide to the Balkans," New York Times Book Review, April 18, 1993, pp. 1, 30-32. See also Robert D. Kaplan, "History's Cauldron," Atlantic Monthly, June 1991, pp. 93-104; and Kaplan, Balkan Ghosts: A Journey through History (New York: St. Martin's, 1993). For Kaplan's more recent doomsaying, now focused also on Africa, see his "The Coming Anarchy," Atlantic, February 1994, pp. 44-76. For a devastating critique of the argument, see Noel Malcolm, "Seeing Ghosts," National Intetest, Summer 1993, pp. 83-88. See also V.P. Gagnon, Jr., "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia," International Security, Vo. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 133-134; Russell Hardin, One for All: The Logic of Group Conflict (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995), chap. 6; Sadowski, Myth of Global Chaos; and Brian Hall, "Rebecca West's War," New Yorker, April 15, 1996, p. 83. For Kaplan's more recent reflections, see his "Reading Too Much into a Book," New York Times, June 13, 1999, p. 4-17.
17. Robert D. Kaplan, "A Reader's Guide to the Balkans," New York Times Book Review, April 18, 1993, pp. 1, 30-32. See also Robert D. Kaplan, "History's Cauldron," Atlantic Monthly, June 1991, pp. 93-104; and Kaplan, Balkan Ghosts: A Journey through History (New York: St. Martin's, 1993). For Kaplan's more recent doomsaying, now focused also on Africa, see his "The Coming Anarchy," Atlantic, February 1994, pp. 44-76. For a devastating critique of the argument, see Noel Malcolm, "Seeing Ghosts," National Intetest, Summer 1993, pp. 83-88. See also V.P. Gagnon, Jr., "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia," International Security, Vo. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 133-134; Russell Hardin, One for All: The Logic of Group Conflict (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995), chap. 6; Sadowski, Myth of Global Chaos; and Brian Hall, "Rebecca West's War," New Yorker, April 15, 1996, p. 83. For Kaplan's more recent reflections, see his "Reading Too Much into a Book," New York Times, June 13, 1999, p. 4-17.
18. Quoted in Noel Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History (New York: New York University Press, 1994), p. 252. On this argument, see, for example, Christopher Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse (New York: New York University Press, 1995), pp. viii, 10, 242; Warren Zimmermann, Origins of a Catastrophe: Yugoslavia and Its Destroyers (New York: Times Books, 1996), pp. 120-122; Christopher Cviić, "A Culture of Humiliation," National Interest, Summer 1993, p. 82; Jack Snyder and Karen Ballentine, "Nationalism and the Marketplace of Ideas," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Fall 1996), pp. 25-30; Michael Ignatieff, "The Balkan Tragedy," New York Review of Books, May 13, 1993, p. 3; Noel Malcolm, "The Roots of Bosnian Horror Lie Not So Deep," New York Times, October 19, 1998; Tim Judah, The Serbs: History, Myth, and the Destruction of Yugoslavia (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1997), pp. 285, 309; and Peter Maass, Love Thy Neighbor: A Story of War (New York: Vintage, 1996), p. 227.
19. Quoted in Noel Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History (New York: New York University Press, 1994), p. 252. On this argument, see, for example, Christopher Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse (New York: New York University Press, 1995), pp. viii, 10, 242; Warren Zimmermann, Origins of a Catastrophe: Yugoslavia and Its Destroyers (New York: Times Books, 1996), pp. 120-122; Christopher Cviić, "A Culture of Humiliation," National Interest, Summer 1993, p. 82; Jack Snyder and Karen Ballentine, "Nationalism and the Marketplace of Ideas," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Fall 1996), pp. 25-30; Michael Ignatieff, "The Balkan Tragedy," New York Review of Books, May 13, 1993, p. 3; Noel Malcolm, "The Roots of Bosnian Horror Lie Not So Deep," New York Times, October 19, 1998; Tim Judah, The Serbs: History, Myth, and the Destruction of Yugoslavia (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1997), pp. 285, 309; and Peter Maass, Love Thy Neighbor: A Story of War (New York: Vintage, 1996), p. 227.
20. Quoted in Noel Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History (New York: New York University Press, 1994), p. 252. On this argument, see, for example, Christopher Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse (New York: New York University Press, 1995), pp. viii, 10, 242; Warren Zimmermann, Origins of a Catastrophe: Yugoslavia and Its Destroyers (New York: Times Books, 1996), pp. 120-122; Christopher Cviić, "A Culture of Humiliation," National Interest, Summer 1993, p. 82; Jack Snyder and Karen Ballentine, "Nationalism and the Marketplace of Ideas," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Fall 1996), pp. 25-30; Michael Ignatieff, "The Balkan Tragedy," New York Review of Books, May 13, 1993, p. 3; Noel Malcolm, "The Roots of Bosnian Horror Lie Not So Deep," New York Times, October 19, 1998; Tim Judah, The Serbs: History, Myth, and the Destruction of Yugoslavia (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1997), pp. 285, 309; and Peter Maass, Love Thy Neighbor: A Story of War (New York: Vintage, 1996), p. 227.
21. Quoted in Noel Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History (New York: New York University Press, 1994), p. 252. On this argument, see, for example, Christopher Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse (New York: New York University Press, 1995), pp. viii, 10, 242; Warren Zimmermann, Origins of a Catastrophe: Yugoslavia and Its Destroyers (New York: Times Books, 1996), pp. 120-122; Christopher Cviić, "A Culture of Humiliation," National Interest, Summer 1993, p. 82; Jack Snyder and Karen Ballentine, "Nationalism and the Marketplace of Ideas," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Fall 1996), pp. 25-30; Michael Ignatieff, "The Balkan Tragedy," New York Review of Books, May 13, 1993, p. 3; Noel Malcolm, "The Roots of Bosnian Horror Lie Not So Deep," New York Times, October 19, 1998; Tim Judah, The Serbs: History, Myth, and the Destruction of Yugoslavia (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1997), pp. 285, 309; and Peter Maass, Love Thy Neighbor: A Story of War (New York: Vintage, 1996), p. 227.
22. Quoted in Noel Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History (New York: New York University Press, 1994), p. 252. On this argument, see, for example, Christopher Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse (New York: New York University Press, 1995), pp. viii, 10, 242; Warren Zimmermann, Origins of a Catastrophe: Yugoslavia and Its Destroyers (New York: Times Books, 1996), pp. 120-122; Christopher Cviić, "A Culture of Humiliation," National Interest, Summer 1993, p. 82; Jack Snyder and Karen Ballentine, "Nationalism and the Marketplace of Ideas," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Fall 1996), pp. 25-30; Michael Ignatieff, "The Balkan Tragedy," New York Review of Books, May 13, 1993, p. 3; Noel Malcolm, "The Roots of Bosnian Horror Lie Not So Deep," New York Times, October 19, 1998; Tim Judah, The Serbs: History, Myth, and the Destruction of Yugoslavia (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1997), pp. 285, 309; and Peter Maass, Love Thy Neighbor: A Story of War (New York: Vintage, 1996), p. 227.
23. Quoted in Noel Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History (New York: New York University Press, 1994), p. 252. On this argument, see, for example, Christopher Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse (New York: New York University Press, 1995), pp. viii, 10, 242; Warren Zimmermann, Origins of a Catastrophe: Yugoslavia and Its Destroyers (New York: Times Books, 1996), pp. 120-122; Christopher Cviić, "A Culture of Humiliation," National Interest, Summer 1993, p. 82; Jack Snyder and Karen Ballentine, "Nationalism and the Marketplace of Ideas," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Fall 1996), pp. 25-30; Michael Ignatieff, "The Balkan Tragedy," New York Review of Books, May 13, 1993, p. 3; Noel Malcolm, "The Roots of Bosnian Horror Lie Not So Deep," New York Times, October 19, 1998; Tim Judah, The Serbs: History, Myth, and the Destruction of Yugoslavia (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1997), pp. 285, 309; and Peter Maass, Love Thy Neighbor: A Story of War (New York: Vintage, 1996), p. 227.
24. Quoted in Noel Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History (New York: New York University Press, 1994), p. 252. On this argument, see, for example, Christopher Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse (New York: New York University Press, 1995), pp. viii, 10, 242; Warren Zimmermann, Origins of a Catastrophe: Yugoslavia and Its Destroyers (New York: Times Books, 1996), pp. 120-122; Christopher Cviić, "A Culture of Humiliation," National Interest, Summer 1993, p. 82; Jack Snyder and Karen Ballentine, "Nationalism and the Marketplace of Ideas," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Fall 1996), pp. 25-30; Michael Ignatieff, "The Balkan Tragedy," New York Review of Books, May 13, 1993, p. 3; Noel Malcolm, "The Roots of Bosnian Horror Lie Not So Deep," New York Times, October 19, 1998; Tim Judah, The Serbs: History, Myth, and the Destruction of Yugoslavia (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1997), pp. 285, 309; and Peter Maass, Love Thy Neighbor: A Story of War (New York: Vintage, 1996), p. 227.
25. Quoted in Noel Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History (New York: New York University Press, 1994), p. 252. On this argument, see, for example, Christopher Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse (New York: New York University Press, 1995), pp. viii, 10, 242; Warren Zimmermann, Origins of a Catastrophe: Yugoslavia and Its Destroyers (New York: Times Books, 1996), pp. 120-122; Christopher Cviić, "A Culture of Humiliation," National Interest, Summer 1993, p. 82; Jack Snyder and Karen Ballentine, "Nationalism and the Marketplace of Ideas," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Fall 1996), pp. 25-30; Michael Ignatieff, "The Balkan Tragedy," New York Review of Books, May 13, 1993, p. 3; Noel Malcolm, "The Roots of Bosnian Horror Lie Not So Deep," New York Times, October 19, 1998; Tim Judah, The Serbs: History, Myth, and the Destruction of Yugoslavia (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1997), pp. 285, 309; and Peter Maass, Love Thy Neighbor: A Story of War (New York: Vintage, 1996), p. 227.
26. Quoted in Noel Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History (New York: New York University Press, 1994), p. 252. On this argument, see, for example, Christopher Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse (New York: New York University Press, 1995), pp. viii, 10, 242; Warren Zimmermann, Origins of a Catastrophe: Yugoslavia and Its Destroyers (New York: Times Books, 1996), pp. 120-122; Christopher Cviić, "A Culture of Humiliation," National Interest, Summer 1993, p. 82; Jack Snyder and Karen Ballentine, "Nationalism and the Marketplace of Ideas," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Fall 1996), pp. 25-30; Michael Ignatieff, "The Balkan Tragedy," New York Review of Books, May 13, 1993, p. 3; Noel Malcolm, "The Roots of Bosnian Horror Lie Not So Deep," New York Times, October 19, 1998; Tim Judah, The Serbs: History, Myth, and the Destruction of Yugoslavia (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1997), pp. 285, 309; and Peter Maass, Love Thy Neighbor: A Story of War (New York: Vintage, 1996), p. 227.
27. On Tudjman's spending, see Susan L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1995), pp. 119, 229; Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 199; Lenard J. Cohen, Broken Bonds: Yugoslavia's Disintegration and Balkan Politics in Transition, 2d ed. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1995), p. 95; Marcus Tanner, Croatia: A Nation Forged in War (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1997), p. 222; and David Binder, "Gojko Susak, "Defense Minister of Croatia Is Dead at 53," New York Times, May 5, 1998, p. A25. On Tudjman's electoral success, see Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 127; Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, pp. 117-119; Laura Silber and Allan Little, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation (New York: Penguin, 1997), p. 90; and Cohen, Broken Bonds, pp. 99-100. On the Serb vote in Croatia, see Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict," p. 155; and Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 127. Somewhat similarly, a large portion of those Serbs in Bosnia who lived outside areas controlled by Serb nationalists voted with the Muslims for independence from Serbia in a 1992 referendum; see Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict," p. 163. On Bosnia, see Steven L. Burg and Paul S. Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1999), pp. 50-51, 57. On Serbia, see Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict," p. 154; Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 121; Brian Hall, The Impossible Country: A Journey through the Last Days of Yugoslavia (New York: Penguin, 1994), p. 48; Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, pp. 130, 448-449; Mladjan Dinkic, The Economics of Destruction (Belgrade: Video Nedeljnik, 1995), pp. 30, 61-66; see also Judah, The Serbs, p. 260. On vote percentages, see Cohen, Broken Bonds, p. 158. On the Albanian vote, see Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, p. 121.
28. On Tudjman's spending, see Susan L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1995), pp. 119, 229; Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 199; Lenard J. Cohen, Broken Bonds: Yugoslavia's Disintegration and Balkan Politics in Transition, 2d ed. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1995), p. 95; Marcus Tanner, Croatia: A Nation Forged in War (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1997), p. 222; and David Binder, "Gojko Susak, "Defense Minister of Croatia Is Dead at 53," New York Times, May 5, 1998, p. A25. On Tudjman's electoral success, see Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 127; Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, pp. 117-119; Laura Silber and Allan Little, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation (New York: Penguin, 1997), p. 90; and Cohen, Broken Bonds, pp. 99-100. On the Serb vote in Croatia, see Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict," p. 155; and Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 127. Somewhat similarly, a large portion of those Serbs in Bosnia who lived outside areas controlled by Serb nationalists voted with the Muslims for independence from Serbia in a 1992 referendum; see Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict," p. 163. On Bosnia, see Steven L. Burg and Paul S. Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1999), pp. 50-51, 57. On Serbia, see Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict," p. 154; Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 121; Brian Hall, The Impossible Country: A Journey through the Last Days of Yugoslavia (New York: Penguin, 1994), p. 48; Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, pp. 130, 448-449; Mladjan Dinkic, The Economics of Destruction (Belgrade: Video Nedeljnik, 1995), pp. 30, 61-66; see also Judah, The Serbs, p. 260. On vote percentages, see Cohen, Broken Bonds, p. 158. On the Albanian vote, see Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, p. 121.
29. On Tudjman's spending, see Susan L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1995), pp. 119, 229; Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 199; Lenard J. Cohen, Broken Bonds: Yugoslavia's Disintegration and Balkan Politics in Transition, 2d ed. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1995), p. 95; Marcus Tanner, Croatia: A Nation Forged in War (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1997), p. 222; and David Binder, "Gojko Susak, "Defense Minister of Croatia Is Dead at 53," New York Times, May 5, 1998, p. A25. On Tudjman's electoral success, see Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 127; Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, pp. 117-119; Laura Silber and Allan Little, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation (New York: Penguin, 1997), p. 90; and Cohen, Broken Bonds, pp. 99-100. On the Serb vote in Croatia, see Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict," p. 155; and Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 127. Somewhat similarly, a large portion of those Serbs in Bosnia who lived outside areas controlled by Serb nationalists voted with the Muslims for independence from Serbia in a 1992 referendum; see Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict," p. 163. On Bosnia, see Steven L. Burg and Paul S. Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1999), pp. 50-51, 57. On Serbia, see Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict," p. 154; Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 121; Brian Hall, The Impossible Country: A Journey through the Last Days of Yugoslavia (New York: Penguin, 1994), p. 48; Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, pp. 130, 448-449; Mladjan Dinkic, The Economics of Destruction (Belgrade: Video Nedeljnik, 1995), pp. 30, 61-66; see also Judah, The Serbs, p. 260. On vote percentages, see Cohen, Broken Bonds, p. 158. On the Albanian vote, see Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, p. 121.
30. On Tudjman's spending, see Susan L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1995), pp. 119, 229; Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 199; Lenard J. Cohen, Broken Bonds: Yugoslavia's Disintegration and Balkan Politics in Transition, 2d ed. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1995), p. 95; Marcus Tanner, Croatia: A Nation Forged in War (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1997), p. 222; and David Binder, "Gojko Susak, "Defense Minister of Croatia Is Dead at 53," New York Times, May 5, 1998, p. A25. On Tudjman's electoral success, see Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 127; Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, pp. 117-119; Laura Silber and Allan Little, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation (New York: Penguin, 1997), p. 90; and Cohen, Broken Bonds, pp. 99-100. On the Serb vote in Croatia, see Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict," p. 155; and Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 127. Somewhat similarly, a large portion of those Serbs in Bosnia who lived outside areas controlled by Serb nationalists voted with the Muslims for independence from Serbia in a 1992 referendum; see Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict," p. 163. On Bosnia, see Steven L. Burg and Paul S. Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1999), pp. 50-51, 57. On Serbia, see Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict," p. 154; Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 121; Brian Hall, The Impossible Country: A Journey through the Last Days of Yugoslavia (New York: Penguin, 1994), p. 48; Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, pp. 130, 448-449; Mladjan Dinkic, The Economics of Destruction (Belgrade: Video Nedeljnik, 1995), pp. 30, 61-66; see also Judah, The Serbs, p. 260. On vote percentages, see Cohen, Broken Bonds, p. 158. On the Albanian vote, see Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, p. 121.
31. On Tudjman's spending, see Susan L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1995), pp. 119, 229; Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 199; Lenard J. Cohen, Broken Bonds: Yugoslavia's Disintegration and Balkan Politics in Transition, 2d ed. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1995), p. 95; Marcus Tanner, Croatia: A Nation Forged in War (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1997), p. 222; and David Binder, "Gojko Susak, "Defense Minister of Croatia Is Dead at 53," New York Times, May 5, 1998, p. A25. On Tudjman's electoral success, see Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 127; Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, pp. 117-119; Laura Silber and Allan Little, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation (New York: Penguin, 1997), p. 90; and Cohen, Broken Bonds, pp. 99-100. On the Serb vote in Croatia, see Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict," p. 155; and Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 127. Somewhat similarly, a large portion of those Serbs in Bosnia who lived outside areas controlled by Serb nationalists voted with the Muslims for independence from Serbia in a 1992 referendum; see Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict," p. 163. On Bosnia, see Steven L. Burg and Paul S. Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1999), pp. 50-51, 57. On Serbia, see Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict," p. 154; Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 121; Brian Hall, The Impossible Country: A Journey through the Last Days of Yugoslavia (New York: Penguin, 1994), p. 48; Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, pp. 130, 448-449; Mladjan Dinkic, The Economics of Destruction (Belgrade: Video Nedeljnik, 1995), pp. 30, 61-66; see also Judah, The Serbs, p. 260. On vote percentages, see Cohen, Broken Bonds, p. 158. On the Albanian vote, see Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, p. 121.
32. On Tudjman's spending, see Susan L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1995), pp. 119, 229; Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 199; Lenard J. Cohen, Broken Bonds: Yugoslavia's Disintegration and Balkan Politics in Transition, 2d ed. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1995), p. 95; Marcus Tanner, Croatia: A Nation Forged in War (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1997), p. 222; and David Binder, "Gojko Susak, "Defense Minister of Croatia Is Dead at 53," New York Times, May 5, 1998, p. A25. On Tudjman's electoral success, see Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 127; Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, pp. 117-119; Laura Silber and Allan Little, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation (New York: Penguin, 1997), p. 90; and Cohen, Broken Bonds, pp. 99-100. On the Serb vote in Croatia, see Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict," p. 155; and Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 127. Somewhat similarly, a large portion of those Serbs in Bosnia who lived outside areas controlled by Serb nationalists voted with the Muslims for independence from Serbia in a 1992 referendum; see Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict," p. 163. On Bosnia, see Steven L. Burg and Paul S. Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1999), pp. 50-51, 57. On Serbia, see Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict," p. 154; Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 121; Brian Hall, The Impossible Country: A Journey through the Last Days of Yugoslavia (New York: Penguin, 1994), p. 48; Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, pp. 130, 448-449; Mladjan Dinkic, The Economics of Destruction (Belgrade: Video Nedeljnik, 1995), pp. 30, 61-66; see also Judah, The Serbs, p. 260. On vote percentages, see Cohen, Broken Bonds, p. 158. On the Albanian vote, see Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, p. 121.
33. On Tudjman's spending, see Susan L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1995), pp. 119, 229; Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 199; Lenard J. Cohen, Broken Bonds: Yugoslavia's Disintegration and Balkan Politics in Transition, 2d ed. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1995), p. 95; Marcus Tanner, Croatia: A Nation Forged in War (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1997), p. 222; and David Binder, "Gojko Susak, "Defense Minister of Croatia Is Dead at 53," New York Times, May 5, 1998, p. A25. On Tudjman's electoral success, see Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 127; Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, pp. 117-119; Laura Silber and Allan Little, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation (New York: Penguin, 1997), p. 90; and Cohen, Broken Bonds, pp. 99-100. On the Serb vote in Croatia, see Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict," p. 155; and Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 127. Somewhat similarly, a large portion of those Serbs in Bosnia who lived outside areas controlled by Serb nationalists voted with the Muslims for independence from Serbia in a 1992 referendum; see Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict," p. 163. On Bosnia, see Steven L. Burg and Paul S. Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1999), pp. 50-51, 57. On Serbia, see Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict," p. 154; Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 121; Brian Hall, The Impossible Country: A Journey through the Last Days of Yugoslavia (New York: Penguin, 1994), p. 48; Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, pp. 130, 448-449; Mladjan Dinkic, The Economics of Destruction (Belgrade: Video Nedeljnik, 1995), pp. 30, 61-66; see also Judah, The Serbs, p. 260. On vote percentages, see Cohen, Broken Bonds, p. 158. On the Albanian vote, see Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, p. 121.
34. On Tudjman's spending, see Susan L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1995), pp. 119, 229; Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 199; Lenard J. Cohen, Broken Bonds: Yugoslavia's Disintegration and Balkan Politics in Transition, 2d ed. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1995), p. 95; Marcus Tanner, Croatia: A Nation Forged in War (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1997), p. 222; and David Binder, "Gojko Susak, "Defense Minister of Croatia Is Dead at 53," New York Times, May 5, 1998, p. A25. On Tudjman's electoral success, see Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 127; Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, pp. 117-119; Laura Silber and Allan Little, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation (New York: Penguin, 1997), p. 90; and Cohen, Broken Bonds, pp. 99-100. On the Serb vote in Croatia, see Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict," p. 155; and Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 127. Somewhat similarly, a large portion of those Serbs in Bosnia who lived outside areas controlled by Serb nationalists voted with the Muslims for independence from Serbia in a 1992 referendum; see Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict," p. 163. On Bosnia, see Steven L. Burg and Paul S. Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1999), pp. 50-51, 57. On Serbia, see Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict," p. 154; Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 121; Brian Hall, The Impossible Country: A Journey through the Last Days of Yugoslavia (New York: Penguin, 1994), p. 48; Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, pp. 130, 448-449; Mladjan Dinkic, The Economics of Destruction (Belgrade: Video Nedeljnik, 1995), pp. 30, 61-66; see also Judah, The Serbs, p. 260. On vote percentages, see Cohen, Broken Bonds, p. 158. On the Albanian vote, see Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, p. 121.
35. On Tudjman's spending, see Susan L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1995), pp. 119, 229; Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 199; Lenard J. Cohen, Broken Bonds: Yugoslavia's Disintegration and Balkan Politics in Transition, 2d ed. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1995), p. 95; Marcus Tanner, Croatia: A Nation Forged in War (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1997), p. 222; and David Binder, "Gojko Susak, "Defense Minister of Croatia Is Dead at 53," New York Times, May 5, 1998, p. A25. On Tudjman's electoral success, see Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 127; Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, pp. 117-119; Laura Silber and Allan Little, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation (New York: Penguin, 1997), p. 90; and Cohen, Broken Bonds, pp. 99-100. On the Serb vote in Croatia, see Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict," p. 155; and Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 127. Somewhat similarly, a large portion of those Serbs in Bosnia who lived outside areas controlled by Serb nationalists voted with the Muslims for independence from Serbia in a 1992 referendum; see Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict," p. 163. On Bosnia, see Steven L. Burg and Paul S. Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1999), pp. 50-51, 57. On Serbia, see Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict," p. 154; Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 121; Brian Hall, The Impossible Country: A Journey through the Last Days of Yugoslavia (New York: Penguin, 1994), p. 48; Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, pp. 130, 448-449; Mladjan Dinkic, The Economics of Destruction (Belgrade: Video Nedeljnik, 1995), pp. 30, 61-66; see also Judah, The Serbs, p. 260. On vote percentages, see Cohen, Broken Bonds, p. 158. On the Albanian vote, see Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, p. 121.
36. On Tudjman's spending, see Susan L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1995), pp. 119, 229; Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 199; Lenard J. Cohen, Broken Bonds: Yugoslavia's Disintegration and Balkan Politics in Transition, 2d ed. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1995), p. 95; Marcus Tanner, Croatia: A Nation Forged in War (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1997), p. 222; and David Binder, "Gojko Susak, "Defense Minister of Croatia Is Dead at 53," New York Times, May 5, 1998, p. A25. On Tudjman's electoral success, see Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 127; Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, pp. 117-119; Laura Silber and Allan Little, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation (New York: Penguin, 1997), p. 90; and Cohen, Broken Bonds, pp. 99-100. On the Serb vote in Croatia, see Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict," p. 155; and Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 127. Somewhat similarly, a large portion of those Serbs in Bosnia who lived outside areas controlled by Serb nationalists voted with the Muslims for independence from Serbia in a 1992 referendum; see Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict," p. 163. On Bosnia, see Steven L. Burg and Paul S. Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1999), pp. 50-51, 57. On Serbia, see Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict," p. 154; Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 121; Brian Hall, The Impossible Country: A Journey through the Last Days of Yugoslavia (New York: Penguin, 1994), p. 48; Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, pp. 130, 448-449; Mladjan Dinkic, The Economics of Destruction (Belgrade: Video Nedeljnik, 1995), pp. 30, 61-66; see also Judah, The Serbs, p. 260. On vote percentages, see Cohen, Broken Bonds, p. 158. On the Albanian vote, see Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, p. 121.
37. On Tudjman's spending, see Susan L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1995), pp. 119, 229; Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 199; Lenard J. Cohen, Broken Bonds: Yugoslavia's Disintegration and Balkan Politics in Transition, 2d ed. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1995), p. 95; Marcus Tanner, Croatia: A Nation Forged in War (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1997), p. 222; and David Binder, "Gojko Susak, "Defense Minister of Croatia Is Dead at 53," New York Times, May 5, 1998, p. A25. On Tudjman's electoral success, see Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 127; Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, pp. 117-119; Laura Silber and Allan Little, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation (New York: Penguin, 1997), p. 90; and Cohen, Broken Bonds, pp. 99-100. On the Serb vote in Croatia, see Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict," p. 155; and Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 127. Somewhat similarly, a large portion of those Serbs in Bosnia who lived outside areas controlled by Serb nationalists voted with the Muslims for independence from Serbia in a 1992 referendum; see Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict," p. 163. On Bosnia, see Steven L. Burg and Paul S. Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1999), pp. 50-51, 57. On Serbia, see Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict," p. 154; Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 121; Brian Hall, The Impossible Country: A Journey through the Last Days of Yugoslavia (New York: Penguin, 1994), p. 48; Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, pp. 130, 448-449; Mladjan Dinkic, The Economics of Destruction (Belgrade: Video Nedeljnik, 1995), pp. 30, 61-66; see also Judah, The Serbs, p. 260. On vote percentages, see Cohen, Broken Bonds, p. 158. On the Albanian vote, see Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, p. 121.
38. On Tudjman's spending, see Susan L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1995), pp. 119, 229; Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 199; Lenard J. Cohen, Broken Bonds: Yugoslavia's Disintegration and Balkan Politics in Transition, 2d ed. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1995), p. 95; Marcus Tanner, Croatia: A Nation Forged in War (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1997), p. 222; and David Binder, "Gojko Susak, "Defense Minister of Croatia Is Dead at 53," New York Times, May 5, 1998, p. A25. On Tudjman's electoral success, see Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 127; Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, pp. 117-119; Laura Silber and Allan Little, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation (New York: Penguin, 1997), p. 90; and Cohen, Broken Bonds, pp. 99-100. On the Serb vote in Croatia, see Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict," p. 155; and Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 127. Somewhat similarly, a large portion of those Serbs in Bosnia who lived outside areas controlled by Serb nationalists voted with the Muslims for independence from Serbia in a 1992 referendum; see Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict," p. 163. On Bosnia, see Steven L. Burg and Paul S. Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1999), pp. 50-51, 57. On Serbia, see Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict," p. 154; Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 121; Brian Hall, The Impossible Country: A Journey through the Last Days of Yugoslavia (New York: Penguin, 1994), p. 48; Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, pp. 130, 448-449; Mladjan Dinkic, The Economics of Destruction (Belgrade: Video Nedeljnik, 1995), pp. 30, 61-66; see also Judah, The Serbs, p. 260. On vote percentages, see Cohen, Broken Bonds, p. 158. On the Albanian vote, see Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, p. 121.
39. On Tudjman's spending, see Susan L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1995), pp. 119, 229; Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 199; Lenard J. Cohen, Broken Bonds: Yugoslavia's Disintegration and Balkan Politics in Transition, 2d ed. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1995), p. 95; Marcus Tanner, Croatia: A Nation Forged in War (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1997), p. 222; and David Binder, "Gojko Susak, "Defense Minister of Croatia Is Dead at 53," New York Times, May 5, 1998, p. A25. On Tudjman's electoral success, see Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 127; Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, pp. 117-119; Laura Silber and Allan Little, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation (New York: Penguin, 1997), p. 90; and Cohen, Broken Bonds, pp. 99-100. On the Serb vote in Croatia, see Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict," p. 155; and Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 127. Somewhat similarly, a large portion of those Serbs in Bosnia who lived outside areas controlled by
40. On Tudjman's spending, see Susan L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1995), pp. 119, 229; Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 199; Lenard J. Cohen, Broken Bonds: Yugoslavia's Disintegration and Balkan Politics in Transition, 2d ed. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1995), p. 95; Marcus Tanner, Croatia: A Nation Forged in War (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1997), p. 222; and David Binder, "Gojko Susak, "Defense Minister of Croatia Is Dead at 53," New York Times, May 5, 1998, p. A25. On Tudjman's electoral success, see Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 127; Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, pp. 117-119; Laura Silber and Allan Little, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation (New York: Penguin, 1997), p. 90; and Cohen, Broken Bonds, pp. 99-100. On the Serb vote in Croatia, see Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict," p. 155; and Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 127. Somewhat similarly, a large portion of those Serbs in Bosnia who lived outside areas controlled by Serb nationalists voted with the Muslims for independence from Serbia in a 1992 referendum; see Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict," p. 163. On Bosnia, see Steven L. Burg and Paul S. Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1999), pp. 50-51, 57. On Serbia, see Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict," p. 154; Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 121; Brian Hall, The Impossible Country: A Journey through the Last Days of Yugoslavia (New York: Penguin, 1994), p. 48; Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, pp. 130, 448-449; Mladjan Dinkic, The Economics of Destruction (Belgrade: Video Nedeljnik, 1995), pp. 30, 61-66; see also Judah, The Serbs, p. 260. On vote percentages, see Cohen, Broken Bonds, p. 158. On the Albanian vote, see Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, p. 121.
41. On Tudjman's spending, see Susan L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1995), pp. 119, 229; Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 199; Lenard J. Cohen, Broken Bonds: Yugoslavia's Disintegration and Balkan Politics in Transition, 2d ed. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1995), p. 95; Marcus Tanner, Croatia: A Nation Forged in War (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1997), p. 222; and David Binder, "Gojko Susak, "Defense Minister of Croatia Is Dead at 53," New York Times, May 5, 1998, p. A25. On Tudjman's electoral success, see Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 127; Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, pp. 117-119; Laura Silber and Allan Little, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation (New York: Penguin, 1997), p. 90; and Cohen, Broken Bonds, pp. 99-100. On the Serb vote in Croatia, see Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict," p. 155; and Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 127. Somewhat similarly, a large portion of those Serbs in Bosnia who lived outside areas controlled by Serb nationalists voted with the Muslims for independence from Serbia in a 1992 referendum; see Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict," p. 163. On Bosnia, see Steven L. Burg and Paul S. Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1999), pp. 50-51, 57. On Serbia, see Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict," p. 154; Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 121; Brian Hall, The Impossible Country: A Journey through the Last Days of Yugoslavia (New York: Penguin, 1994), p. 48; Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, pp. 130, 448-449; Mladjan Dinkic, The Economics of Destruction (Belgrade: Video Nedeljnik, 1995), pp. 30, 61-66; see also Judah, The Serbs, p. 260. On vote percentages, see Cohen, Broken Bonds, p. 158. On the Albanian vote, see Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, p. 121.
42. On Tudjman's spending, see Susan L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1995), pp. 119, 229; Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 199; Lenard J. Cohen, Broken Bonds: Yugoslavia's Disintegration and Balkan Politics in Transition, 2d ed. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1995), p. 95; Marcus Tanner, Croatia: A Nation Forged in War (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1997), p. 222; and David Binder, "Gojko Susak, "Defense Minister of Croatia Is Dead at 53," New York Times, May 5, 1998, p. A25. On Tudjman's electoral success, see Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 127; Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, pp. 117-119; Laura Silber and Allan Little, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation (New York: Penguin, 1997), p. 90; and Cohen, Broken Bonds, pp. 99-100. On the Serb vote in Croatia, see Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict," p. 155; and Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 127. Somewhat similarly, a large portion of those Serbs in Bosnia who lived outside areas controlled by Serb nationalists voted with the Muslims for independence from Serbia in a 1992 referendum; see Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict," p. 163. On Bosnia, see Steven L. Burg and Paul S. Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1999), pp. 50-51, 57. On Serbia, see Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict," p. 154; Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 121; Brian Hall, The Impossible Country: A Journey through the Last Days of Yugoslavia (New York: Penguin, 1994), p. 48; Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, pp. 130, 448-449; Mladjan Dinkic, The Economics of Destruction (Belgrade: Video Nedeljnik, 1995), pp. 30, 61-66; see also Judah, The Serbs, p. 260. On vote percentages, see Cohen, Broken Bonds, p. 158. On the Albanian vote, see Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, p. 121.
43. On Tudjman's spending, see Susan L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1995), pp. 119, 229; Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 199; Lenard J. Cohen, Broken Bonds: Yugoslavia's Disintegration and Balkan Politics in Transition, 2d ed. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1995), p. 95; Marcus Tanner, Croatia: A Nation Forged in War (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1997), p. 222; and David Binder, "Gojko Susak, "Defense Minister of Croatia Is Dead at 53," New York Times, May 5, 1998, p. A25. On Tudjman's electoral success, see Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 127; Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, pp. 117-119; Laura Silber and Allan Little, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation (New York: Penguin, 1997), p. 90; and Cohen, Broken Bonds, pp. 99-100. On the Serb vote in Croatia, see Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict," p. 155; and Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 127. Somewhat similarly, a large portion of those Serbs in Bosnia who lived outside areas controlled by Serb nationalists voted with the Muslims for independence from Serbia in a 1992 referendum; see Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict," p. 163. On Bosnia, see Steven L. Burg and Paul S. Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1999), pp. 50-51, 57. On Serbia, see Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict," p. 154; Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 121; Brian Hall, The Impossible Country: A Journey through the Last Days of Yugoslavia (New York: Penguin, 1994), p. 48; Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, pp. 130, 448-449; Mladjan Dinkic, The Economics of Destruction (Belgrade: Video Nedeljnik, 1995), pp. 30, 61-66; see also Judah, The Serbs, p. 260. On vote percentages, see Cohen, Broken Bonds, p. 158. On the Albanian vote, see Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, p. 121.
44. On Tudjman's spending, see Susan L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1995), pp. 119, 229; Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 199; Lenard J. Cohen, Broken Bonds: Yugoslavia's Disintegration and Balkan Politics in Transition, 2d ed. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1995), p. 95; Marcus Tanner, Croatia: A Nation Forged in War (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1997), p. 222; and David Binder, "Gojko Susak, "Defense Minister of Croatia Is Dead at 53," New York Times, May 5, 1998, p. A25. On Tudjman's electoral success, see Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 127; Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, pp. 117-119; Laura Silber and Allan Little, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation (New York: Penguin, 1997), p. 90; and Cohen, Broken Bonds, pp. 99-100. On the Serb vote in Croatia, see Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict," p. 155; and Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 127. Somewhat similarly, a large portion of those Serbs in Bosnia who lived outside areas controlled by Serb nationalists voted with the Muslims for independence from Serbia in a 1992 referendum; see Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict," p. 163. On Bosnia, see Steven L. Burg and Paul S. Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1999), pp. 50-51, 57. On Serbia, see Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict," p. 154; Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 121; Brian Hall, The Impossible Country: A Journey through the Last Days of Yugoslavia (New York: Penguin, 1994), p. 48; Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, pp. 130, 448-449; Mladjan Dinkic, The Economics of Destruction (Belgrade: Video Nedeljnik, 1995), pp. 30, 61-66; see also Judah, The Serbs, p. 260. On vote percentages, see Cohen, Broken Bonds, p. 158. On the Albanian vote, see Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, p. 121.
45. On Tudjman's spending, see Susan L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1995), pp. 119, 229; Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 199; Lenard J. Cohen, Broken Bonds: Yugoslavia's Disintegration and Balkan Politics in Transition, 2d ed. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1995), p. 95; Marcus Tanner, Croatia: A Nation Forged in War (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1997), p. 222; and David Binder, "Gojko Susak, "Defense Minister of Croatia Is Dead at 53," New York Times, May 5, 1998, p. A25. On Tudjman's electoral success, see Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 127; Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, pp. 117-119; Laura Silber and Allan Little, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation (New York: Penguin, 1997), p. 90; and Cohen, Broken Bonds, pp. 99-100. On the Serb vote in Croatia, see Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict," p. 155; and Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 127. Somewhat similarly, a large portion of those Serbs in Bosnia who lived outside areas controlled by Serb nationalists voted with the Muslims for independence from Serbia in a 1992 referendum; see Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict," p. 163. On Bosnia, see Steven L. Burg and Paul S. Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1999), pp. 50-51, 57. On Serbia, see Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict," p. 154; Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 121; Brian Hall, The Impossible Country: A Journey through the Last Days of Yugoslavia (New York: Penguin, 1994), p. 48; Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, pp. 130, 448-449; Mladjan Dinkic, The Economics of Destruction (Belgrade: Video Nedeljnik, 1995), pp. 30, 61-66; see also Judah, The Serbs, p. 260. On vote percentages, see Cohen, Broken Bonds, p. 158. On the Albanian vote, see Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, p. 121.
46. On Tudjman's spending, see Susan L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1995), pp. 119, 229; Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 199; Lenard J. Cohen, Broken Bonds: Yugoslavia's Disintegration and Balkan Politics in Transition, 2d ed. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1995), p. 95; Marcus Tanner, Croatia: A Nation Forged in War (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1997), p. 222; and David Binder, "Gojko Susak, "Defense Minister of Croatia Is Dead at 53," New York Times, May 5, 1998, p. A25. On Tudjman's electoral success, see Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 127; Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, pp. 117-119; Laura Silber and Allan Little, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation (New York: Penguin, 1997), p. 90; and Cohen, Broken Bonds, pp. 99-100. On the Serb vote in Croatia, see Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict," p. 155; and Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 127. Somewhat similarly, a large portion of those Serbs in Bosnia who lived outside areas controlled by Serb nationalists voted with the Muslims for independence from Serbia in a 1992 referendum; see Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict," p. 163. On Bosnia, see Steven L. Burg and Paul S. Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1999), pp. 50-51, 57. On Serbia, see Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict," p. 154; Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 121; Brian Hall, The Impossible Country: A Journey through the Last Days of Yugoslavia (New York: Penguin, 1994), p. 48; Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, pp. 130, 448-449; Mladjan Dinkic, The Economics of Destruction (Belgrade: Video Nedeljnik, 1995), pp. 30, 61-66; see also Judah, The Serbs, p. 260. On vote percentages, see Cohen, Broken Bonds, p. 158. On the Albanian vote, see Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, p. 121.
47. On Tudjman's spending, see Susan L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1995), pp. 119, 229; Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 199; Lenard J. Cohen, Broken Bonds: Yugoslavia's Disintegration and Balkan Politics in Transition, 2d ed. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1995), p. 95; Marcus Tanner, Croatia: A Nation Forged in War (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1997), p. 222; and David Binder, "Gojko Susak, "Defense Minister of Croatia Is Dead at 53," New York Times, May 5, 1998, p. A25. On Tudjman's electoral success, see Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 127; Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, pp. 117-119; Laura Silber and Allan Little, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation (New York: Penguin, 1997), p. 90; and Cohen, Broken Bonds, pp. 99-100. On the Serb vote in Croatia, see Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict," p. 155; and Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 127. Somewhat similarly, a large portion of those Serbs in Bosnia who lived outside areas controlled by Serb nationalists voted with the Muslims for independence from Serbia in a 1992 referendum; see Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict," p. 163. On Bosnia, see Steven L. Burg and Paul S. Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1999), pp. 50-51, 57. On Serbia, see Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict," p. 154; Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 121; Brian Hall, The Impossible Country: A Journey through the Last Days of Yugoslavia (New York: Penguin, 1994), p. 48; Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, pp. 130, 448-449; Mladjan Dinkic, The Economics of Destruction (Belgrade: Video Nedeljnik, 1995), pp. 30, 61-66; see also Judah, The Serbs, p. 260. On vote percentages, see Cohen, Broken Bonds, p. 158. On the Albanian vote, see Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, p. 121.
48. Laslo Sekelj, Yugoslavia: The Process of Disintegration (Highland Lakes, N.J.: Atlantic Research and Publications, 1992), p. 277.
49. Thus, because anti-Vietnam War demonstrators in the 1960s in the United States were predominantly young, most commentators came to hold that young people were more opposed to the war than older people; yet poll data clearly show the opposite to have been the case. John Mueller, War, Presidents, and Public Opinion (New York: Wiley, 1973), pp. 136-140.
50. Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 98.
51. On Zagreb, see "Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation," Discovery Channel, 1995. On Belgrade, see Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict," pp. 157-158; Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, chap. 9; Judah, The Serbs, p. 174; and Chuck Sudetic, Blood and Vengeance: One Family's Story of the War in Bosnia (New York: W.W. Norton, 1998), p. 85. On Sarajevo, see Judah, The Serbs, p. 211; and Robert J. Donia and John V.A. Fine, Jr., Bosnia and Hercegovina: A Tradition Betrayed (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), p. 1.
52. On Zagreb, see "Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation," Discovery Channel, 1995. On Belgrade, see Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict," pp. 157-158; Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, chap. 9; Judah, The Serbs, p. 174; and Chuck Sudetic, Blood and Vengeance: One Family's Story of the War in Bosnia (New York: W.W. Norton, 1998), p. 85. On Sarajevo, see Judah, The Serbs, p. 211; and Robert J. Donia and John V.A. Fine, Jr., Bosnia and Hercegovina: A Tradition Betrayed (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), p. 1.
53. On Zagreb, see "Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation," Discovery Channel, 1995. On Belgrade, see Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict," pp. 157-158; Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, chap. 9; Judah, The Serbs, p. 174; and Chuck Sudetic, Blood and Vengeance: One Family's Story of the War in Bosnia (New York: W.W. Norton, 1998), p. 85. On Sarajevo, see Judah, The Serbs, p. 211; and Robert J. Donia and John V.A. Fine, Jr., Bosnia and Hercegovina: A Tradition Betrayed (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), p. 1.
54. On Zagreb, see "Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation," Discovery Channel, 1995. On Belgrade, see Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict," pp. 157-158; Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, chap. 9; Judah, The Serbs, p. 174; and Chuck Sudetic, Blood and Vengeance: One Family's Story of the War in Bosnia (New York: W.W. Norton, 1998), p. 85. On Sarajevo, see Judah, The Serbs, p. 211; and Robert J. Donia and John V.A. Fine, Jr., Bosnia and Hercegovina: A Tradition Betrayed (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), p. 1.
55. On Zagreb, see "Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation," Discovery Channel, 1995. On Belgrade, see Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict," pp. 157-158; Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, chap. 9; Judah, The Serbs, p. 174; and Chuck Sudetic, Blood and Vengeance: One Family's Story of the War in Bosnia (New York: W.W. Norton, 1998), p. 85. On Sarajevo, see Judah, The Serbs, p. 211; and Robert J. Donia and John V.A. Fine, Jr., Bosnia and Hercegovina: A Tradition Betrayed (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), p. 1.
56. On Zagreb, see "Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation," Discovery Channel, 1995. On Belgrade, see Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict," pp. 157-158; Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, chap. 9; Judah, The Serbs, p. 174; and Chuck Sudetic, Blood and Vengeance: One Family's Story of the War in Bosnia (New York: W.W. Norton, 1998), p. 85. On Sarajevo, see Judah, The Serbs, p. 211; and Robert J. Donia and John V.A. Fine, Jr., Bosnia and Hercegovina: A Tradition Betrayed (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), p. 1.
57. On Zagreb, see "Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation," Discovery Channel, 1995. On Belgrade, see Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict," pp. 157-158; Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, chap. 9; Judah, The Serbs, p. 174; and Chuck Sudetic, Blood and Vengeance: One Family's Story of the War in Bosnia (New York: W.W. Norton, 1998), p. 85. On Sarajevo, see Judah, The Serbs, p. 211; and Robert J. Donia and John V.A. Fine, Jr., Bosnia and Hercegovina: A Tradition Betrayed (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), p. 1.
58. Christine Spolar, "Lesser Serbs in Greater Serbia: Refugees of Croatia Fighting Find Little Welcome from Fellow Serbs," Washington Post, May 15, 1995, p. A36; Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, p. 364; Stephen Kinzer, "Yugoslavia Deports Refugee Serbs to Fight for Rebels in Bosnia and Croatia," New York Times, July 6, 1995, p. A6; and Roger Cohen, Hearts Grown Brutal: Sagas of Sarajevo (New York: Random House, 1998), p. 296.
59. Christine Spolar, "Lesser Serbs in Greater Serbia: Refugees of Croatia Fighting Find Little Welcome from Fellow Serbs," Washington Post, May 15, 1995, p. A36; Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, p. 364; Stephen Kinzer, "Yugoslavia Deports Refugee Serbs to Fight for Rebels in Bosnia and Croatia," New York Times, July 6, 1995, p. A6; and Roger Cohen, Hearts Grown Brutal: Sagas of Sarajevo (New York: Random House, 1998), p. 296.
60. Christine Spolar, "Lesser Serbs in Greater Serbia: Refugees of Croatia Fighting Find Little Welcome from Fellow Serbs," Washington Post, May 15, 1995, p. A36; Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, p. 364; Stephen Kinzer, "Yugoslavia Deports Refugee Serbs to Fight for Rebels in Bosnia and Croatia," New York Times, July 6, 1995, p. A6; and Roger Cohen, Hearts Grown Brutal: Sagas of Sarajevo (New York: Random House, 1998), p. 296.
61. Christine Spolar, "Lesser Serbs in Greater Serbia: Refugees of Croatia Fighting Find Little Welcome from Fellow Serbs," Washington Post, May 15, 1995, p. A36; Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, p. 364; Stephen Kinzer, "Yugoslavia Deports Refugee Serbs to Fight for Rebels in Bosnia and Croatia," New York Times, July 6, 1995, p. A6; and Roger Cohen, Hearts Grown Brutal: Sagas of Sarajevo (New York: Random House, 1998), p. 296.
62. Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 63. See also Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, pp. 238, 241; Ignatieff, "Balkan Tragedy," p. 4; John R. Bowen, "The Myth of Global Ethnic Conflict," Journal of Democracy, Vol. 7, No. 4 (October 1996), pp. 3-14; and Sadowski, Myth of Global Chaos, pp. 78-80. Interestingly, in his discussion of the Bosnian war, Peter Maass observes that "to a surprising extent, this was a war of poor rural Serbs against wealthier urban Muslims, a Deliverance scenario." Maass, Love Thy Neighbor, p. 159. Donia and Fine note that it was the "relatively uneducated armed hillsmen, with a hostility toward urban culture and the state institutions (including taxes) that go with it" who proved "susceptible to Serbian chauvinist propaganda," "allowed themselves to be recruited into Serb paramilitary units," and formed a significant portion of those shelling Bosnia's cities. Donia and Fine, Bosnia and Hercegovina, p. 28. See also Fearon and Laitin, "Weak States, Rough Terrain."
63. Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 63. See also Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, pp. 238, 241; Ignatieff, "Balkan Tragedy," p. 4; John R. Bowen, "The Myth of Global Ethnic Conflict," Journal of Democracy, Vol. 7, No. 4 (October 1996), pp. 3-14; and Sadowski, Myth of Global Chaos, pp. 78-80. Interestingly, in his discussion of the Bosnian war, Peter Maass observes that "to a surprising extent, this was a war of poor rural Serbs against wealthier urban Muslims, a Deliverance scenario." Maass, Love Thy Neighbor, p. 159. Donia and Fine note that it was the "relatively uneducated armed hillsmen, with a hostility toward urban culture and the state institutions (including taxes) that go with it" who proved "susceptible to Serbian chauvinist propaganda," "allowed themselves to be recruited into Serb paramilitary units," and formed a significant portion of those shelling Bosnia's cities. Donia and Fine, Bosnia and Hercegovina, p. 28. See also Fearon and Laitin, "Weak States, Rough Terrain."
64. Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 63. See also Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, pp. 238, 241; Ignatieff, "Balkan Tragedy," p. 4; John R. Bowen, "The Myth of Global Ethnic Conflict," Journal of Democracy, Vol. 7, No. 4 (October 1996), pp. 3-14; and Sadowski, Myth of Global Chaos, pp. 78-80. Interestingly, in his discussion of the Bosnian war, Peter Maass observes that "to a surprising extent, this was a war of poor rural Serbs against wealthier urban Muslims, a Deliverance scenario." Maass, Love Thy Neighbor, p. 159. Donia and Fine note that it was the "relatively uneducated armed hillsmen, with a hostility toward urban culture and the state institutions (including taxes) that go with it" who proved "susceptible to Serbian chauvinist propaganda," "allowed themselves to be recruited into Serb paramilitary units," and formed a significant portion of those shelling Bosnia's cities. Donia and Fine, Bosnia and Hercegovina, p. 28. See also Fearon and Laitin, "Weak States, Rough Terrain."
65. Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 63. See also Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, pp. 238, 241; Ignatieff, "Balkan Tragedy," p. 4; John R. Bowen, "The Myth of Global Ethnic Conflict," Journal of Democracy, Vol. 7, No. 4 (October 1996), pp. 3-14; and Sadowski, Myth of Global Chaos, pp. 78-80. Interestingly, in his discussion of the Bosnian war, Peter Maass observes that "to a surprising extent, this was a war of poor rural Serbs against wealthier urban Muslims, a Deliverance scenario." Maass, Love Thy Neighbor, p. 159. Donia and Fine note that it was the "relatively uneducated armed hillsmen, with a hostility toward urban culture and the state institutions (including taxes) that go with it" who proved "susceptible to Serbian chauvinist propaganda," "allowed themselves to be recruited into Serb paramilitary units," and formed a significant portion of those shelling Bosnia's cities. Donia and Fine, Bosnia and Hercegovina, p. 28. See also Fearon and Laitin, "Weak States, Rough Terrain."
66. Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 63. See also Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, pp. 238, 241; Ignatieff, "Balkan Tragedy," p. 4; John R. Bowen, "The Myth of Global Ethnic Conflict," Journal of Democracy, Vol. 7, No. 4 (October 1996), pp. 3-14; and Sadowski, Myth of Global Chaos, pp. 78-80. Interestingly, in his discussion of the Bosnian war, Peter Maass observes that "to a surprising extent, this was a war of poor rural Serbs against wealthier urban Muslims, a Deliverance scenario." Maass, Love Thy Neighbor, p. 159. Donia and Fine note that it was the "relatively uneducated armed hillsmen, with a hostility toward urban culture and the state institutions (including taxes) that go with it" who proved "susceptible to Serbian chauvinist propaganda," "allowed themselves to be recruited into Serb paramilitary units," and formed a significant portion of those shelling Bosnia's cities. Donia and Fine, Bosnia and Hercegovina, p. 28. See also Fearon and Laitin, "Weak States, Rough Terrain."
67. Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 63. See also Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, pp. 238, 241; Ignatieff, "Balkan Tragedy," p. 4; John R. Bowen, "The Myth of Global Ethnic Conflict," Journal of Democracy, Vol. 7, No. 4 (October 1996), pp. 3-14; and Sadowski, Myth of Global Chaos, pp. 78-80. Interestingly, in his discussion of the Bosnian war, Peter Maass observes that "to a surprising extent, this was a war of poor rural Serbs against wealthier urban Muslims, a Deliverance scenario." Maass, Love Thy Neighbor, p. 159. Donia and Fine note that it was the "relatively uneducated armed hillsmen, with a hostility toward urban culture and the state institutions (including taxes) that go with it" who proved "susceptible to Serbian chauvinist propaganda," "allowed themselves to be recruited into Serb paramilitary units," and formed a significant portion of those shelling Bosnia's cities. Donia and Fine, Bosnia and Hercegovina, p. 28. See also Fearon and Laitin, "Weak States, Rough Terrain."
68. Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 63. See also Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, pp. 238, 241; Ignatieff, "Balkan Tragedy," p. 4; John R. Bowen, "The Myth of Global Ethnic Conflict," Journal of Democracy, Vol. 7, No. 4 (October 1996), pp. 3-14; and Sadowski, Myth of Global Chaos, pp. 78-80. Interestingly, in his discussion of the Bosnian war, Peter Maass observes that "to a surprising extent, this was a war of poor rural Serbs against wealthier urban Muslims, a Deliverance scenario." Maass, Love Thy Neighbor, p. 159. Donia and Fine note that it was the "relatively uneducated armed hillsmen, with a hostility toward urban culture and the state institutions (including taxes) that go with it" who proved "susceptible to Serbian chauvinist propaganda," "allowed themselves to be recruited into Serb paramilitary units," and formed a significant portion of those shelling Bosnia's cities. Donia and Fine, Bosnia and Hercegovina, p. 28. See also Fearon and Laitin, "Weak States, Rough Terrain."
69. Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 63. See also Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, pp. 238, 241; Ignatieff, "Balkan Tragedy," p. 4; John R. Bowen, "The Myth of Global Ethnic Conflict," Journal of Democracy, Vol. 7, No. 4 (October 1996), pp. 3-14; and Sadowski, Myth of Global Chaos, pp. 78-80. Interestingly, in his discussion of the Bosnian war, Peter Maass observes that "to a surprising extent, this was a war of poor rural Serbs against wealthier urban Muslims, a Deliverance scenario." Maass, Love Thy Neighbor, p. 159. Donia and Fine note that it was the "relatively uneducated armed hillsmen, with a hostility toward urban culture and the state institutions (including taxes) that go with it" who proved "susceptible to Serbian chauvinist propaganda," "allowed themselves to be recruited into Serb paramilitary units," and formed a significant portion of those shelling Bosnia's cities. Donia and Fine, Bosnia and Hercegovina, p. 28. See also Fearon and Laitin, "Weak States, Rough Terrain."
70. Norman Cigar, "The Serbo-Croatian War, 1991: Political and Military Dimensions," Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 16, No. 3 (September 1993), pp. 317-319; Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, p. 238; Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 167; Ed Vulliamy, Seasons in Hell: Understanding Bosnia's War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), p. 19; Miloš Vasič, "The Yugoslav Army and the Post-Yugoslav Armies," in David A. Dyker and Ivan Vejvoda, eds., Yugoslavia and After: A Study in Fragmentation, Despair, and Rebirth (London: Longman, 1996), p. 128; Burg and Shoup, War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, p. 51; Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict," p. 162; Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, p. 177; Tanner, Croatia, p. 269; and Judah, The Serbs, pp. 185, 189.
71. Norman Cigar, "The Serbo-Croatian War, 1991: Political and Military Dimensions," Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 16, No. 3 (September 1993), pp. 317-319; Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, p. 238; Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 167; Ed Vulliamy, Seasons in Hell: Understanding Bosnia's War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), p. 19; Miloš Vasič, "The Yugoslav Army and the Post-Yugoslav Armies," in David A. Dyker and Ivan Vejvoda, eds., Yugoslavia and After: A Study in Fragmentation, Despair, and Rebirth (London: Longman, 1996), p. 128; Burg and Shoup, War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, p. 51; Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict," p. 162; Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, p. 177; Tanner, Croatia, p. 269; and Judah, The Serbs, pp. 185, 189.
72. Norman Cigar, "The Serbo-Croatian War, 1991: Political and Military Dimensions," Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 16, No. 3 (September 1993), pp. 317-319; Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, p. 238; Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 167; Ed Vulliamy, Seasons in Hell: Understanding Bosnia's War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), p. 19; Miloš Vasič, "The Yugoslav Army and the Post-Yugoslav Armies," in David A. Dyker and Ivan Vejvoda, eds., Yugoslavia and After: A Study in Fragmentation, Despair, and Rebirth (London: Longman, 1996), p. 128; Burg and Shoup, War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, p. 51; Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict," p. 162; Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, p. 177; Tanner, Croatia, p. 269; and Judah, The Serbs, pp. 185, 189.
73. Norman Cigar, "The Serbo-Croatian War, 1991: Political and Military Dimensions," Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 16, No. 3 (September 1993), pp. 317-319; Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, p. 238; Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 167; Ed Vulliamy, Seasons in Hell: Understanding Bosnia's War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), p. 19; Miloš Vasič, "The Yugoslav Army and the Post-Yugoslav Armies," in David A. Dyker and Ivan Vejvoda, eds., Yugoslavia and After: A Study in Fragmentation, Despair, and Rebirth (London: Longman, 1996), p. 128; Burg and Shoup, War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, p. 51; Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict," p. 162; Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, p. 177; Tanner, Croatia, p. 269; and Judah, The Serbs, pp. 185, 189.
74. Norman Cigar, "The Serbo-Croatian War, 1991: Political and Military Dimensions," Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 16, No. 3 (September 1993), pp. 317-319; Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, p. 238; Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 167; Ed Vulliamy, Seasons in Hell: Understanding Bosnia's War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), p. 19; Miloš Vasič, "The Yugoslav Army and the Post-Yugoslav Armies," in David A. Dyker and Ivan Vejvoda, eds., Yugoslavia and After: A Study in Fragmentation, Despair, and Rebirth (London: Longman, 1996), p. 128; Burg and Shoup, War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, p. 51; Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict," p. 162; Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, p. 177; Tanner, Croatia, p. 269; and Judah, The Serbs, pp. 185, 189.
75. Norman Cigar, "The Serbo-Croatian War, 1991: Political and Military Dimensions," Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 16, No. 3 (September 1993), pp. 317-319; Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, p. 238; Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 167; Ed Vulliamy, Seasons in Hell: Understanding Bosnia's War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), p. 19; Miloš Vasič, "The Yugoslav Army and the Post-Yugoslav Armies," in David A. Dyker and Ivan Vejvoda, eds., Yugoslavia and After: A Study in Fragmentation, Despair, and Rebirth (London: Longman, 1996), p. 128; Burg and Shoup, War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, p. 51; Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict," p. 162; Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, p. 177; Tanner, Croatia, p. 269; and Judah, The Serbs, pp. 185, 189.
76. Norman Cigar, "The Serbo-Croatian War, 1991: Political and Military Dimensions," Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 16, No. 3 (September 1993), pp. 317-319; Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, p. 238; Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 167; Ed Vulliamy, Seasons in Hell: Understanding Bosnia's War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), p. 19; Miloš Vasič, "The Yugoslav Army and the Post-Yugoslav Armies," in David A. Dyker and Ivan Vejvoda, eds., Yugoslavia and After: A Study in Fragmentation, Despair, and Rebirth (London: Longman, 1996), p. 128; Burg and Shoup, War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, p. 51; Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict," p. 162; Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, p. 177; Tanner, Croatia, p. 269; and Judah, The Serbs, pp. 185, 189.
77. Norman Cigar, "The Serbo-Croatian War, 1991: Political and Military Dimensions," Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 16, No. 3 (September 1993), pp. 317-319; Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, p. 238; Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 167; Ed Vulliamy, Seasons in Hell: Understanding Bosnia's War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), p. 19; Miloš Vasič, "The Yugoslav Army and the Post-Yugoslav Armies," in David A. Dyker and Ivan Vejvoda, eds., Yugoslavia and After: A Study in Fragmentation, Despair, and Rebirth (London: Longman, 1996), p. 128; Burg and Shoup, War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, p. 51; Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict," p. 162; Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, p. 177; Tanner, Croatia, p. 269; and Judah, The Serbs, pp. 185, 189.
78. Norman Cigar, "The Serbo-Croatian War, 1991: Political and Military Dimensions," Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 16, No. 3 (September 1993), pp. 317-319; Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, p. 238; Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 167; Ed Vulliamy, Seasons in Hell: Understanding Bosnia's War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), p. 19; Miloš Vasič, "The Yugoslav Army and the Post-Yugoslav Armies," in David A. Dyker and Ivan Vejvoda, eds., Yugoslavia and After: A Study in Fragmentation, Despair, and Rebirth (London: Longman, 1996), p. 128; Burg and Shoup, War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, p. 51; Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict," p. 162; Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, p. 177; Tanner, Croatia, p. 269; and Judah, The Serbs, pp. 185, 189.
79. Norman Cigar, "The Serbo-Croatian War, 1991: Political and Military Dimensions," Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 16, No. 3 (September 1993), pp. 317-319; Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, p. 238; Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 167; Ed Vulliamy, Seasons in Hell: Understanding Bosnia's War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), p. 19; Miloš Vasič, "The Yugoslav Army and the Post-Yugoslav Armies," in David A. Dyker and Ivan Vejvoda, eds., Yugoslavia and After: A Study in Fragmentation, Despair, and Rebirth (London: Longman, 1996), p. 128; Burg and Shoup, War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, p. 51; Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict," p. 162; Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, p. 177; Tanner, Croatia, p. 269; and Judah, The Serbs, pp. 185, 189.
80. Jasminka Udovicki and Stojan Cerovic, "The People's Mass Murderer," Village Voice, November 7, 1995, p. 27; Stipe Sikavica, "The Collapse of Tito's Army," in Jasminka Udovićki and James Ridgeway, eds., Yugoslavia's Ethnic Nightmare (New York: Lawrence Hill, 1995), p. 138; Cigar, "Serbo-Croatian War," p. 315; Tanner, Croatia, p. 270; Judah, The Serbs, p. 185; and Burg and Shoup, War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, p. 51. See also Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, p. 177; and Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict," p. 162. See also Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, p. 177. In all communist countries, certainly including Yugoslavia, people were determinedly subject to decades of communist propaganda in the media. Yet, as history has shown, many - probably most - failed in the end to be convinced by it. If media promotion could guarantee lasting impact, all Yugoslavs would today be worshiping Tito, and all Americans would be driving Edsels. For a discussion, see John Mueller, Policy and Opinion in the Gulf War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), pp. 129-136. Warren Zimmerman observes, "My most difficult task has been to convey the conviction that all Yugoslavs weren't the bloodthirsty extremists so ubiquitously visible in Western news accounts. Most of the people my wife and I met in six years of living in Yugoslavia were peaceful and decent, without a trace of the hostility on which nationalism feeds. . . . What amazed me was how many Yugoslavs resisted the incessant racist propaganda." Zimmerman, Origins of a Catastrophe, p. xi; see also pp. 209-210.
81. Jasminka Udovicki and Stojan Cerovic, "The People's Mass Murderer," Village Voice, November 7, 1995, p. 27; Stipe Sikavica, "The Collapse of Tito's Army," in Jasminka Udovićki and James Ridgeway, eds., Yugoslavia's Ethnic Nightmare (New York: Lawrence Hill, 1995), p. 138; Cigar, "Serbo-Croatian War," p. 315; Tanner, Croatia, p. 270; Judah, The Serbs, p. 185; and Burg and Shoup, War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, p. 51. See also Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, p. 177; and Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict," p. 162. See also Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, p. 177. In all communist countries, certainly including Yugoslavia, people were determinedly subject to decades of communist propaganda in the media. Yet, as history has shown, many - probably most - failed in the end to be convinced by it. If media promotion could guarantee lasting impact, all Yugoslavs would today be worshiping Tito, and all Americans would be driving Edsels. For a discussion, see John Mueller, Policy and Opinion in the Gulf War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), pp. 129-136. Warren Zimmerman observes, "My most difficult task has been to convey the conviction that all Yugoslavs weren't the bloodthirsty extremists so ubiquitously visible in Western news accounts. Most of the people my wife and I met in six years of living in Yugoslavia were peaceful and decent, without a trace of the hostility on which nationalism feeds. . . . What amazed me was how many Yugoslavs resisted the incessant racist propaganda." Zimmerman, Origins of a Catastrophe, p. xi; see also pp. 209-210.
82. Jasminka Udovicki and Stojan Cerovic, "The People's Mass Murderer," Village Voice, November 7, 1995, p. 27; Stipe Sikavica, "The Collapse of Tito's Army," in Jasminka Udovićki and James Ridgeway, eds., Yugoslavia's Ethnic Nightmare (New York: Lawrence Hill, 1995), p. 138; Cigar, "Serbo-Croatian War," p. 315; Tanner, Croatia, p. 270; Judah, The Serbs, p. 185; and Burg and Shoup, War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, p. 51. See also Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, p. 177; and Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict," p. 162. See also Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, p. 177. In all communist countries, certainly including Yugoslavia, people were determinedly subject to decades of communist propaganda in the media. Yet, as history has shown, many - probably most - failed in the end to be convinced by it. If media promotion could guarantee lasting impact, all Yugoslavs would today be worshiping Tito, and all Americans would be driving Edsels. For a discussion, see John Mueller, Policy and Opinion in the Gulf War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), pp. 129-136. Warren Zimmerman observes, "My most difficult task has been to convey the conviction that all Yugoslavs weren't the bloodthirsty extremists so ubiquitously visible in Western news accounts. Most of the people my wife and I met in six years of living in Yugoslavia were peaceful and decent, without a trace of the hostility on which nationalism feeds. . . . What amazed me was how many Yugoslavs resisted the incessant racist propaganda." Zimmerman, Origins of a Catastrophe, p. xi; see also pp. 209-210.
83. Jasminka Udovicki and Stojan Cerovic, "The People's Mass Murderer," Village Voice, November 7, 1995, p. 27; Stipe Sikavica, "The Collapse of Tito's Army," in Jasminka Udovićki and James Ridgeway, eds., Yugoslavia's Ethnic Nightmare (New York: Lawrence Hill, 1995), p. 138; Cigar, "Serbo-Croatian War," p. 315; Tanner, Croatia, p. 270; Judah, The Serbs, p. 185; and Burg and Shoup, War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, p. 51. See also Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, p. 177; and Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict," p. 162. See also Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, p. 177. In all communist countries, certainly including Yugoslavia, people were determinedly subject to decades of communist propaganda in the media. Yet, as history has shown, many - probably most - failed in the end to be convinced by it. If media promotion could guarantee lasting impact, all Yugoslavs would today be worshiping Tito, and all Americans would be driving Edsels. For a discussion, see John Mueller, Policy and Opinion in the Gulf War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), pp. 129-136. Warren Zimmerman observes, "My most difficult task has been to convey the conviction that all Yugoslavs weren't the bloodthirsty extremists so ubiquitously visible in Western news accounts. Most of the people my wife and I met in six years of living in Yugoslavia were peaceful and decent, without a trace of the hostility on which nationalism feeds. . . . What amazed me was how many Yugoslavs resisted the incessant racist propaganda." Zimmerman, Origins of a Catastrophe, p. xi; see also pp. 209-210.
84. Jasminka Udovicki and Stojan Cerovic, "The People's Mass Murderer," Village Voice, November 7, 1995, p. 27; Stipe Sikavica, "The Collapse of Tito's Army," in Jasminka Udovićki and James Ridgeway, eds., Yugoslavia's Ethnic Nightmare (New York: Lawrence Hill, 1995), p. 138; Cigar, "Serbo-Croatian War," p. 315; Tanner, Croatia, p. 270; Judah, The Serbs, p. 185; and Burg and Shoup, War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, p. 51. See also Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, p. 177; and Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict," p. 162. See also Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, p. 177. In all communist countries, certainly including Yugoslavia, people were determinedly subject to decades of communist propaganda in the media. Yet, as history has shown, many - probably most - failed in the end to be convinced by it. If media promotion could guarantee lasting impact, all Yugoslavs would today be worshiping Tito, and all Americans would be driving Edsels. For a discussion, see John Mueller, Policy and Opinion in the Gulf War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), pp. 129-136. Warren Zimmerman observes, "My most difficult task has been to convey the conviction that all Yugoslavs weren't the bloodthirsty extremists so ubiquitously visible in Western news accounts. Most of the people my wife and I met in six years of living in Yugoslavia were peaceful and decent, without a trace of the hostility on which nationalism feeds. . . . What amazed me was how many Yugoslavs resisted the incessant racist propaganda." Zimmerman, Origins of a Catastrophe, p. xi; see also pp. 209-210.
85. Jasminka Udovicki and Stojan Cerovic, "The People's Mass Murderer," Village Voice, November 7, 1995, p. 27; Stipe Sikavica, "The Collapse of Tito's Army," in Jasminka Udovićki and James Ridgeway, eds., Yugoslavia's Ethnic Nightmare (New York: Lawrence Hill, 1995), p. 138; Cigar, "Serbo-Croatian War," p. 315; Tanner, Croatia, p. 270; Judah, The Serbs, p. 185; and Burg and Shoup, War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, p. 51. See also Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, p. 177; and Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict," p. 162. See also Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, p. 177. In all communist countries, certainly including Yugoslavia, people were determinedly subject to decades of communist propaganda in the media. Yet, as history has shown, many - probably most - failed in the end to be convinced by it. If media promotion could guarantee lasting impact, all Yugoslavs would today be worshiping Tito, and all Americans would be driving Edsels. For a discussion, see John Mueller, Policy and Opinion in the Gulf War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), pp. 129-136. Warren Zimmerman observes, "My most difficult task has been to convey the conviction that all Yugoslavs weren't the bloodthirsty extremists so ubiquitously visible in Western news accounts. Most of the people my wife and I met in six years of living in Yugoslavia were peaceful and decent, without a trace of the hostility on which nationalism feeds. . . . What amazed me was how many Yugoslavs resisted the incessant racist propaganda." Zimmerman, Origins of a Catastrophe, p. xi; see also pp. 209-210.
86. Jasminka Udovicki and Stojan Cerovic, "The People's Mass Murderer," Village Voice, November 7, 1995, p. 27; Stipe Sikavica, "The Collapse of Tito's Army," in Jasminka Udovićki and James Ridgeway, eds., Yugoslavia's Ethnic Nightmare (New York: Lawrence Hill, 1995), p. 138; Cigar, "Serbo-Croatian War," p. 315; Tanner, Croatia, p. 270; Judah, The Serbs, p. 185; and Burg and Shoup, War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, p. 51. See also Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, p. 177; and Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict," p. 162. See also Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, p. 177. In all communist countries, certainly including Yugoslavia, people were determinedly subject to decades of communist propaganda in the media. Yet, as history has shown, many - probably most - failed in the end to be convinced by it. If media promotion could guarantee lasting impact, all Yugoslavs would today be worshiping Tito, and all Americans would be driving Edsels. For a discussion, see John Mueller, Policy and Opinion in the Gulf War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), pp. 129-136. Warren Zimmerman observes, "My most difficult task has been to convey the conviction that all Yugoslavs weren't the bloodthirsty extremists so ubiquitously visible in Western news accounts. Most of the people my wife and I met in six years of living in Yugoslavia were peaceful and decent, without a trace of the hostility on which nationalism feeds. . . . What amazed me was how many Yugoslavs resisted the incessant racist propaganda." Zimmerman, Origins of a Catastrophe, p. xi; see also pp. 209-210.
87. Jasminka Udovicki and Stojan Cerovic, "The People's Mass Murderer," Village Voice, November 7, 1995, p. 27; Stipe Sikavica, "The Collapse of Tito's Army," in Jasminka Udovićki and James Ridgeway, eds., Yugoslavia's Ethnic Nightmare (New York: Lawrence Hill, 1995), p. 138; Cigar, "Serbo-Croatian War," p. 315; Tanner, Croatia, p. 270; Judah, The Serbs, p. 185; and Burg and Shoup, War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, p. 51. See also Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, p. 177; and Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict," p. 162. See also Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, p. 177. In all communist countries, certainly including Yugoslavia, people were determinedly subject to decades of communist propaganda in the media. Yet, as history has shown, many - probably most - failed in the end to be convinced by it. If media promotion could guarantee lasting impact, all Yugoslavs would today be worshiping Tito, and all Americans would be driving Edsels. For a discussion, see John Mueller, Policy and Opinion in the Gulf War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), pp. 129-136. Warren Zimmerman observes, "My most difficult task has been to convey the conviction that all Yugoslavs weren't the bloodthirsty extremists so ubiquitously visible in Western news accounts. Most of the people my wife and I met in six years of living in Yugoslavia were peaceful and decent, without a trace of the hostility on which nationalism feeds. . . . What amazed me was how many Yugoslavs resisted the incessant racist propaganda." Zimmerman, Origins of a Catastrophe, p. xi; see also pp. 209-210.
88. Jasminka Udovicki and Stojan Cerovic, "The People's Mass Murderer," Village Voice, November 7, 1995, p. 27; Stipe Sikavica, "The Collapse of Tito's Army," in Jasminka Udovićki and James Ridgeway, eds., Yugoslavia's Ethnic Nightmare (New York: Lawrence Hill, 1995), p. 138; Cigar, "Serbo-Croatian War," p. 315; Tanner, Croatia, p. 270; Judah, The Serbs, p. 185; and Burg and Shoup, War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, p. 51. See also Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, p. 177; and Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict," p. 162. See also Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, p. 177. In all communist countries, certainly including Yugoslavia, people were determinedly subject to decades of communist propaganda in the media. Yet, as history has shown, many - probably most - failed in the end to be convinced by it. If media promotion could guarantee lasting impact, all Yugoslavs would today be worshiping Tito, and all Americans would be driving Edsels. For a discussion, see John Mueller, Policy and Opinion in the Gulf War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), pp. 129-136. Warren Zimmerman observes, "My most difficult task has been to convey the conviction that all Yugoslavs weren't the bloodthirsty extremists so ubiquitously visible in Western news accounts. Most of the people my wife and I met in six years of living in Yugoslavia were peaceful and decent, without a trace of the hostility on which nationalism feeds. . . . What amazed me was how many Yugoslavs resisted the incessant racist propaganda." Zimmerman, Origins of a Catastrophe, p. xi; see also pp. 209-210.
89. Jasminka Udovicki and Stojan Cerovic, "The People's Mass Murderer," Village Voice, November 7, 1995, p. 27; Stipe Sikavica, "The Collapse of Tito's Army," in Jasminka Udovićki and James Ridgeway, eds., Yugoslavia's Ethnic Nightmare (New York: Lawrence Hill, 1995), p. 138; Cigar, "Serbo-Croatian War," p. 315; Tanner, Croatia, p. 270; Judah, The Serbs, p. 185; and Burg and Shoup, War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, p. 51. See also Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, p. 177; and Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict," p. 162. See also Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, p. 177. In all communist countries, certainly including Yugoslavia, people were determinedly subject to decades of communist propaganda in the media. Yet, as history has shown, many - probably most - failed in the end to be convinced by it. If media promotion could guarantee lasting impact, all Yugoslavs would today be worshiping Tito, and all Americans would be driving Edsels. For a discussion, see John Mueller, Policy and Opinion in the Gulf War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), pp. 129-136. Warren Zimmerman observes, "My most difficult task has been to convey the conviction that all Yugoslavs weren't the bloodthirsty extremists so ubiquitously visible in Western news accounts. Most of the people my wife and I met in six years of living in Yugoslavia were peaceful and decent, without a trace of the hostility on which nationalism feeds. . . . What amazed me was how many Yugoslavs resisted the incessant racist propaganda." Zimmerman, Origins of a Catastrophe, p. xi; see also pp. 209-210.
90. Jasminka Udovicki and Stojan Cerovic, "The People's Mass Murderer," Village Voice, November 7, 1995, p. 27; Stipe Sikavica, "The Collapse of Tito's Army," in Jasminka Udovićki and James Ridgeway, eds., Yugoslavia's Ethnic Nightmare (New York: Lawrence Hill, 1995), p. 138; Cigar, "Serbo-Croatian War," p. 315; Tanner, Croatia, p. 270; Judah, The Serbs, p. 185; and Burg and Shoup, War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, p. 51. See also Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, p. 177; and Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict," p. 162. See also Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, p. 177. In all communist countries, certainly including Yugoslavia, people were determinedly subject to decades of communist propaganda in the media. Yet, as history has shown, many - probably most - failed in the end to be convinced by it. If media promotion could guarantee lasting impact, all Yugoslavs would today be worshiping Tito, and all Americans would be driving Edsels. For a discussion, see John Mueller, Policy and Opinion in the Gulf War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), pp. 129-136. Warren Zimmerman observes, "My most difficult task has been to convey the conviction that all Yugoslavs weren't the bloodthirsty extremists so ubiquitously visible in Western news accounts. Most of the people my wife and I met in six years of living in Yugoslavia were peaceful and decent, without a trace of the hostility on which nationalism feeds. . . . What amazed me was how many Yugoslavs resisted the incessant racist propaganda." Zimmerman, Origins of a Catastrophe, p. xi; see also pp. 209-210.
91. Tanner, Croatia, p. 269. See also United Nations Commission of Experts, Final Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), Annex III.A Special Forces, ed. M. Cherif Bassiouni, December 28, 1994, par. 29.
92. Tanner, Croatia, p. 269. See also United Nations Commission of Experts, Final Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), Annex III.A Special Forces, ed. M. Cherif Bassiouni, December 28, 1994, par. 29.
93. Burg and Shoup, War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, p. 130; and Judah, The Serbs, pp. 170-172, 192-195.
94. Burg and Shoup, War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, p. 130; and Judah, The Serbs, pp. 170-172, 192-195.
95. Burg and Shoup, War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, p. 137. There were at least eighty-three of these groups operating in Croatia and Bosnia: fifty-six Serb, thirteen Croat, and fourteen Muslim, with 36,000-66,000 members. See UN Experts, Final Retort, par. 14.
96. UN Experts, Final Report, par. 100.
97. Julian Borger, "The President's Secret Henchmen," Guardian Weekly, February 16, 1997, p. 8; Cohen, Hearts Grown Brutal, pp. 192, 410-411; UN Experts, Final Report, par. 3, 30; and David Firestone, "Serb Lawmaker Is Called Vicious Killer," St. Louis Post-Dispatch, January 3, 1993, p. 1A. See also Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, pp. 238, 249, 265; Vasić, "Yugoslav Army," p. 128; Udovicki and Cerovic, "People's Mass Murderer"; and Michael Ignatieff, The Warrior's Honor: Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience (New York: Henry Holt, 1997), p. 132.
98. Julian Borger, "The President's Secret Henchmen," Guardian Weekly, February 16, 1997, p. 8; Cohen, Hearts Grown Brutal, pp. 192, 410-411; UN Experts, Final Report, par. 3, 30; and David Firestone, "Serb Lawmaker Is Called Vicious Killer," St. Louis Post-Dispatch, January 3, 1993, p. 1A. See also Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, pp. 238, 249, 265; Vasić, "Yugoslav Army," p. 128; Udovicki and Cerovic, "People's Mass Murderer"; and Michael Ignatieff, The Warrior's Honor: Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience (New York: Henry Holt, 1997), p. 132.
99. Julian Borger, "The President's Secret Henchmen," Guardian Weekly, February 16, 1997, p. 8; Cohen, Hearts Grown Brutal, pp. 192, 410-411; UN Experts, Final Report, par. 3, 30; and David Firestone, "Serb Lawmaker Is Called Vicious Killer," St. Louis Post-Dispatch, January 3, 1993, p. 1A. See also Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, pp. 238, 249, 265; Vasić, "Yugoslav Army," p. 128; Udovicki and Cerovic, "People's Mass Murderer"; and Michael Ignatieff, The Warrior's Honor: Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience (New York: Henry Holt, 1997), p. 132.
100. Julian Borger, "The President's Secret Henchmen," Guardian Weekly, February 16, 1997, p. 8; Cohen, Hearts Grown Brutal, pp. 192, 410-411; UN Experts, Final Report, par. 3, 30; and David Firestone, "Serb Lawmaker Is Called Vicious Killer," St. Louis Post-Dispatch, January 3, 1993, p. 1A.
101. Julian Borger, "The President's Secret Henchmen," Guardian Weekly, February 16, 1997, p. 8; Cohen, Hearts Grown Brutal, pp. 192, 410-411; UN Experts, Final Report, par. 3, 30; and David Firestone, "Serb Lawmaker Is Called Vicious Killer," St. Louis Post-Dispatch, January 3, 1993, p. 1A. See also Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, pp. 238, 249, 265; Vasić, "Yugoslav Army," p. 128; Udovicki and Cerovic, "People's Mass Murderer"; and Michael Ignatieff, The Warrior's Honor: Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience (New York: Henry Holt, 1997), p. 132.
102. Julian Borger, "The President's Secret Henchmen," Guardian Weekly, February 16, 1997, p. 8; Cohen, Hearts Grown Brutal, pp. 192, 410-411; UN Experts, Final Report, par. 3, 30; and David Firestone, "Serb Lawmaker Is Called Vicious Killer," St. Louis Post-Dispatch, January 3, 1993, p. 1A. See also Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, pp. 238, 249, 265; Vasić, "Yugoslav Army," p. 128; Udovicki and Cerovic, "People's Mass Murderer"; and Michael Ignatieff, The Warrior's Honor: Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience (New York: Henry Holt, 1997), p. 132.
103. Julian Borger, "The President's Secret Henchmen," Guardian Weekly, February 16, 1997, p. 8; Cohen, Hearts Grown Brutal, pp. 192, 410-411; UN Experts, Final Report, par. 3, 30; and David Firestone, "Serb Lawmaker Is Called Vicious Killer," St. Louis Post-Dispatch, January 3, 1993, p. 1A. See also Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, pp. 238, 249, 265; Vasić, "Yugoslav Army," p. 128; Udovicki and Cerovic, "People's Mass Murderer"; and Michael Ignatieff, The Warrior's Honor: Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience (New York: Henry Holt, 1997), p. 132.
104. Julian Borger, "The President's Secret Henchmen," Guardian Weekly, February 16, 1997, p. 8; Cohen, Hearts Grown Brutal, pp. 192, 410-411; UN Experts, Final Report, par. 3, 30; and David Firestone, "Serb Lawmaker Is Called Vicious Killer," St. Louis Post-Dispatch, January 3, 1993, p. 1A. See also Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, pp. 238, 249, 265; Vasić, "Yugoslav Army," p. 128; Udovicki and Cerovic, "People's Mass Murderer"; and Michael Ignatieff, The Warrior's Honor: Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience (New York: Henry Holt, 1997), p. 132.
105. Vasić, "Yugoslav Army," p. 134; Borger, "President's Secret Henchmen"; Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, pp. 177-178; Tanner, Croatia, p. 245; Judah, The Serbs, chap. 9; and UN Experts, Final Report, par. 18, 24.
106. Vasić, "Yugoslav Army," p. 134; Borger, "President's Secret Henchmen"; Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, pp. 177-178; Tanner, Croatia, p. 245; Judah, The Serbs, chap. 9; and UN Experts, Final Report, par. 18, 24.
107. Vasić, "Yugoslav Army," p. 134; Borger, "President's Secret Henchmen"; Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, pp. 177-178; Tanner, Croatia, p. 245; Judah, The Serbs, chap. 9; and UN Experts, Final Report, par. 18, 24.
108. Vasić, "Yugoslav Army," p. 134; Borger, "President's Secret Henchmen"; Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, pp. 177-178; Tanner, Croatia, p. 245; Judah, The Serbs, chap. 9; and UN Experts, Final Report, par. 18, 24.
109. Vasić, "Yugoslav Army," p. 134; Borger, "President's Secret Henchmen"; Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, pp. 177-178; Tanner, Croatia, p. 245; Judah, The Serbs, chap. 9; and UN Experts, Final Report, par. 18, 24.
110. Vasić, "Yugoslav Army," p. 134; Borger, "President's Secret Henchmen"; Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, pp. 177-178; Tanner, Croatia, p. 245; Judah, The Serbs, chap. 9; and UN Experts, Final Report, par. 18, 24.
111. Vasić, "Yugoslav Army," p. 128.
112. One of the most fanatical of Serb nationalists, the political scientist Šešelj, who spent a year teaching at the University of Michigan in his younger years, later seems to have become mentally unbalanced as the result of the torture and beatings he endured while in prison in Yugoslavia for counterrevolutionary activities. One academic colleague described him as "disturbed, totally lost, and out of his mind." See UN Experts, Final Report, par. 107, 108; see also Judah, The Serbs, p. 187.
113. UN Experts, Final Report, par. 129; Judah, The Serbs, p. 186; and Sudetic, Blood and Vengeance, p. 98. The overlap between soccer hooligans and criminals seems to be very high. See Bill Buford, Among the Thugs (New York: W.W. Norton, 1991), p. 28. Also associated are racist attitudes, a proclivity for extreme right-wing politics; a capacity to imbibe huge amounts of liquor; a strident and vicious boorishness; a deep need for camaraderie and for being accepted by the "lads"; and an affinity for, even a lusting after, the thrill of violence. On the war-anticipating pitched battle between supporters of the Zagreb and Belgrade soccer clubs in 1990, see Tanner, Croatia, p. 228.
114. UN Experts, Final Report, par. 129; Judah, The Serbs, p. 186; and Sudetic, Blood and Vengeance, p. 98. The overlap between soccer hooligans and criminals seems to be very high. See Bill Buford, Among the Thugs (New York: W.W. Norton, 1991), p. 28. Also associated are racist attitudes, a proclivity for extreme right-wing politics; a capacity to imbibe huge amounts of liquor; a strident and vicious boorishness; a deep need for camaraderie and for being accepted by the "lads"; and an affinity for, even a lusting after, the thrill of violence. On the war-anticipating pitched battle between supporters of the Zagreb and Belgrade soccer clubs in 1990, see Tanner, Croatia, p. 228.
115. UN Experts, Final Report, par. 129; Judah, The Serbs, p. 186; and Sudetic, Blood and Vengeance, p. 98. The overlap between soccer hooligans and criminals seems to be very high. See Bill Buford, Among the Thugs (New York: W.W. Norton, 1991), p. 28. Also associated are racist attitudes, a proclivity for extreme right-wing politics; a capacity to imbibe huge amounts of liquor; a strident and vicious boorishness; a deep need for camaraderie and for being accepted by the "lads"; and an affinity for, even a lusting after, the thrill of violence. On the war-anticipating pitched battle between supporters of the Zagreb and Belgrade soccer clubs in 1990, see Tanner, Croatia, p. 228.
116. UN Experts, Final Report, par. 129; Judah, The Serbs, p. 186; and Sudetic, Blood and Vengeance, p. 98. The overlap between soccer hooligans and criminals seems to be very high. See Bill Buford, Among the Thugs (New York: W.W. Norton, 1991), p. 28. Also associated are racist attitudes, a proclivity for extreme right-wing politics; a capacity to imbibe huge amounts of liquor; a strident and vicious boorishness; a deep need for camaraderie and for being accepted by the "lads"; and an affinity for, even a lusting after, the thrill of violence. On the war-anticipating pitched battle between supporters of the Zagreb and Belgrade soccer clubs in 1990, see Tanner, Croatia, p. 228.
117. UN Experts, Final Report, par. 23, 26.
118. Vasić, "Yugoslav Army," p. 134.
119. Sikavica, "Collapse of Tito's Army," p. 137. There was one paramilitary group, identified as "The Weekenders," that ventured from Bijeljina to Brčko each weekend over a three-year period to plunder and vandalize. See UN Experts, Final Report, par. 317.
120. Particularly in the case of Croatia, as Bennett notes, many of the most extreme fighters were emigré adventurers from abroad. See, Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 165. See also Hall, Impossible Country, p. 11; David Rieff, Slaughterhouse (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995), p. 66. Tony Horwitz met German skinheads in Zagreb who had come "for a bit of graduate training." See Horwitz, "Balkan Death Trip: Scenes from a Futile War," Harper's, March 1993, p. 41.
121. Particularly in the case of Croatia, as Bennett notes, many of the most extreme fighters were emigré adventurers from abroad. See, Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 165. See also Hall, Impossible Country, p. 11; David Rieff, Slaughterhouse (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995), p. 66. Tony Horwitz met German skinheads in Zagreb who had come "for a bit of graduate training." See Horwitz, "Balkan Death Trip: Scenes from a Futile War," Harper's, March 1993, p. 41.
122. Particularly in the case of Croatia, as Bennett notes, many of the most extreme fighters were emigré adventurers from abroad. See, Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 165. See also Hall, Impossible Country, p. 11; David Rieff, Slaughterhouse (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995), p. 66. Tony Horwitz met German skinheads in Zagreb who had come "for a bit of graduate training." See Horwitz, "Balkan Death Trip: Scenes from a Futile War," Harper's, March 1993, p. 41.
123. Particularly in the case of Croatia, as Bennett notes, many of the most extreme fighters were emigré adventurers from abroad. See, Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 165. See also Hall, Impossible Country, p. 11; David Rieff, Slaughterhouse (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995), p. 66. Tony Horwitz met German skinheads in Zagreb who had come "for a bit of graduate training." See Horwitz, "Balkan Death Trip: Scenes from a Futile War," Harper's, March 1993, p. 41.
124. UN Experts, Final Report, par. 125-128; see also Sudetic, Blood and Vengeance, pp. 97-98. He was assassinated gangland-style in Belgrade in January 2000.
125. UN Experts, Final Report, par. 206; and Tanner, Croatia, p. 245. There was also a group identified as the "Knindža Turtles," but it is not clear whether this is the same band as the one led by Captain Dragan. See UN Experts, Final Report, n. 493. For completeness, it should be reported that a paramilitary unit in Bosnia was led by a man calling himself "Commander Turtle." See ibid., par. 311.
126. UN Experts, Final Report, par. 206; and Tanner, Croatia, p. 245. There was also a group identified as the "Knindža Turtles," but it is not clear whether this is the same band as the one led by Captain Dragan. See UN Experts, Final Report, n. 493. For completeness, it should be reported that a paramilitary unit in Bosnia was led by a man calling himself "Commander Turtle." See ibid., par. 311.
127. UN Experts, Final Report, par. 206; and Tanner, Croatia, p. 245. There was also a group identified as the "Knindža Turtles," but it is not clear whether this is the same band as the one led by Captain Dragan. See UN Experts, Final Report, n. 493. For completeness, it should be reported that a paramilitary unit in Bosnia was led by a man calling himself "Commander Turtle." See ibid., par. 311.
128. Cohen, Hearts Grown Brutal, p. 280; Robert Block, "Killers," New York Review of Books, November 18, 1993, p. 9; UN Experts, Final Report, par. 74; and Maass, Love Thy Neighbor, p. 31.
129. Cohen, Hearts Grown Brutal, p. 280; Robert Block, "Killers," New York Review of Books, November 18, 1993, p. 9; UN Experts, Final Report, par. 74; and Maass, Love Thy Neighbor, p. 31.
130. Cohen, Hearts Grown Brutal, p. 280; Robert Block, "Killers," New York Review of Books, November 18, 1993, p. 9; UN Experts, Final Report, par. 74; and Maass, Love Thy Neighbor, p. 31.
131. Block, "Killers," p. 9. On these issues, see also Anna Husarska, "Rocky-Road Warrior," New Republic, December 4, 1995, pp. 16-17; Tanner, Croatia, p. 245; Rieff, Slaughterhouse, pp. 131-132; Vulliamy, Seasons in Hell, pp. 314-316; Ignatieff, Warrior's Honor, p. 131; Burg and Shoup, War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, pp. 137-139; and Sadowski, Myth of Global Chaos, p. 163.
132. Block, "Killers," p. 9. On these issues, see also Anna Husarska, "Rocky-Road Warrior," New Republic, December 4, 1995, pp. 16-17; Tanner, Croatia, p. 245; Rieff, Slaughterhouse, pp. 131-132; Vulliamy, Seasons in Hell, pp. 314-316; Ignatieff, Warrior's Honor, p. 131; Burg and Shoup, War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, pp. 137-139; and Sadowski, Myth of Global Chaos, p. 163.
133. Block, "Killers," p. 9. On these issues, see also Anna Husarska, "Rocky-Road Warrior," New Republic, December 4, 1995, pp. 16-17; Tanner, Croatia, p. 245; Rieff, Slaughterhouse, pp. 131-132; Vulliamy, Seasons in Hell, pp. 314-316; Ignatieff, Warrior's Honor, p. 131; Burg and Shoup, War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, pp. 137-139; and Sadowski, Myth of Global Chaos, p. 163.
134. Block, "Killers," p. 9. On these issues, see also Anna Husarska, "Rocky-Road Warrior," New Republic, December 4, 1995, pp. 16-17; Tanner, Croatia, p. 245; Rieff, Slaughterhouse, pp. 131-132; Vulliamy, Seasons in Hell, pp. 314-316; Ignatieff, Warrior's Honor, p. 131; Burg and Shoup, War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, pp. 137-139; and Sadowski, Myth of Global Chaos, p. 163.
135. Block, "Killers," p. 9. On these issues, see also Anna Husarska, "Rocky-Road Warrior," New Republic, December 4, 1995, pp. 16-17; Tanner, Croatia, p. 245; Rieff, Slaughterhouse, pp. 131-132; Vulliamy, Seasons in Hell, pp. 314-316; Ignatieff, Warrior's Honor, p. 131; Burg and Shoup, War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, pp. 137-139; and Sadowski, Myth of Global Chaos, p. 163.
136. Block, "Killers," p. 9. On these issues, see also Anna Husarska, "Rocky-Road Warrior," New Republic, December 4, 1995, pp. 16-17; Tanner, Croatia, p. 245; Rieff, Slaughterhouse, pp. 131-132; Vulliamy, Seasons in Hell, pp. 314-316; Ignatieff, Warrior's Honor, p. 131; Burg and Shoup, War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, pp. 137-139; and Sadowski, Myth of Global Chaos, p. 163.
137. Block, "Killers," p. 9. On these issues, see also Anna Husarska, "Rocky-Road Warrior," New Republic, December 4, 1995, pp. 16-17; Tanner, Croatia, p. 245; Rieff, Slaughterhouse, pp. 131-132; Vulliamy, Seasons in Hell, pp. 314-316; Ignatieff, Warrior's Honor, p. 131; Burg and Shoup, War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, pp. 137-139; and Sadowski, Myth of Global Chaos, p. 163.
138. Block, "Killers," p. 9. On these issues, see also Anna Husarska, "Rocky-Road Warrior," New Republic, December 4, 1995, pp. 16-17; Tanner, Croatia, p. 245; Rieff, Slaughterhouse, pp. 131-132; Vulliamy, Seasons in Hell, pp. 314-316; Ignatieff, Warrior's Honor, p. 131; Burg and Shoup, War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, pp. 137-139; and Sadowski, Myth of Global Chaos, p. 163.
139. Zimmermann, Origins of a Catastrophe, p. 152. Block, "Killers," p. 9. Rieff, Slaughterhouse, p. 130. Reportage by Peter Maass is peppered with such phrases as "drunken hillbillies," "death and thuggery," "they don't wear normal uniforms, they don't have many teeth," "the trigger fingers belonged to drunks," "the Bosnians might be the underdogs, but most of their frontline soldiers were crooks," "bullies," "a massive oaf," "a foul-smelling warlord," "mouthing the words, 'Bang, you're dead,' through rotten teeth," "an unshaven soldier would point his gun at a desired item and grunt," "only drunks and bandits ventured outside," "goons with guns," "Serb soldiers or thugs - and the difference is hard to tell." See Maass, Love Thy Neighbor, pp. 6, 7, 16, 30, 42, 48, 61, 69, 77, 79, 80, 85. Reporter Ed Vulliamy describes them as "boozy at their best, wild and sadistic at their worst" or as "toothless goons" with "inflammable breath." See Vulliamy, Seasons in Hell, pp. 19, 46.
140. Zimmermann, Origins of a Catastrophe, p. 152. Block, "Killers," p. 9. Rieff, Slaughterhouse, p. 130. Reportage by Peter Maass is peppered with such phrases as "drunken hillbillies," "death and thuggery," "they don't wear normal uniforms, they don't have many teeth," "the trigger fingers belonged to drunks," "the Bosnians might be the underdogs, but most of their frontline soldiers were crooks," "bullies," "a massive oaf," "a foul-smelling warlord," "mouthing the words, 'Bang, you're dead,' through rotten teeth," "an unshaven soldier would point his gun at a desired item and grunt," "only drunks and bandits ventured outside," "goons with guns," "Serb soldiers or thugs - and the difference is hard to tell." See Maass, Love Thy Neighbor, pp. 6, 7, 16, 30, 42, 48, 61, 69, 77, 79, 80, 85. Reporter Ed Vulliamy describes them as "boozy at their best, wild and sadistic at their worst" or as "toothless goons" with "inflammable breath." See Vulliamy, Seasons in Hell, pp. 19, 46.
141. Zimmermann, Origins of a Catastrophe, p. 152. Block, "Killers," p. 9. Rieff, Slaughterhouse, p. 130. Reportage by Peter Maass is peppered with such phrases as "drunken hillbillies," "death and thuggery," "they don't wear normal uniforms, they don't have many teeth," "the trigger fingers belonged to drunks," "the Bosnians might be the underdogs, but most of their frontline soldiers were crooks," "bullies," "a massive oaf," "a foul-smelling warlord," "mouthing the words, 'Bang, you're dead,' through rotten teeth," "an unshaven soldier would point his gun at a desired item and grunt," "only drunks and bandits ventured outside," "goons with guns," "Serb soldiers or thugs - and the difference is hard to tell." See Maass, Love Thy Neighbor, pp. 6, 7, 16, 30, 42, 48, 61, 69, 77, 79, 80, 85. Reporter Ed Vulliamy describes them as "boozy at their best, wild and sadistic at their worst" or as "toothless goons" with "inflammable breath." See Vulliamy, Seasons in Hell, pp. 19, 46.
142. Zimmermann, Origins of a Catastrophe, p. 152. Block, "Killers," p. 9. Rieff, Slaughterhouse, p. 130. Reportage by Peter Maass is peppered with such phrases as "drunken hillbillies," "death and thuggery," "they don't wear normal uniforms, they don't have many teeth," "the trigger fingers belonged to drunks," "the Bosnians might be the underdogs, but most of their frontline soldiers were crooks," "bullies," "a massive oaf," "a foul-smelling warlord," "mouthing the words, 'Bang, you're dead,' through rotten teeth," "an unshaven soldier would point his gun at a desired item and grunt," "only drunks and bandits ventured outside," "goons with guns," "Serb soldiers or thugs - and the difference is hard to tell." See Maass, Love Thy Neighbor, pp. 6, 7, 16, 30, 42, 48, 61, 69, 77, 79, 80, 85. Reporter Ed Vulliamy describes them as "boozy at their best, wild and sadistic at their worst" or as "toothless goons" with "inflammable breath." See Vulliamy, Seasons in Hell, pp. 19, 46.
143. Zimmermann, Origins of a Catastrophe, p. 152. Block, "Killers," p. 9. Rieff, Slaughterhouse, p. 130. Reportage by Peter Maass is peppered with such phrases as "drunken hillbillies," "death and thuggery," "they don't wear normal uniforms, they don't have many teeth," "the trigger fingers belonged to drunks," "the Bosnians might be the underdogs, but most of their frontline soldiers were crooks," "bullies," "a massive oaf," "a foul-smelling warlord," "mouthing the words, 'Bang, you're dead,' through rotten teeth," "an unshaven soldier would point his gun at a desired item and grunt," "only drunks and bandits ventured outside," "goons with guns," "Serb soldiers or thugs - and the difference is hard to tell." See Maass, Love Thy Neighbor, pp. 6, 7, 16, 30, 42, 48, 61, 69, 77, 79, 80, 85. Reporter Ed Vulliamy describes them as "boozy at their best, wild and sadistic at their worst" or as "toothless goons" with "inflammable breath." See Vulliamy, Seasons in Hell, pp. 19, 46.
144. Block, "Killers"; UN Experts, Final Report, par. 291; and Cohen, Hearts Grown Brutal, p. 126.
145. Block, "Killers"; UN Experts, Final Report, par. 291; and Cohen, Hearts Grown Brutal, p. 126.
146. Burg and Shoup, War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, p. 137; and UN Experts, Final Report, at par. 142.
147. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, pp. 254, 356, 485; and Cigar, "Serbo-Croatian War," p. 323. See also Mischa Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War (New York: Penguin, 1993), p. 185; Chuck Sudetic, "A 'Wild East' Revival in Serbian-Held Croatia," New York Times, September 21, 1992, p. A6; Cheryl Benard, "Bosnia: Was It Inevitable?" in Zalmay M. Khalilzad, ed., Lessons from Bosnia (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 1993), pp. 18-25; Vulliamy, Seasons in Hell, pp. 307-316; and Bob Stewart, Broken Lives: A Personal View of the Bosnian Conflict (London: HarperCollins, 1994), pp. 318-319. See also Rieff, Slaughterhouse, p. 83; Ignatieff, Warrior's Honor, p. 131; and Sikavica, "Collapse of Tito's Army," p. 138. Vulliamy quotes Reuters reporter Andrej Gustinčić: "Gangs of gun-toting Serbs rule Foča, turning the once quiet town into a nightmare landscape of burning streets and houses. . . . Some are members of paramilitary groups from Serbia, self-proclaimed crusaders against Islam and defenders of the Serbian nation, others are wild-eyed local men, hostile towards strangers and happy to have driven out their Muslim neighbors. No one seems to be in command, and ill-disciplined and bad-tempered gunmen stop and detain people at will." See Vulliamy, Seasons in Hell, pp. 90-91. Many of the "wild-eyed local men," according to another report, were local criminals who "donned uniforms and took part enthusiastically in the subsequent looting." See Julian Borger, "Friends or Foes?" Guardian Weekly, January 19, 1997, p. 23. Similarly, the town of Bosanski Novi was ruled by five roaming Serbian armed groups, the most brutal of which was a well-known local mafia known as the "Spare Ribs" that had donned uniforms. See Judah, The Serbs, p. 227.
148. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, pp. 254, 356, 485; and Cigar, "Serbo-Croatian War," p. 323. See also Mischa Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War (New York: Penguin, 1993), p. 185; Chuck Sudetic, "A 'Wild East' Revival in Serbian-Held Croatia," New York Times, September 21, 1992, p. A6; Cheryl Benard, "Bosnia: Was It Inevitable?" in Zalmay M. Khalilzad, ed., Lessons from Bosnia (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 1993), pp. 18-25; Vulliamy, Seasons in Hell, pp. 307-316; and Bob Stewart, Broken Lives: A Personal View of the Bosnian Conflict (London: HarperCollins, 1994), pp. 318-319. See also Rieff, Slaughterhouse, p. 83; Ignatieff, Warrior's Honor, p. 131; and Sikavica, "Collapse of Tito's Army," p. 138. Vulliamy quotes Reuters reporter Andrej Gustinčić: "Gangs of gun-toting Serbs rule Foča, turning the once quiet town into a nightmare landscape of burning streets and houses. . . . Some are members of paramilitary groups from Serbia, self-proclaimed crusaders against Islam and defenders of the Serbian nation, others are wild-eyed local men, hostile towards strangers and happy to have driven out their Muslim neighbors. No one seems to be in command, and ill-disciplined and bad-tempered gunmen stop and detain people at will." See Vulliamy, Seasons in Hell, pp. 90-91. Many of the "wild-eyed local men," according to another report, were local criminals who "donned uniforms and took part enthusiastically in the subsequent looting." See Julian Borger, "Friends or Foes?" Guardian Weekly, January 19, 1997, p. 23. Similarly, the town of Bosanski Novi was ruled by five roaming Serbian armed groups, the most brutal of which was a well-known local mafia known as the "Spare Ribs" that had donned uniforms. See Judah, The Serbs, p. 227.
149. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, pp. 254, 356, 485; and Cigar, "Serbo-Croatian War," p. 323. See also Mischa Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War (New York: Penguin, 1993), p. 185; Chuck Sudetic, "A 'Wild East' Revival in Serbian-Held Croatia," New York Times, September 21, 1992, p. A6; Cheryl Benard, "Bosnia: Was It Inevitable?" in Zalmay M. Khalilzad, ed., Lessons from Bosnia (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 1993), pp. 18-25; Vulliamy, Seasons in Hell, pp. 307-316; and Bob Stewart, Broken Lives: A Personal View of the Bosnian Conflict (London: HarperCollins, 1994), pp. 318-319. See also Rieff, Slaughterhouse, p. 83; Ignatieff, Warrior's Honor, p. 131; and Sikavica, "Collapse of Tito's Army," p. 138. Vulliamy quotes Reuters reporter Andrej Gustinčić: "Gangs of gun-toting Serbs rule Foča, turning the once quiet town into a nightmare landscape of burning streets and houses. . . . Some are members of paramilitary groups from Serbia, self-proclaimed crusaders against Islam and defenders of the Serbian nation, others are wild-eyed local men, hostile towards strangers and happy to have driven out their Muslim neighbors. No one seems to be in command, and ill-disciplined and bad-tempered gunmen stop and detain people at will." See Vulliamy, Seasons in Hell, pp. 90-91. Many of the "wild-eyed local men," according to another report, were local criminals who "donned uniforms and took part enthusiastically in the subsequent looting." See Julian Borger, "Friends or Foes?" Guardian Weekly, January 19, 1997, p. 23. Similarly, the town of Bosanski Novi was ruled by five roaming Serbian armed groups, the most brutal of which was a well-known local mafia known as the "Spare Ribs" that had donned uniforms. See Judah, The Serbs, p. 227.
150. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, pp. 254, 356, 485; and Cigar, "Serbo-Croatian War," p. 323. See also Mischa Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War (New York: Penguin, 1993), p. 185; Chuck Sudetic, "A 'Wild East' Revival in Serbian-Held Croatia," New York Times, September 21, 1992, p. A6; Cheryl Benard, "Bosnia: Was It Inevitable?" in Zalmay M. Khalilzad, ed., Lessons from Bosnia (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 1993), pp. 18-25; Vulliamy, Seasons in Hell, pp. 307-316; and Bob Stewart, Broken Lives: A Personal View of the Bosnian Conflict (London: HarperCollins, 1994), pp. 318-319. See also Rieff, Slaughterhouse, p. 83; Ignatieff, Warrior's Honor, p. 131; and Sikavica, "Collapse of Tito's Army," p. 138. Vulliamy quotes Reuters reporter Andrej Gustinčić: "Gangs of gun-toting Serbs rule Foča, turning the once quiet town into a nightmare landscape of burning streets and houses. . . . Some are members of paramilitary groups from Serbia, self-proclaimed crusaders against Islam and defenders of the Serbian nation, others are wild-eyed local men, hostile towards strangers and happy to have driven out their Muslim neighbors. No one seems to be in command, and ill-disciplined and bad-tempered gunmen stop and detain people at will." See Vulliamy, Seasons in Hell, pp. 90-91. Many of the "wild-eyed local men," according to another report, were local criminals who "donned uniforms and took part enthusiastically in the subsequent looting." See Julian Borger, "Friends or Foes?" Guardian Weekly, January 19, 1997, p. 23. Similarly, the town of Bosanski Novi was ruled by five roaming Serbian armed groups, the most brutal of which was a well-known local mafia known as the "Spare Ribs" that had donned uniforms. See Judah, The Serbs, p. 227.
151. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, pp. 254, 356, 485; and Cigar, "Serbo-Croatian War," p. 323. See also Mischa Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War (New York: Penguin, 1993), p. 185; Chuck Sudetic, "A 'Wild East' Revival in Serbian-Held Croatia," New York Times, September 21, 1992, p. A6; Cheryl Benard, "Bosnia: Was It Inevitable?" in Zalmay M. Khalilzad, ed., Lessons from Bosnia (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 1993), pp. 18-25; Vulliamy, Seasons in Hell, pp. 307-316; and Bob Stewart, Broken Lives: A Personal View of the Bosnian Conflict (London: HarperCollins, 1994), pp. 318-319. See also Rieff, Slaughterhouse, p. 83; Ignatieff, Warrior's Honor, p. 131; and Sikavica, "Collapse of Tito's Army," p. 138. Vulliamy quotes Reuters reporter Andrej Gustinčić: "Gangs of gun-toting Serbs rule Foča, turning the once quiet town into a nightmare landscape of burning streets and houses. . . . Some are members of paramilitary groups from Serbia, self-proclaimed crusaders against Islam and defenders of the Serbian nation, others are wild-eyed local men, hostile towards strangers and happy to have driven out their Muslim neighbors. No one seems to be in command, and ill-disciplined and bad-tempered gunmen stop and detain people at will." See Vulliamy, Seasons in Hell, pp. 90-91. Many of the "wild-eyed local men," according to another report, were local criminals who "donned uniforms and took part enthusiastically in the subsequent looting." See Julian Borger, "Friends or Foes?" Guardian Weekly, January 19, 1997, p. 23. Similarly, the town of Bosanski Novi was ruled by five roaming Serbian armed groups, the most brutal of which was a well-known local mafia known as the "Spare Ribs" that had donned uniforms. See Judah, The Serbs, p. 227.
152. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, pp. 254, 356, 485; and Cigar, "Serbo-Croatian War," p. 323. See also Mischa Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War (New York: Penguin, 1993), p. 185; Chuck Sudetic, "A 'Wild East' Revival in Serbian-Held Croatia," New York Times, September 21, 1992, p. A6; Cheryl Benard, "Bosnia: Was It Inevitable?" in Zalmay M. Khalilzad, ed., Lessons from Bosnia (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 1993), pp. 18-25; Vulliamy, Seasons in Hell, pp. 307-316; and Bob Stewart, Broken Lives: A Personal View of the Bosnian Conflict (London: HarperCollins, 1994), pp. 318-319. See also Rieff, Slaughterhouse, p. 83; Ignatieff, Warrior's Honor, p. 131; and Sikavica, "Collapse of Tito's Army," p. 138. Vulliamy quotes Reuters reporter Andrej Gustinčić: "Gangs of gun-toting Serbs rule Foča, turning the once quiet town into a nightmare landscape of burning streets and houses. . . . Some are members of paramilitary groups from Serbia, self-proclaimed crusaders against Islam and defenders of the Serbian nation, others are wild-eyed local men, hostile towards strangers and happy to have driven out their Muslim neighbors. No one seems to be in command, and ill-disciplined and bad-tempered gunmen stop and detain people at will." See Vulliamy, Seasons in Hell, pp. 90-91. Many of the "wild-eyed local men," according to another report, were local criminals who "donned uniforms and took part enthusiastically in the subsequent looting." See Julian Borger, "Friends or Foes?" Guardian Weekly, January 19, 1997, p. 23. Similarly, the town of Bosanski Novi was ruled by five roaming Serbian armed groups, the most brutal of which was a well-known local mafia known as the "Spare Ribs" that had donned uniforms. See Judah, The Serbs, p. 227.
153. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, pp. 254, 356, 485; and Cigar, "Serbo-Croatian War," p. 323. See also Mischa Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War (New York: Penguin, 1993), p. 185; Chuck Sudetic, "A 'Wild East' Revival in Serbian-Held Croatia," New York Times, September 21, 1992, p. A6; Cheryl Benard, "Bosnia: Was It Inevitable?" in Zalmay M. Khalilzad, ed., Lessons from Bosnia (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 1993), pp. 18-25; Vulliamy, Seasons in Hell, pp. 307-316; and Bob Stewart, Broken Lives: A Personal View of the Bosnian Conflict (London: HarperCollins, 1994), pp. 318-319. See also Rieff, Slaughterhouse, p. 83; Ignatieff, Warrior's Honor, p. 131; and Sikavica, "Collapse of Tito's Army," p. 138. Vulliamy quotes Reuters reporter Andrej Gustinčić: "Gangs of gun-toting Serbs rule Foča, turning the once quiet town into a nightmare landscape of burning streets and houses. . . . Some are members of paramilitary groups from Serbia, self-proclaimed crusaders against Islam and defenders of the Serbian nation, others are wild-eyed local men, hostile towards strangers and happy to have driven out their Muslim neighbors. No one seems to be in command, and ill-disciplined and bad-tempered gunmen stop and detain people at will." See Vulliamy, Seasons in Hell, pp. 90-91. Many of the "wild-eyed local men," according to another report, were local criminals who "donned uniforms and took part enthusiastically in the subsequent looting." See Julian Borger, "Friends or Foes?" Guardian Weekly, January 19, 1997, p. 23. Similarly, the town of Bosanski Novi was ruled by five roaming Serbian armed groups, the most brutal of which was a well-known local mafia known as the "Spare Ribs" that had donned uniforms. See Judah, The Serbs, p. 227.
154. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, pp. 254, 356, 485; and Cigar, "Serbo-Croatian War," p. 323. See also Mischa Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War (New York: Penguin, 1993), p. 185; Chuck Sudetic, "A 'Wild East' Revival in Serbian-Held Croatia," New York Times, September 21, 1992, p. A6; Cheryl Benard, "Bosnia: Was It Inevitable?" in Zalmay M. Khalilzad, ed., Lessons from Bosnia (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 1993), pp. 18-25; Vulliamy, Seasons in Hell, pp. 307-316; and Bob Stewart, Broken Lives: A Personal View of the Bosnian Conflict (London: HarperCollins, 1994), pp. 318-319. See also Rieff, Slaughterhouse, p. 83; Ignatieff, Warrior's Honor, p. 131; and Sikavica, "Collapse of Tito's Army," p. 138. Vulliamy quotes Reuters reporter Andrej Gustinčić: "Gangs of gun-toting Serbs rule Foča, turning the once quiet town into a nightmare landscape of burning streets and houses. . . . Some are members of paramilitary groups from Serbia, self-proclaimed crusaders against Islam and defenders of the Serbian nation, others are wild-eyed local men, hostile towards strangers and happy to have driven out their Muslim neighbors. No one seems to be in command, and ill-disciplined and bad-tempered gunmen stop and detain people at will." See Vulliamy, Seasons in Hell, pp. 90-91. Many of the "wild-eyed local men," according to another report, were local criminals who "donned uniforms and took part enthusiastically in the subsequent looting." See Julian Borger, "Friends or Foes?" Guardian Weekly, January 19, 1997, p. 23. Similarly, the town of Bosanski Novi was ruled by five roaming Serbian armed groups, the most brutal of which was a well-known local mafia known as the "Spare Ribs" that had donned uniforms. See Judah, The Serbs, p. 227.
155. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, pp. 254, 356, 485; and Cigar, "Serbo-Croatian War," p. 323. See also Mischa Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War (New York: Penguin, 1993), p. 185; Chuck Sudetic, "A 'Wild East' Revival in Serbian-Held Croatia," New York Times, September 21, 1992, p. A6; Cheryl Benard, "Bosnia: Was It Inevitable?" in Zalmay M. Khalilzad, ed., Lessons from Bosnia (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 1993), pp. 18-25; Vulliamy, Seasons in Hell, pp. 307-316; and Bob Stewart, Broken Lives: A Personal View of the Bosnian Conflict (London: HarperCollins, 1994), pp. 318-319. See also Rieff, Slaughterhouse, p. 83; Ignatieff, Warrior's Honor, p. 131; and Sikavica, "Collapse of Tito's Army," p. 138. Vulliamy quotes Reuters reporter Andrej Gustinčić: "Gangs of gun-toting Serbs rule Foča, turning the once quiet town into a nightmare landscape of burning streets and houses. . . . Some are members of paramilitary groups from Serbia, self-proclaimed crusaders against Islam and defenders of the Serbian nation, others are wild-eyed local men, hostile towards strangers and happy to have driven out their Muslim neighbors. No one seems to be in command, and ill-disciplined and bad-tempered gunmen stop and detain people at will." See Vulliamy, Seasons in Hell, pp. 90-91. Many of the "wild-eyed local men," according to another report, were local criminals who "donned uniforms and took part enthusiastically in the subsequent looting." See Julian Borger, "Friends or Foes?" Guardian Weekly, January 19, 1997, p. 23. Similarly, the town of Bosanski Novi was ruled by five roaming Serbian armed groups, the most brutal of which was a well-known local mafia known as the "Spare Ribs" that had donned uniforms. See Judah, The Serbs, p. 227.
156. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, pp. 254, 356, 485; and Cigar, "Serbo-Croatian War," p. 323. See also Mischa Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War (New York: Penguin, 1993), p. 185; Chuck Sudetic, "A 'Wild East' Revival in Serbian-Held Croatia," New York Times, September 21, 1992, p. A6; Cheryl Benard, "Bosnia: Was It Inevitable?" in Zalmay M. Khalilzad, ed., Lessons from Bosnia (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 1993), pp. 18-25; Vulliamy, Seasons in Hell, pp. 307-316; and Bob Stewart, Broken Lives: A Personal View of the Bosnian Conflict (London: HarperCollins, 1994), pp. 318-319. See also Rieff, Slaughterhouse, p. 83; Ignatieff, Warrior's Honor, p. 131; and Sikavica, "Collapse of Tito's Army," p. 138. Vulliamy quotes Reuters reporter Andrej Gustinčić: "Gangs of gun-toting Serbs rule Foča, turning the once quiet town into a nightmare landscape of burning streets and houses. . . . Some are members of paramilitary groups from Serbia, self-proclaimed crusaders against Islam and defenders of the Serbian nation, others are wild-eyed local men, hostile towards strangers and happy to have driven out their Muslim neighbors. No one seems to be in command, and ill-disciplined and bad-tempered gunmen stop and detain people at will." See Vulliamy, Seasons in Hell, pp. 90-91. Many of the "wild-eyed local men," according to another report, were local criminals who "donned uniforms and took part enthusiastically in the subsequent looting." See Julian Borger, "Friends or Foes?" Guardian Weekly, January 19, 1997, p. 23. Similarly, the town of Bosanski Novi was ruled by five roaming Serbian armed groups, the most brutal of which was a well-known local mafia known as the "Spare Ribs" that had donned uniforms. See Judah, The Serbs, p. 227.
157. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, pp. 254, 356, 485; and Cigar, "Serbo-Croatian War," p. 323. See also Mischa Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War (New York: Penguin, 1993), p. 185; Chuck Sudetic, "A 'Wild East' Revival in Serbian-Held Croatia," New York Times, September 21, 1992, p. A6; Cheryl Benard, "Bosnia: Was It Inevitable?" in Zalmay M. Khalilzad, ed., Lessons from Bosnia (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 1993), pp. 18-25; Vulliamy, Seasons in Hell, pp. 307-316; and Bob Stewart, Broken Lives: A Personal View of the Bosnian Conflict (London: HarperCollins, 1994), pp. 318-319. See also Rieff, Slaughterhouse, p. 83; Ignatieff, Warrior's Honor, p. 131; and Sikavica, "Collapse of Tito's Army," p. 138. Vulliamy quotes Reuters reporter Andrej Gustinčić: "Gangs of gun-toting Serbs rule Foča, turning the once quiet town into a nightmare landscape of burning streets and houses. . . . Some are members of paramilitary groups from Serbia, self-proclaimed crusaders against Islam and defenders of the Serbian nation, others are wild-eyed local men, hostile towards strangers and happy to have driven out their Muslim neighbors. No one seems to be in command, and ill-disciplined and bad-tempered gunmen stop and detain people at will." See Vulliamy, Seasons in Hell, pp. 90-91. Many of the "wild-eyed local men," according to another report, were local criminals who "donned uniforms and took part enthusiastically in the subsequent looting." See Julian Borger, "Friends or Foes?" Guardian Weekly, January 19, 1997, p. 23. Similarly, the town of Bosanski Novi was ruled by five roaming Serbian armed groups, the most brutal of which was a well-known local mafia known as the "Spare Ribs" that had donned uniforms. See Judah, The Serbs, p. 227.
158. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, pp. 254, 356, 485; and Cigar, "Serbo-Croatian War," p. 323. See also Mischa Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War (New York: Penguin, 1993), p. 185; Chuck Sudetic, "A 'Wild East' Revival in Serbian-Held Croatia," New York Times, September 21, 1992, p. A6; Cheryl Benard, "Bosnia: Was It Inevitable?" in Zalmay M. Khalilzad, ed., Lessons from Bosnia (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 1993), pp. 18-25; Vulliamy, Seasons in Hell, pp. 307-316; and Bob Stewart, Broken Lives: A Personal View of the Bosnian Conflict (London: HarperCollins, 1994), pp. 318-319. See also Rieff, Slaughterhouse, p. 83; Ignatieff, Warrior's Honor, p. 131; and Sikavica, "Collapse of Tito's Army," p. 138. Vulliamy quotes Reuters reporter Andrej Gustinčić: "Gangs of gun-toting Serbs rule Foča, turning the once quiet town into a nightmare landscape of burning streets and houses. . . . Some are members of paramilitary groups from Serbia, self-proclaimed crusaders against Islam and defenders of the Serbian nation, others are wild-eyed local men, hostile towards strangers and happy to have driven out their Muslim neighbors. No one seems to be in command, and ill-disciplined and bad-tempered gunmen stop and detain people at will." See Vulliamy, Seasons in Hell, pp. 90-91. Many of the "wild-eyed local men," according to another report, were local criminals who "donned uniforms and took part enthusiastically in the subsequent looting." See Julian Borger, "Friends or Foes?" Guardian Weekly, January 19, 1997, p. 23. Similarly, the town of Bosanski Novi was ruled by five roaming Serbian armed groups, the most brutal of which was a well-known local mafia known as the "Spare Ribs" that had donned uniforms. See Judah, The Serbs, p. 227.
159. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, pp. 254, 356, 485; and Cigar, "Serbo-Croatian War," p. 323. See also Mischa Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War (New York: Penguin, 1993), p. 185; Chuck Sudetic, "A 'Wild East' Revival in Serbian-Held Croatia," New York Times, September 21, 1992, p. A6; Cheryl Benard, "Bosnia: Was It Inevitable?" in Zalmay M. Khalilzad, ed., Lessons from Bosnia (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 1993), pp. 18-25; Vulliamy, Seasons in Hell, pp. 307-316; and Bob Stewart, Broken Lives: A Personal View of the Bosnian Conflict (London: HarperCollins, 1994), pp. 318-319. See also Rieff, Slaughterhouse, p. 83; Ignatieff, Warrior's Honor, p. 131; and Sikavica, "Collapse of Tito's Army," p. 138. Vulliamy quotes Reuters reporter Andrej Gustinčić: "Gangs of gun-toting Serbs rule Foča, turning the once quiet town into a nightmare landscape of burning streets and houses. . . . Some are members of paramilitary groups from Serbia, self-proclaimed crusaders against Islam and defenders of the Serbian nation, others are wild-eyed local men, hostile towards strangers and happy to have driven out their Muslim neighbors. No one seems to be in command, and ill-disciplined and bad-tempered gunmen stop and detain people at will." See Vulliamy, Seasons in Hell, pp. 90-91. Many of the "wild-eyed local men," according to another report, were local criminals who "donned uniforms and took part enthusiastically in the subsequent looting." See Julian Borger, "Friends or Foes?" Guardian Weekly, January 19, 1997, p. 23. Similarly, the town of Bosanski Novi was ruled by five roaming Serbian armed groups, the most brutal of which was a well-known local mafia known as the "Spare Ribs" that had donned uniforms. See Judah, The Serbs, p. 227.
160. On Vasilijevk, see Firestone, "Serb Lawmaker Is Called Vicious Killer." UN Experts, Final Report, par. 21.
161. A partial exception to this pattern was the slaughter of thousands of Muslim men by Serbs after they successfully invaded the "safe area" of Srebrenica in 1995, a seemingly calculated and rather orderly massacre that was carried out by what appears to have been the regular army. On this issue, see Sadowski, Myth of Global Chaos, p. 133. Given that the army had become increasingly thuggish by this time, a formal distinction with less-organized bands of thugs may be somewhat strained. Nevertheless, this murderous episode does seem to show more method and less madness than the more capricious and improvisatory killings that had taken place during the main period of ethnic cleansing in 1992. As was typical in this war, however, the killing squads at Srebrenica were often shored up with generous quantities of liquor. See Judah, The Serbs, p. 241. Although in no way excusing the massacre, it may be relevant to point out that the Serbs were deeply bitter because, although they had allowed the city to become a UN safe area in 1993 under an agreement that it would be demilitarized, it had repeatedly been used as a base for attacks on Serb civilians. David Rohde, Endgame: The Betrayal and Fall of Srebrenica, Europe's Worst Massacre since World War II (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1997), pp. xvi, 215-216, 409.
162. A partial exception to this pattern was the slaughter of thousands of Muslim men by Serbs after they successfully invaded the "safe area" of Srebrenica in 1995, a seemingly calculated and rather orderly massacre that was carried out by what appears to have been the regular army. On this issue, see Sadowski, Myth of Global Chaos, p. 133. Given that the army had become increasingly thuggish by this time, a formal distinction with less-organized bands of thugs may be somewhat strained. Nevertheless, this murderous episode does seem to show more method and less madness than the more capricious and improvisatory killings that had taken place during the main period of ethnic cleansing in 1992. As was typical in this war, however, the killing squads at Srebrenica were often shored up with generous quantities of liquor. See Judah, The Serbs, p. 241. Although in no way excusing the massacre, it may be relevant to point out that the Serbs were deeply bitter because, although they had allowed the city to become a UN safe area in 1993 under an agreement that it would be demilitarized, it had repeatedly been used as a base for attacks on Serb civilians. David Rohde, Endgame: The Betrayal and Fall of Srebrenica, Europe's Worst Massacre since World War II (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1997), pp. xvi, 215-216, 409.
163. A partial exception to this pattern was the slaughter of thousands of Muslim men by Serbs after they successfully invaded the "safe area" of Srebrenica in 1995, a seemingly calculated and rather orderly massacre that was carried out by what appears to have been the regular army. On this issue, see Sadowski, Myth of Global Chaos, p. 133. Given that the army had become increasingly thuggish by this time, a formal distinction with less-organized bands of thugs may be somewhat strained. Nevertheless, this murderous episode does seem to show more method and less madness than the more capricious and improvisatory killings that had taken place during the main period of ethnic cleansing in 1992. As was typical in this war, however, the killing squads at Srebrenica were often shored up with generous quantities of liquor. See Judah, The Serbs, p. 241. Although in no way excusing the massacre, it may be relevant to point out that the Serbs were deeply bitter because, although they had allowed the city to become a UN safe area in 1993 under an agreement that it would be demilitarized, it had repeatedly been used as a base for attacks on Serb civilians. David Rohde, Endgame: The Betrayal and Fall of Srebrenica, Europe's Worst Massacre since World War II (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1997), pp. xvi, 215-216, 409.
164. UN Experts, Final Report, par. 104.
165. Chris Hedges, "Croatian's Confession Describes Torture and Killing on Vast Scale," New York Times, September 5, 1997, p. A1.
166. Quoted in Husarska, "Rocky-Road Warrior," p. 16; see also Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 191; Mike O'Connor, "Nationalism Checkmates Pawns, Too, in Bosnia," New York Times, March 28, 1996, p. A3; Rieff, Slaughterhouse, p. 110; Judah, The Serbs, p. 195; and Peter Maass, "In Bosnia, 'Disloyal Serbs' Share Plight of Opposition," Washington Post, August 24, 1992, p. A1.
167. Quoted in Husarska, "Rocky-Road Warrior," p. 16; see also Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 191; Mike O'Connor, "Nationalism Checkmates Pawns, Too, in Bosnia," New York Times, March 28, 1996, p. A3; Rieff, Slaughterhouse, p. 110; Judah, The Serbs, p. 195; and Peter Maass, "In Bosnia, 'Disloyal Serbs' Share Plight of Opposition," Washington Post, August 24, 1992, p. A1.
168. Quoted in Husarska, "Rocky-Road Warrior," p. 16; see also Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 191; Mike O'Connor, "Nationalism Checkmates Pawns, Too, in Bosnia," New York Times, March 28, 1996, p. A3; Rieff, Slaughterhouse, p. 110; Judah, The Serbs, p. 195; and Peter Maass, "In Bosnia, 'Disloyal Serbs' Share Plight of Opposition," Washington Post, August 24, 1992, p. A1.
169. Quoted in Husarska, "Rocky-Road Warrior," p. 16; see also Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 191; Mike O'Connor, "Nationalism Checkmates Pawns, Too, in Bosnia," New York Times, March 28, 1996, p. A3; Rieff, Slaughterhouse, p. 110; Judah, The Serbs, p. 195; and Peter Maass, "In Bosnia, 'Disloyal Serbs' Share Plight of Opposition," Washington Post, August 24, 1992, p. A1.
170. Quoted in Husarska, "Rocky-Road Warrior," p. 16; see also Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 191; Mike O'Connor, "Nationalism Checkmates Pawns, Too, in Bosnia," New York Times, March 28, 1996, p. A3; Rieff, Slaughterhouse, p. 110; Judah, The Serbs, p. 195; and Peter Maass, "In Bosnia, 'Disloyal Serbs' Share Plight of Opposition," Washington Post, August 24, 1992, p. A1.
171. Quoted in Husarska, "Rocky-Road Warrior," p. 16; see also Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 191; Mike O'Connor, "Nationalism Checkmates Pawns, Too, in Bosnia," New York Times, March 28, 1996, p. A3; Rieff, Slaughterhouse, p. 110; Judah, The Serbs, p. 195; and Peter Maass, "In Bosnia, 'Disloyal Serbs' Share Plight of Opposition," Washington Post, August 24, 1992, p. A1.
172. Chris Hedges, "From One Serbian Militia Chief: A Trail of Plunder and Slaughter," New York Times, March 25, 1996, p. A1. Ed Vulliamy, "Bloody Train of Butchery at the Bridge," Guardian, March 11, 1996, p. 9. Maass, Love Thy Neighbor, pp. 12-14, 157. UN Experts, Final Report, par. 246-250, 540-556. Sudetic, Blood and Vengeance, pp. 120-125. Lukić is reported to be spending the postwar years in Serbia, a wealthy man. Vulliamy, "Bloody Train of Butchery." Other reports, however, indicate that he has sought psychiatric care, has become unhinged, sleeps with all the lights on, and drives around in a differenct car all the time. Still, he claims to to be proud he killed so many Muslims in the war and says he has an almost uncontollable urge to kill again. Sudetic, Blood and Vengeance, pp. 355-356, 358.
173. Chris Hedges, "From One Serbian Militia Chief: A Trail of Plunder and Slaughter," New York Times, March 25, 1996, p. A1. Ed Vulliamy, "Bloody Train of Butchery at the Bridge," Guardian, March 11, 1996, p. 9. Maass, Love Thy Neighbor, pp. 12-14, 157. UN Experts, Final Report, par. 246-250, 540-556. Sudetic, Blood and Vengeance, pp. 120-125. Lukić is reported to be spending the postwar years in Serbia, a wealthy man. Vulliamy, "Bloody Train of Butchery." Other reports, however, indicate that he has sought psychiatric care, has become unhinged, sleeps with all the lights on, and drives around in a differenct car all the time. Still, he claims to to be proud he killed so many Muslims in the war and says he has an almost uncontollable urge to kill again. Sudetic, Blood and Vengeance, pp. 355-356, 358.
174. Chris Hedges, "From One Serbian Militia Chief: A Trail of Plunder and Slaughter," New York Times, March 25, 1996, p. A1. Ed Vulliamy, "Bloody Train of Butchery at the Bridge," Guardian, March 11, 1996, p. 9. Maass, Love Thy Neighbor, pp. 12-14, 157. UN Experts, Final Report, par. 246-250, 540-556. Sudetic, Blood and Vengeance, pp. 120-125. Lukić is reported to be spending the postwar years in Serbia, a wealthy man. Vulliamy, "Bloody Train of Butchery." Other reports, however, indicate that he has sought psychiatric care, has become unhinged, sleeps with all the lights on, and drives around in a differenct car all the time. Still, he claims to to be proud he killed so many Muslims in the war and says he has an almost uncontollable urge to kill again. Sudetic, Blood and Vengeance, pp. 355-356, 358.
175. Chris Hedges, "From One Serbian Militia Chief: A Trail of Plunder and Slaughter," New York Times, March 25, 1996, p. A1. Ed Vulliamy, "Bloody Train of Butchery at the Bridge," Guardian, March 11, 1996, p. 9. Maass, Love Thy Neighbor, pp. 12-14, 157. UN Experts, Final Report, par. 246-250, 540-556. Sudetic, Blood and Vengeance, pp. 120-125. Lukić is reported to be spending the postwar years in Serbia, a wealthy man. Vulliamy, "Bloody Train of Butchery." Other reports, however, indicate that he has sought psychiatric care, has become unhinged, sleeps with all the lights on, and drives around in a differenct car all the time. Still, he claims to to be proud he killed so many Muslims in the war and says he has an almost uncontollable urge to kill again. Sudetic, Blood and Vengeance, pp. 355-356, 358.
176. Chris Hedges, "From One Serbian Militia Chief: A Trail of Plunder and Slaughter," New York Times, March 25, 1996, p. A1. Ed Vulliamy, "Bloody Train of Butchery at the Bridge," Guardian, March 11, 1996, p. 9. Maass, Love Thy Neighbor, pp. 12-14, 157. UN Experts, Final Report, par. 246-250, 540-556. Sudetic, Blood and Vengeance, pp. 120-125. Lukić is reported to be spending the postwar years in Serbia, a wealthy man. Vulliamy, "Bloody Train of Butchery." Other reports, however, indicate that he has sought psychiatric care, has become unhinged, sleeps with all the lights on, and drives around in a differenct car all the time. Still, he claims to to be proud he killed so many Muslims in the war and says he has an almost uncontollable urge to kill again. Sudetic, Blood and Vengeance, pp. 355-356, 358.
177. Mike O'Connor, "Moderate Bosnian Serbs Plot in Secrecy for Unity," New York Times, July 31, 1996, p. A3.
178. Rohde, Endgame, pp. xiv, 60, 354, 355.
179. Vasić, "Yugoslav Army," p. 134; and UN Experts, Final Report, par. 92, 138.
180. Benard, "Bosnia," p. 24. See also Malcolm, "Roots of Bosnian Horror." Halina Grzymala-Moszczcynska, a Polish sociologist working with Muslim refugees in Poland, reports that the refugees she has interviewed never refer to their persecutors as "Serbs," but always as "criminals." Personal conversation.
181. Benard, "Bosnia," p. 24. See also Malcolm, "Roots of Bosnian Horror." Halina Grzymala-Moszczcynska, a Polish sociologist working with Muslim refugees in Poland, reports that the refugees she has interviewed never refer to their persecutors as "Serbs," but always as "criminals." Personal conversation.
182. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, p. 249.
183. Judah, The Serbs, p. 233; and Maass, Love Thy Neighbor, pp. 52, 111. See also Julian Borger, "Day of Reckoning for the Men of Death," Guardian Weekly, July 20, 1997, p. 7.
184. Judah, The Serbs, p. 233; and Maass, Love Thy Neighbor, pp. 52, 111. See also Julian Borger, "Day of Reckoning for the Men of Death," Guardian Weekly, July 20, 1997, p. 7.
185. Judah, The Serbs, p. 233; and Maass, Love Thy Neighbor, pp. 52, 111. See also Julian Borger, "Day of Reckoning for the Men of Death," Guardian Weekly, July 20, 1997, p. 7.
186. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, p. 249; and Sudetic, "A 'Wild East' Revival." On the phenomenon more broadly, see John Mueller, Quiet Cataclysm (New York: HarperCollins, 1995), chap. 8; J. Glenn Gray, The Warriors: Reflections on Men in Battle (New York: Harper and Row, 1959); William Broyles, Jr., "Why Men Love War," Esquire, November 1984, pp. 55-65; and Dave Grossman, On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society (Boston: Little, Brown, 1995).
187. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, p. 249; and Sudetic, "A 'Wild East' Revival." On the phenomenon more broadly, see John Mueller, Quiet Cataclysm (New York: HarperCollins, 1995), chap. 8; J. Glenn Gray, The Warriors: Reflections on Men in Battle (New York: Harper and Row, 1959); William Broyles, Jr., "Why Men Love War," Esquire, November 1984, pp. 55-65; and Dave Grossman, On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society (Boston: Little, Brown, 1995).
188. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, p. 249; and Sudetic, "A 'Wild East' Revival." On the phenomenon more broadly, see John Mueller, Quiet Cataclysm (New York: HarperCollins, 1995), chap. 8; J. Glenn Gray, The Warriors: Reflections on Men in Battle (New York: Harper and Row, 1959); William Broyles, Jr., "Why Men Love War," Esquire, November 1984, pp. 55-65; and Dave Grossman, On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society (Boston: Little, Brown, 1995).
189. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, p. 249; and Sudetic, "A 'Wild East' Revival." On the phenomenon more broadly, see John Mueller, Quiet Cataclysm (New York: HarperCollins, 1995), chap. 8; J. Glenn Gray, The Warriors: Reflections on Men in Battle (New York: Harper and Row, 1959); William Broyles, Jr., "Why Men Love War," Esquire, November 1984, pp. 55-65; and Dave Grossman, On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society (Boston: Little, Brown, 1995).
190. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, p. 249; and Sudetic, "A 'Wild East' Revival." On the phenomenon more broadly, see John Mueller, Quiet Cataclysm (New York: HarperCollins, 1995), chap. 8; J. Glenn Gray, The Warriors: Reflections on Men in Battle (New York: Harper and Row, 1959); William Broyles, Jr., "Why Men Love War," Esquire, November 1984, pp. 55-65; and Dave Grossman, On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society (Boston: Little, Brown, 1995).
191. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, p. 249; and Sudetic, "A 'Wild East' Revival." On the phenomenon more broadly, see John Mueller, Quiet Cataclysm
192. Borger, "Friends or Foes?"
193. Burg and Shoup, War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, p. 137.
194. Some of this behavior surfaced early - in the fighting in Croatia in 1991. As one Serb from the area recalled, "I don't deny that I myself did some shooting, but the worst crimes were committed by the irregulars who came in from Serbia. First they looted the homes of Croats. When they came back a second time they started looting Serb houses, because the Croat houses had already been robbed clean." Another Serb from the same village reports that after defending their homes for six months (and never seeing a single regular army officer or soldier), they were ordered, together with some of their Croat neighbors who had joined them in home defense, to evacuate for resettlement in Bosnia. On the way, they were all robbed by the Serbian forces of Šešelj. Ejub Štitkovac, "Croatia: The First War," in Udovički and Ridgeway, Yugoslavia's Ethnic Nightmare, p. 160.
195. Rieff, Slaughterhouse, p. 132.
196. Judah, The Serbs, pp. 221-223, 252-255.
197. Rohde, Endgame, pp. 107-109; and Sudetic, Blood and Vengeance, pp. 223, 244.
198. Rohde, Endgame, pp. 107-109; and Sudetic, Blood and Vengeance, pp. 223, 244.
199. UN Experts, Final Report, par. 84, 86; John F. Burns, "2 Gang Leaders in Sarajevo Face Crackdown in Bosnia," New York Times, October 27, 1993, p. A6; and Maass, Love Thy Neighbor, p. 31.
200. UN Experts, Final Report, par. 84, 86; John F. Burns, "2 Gang Leaders in Sarajevo Face Crackdown in Bosnia," New York Times, October 27, 1993, p. A6; and Maass, Love Thy Neighbor, p. 31.
201. Vasić, "Yugoslav Army," p. 133; Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, p. 246; Charles G. Boyd, "Making Peace with the Guilty: The Truth about Bosnia," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 5 (September/October 1995), p. 29; Noel Malcolm, "Bosnia and the West: A Study in Failure," National Interest, Spring 1995, p. 9; Judah, The Serbs, pp. 223, 237, 296; Chuck Sudetic, "Serbs of Sarajevo Stay Loyal to Bosnia," New York Times, August 26, 1994, p. A6; and Maass, "In Bosnia, 'Disloyal Serbs' Share Plight of Opposition." The population of the once thoroughly integrated city of Mostar declined from 130,000 to 60,000. Chris Hedges, "A War-Bred Underworld Threatens Bosnia Peace," New York Times, May 1, 1996, p. 8. Sarajevo declined from 450,000 to something close to 280,000, including some 100,000 refugees from ethnically cleansed areas of the country. Chris Hedges, "War Turns Sarajevo Away from Europe," New York Times, July 28, 1995, p. A4. By September 1992, only nine months after their brief war for independence had ended, the number of Serbs from the Krajina section of Croatia who had moved to Serbia was reaching "disastrous proportions," according to a Belgrade daily, a situation it blamed on the endemic corruption of Krajina officials. Tanner, Croatia, p. 283.
202. Vasić, "Yugoslav Army," p. 133; Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, p. 246; Charles G. Boyd, "Making Peace with the Guilty: The Truth about Bosnia," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 5 (September/October 1995), p. 29; Noel Malcolm, "Bosnia and the West: A Study in Failure," National Interest, Spring 1995, p. 9; Judah, The Serbs, pp. 223, 237, 296; Chuck Sudetic, "Serbs of Sarajevo Stay Loyal to Bosnia," New York Times, August 26, 1994, p. A6; and Maass, "In Bosnia, 'Disloyal Serbs' Share Plight of Opposition." The population of the once thoroughly integrated city of Mostar declined from 130,000 to 60,000. Chris Hedges, "A War-Bred Underworld Threatens Bosnia Peace," New York Times, May 1, 1996, p. 8. Sarajevo declined from 450,000 to something close to 280,000, including some 100,000 refugees from ethnically cleansed areas of the country. Chris Hedges, "War Turns Sarajevo Away from Europe," New York Times, July 28, 1995, p. A4. By September 1992, only nine months after their brief war for independence had ended, the number of Serbs from the Krajina section of Croatia who had moved to Serbia was reaching "disastrous proportions," according to a Belgrade daily, a situation it blamed on the endemic corruption of Krajina officials. Tanner, Croatia, p. 283.
203. Vasić, "Yugoslav Army," p. 133; Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, p. 246; Charles G. Boyd, "Making Peace with the Guilty: The Truth about Bosnia," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 5 (September/October 1995), p. 29; Noel Malcolm, "Bosnia and the West: A Study in Failure," National Interest, Spring 1995, p. 9; Judah, The Serbs, pp. 223, 237, 296; Chuck Sudetic, "Serbs of Sarajevo Stay Loyal to Bosnia," New York Times, August 26, 1994, p. A6; and Maass, "In Bosnia, 'Disloyal Serbs' Share Plight of Opposition." The population of the once thoroughly integrated city of Mostar declined from 130,000 to 60,000. Chris Hedges, "A War-Bred Underworld Threatens Bosnia Peace," New York Times, May 1, 1996, p. 8. Sarajevo declined from 450,000 to something close to 280,000, including some 100,000 refugees from ethnically cleansed areas of the country. Chris Hedges, "War Turns Sarajevo Away from Europe," New York Times, July 28, 1995, p. A4. By September 1992, only nine months after their brief war for independence had ended, the number of Serbs from the Krajina section of Croatia who had moved to Serbia was reaching "disastrous proportions," according to a Belgrade daily, a situation it blamed on the endemic corruption of Krajina officials. Tanner, Croatia, p. 283.
204. Vasić, "Yugoslav Army," p. 133; Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, p. 246; Charles G. Boyd, "Making Peace with the Guilty: The Truth about Bosnia," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 5 (September/October 1995), p. 29; Noel Malcolm, "Bosnia and the West: A Study in Failure," National Interest, Spring 1995, p. 9; Judah, The Serbs, pp. 223, 237, 296; Chuck Sudetic, "Serbs of Sarajevo Stay Loyal to Bosnia," New York Times, August 26, 1994, p. A6; and Maass, "In Bosnia, 'Disloyal Serbs' Share Plight of Opposition." The population of the once thoroughly integrated city of Mostar declined from 130,000 to 60,000. Chris Hedges, "A War-Bred Underworld Threatens Bosnia Peace," New York Times, May 1, 1996, p. 8. Sarajevo declined from 450,000 to something close to 280,000, including some 100,000 refugees from ethnically cleansed areas of the country. Chris Hedges, "War Turns Sarajevo Away from Europe," New York Times, July 28, 1995, p. A4. By September 1992, only nine months after their brief war for independence had ended, the number of Serbs from the Krajina section of Croatia who had moved to Serbia was reaching "disastrous proportions," according to a Belgrade daily, a situation it blamed on the endemic corruption of Krajina officials. Tanner, Croatia, p. 283.
205. Vasić, "Yugoslav Army," p. 133; Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, p. 246; Charles G. Boyd, "Making Peace with the Guilty: The Truth about Bosnia," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 5 (September/October 1995), p. 29; Noel Malcolm, "Bosnia and the West: A Study in Failure," National Interest, Spring 1995, p. 9; Judah, The Serbs, pp. 223, 237, 296; Chuck Sudetic, "Serbs of Sarajevo Stay Loyal to Bosnia," New York Times, August 26, 1994, p. A6; and Maass, "In Bosnia, 'Disloyal Serbs' Share Plight of Opposition." The population of the once thoroughly integrated city of Mostar declined from 130,000 to 60,000. Chris Hedges, "A War-Bred Underworld Threatens Bosnia Peace," New York Times, May 1, 1996, p. 8. Sarajevo declined from 450,000 to something close to 280,000, including some 100,000 refugees from ethnically cleansed areas of the country. Chris Hedges, "War Turns Sarajevo Away from Europe," New York Times, July 28, 1995, p. A4. By September 1992, only nine months after their brief war for independence had ended, the number of Serbs from the Krajina section of Croatia who had moved to Serbia was reaching "disastrous proportions," according to a Belgrade daily, a situation it blamed on the endemic corruption of Krajina officials. Tanner, Croatia, p. 283.
206. Vasić, "Yugoslav Army," p. 133; Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, p. 246; Charles G. Boyd, "Making Peace with the Guilty: The Truth about Bosnia," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 5 (September/October 1995), p. 29; Noel Malcolm, "Bosnia and the West: A Study in Failure," National Interest, Spring 1995, p. 9; Judah, The Serbs, pp. 223, 237, 296; Chuck Sudetic, "Serbs of Sarajevo Stay Loyal to Bosnia," New York Times, August 26, 1994, p. A6; and Maass, "In Bosnia, 'Disloyal Serbs' Share Plight of Opposition." The population of the once thoroughly integrated city of Mostar declined from 130,000 to 60,000. Chris Hedges, "A War-Bred Underworld Threatens Bosnia Peace," New York Times, May 1, 1996, p. 8. Sarajevo declined from 450,000 to something close to 280,000, including some 100,000 refugees from ethnically cleansed areas of the country. Chris Hedges, "War Turns Sarajevo Away from Europe," New York Times, July 28, 1995, p. A4. By September 1992, only nine months after their brief war for independence had ended, the number of Serbs from the Krajina section of Croatia who had moved to Serbia was reaching "disastrous proportions," according to a Belgrade daily, a situation it blamed on the endemic corruption of Krajina officials. Tanner, Croatia, p. 283.
207. Vasić, "Yugoslav Army," p. 133; Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, p. 246; Charles G. Boyd, "Making Peace with the Guilty: The Truth about Bosnia," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 5 (September/October 1995), p. 29; Noel Malcolm, "Bosnia and the West: A Study in Failure," National Interest, Spring 1995, p. 9; Judah, The Serbs, pp. 223, 237, 296; Chuck Sudetic, "Serbs of Sarajevo Stay Loyal to Bosnia," New York Times, August 26, 1994, p. A6; and Maass, "In Bosnia, 'Disloyal Serbs' Share Plight of Opposition." The population of the once thoroughly integrated city of Mostar declined from 130,000 to 60,000. Chris Hedges, "A War-Bred Underworld Threatens Bosnia Peace," New York Times, May 1, 1996, p. 8. Sarajevo declined from 450,000 to something close to 280,000, including some 100,000 refugees from ethnically cleansed areas of the country. Chris Hedges, "War Turns Sarajevo Away from Europe," New York Times, July 28, 1995, p. A4. By September 1992, only nine months after their brief war for independence had ended, the number of Serbs from the Krajina section of Croatia who had moved to Serbia was reaching "disastrous proportions," according to a Belgrade daily, a situation it blamed on the endemic corruption of Krajina officials. Tanner, Croatia, p. 283.
208. Vasić, "Yugoslav Army," p. 133; Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, p. 246; Charles G. Boyd, "Making Peace with the Guilty: The Truth about Bosnia," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 5 (September/October 1995), p. 29; Noel Malcolm, "Bosnia and the West: A Study in Failure," National Interest, Spring 1995, p. 9; Judah, The Serbs, pp. 223, 237, 296; Chuck Sudetic, "Serbs of Sarajevo Stay Loyal to Bosnia," New York Times, August 26, 1994, p. A6; and Maass, "In Bosnia, 'Disloyal Serbs' Share Plight of Opposition." The population of the once thoroughly integrated city of Mostar declined from 130,000 to 60,000. Chris Hedges, "A War-Bred Underworld Threatens Bosnia Peace," New York Times, May 1, 1996, p. 8. Sarajevo declined from 450,000 to something close to 280,000, including some 100,000 refugees from ethnically cleansed areas of the country. Chris Hedges, "War Turns Sarajevo Away from Europe," New York Times, July 28, 1995, p. A4. By September 1992, only nine months after their brief war for independence had ended, the number of Serbs from the Krajina section of Croatia who had moved to Serbia was reaching "disastrous proportions," according to a Belgrade daily, a situation it blamed on the endemic corruption of Krajina officials. Tanner, Croatia, p. 283.
209. Vasić, "Yugoslav Army," p. 133; Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, p. 246; Charles G. Boyd, "Making Peace with the Guilty: The Truth about Bosnia," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 5 (September/October 1995), p. 29; Noel Malcolm, "Bosnia and the West: A Study in Failure," National Interest, Spring 1995, p. 9; Judah, The Serbs, pp. 223, 237, 296; Chuck Sudetic, "Serbs of Sarajevo Stay Loyal to Bosnia," New York Times, August 26, 1994, p. A6; and Maass, "In Bosnia, 'Disloyal Serbs' Share Plight of Opposition." The population of the once thoroughly integrated city of Mostar declined from 130,000 to 60,000. Chris Hedges, "A War-Bred Underworld Threatens Bosnia Peace," New York Times, May 1, 1996, p. 8. Sarajevo declined from 450,000 to something close to 280,000, including some 100,000 refugees from ethnically cleansed areas of the country. Chris Hedges, "War Turns Sarajevo Away from Europe," New York Times, July 28, 1995, p. A4. By September 1992, only nine months after their brief war for independence had ended, the number of Serbs from the Krajina section of Croatia who had moved to Serbia was reaching "disastrous proportions," according to a Belgrade daily, a situation it blamed on the endemic corruption of Krajina officials. Tanner, Croatia, p. 283.
210. Vasić, "Yugoslav Army," p. 133; Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, p. 246; Charles G. Boyd, "Making Peace with the Guilty: The Truth about Bosnia," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 5 (September/October 1995), p. 29; Noel Malcolm, "Bosnia and the West: A Study in Failure," National Interest, Spring 1995, p. 9; Judah, The Serbs, pp. 223, 237, 296; Chuck Sudetic, "Serbs of Sarajevo Stay Loyal to Bosnia," New York Times, August 26, 1994, p. A6; and Maass, "In Bosnia, 'Disloyal Serbs' Share Plight of Opposition." The population of the once thoroughly integrated city of Mostar declined from 130,000 to 60,000. Chris Hedges, "A War-Bred Underworld Threatens Bosnia Peace," New York Times, May 1, 1996, p. 8. Sarajevo declined from 450,000 to something close to 280,000, including some 100,000 refugees from ethnically cleansed areas of the country. Chris Hedges, "War Turns Sarajevo Away from Europe," New York Times, July 28, 1995, p. A4. By September 1992, only nine months after their brief war for independence had ended, the number of Serbs from the Krajina section of Croatia who had moved to Serbia was reaching "disastrous proportions," according to a Belgrade daily, a situation it blamed on the endemic corruption of Krajina officials. Tanner, Croatia, p. 283.
211. For a portrait of the clearly deranged Branko Grujić, a Serb who reigned as the mayor of Zvornik after the Muslim majority had been driven from the city, see Cohen, Hearts Grown Brutal, pp. 296-298.
212. Judah, The Serbs, pp. 242-252; and Ed Vulliamy, "Croats Who Supped with the Devil," Guardian, March 18, 1996 p. 8. See also Burg and Shoup, War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, p. 138; and Sudetic, Blood and Vengeance, p. 90. Serbia itself was substantially criminalized during the war. Judah, The Serbs, pp. 255-256.
213. Judah, The Serbs, pp. 242-252; and Ed Vulliamy, "Croats Who Supped with the Devil," Guardian, March 18, 1996 p. 8. See also Burg and Shoup, War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, p. 138; and Sudetic, Blood and Vengeance, p. 90. Serbia itself was substantially criminalized during the war. Judah, The Serbs, pp. 255-256.
214. Judah, The Serbs, pp. 242-252; and Ed Vulliamy, "Croats Who Supped with the Devil," Guardian, March 18, 1996 p. 8. See also Burg and Shoup, War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, p. 138; and Sudetic, Blood and Vengeance, p. 90. Serbia itself was substantially criminalized during the war. Judah, The Serbs, pp. 255-256.
215. Judah, The Serbs, pp. 242-252; and Ed Vulliamy, "Croats Who Supped with the Devil," Guardian, March 18, 1996 p. 8. See also Burg and Shoup, War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, p. 138; and Sudetic, Blood and Vengeance, p. 90. Serbia itself was substantially criminalized during the war. Judah, The Serbs, pp. 255-256.
216. Judah, The Serbs, pp. 242-252; and Ed Vulliamy, "Croats Who Supped with the Devil," Guardian, March 18, 1996 p. 8. See also Burg and Shoup, War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, p. 138; and Sudetic, Blood and Vengeance, p. 90. Serbia itself was substantially criminalized during the war. Judah, The Serbs, pp. 255-256.
217. Although there are differences, the Serb rampages in Kosovo in 1999 often resembled those seen earlier in Bosnia and Croatia. The army provided a sort of generalized support, it participated directly in some areas, and it hardly escapes blame for the results in any case. But, as one report puts it, "in hundreds of interviews," Kosovo Albanians "have said that nearly all the killings of civilians were committed by Serbian paramilitary forces and not by the regular army." Blaine Harden, "Reservist a Crucial Factor in Effort against Milosevic," New York Times, July 9, 1999, p. A1. Released criminals formed an important component of Serb forces. See Michael R. Gordon, "Civilians Are Slain in Military Attack on a Kosovo Road," New York Times, April 15, 1999, p. A1; and Charles Ingrao, "It Will Take More Than Bombs to Bring Stability," Los Angeles Times, April 12, 1999, p. B11.
218. Although there are differences, the Serb rampages in Kosovo in 1999 often resembled those seen earlier in Bosnia and Croatia. The army provided a sort of generalized support, it participated directly in some areas, and it hardly escapes blame for the results in any case. But, as one report puts it, "in hundreds of interviews," Kosovo Albanians "have said that nearly all the killings of civilians were committed by Serbian paramilitary forces and not by the regular army." Blaine Harden, "Reservist a Crucial Factor in Effort against Milosevic," New York Times, July 9, 1999, p. A1. Released criminals formed an important component of Serb forces. See Michael R. Gordon, "Civilians Are Slain in Military Attack on a Kosovo Road," New York Times, April 15, 1999, p. A1; and Charles Ingrao, "It Will Take More Than Bombs to Bring Stability," Los Angeles Times, April 12, 1999, p. B11.
219. Although there are differences, the Serb rampages in Kosovo in 1999 often resembled those seen earlier in Bosnia and Croatia. The army provided a sort of generalized support, it participated directly in some areas, and it hardly escapes blame for the results in any case. But, as one report puts it, "in hundreds of interviews," Kosovo Albanians "have said that nearly all the killings of civilians were committed by Serbian paramilitary forces and not by the regular army." Blaine Harden, "Reservist a Crucial Factor in Effort against Milosevic," New York Times, July 9, 1999, p. A1. Released criminals formed an important component of Serb forces. See Michael R. Gordon, "Civilians Are Slain in Military Attack on a Kosovo Road," New York Times, April 15, 1999, p. A1; and Charles Ingrao, "It Will Take More Than Bombs to Bring Stability," Los Angeles Times, April 12, 1999, p. B11.
220. Gérard Prunier, Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), p. 169; and African Rights, Rwanda: Death, Despair, and Defiance, rev. ed. (London: African Rights, 1995), pp. 51-52.
221. Gérard Prunier, Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), p. 169; and African Rights, Rwanda: Death, Despair, and Defiance, rev. ed. (London: African Rights, 1995), pp. 51-52.
222. Prunier, Rwanda Crisis, pp. 113, 242-243; and African Rights, Rwanda, pp. 49, 65.
223. Prunier, Rwanda Crisis, pp. 113, 242-243; and African Rights, Rwanda, pp. 49, 65.
224. Philip Gourevitch, We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with Our Families: Stories from Rwanda (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1998), p. 93.
225. Prunier, Rwanda Crisis, pp. 231-232. See also Allison Des Forges, "Leave None to Tell the Story": Genocide in Rwanda (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999) pp 11, 261.
226. Prunier, Rwanda Crisis, pp. 231-232. See also Allison Des Forges, "Leave None to Tell the Story": Genocide in Rwanda (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999) pp 11, 261.
227. Gourevitch, We Wish to Inform You, p. 115.
228. African Rights, Rwanda, pp. 55, 61-62, 114.
229. Gourevitch, We Wish to Inform You, p. 242.
230. African Rights, Rwanda, pp. 55, 61-62, 114.
231. Prunier, Rwanda Crisis, p. 247; African Rights, Rwanda, chap. 14; and Gourevitch, We Wish to Inform You, pp. 307, 309.
232. Prunier, Rwanda Crisis, p. 247; African Rights, Rwanda, chap. 14; and Gourevitch, We Wish to Inform You, pp. 307, 309.
233. Prunier, Rwanda Crisis, p. 247; African Rights, Rwanda, chap. 14; and Gourevitch, We Wish to Inform You, pp. 307, 309.
234. Prunier, Rwanda Crisis, pp. 253-254; and Gourevitch, We Wish to Inform You, p. 136.
235. Prunier, Rwanda Crisis, pp. 253-254; and Gourevitch, We Wish to Inform You, p. 136.
236. African Rights, Rwanda, pp. 1017-1022.
237. Prunier, Rwanda Crisis, p. 253; and Des Forges, "Leave None to Tell the Story," pp. 33, 260-262.
238. Prunier, Rwanda Crisis, p. 253; and Des Forges, "Leave None to Tell the Story," pp. 33, 260-262.
239. Des Forges, "Leave None to Tell the Story," p. 262.
240. Ibid., pp. 2, 16, 260, 262.
241. African Rights, Rwanda.
242. Gourevitch, We Wish to Inform You, p. 242.
243. Bill Keller, "In Mozambique and Other Lands, Children Fight the Wars," New York Times, November 9, 1994, p. A14.
244. Ignatieff, "Balkan Tragedy."
245. Chaim Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Wars," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Spring 1996), p. 144.
246. Robert P. Kraynak, History and Modernity in the Thought of Thomas Hobbes (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990), pp. 165, 176, 179.
247. On this issue, see Bruce L. Benson, "The Spontaneous Evolution of Commercial Law," in Daniel B. Klein, ed., Reputation: Studies in the Voluntary Elicitation of Good Conduct (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997), pp. 165-189; Robert C. Ellickson, Order without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991); and John Mueller, Capitalism, Democracy, and Ralph's Pretty Good Grocery (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999), chap. 4.
248. On this issue, see Bruce L. Benson, "The Spontaneous Evolution of Commercial Law," in Daniel B. Klein, ed., Reputation: Studies in the Voluntary Elicitation of Good Conduct (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997), pp. 165-189; Robert C. Ellickson, Order without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991); and John Mueller, Capitalism, Democracy, and Ralph's Pretty Good Grocery (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999), chap. 4.
249. On this issue, see Bruce L. Benson, "The Spontaneous Evolution of Commercial Law," in Daniel B. Klein, ed., Reputation: Studies in the Voluntary Elicitation of Good Conduct (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997), pp. 165-189; Robert C. Ellickson, Order without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991); and John Mueller, Capitalism, Democracy, and Ralph's Pretty Good Grocery (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999), chap. 4.
250. Judah observes of Bosnian Serb General Ratko Mladić that "his war was a coward's war. He fought few pitched battles but managed to drive hundreds of thousands of unarmed people out of their homes," and he also questions Mladić's mental stability. Judah, The Serbs, pp. 230-231. On this latter issue, see also Robert Block, "The Madness of General Mladic," New York Review of Books, October 5, 1995, pp. 7-9; and Jane Perlez, "A Grim Turn for 2 Embattled Serb Leaders," New York Times, December 15, 1995, p. A1.
251. Judah observes of Bosnian Serb General Ratko Mladić that "his war was a coward's war. He fought few pitched battles but managed to drive hundreds of thousands of unarmed people out of their homes," and he also questions Mladić's mental stability. Judah, The Serbs, pp. 230-231. On this latter issue, see also Robert Block, "The Madness of General Mladic," New York Review of Books, October 5, 1995, pp. 7-9; and Jane Perlez, "A Grim Turn for 2 Embattled Serb Leaders," New York Times, December 15, 1995, p. A1.
252. Judah observes of Bosnian Serb General Ratko Mladić that "his war was a coward's war. He fought few pitched battles but managed to drive hundreds of thousands of unarmed people out of their homes," and he also questions Mladić's mental stability. Judah, The Serbs, pp. 230-231. On this latter issue, see also Robert Block, "The Madness of General Mladic," New York Review of Books, October 5, 1995, pp. 7-9; and Jane Perlez, "A Grim Turn for 2 Embattled Serb Leaders," New York Times, December 15, 1995, p. A1.
253. Vasić, "Yugoslav Army," pp. 134-135; Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, p. 360; Ken Silverstein, "Privatizing War? How Affairs of State Are Outsourced to Corporations beyond Public Control," Nation, July 28/August 4, 1997, pp. 11-17; and Tanner, Croatia, p. 284.
254. Vasić, "Yugoslav Army," pp. 134-135; Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, p. 360; Ken Silverstein, "Privatizing War? How Affairs of State Are Outsourced to Corporations beyond Public Control," Nation, July 28/August 4, 1997, pp. 11-17; and Tanner, Croatia, p. 284.
255. Vasić, "Yugoslav Army," pp. 134-135; Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, p. 360; Ken Silverstein, "Privatizing War? How Affairs of State Are Outsourced to Corporations beyond Public Control," Nation, July 28/August 4, 1997, pp. 11-17; and Tanner, Croatia, p. 284.
256. Vasić, "Yugoslav Army," pp. 134-135; Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, p. 360; Ken Silverstein, "Privatizing War? How Affairs of State Are Outsourced to Corporations beyond Public Control," Nation, July 28/August 4, 1997, pp. 11-17; and Tanner, Croatia, p. 284.
257. Vasić, "Yugoslav Army," p. 136; Judah, The Serbs, pp. 217-218; Maass, Love Thy Neighbor, p. 33; Chris Hedges, "Postscript to Sarajevo's Anguish: Muslim Killings of Serbs Detailed," New York Times, November 12, 1997, p. A1; Burg and Shoup, War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, pp. 138-139; Burns, "2 Gang Leaders in Sarajevo Face Crackdown in Bosnia"; and John F. Burns, "Bosnian Forces Kill Keputed Gang Chief in Sarajevo Gunfight," New York Times, October 27, 1993, p. A6. See also Rieff, Slaughterhouse, p. 132.
258. Vasić, "Yugoslav Army," p. 136; Judah, The Serbs, pp. 217-218; Maass, Love Thy Neighbor, p. 33; Chris Hedges, "Postscript to Sarajevo's Anguish: Muslim Killings of Serbs Detailed," New York Times, November 12, 1997, p. A1; Burg and Shoup, War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, pp. 138-139; Burns, "2 Gang Leaders in Sarajevo Face Crackdown in Bosnia"; and John F. Burns, "Bosnian Forces Kill Keputed Gang Chief in Sarajevo Gunfight," New York Times, October 27, 1993, p. A6. See also Rieff, Slaughterhouse, p. 132.
259. Vasić, "Yugoslav Army," p. 136; Judah, The Serbs, pp. 217-218; Maass, Love Thy Neighbor, p. 33; Chris Hedges, "Postscript to Sarajevo's Anguish: Muslim Killings of Serbs Detailed," New York Times, November 12, 1997, p. A1; Burg and Shoup, War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, pp. 138-139; Burns, "2 Gang Leaders in Sarajevo Face Crackdown in Bosnia"; and John F. Burns, "Bosnian Forces Kill Keputed Gang Chief in Sarajevo Gunfight," New York Times, October 27, 1993, p. A6. See also Rieff, Slaughterhouse, p. 132.
260. Vasić, "Yugoslav Army," p. 136; Judah, The Serbs, pp. 217-218; Maass, Love Thy Neighbor, p. 33; Chris Hedges, "Postscript to Sarajevo's Anguish: Muslim Killings of Serbs Detailed," New York Times, November 12, 1997, p. A1; Burg and Shoup, War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, pp. 138-139; Burns, "2 Gang Leaders in Sarajevo Face Crackdown in Bosnia"; and John F. Burns, "Bosnian Forces Kill Keputed Gang Chief in Sarajevo Gunfight," New York Times, October 27, 1993, p. A6. See also Rieff, Slaughterhouse, p. 132.
261. Vasić, "Yugoslav Army," p. 136; Judah, The Serbs, pp. 217-218; Maass, Love Thy Neighbor, p. 33; Chris Hedges, "Postscript to Sarajevo's Anguish: Muslim Killings of Serbs Detailed," New York Times, November 12, 1997, p. A1; Burg and Shoup, War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, pp. 138-139; Burns, "2 Gang Leaders in Sarajevo Face Crackdown in Bosnia"; and John F. Burns, "Bosnian Forces Kill Keputed Gang Chief in Sarajevo Gunfight," New York Times, October 27, 1993, p. A6. See also Rieff, Slaughterhouse, p. 132.
262. Vasić, "Yugoslav Army," p. 136; Judah, The Serbs, pp. 217-218; Maass, Love Thy Neighbor, p. 33; Chris Hedges, "Postscript to Sarajevo's Anguish: Muslim Killings of Serbs Detailed," New York Times, November 12, 1997, p. A1; Burg and Shoup, War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, pp. 138-139; Burns, "2 Gang Leaders in Sarajevo Face Crackdown in Bosnia"; and John F. Burns, "Bosnian Forces Kill Keputed Gang Chief in Sarajevo Gunfight," New York Times, October 27, 1993, p. A6. See also Rieff, Slaughterhouse, p. 132.
263. Vasić, "Yugoslav Army," p. 136; Judah, The Serbs, pp. 217-218; Maass, Love Thy Neighbor, p. 33; Chris Hedges, "Postscript to Sarajevo's Anguish: Muslim Killings of Serbs Detailed," New York Times, November 12, 1997, p. A1; Burg and Shoup, War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, pp. 138-139; Burns, "2 Gang Leaders in Sarajevo Face Crackdown in Bosnia"; and John F. Burns, "Bosnian Forces Kill Keputed Gang Chief in Sarajevo Gunfight," New York Times, October 27, 1993, p. A6. See also Rieff, Slaughterhouse, p. 132.
264. Vasić, "Yugoslav Army," p. 136; Judah, The Serbs, pp. 217-218; Maass, Love Thy Neighbor, p. 33; Chris Hedges, "Postscript to Sarajevo's Anguish: Muslim Killings of Serbs Detailed," New York Times, November 12, 1997, p. A1; Burg and Shoup, War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, pp. 138-139; Burns, "2 Gang Leaders in Sarajevo Face Crackdown in Bosnia"; and John F. Burns, "Bosnian Forces Kill Keputed Gang Chief in Sarajevo Gunfight," New York Times, October 27, 1993, p. A6. See also Rieff, Slaughterhouse, p. 132.
265. Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, pp. 228-229; and Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, p. 353. Tanner, Croatia, p. 288.
266. Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, pp. 228-229; and Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, p. 353. Tanner, Croatia, p. 288.
267. Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, pp. 228-229; and Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, p. 353. Tanner, Croatia, p. 288.
268. Tanner, Croatia, pp. 294-297; Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, pp. 353-360; see also Vasić, "Yugoslav Army," p. 135. In victory, however, the discipline of the Croat forces often broke down in arson, destruction, and looting. Tanner, Croatia, p. 298.
269. Tanner, Croatia, pp. 294-297; Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, pp. 353-360; see also Vasić, "Yugoslav Army," p. 135. In victory, however, the discipline of the Croat forces often broke down in arson, destruction, and looting. Tanner, Croatia, p. 298.
270. Tanner, Croatia, pp. 294-297; Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, pp. 353-360; see also Vasić, "Yugoslav Army," p. 135. In victory, however, the discipline of the Croat forces often broke down in arson, destruction, and looting. Tanner, Croatia, p. 298.
271. Tanner, Croatia, pp. 294-297; Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, pp. 353-360; see also Vasić, "Yugoslav Army," p. 135. In victory, however, the discipline of the Croat forces often broke down in arson, destruction, and looting. Tanner, Croatia, p. 298.
272. Prunier, Rwanda Crisis, pp. 254, 268, 377; Gourevitch, We Wish to Inform You, pp. 156-157; and Alan J. Kuperman, "Rwanda in Retrospect," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 79, No. 1 (January-February 2000), pp. 94-118.
273. Prunier, Rwanda Crisis, pp. 254, 268, 377; Gourevitch, We Wish to Inform You, pp. 156-157; and Alan J. Kuperman, "Rwanda in Retrospect," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 79, No. 1 (January-February 2000), pp. 94-118.
274. Prunier, Rwanda Crisis, pp. 254, 268, 377; Gourevitch, We Wish to Inform You, pp. 156-157; and Alan J. Kuperman, "Rwanda in Retrospect," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 79, No. 1 (January-February 2000), pp. 94-118.
275. On this issue, see also Malcolm, "Bosnia and the West," pp. 4-5; and Sadowski, Myth of Global Chaos, pp. 24-25, 66-68. On President Bill Clinton's seduction by Kaplan's book, see Elizabeth Drew, On the Edge: The Clinton Presidency (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), p. 157; on his belated, regretful public recantation in 1999 of the Kaplan perspective, see Katharine Q. Seelye, "Clinton Blames Milosevic, Not Fate, for Bloodshed," New York Times, May 14, 1999, p. A12. Talking about the Bosnian conflict on national television on June 5, 1995, Vice President Al Gore had allowed as how the tragedy had been unfolding, "some would say, for five hundred years." Clinton, not to be outdone, opined in the same interview that "their enmities go back five hundred years, some would say almost a thousand years." Cohen, Hearts Grown Brutal, pp. 397-398. The exact identity of the hyperbolic "some" was not specified, but one source perhaps was Henry Kissinger, who has noted authoritatively that "ethnic conflict has been endemic in the Balkans for centuries" (as opposed to gentle, trouble-free Western Europe presumably), and, patronizingly and absurdly, that "none of the populations has any experience with - and essentially no belief in - Western concepts of toleration." Henry Kissinger, "No U.S. Ground Forces for Kosovo," Washington Post, February 22, 1999, p. A15. At the source of many of these perceptions is Rebecca West's two-volume Black Lamb and Grey Falcon (New York: Viking, 1941). The work was written after the author had made three visits - the longest of which lasted less than two months - to Yugoslavia between 1936 and 1938, and it often propounds views that are essentially racist. For a superb assessment, see Hall, "Rebecca West's War."
276. On this issue, see also Malcolm, "Bosnia and the West," pp. 4-5; and Sadowski, Myth of Global Chaos, pp. 24-25, 66-68. On President Bill Clinton's seduction by Kaplan's book, see Elizabeth Drew, On the Edge: The Clinton Presidency (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), p. 157; on his belated, regretful public recantation in 1999 of the Kaplan perspective, see Katharine Q. Seelye, "Clinton Blames Milosevic, Not Fate, for Bloodshed," New York Times, May 14, 1999, p. A12. Talking about the Bosnian conflict on national television on June 5, 1995, Vice President Al Gore had allowed as how the tragedy had been unfolding, "some would say, for five hundred years." Clinton, not to be outdone, opined in the same interview that "their enmities go back five hundred years, some would say almost a thousand years." Cohen, Hearts Grown Brutal, pp. 397-398. The exact identity of the hyperbolic "some" was not specified, but one source perhaps was Henry Kissinger, who has noted authoritatively that "ethnic conflict has been endemic in the Balkans for centuries" (as opposed to gentle, trouble-free Western Europe presumably), and, patronizingly and absurdly, that "none of the populations has any experience with - and essentially no belief in - Western concepts of toleration." Henry Kissinger, "No U.S. Ground Forces for Kosovo," Washington Post, February 22, 1999, p. A15. At the source of many of these perceptions is Rebecca West's two-volume Black Lamb and Grey Falcon (New York: Viking, 1941). The work was written after the author had made three visits - the longest of which lasted less than two months - to Yugoslavia between 1936 and 1938, and it often propounds views that are essentially racist. For a superb assessment, see Hall, "Rebecca West's War."
277. On this issue, see also Malcolm, "Bosnia and the West," pp. 4-5; and Sadowski, Myth of Global Chaos, pp. 24-25, 66-68. On President Bill Clinton's seduction by Kaplan's book, see Elizabeth Drew, On the Edge: The Clinton Presidency (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), p. 157; on his belated, regretful public recantation in 1999 of the Kaplan perspective, see Katharine Q. Seelye, "Clinton Blames Milosevic, Not Fate, for Bloodshed," New York Times, May 14, 1999, p. A12. Talking about the Bosnian conflict on national television on June 5, 1995, Vice President Al Gore had allowed as how the tragedy had been unfolding, "some would say, for five hundred years." Clinton, not to be outdone, opined in the same interview that "their enmities go back five hundred years, some would say almost a thousand years." Cohen, Hearts Grown Brutal, pp. 397-398. The exact identity of the hyperbolic "some" was not specified, but one source perhaps was Henry Kissinger, who has noted authoritatively that "ethnic conflict has been endemic in the Balkans for centuries" (as opposed to gentle, trouble-free Western Europe presumably), and, patronizingly and absurdly, that "none of the populations has any experience with - and essentially no belief in - Western concepts of toleration." Henry Kissinger, "No U.S. Ground Forces for Kosovo," Washington Post, February 22, 1999, p. A15. At the source of many of these perceptions is Rebecca West's two-volume Black Lamb and Grey Falcon (New York: Viking, 1941). The work was written after the author had made three visits - the longest of which lasted less than two months - to Yugoslavia between 1936 and 1938, and it often propounds views that are essentially racist. For a superb assessment, see Hall, "Rebecca West's War."
278. On this issue, see also Malcolm, "Bosnia and the West," pp. 4-5; and Sadowski, Myth of Global Chaos, pp. 24-25, 66-68. On President Bill Clinton's seduction by Kaplan's book, see Elizabeth Drew, On the Edge: The Clinton Presidency (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), p. 157; on his belated, regretful public recantation in 1999 of the Kaplan perspective, see Katharine Q. Seelye, "Clinton Blames Milosevic, Not Fate, for Bloodshed," New York Times, May 14, 1999, p. A12. Talking about the Bosnian conflict on national television on June 5, 1995, Vice President Al Gore had allowed as how the tragedy had been unfolding, "some would say, for five hundred years." Clinton, not to be outdone, opined in the same interview that "their enmities go back five hundred years, some would say almost a thousand years." Cohen, Hearts Grown Brutal, pp. 397-398. The exact identity of the hyperbolic "some" was not specified, but one source perhaps was Henry Kissinger, who has noted authoritatively that "ethnic conflict has been endemic in the Balkans for centuries" (as opposed to gentle, trouble-free Western Europe presumably), and, patronizingly and absurdly, that "none of the populations has any experience with - and essentially no belief in - Western concepts of toleration." Henry Kissinger, "No U.S. Ground Forces for Kosovo," Washington Post, February 22, 1999, p. A15. At the source of many of these perceptions is Rebecca West's two-volume Black Lamb and Grey Falcon (New York: Viking, 1941). The work was written after the author had made three visits - the longest of which lasted less than two months - to Yugoslavia between 1936 and 1938, and it often propounds views that are essentially racist. For a superb assessment, see Hall, "Rebecca West's War."
279. On this issue, see also Malcolm, "Bosnia and the West," pp. 4-5; and Sadowski, Myth of Global Chaos, pp. 24-25, 66-68. On President Bill Clinton's seduction by Kaplan's book, see Elizabeth Drew, On the Edge: The Clinton Presidency (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), p. 157; on his belated, regretful public recantation in 1999 of the Kaplan perspective, see Katharine Q. Seelye, "Clinton Blames Milosevic, Not Fate, for Bloodshed," New York Times, May 14, 1999, p. A12. Talking about the Bosnian conflict on national television on June 5, 1995, Vice President Al Gore had allowed as how the tragedy had been unfolding, "some would say, for five hundred years." Clinton, not to be outdone, opined in the same interview that "their enmities go back five hundred years, some would say almost a thousand years." Cohen, Hearts Grown Brutal, pp. 397-398. The exact identity of the hyperbolic "some" was not specified, but one source perhaps was Henry Kissinger, who has noted authoritatively that "ethnic conflict has been endemic in the Balkans for centuries" (as opposed to gentle, trouble-free Western Europe presumably), and, patronizingly and absurdly, that "none of the populations has any experience with - and essentially no belief in -Western concepts of toleration." Henry Kissinger, "No U.S. Ground Forces for Kosovo," Washington Post, February 22, 1999, p. A15. At the source of many of these perceptions is Rebecca West's two-volume Black Lamb and Grey Falcon (New York: Viking, 1941). The work was written after the author had made three visits - the longest of which lasted less than two months - to Yugoslavia between 1936 and 1938, and it often propounds views that are essentially racist. For a superb assessment, see Hall, "Rebecca West's War."
280. On this issue, see also Malcolm, "Bosnia and the West," pp. 4-5; and Sadowski, Myth of Global Chaos, pp. 24-25, 66-68. On President Bill Clinton's seduction by Kaplan's book, see Elizabeth Drew, On the Edge: The Clinton Presidency (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), p. 157; on his belated, regretful public recantation in 1999 of the Kaplan perspective, see Katharine Q. Seelye, "Clinton Blames Milosevic, Not Fate, for Bloodshed," New York Times, May 14, 1999, p. A12. Talking about the Bosnian conflict on national television on June 5, 1995, Vice President Al Gore had allowed as how the tragedy had been unfolding, "some would say, for five hundred years." Clinton, not to be outdone, opined in the same interview that "their enmities go back five hundred years, some would say almost a thousand years." Cohen, Hearts Grown Brutal, pp. 397-398. The exact identity of the hyperbolic "some" was not specified, but one source perhaps was Henry Kissinger, who has noted authoritatively that "ethnic conflict has been endemic in the Balkans for centuries" (as opposed to gentle, trouble-free Western Europe presumably), and, patronizingly and absurdly, that "none of the populations has any experience with - and essentially no belief in - Western concepts of toleration." Henry Kissinger, "No U.S. Ground Forces for Kosovo," Washington Post, February 22, 1999, p. A15. At the source of many of these perceptions is Rebecca West's two-volume Black Lamb and Grey Falcon (New York: Viking, 1941). The work was written after the author had made three visits - the longest of which lasted less than two months - to Yugoslavia between 1936 and 1938, and it often propounds views that are essentially racist. For a superb assessment, see Hall, "Rebecca West's War."
281. On this issue, see also Malcolm, "Bosnia and the West," pp. 4-5; and Sadowski, Myth of Global Chaos, pp. 24-25, 66-68. On President Bill Clinton's seduction by Kaplan's book, see Elizabeth Drew, On the Edge: The Clinton Presidency (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), p. 157; on his belated, regretful public recantation in 1999 of the Kaplan perspective, see Katharine Q. Seelye, "Clinton Blames Milosevic, Not Fate, for Bloodshed," New York Times, May 14, 1999, p. A12. Talking about the Bosnian conflict on national television on June 5, 1995, Vice President Al Gore had allowed as how the tragedy had been unfolding, "some would say, for five hundred years." Clinton, not to be outdone, opined in the same interview that "their enmities go back five hundred years, some would say almost a thousand years." Cohen, Hearts Grown Brutal, pp. 397-398. The exact identity of the hyperbolic "some" was not specified, but one source perhaps was Henry Kissinger, who has noted authoritatively that "ethnic conflict has been endemic in the Balkans for centuries" (as opposed to gentle, trouble-free Western Europe presumably), and, patronizingly and absurdly, that "none of the populations has any experience with - and essentially no belief in - Western concepts of toleration." Henry Kissinger, "No U.S. Ground Forces for Kosovo," Washington Post, February 22, 1999, p. A15. At the source of many of these perceptions is Rebecca West's two-volume Black Lamb and Grey Falcon (New York: Viking, 1941). The work was written after the author had made three visits - the longest of which lasted less than two months - to Yugoslavia between 1936 and 1938, and it often propounds views that are essentially racist. For a superb assessment, see Hall, "Rebecca West's War."
282. On this issue, see also Malcolm, "Bosnia and the West," pp. 4-5; and Sadowski, Myth of Global Chaos, pp. 24-25, 66-68. On President Bill Clinton's seduction by Kaplan's book, see Elizabeth Drew, On the Edge: The Clinton Presidency (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), p. 157; on his belated, regretful public recantation in 1999 of the Kaplan perspective, see Katharine Q. Seelye, "Clinton Blames Milosevic, Not Fate, for Bloodshed," New York Times, May 14, 1999, p. A12. Talking about the Bosnian conflict on national television on June 5, 1995, Vice President Al Gore had allowed as how the tragedy had been unfolding, "some would say, for five hundred years." Clinton, not to be outdone, opined in the same interview that "their enmities go back five hundred years, some would say almost a thousand years." Cohen, Hearts Grown Brutal, pp. 397-398. The exact identity of the hyperbolic "some" was not specified, but one source perhaps was Henry Kissinger, who has noted authoritatively that "ethnic conflict has been endemic in the Balkans for centuries" (as opposed to gentle, trouble-free Western Europe presumably), and, patronizingly and absurdly, that "none of the populations has any experience with - and essentially no belief in - Western concepts of toleration." Henry Kissinger, "No U.S. Ground Forces for Kosovo," Washington Post, February 22, 1999, p. A15. At the source of many of these perceptions is Rebecca West's two-volume Black Lamb and Grey Falcon (New York: Viking, 1941). The work was written after the author had made three visits - the longest of which lasted less than two months - to Yugoslavia between 1936 and 1938, and it often propounds views that are essentially racist. For a superb assessment, see Hall, "Rebecca West's War."
283. Hall, Impossible Country, p. 68. In the case of Yugoslavia, outsiders also tended vastly to overestimate the fighting tenacity of the defenders under the assumption that Serbs, in particular, were fanatically dedicated fighters. This notion derives from a World War II myth that maintains that the occupying Germans, confronted with a dedicated guerrilla opposition, were forced to divert a huge number of forces to maintain their control in Yugoslavia. Even assuming the situations are comparable, the Germans occupied the country in a matter of days and rarely found the Yugoslav occupation much of a diversion. Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, pp. 49-50; and J.P. Mackley, "The Balkan Quagmire Myth: Taking On the Serbs Would Be More Grenada than Vietnam," Washington Post, March 7, 1993, p. C3. In Bosnia, suggests Mackley, no Yugoslav combat unit, regular or irregular, could successfully compete with the U.S. military "in anything but a drinking contest."
284. Hall, Impossible Country, p. 68. In the case of Yugoslavia, outsiders also tended vastly to overestimate the fighting tenacity of the defenders under the assumption that Serbs, in particular, were fanatically dedicated fighters. This notion derives from a World War II myth that maintains that the occupying Germans, confronted with a dedicated guerrilla opposition, were forced to divert a huge number of forces to maintain their control in Yugoslavia. Even assuming the situations are comparable, the Germans occupied the country in a matter of days and rarely found the Yugoslav occupation much of a diversion. Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, pp. 49-50; and J.P. Mackley, "The Balkan Quagmire Myth: Taking On the Serbs Would Be More Grenada than Vietnam," Washington Post, March 7, 1993, p. C3. In Bosnia, suggests Mackley, no Yugoslav combat unit, regular or irregular, could successfully compete with the U.S. military "in anything but a drinking contest."
285. Hall, Impossible Country, p. 68. In the case of Yugoslavia, outsiders also tended vastly to overestimate the fighting tenacity of the defenders under the assumption that Serbs, in particular, were fanatically dedicated fighters. This notion derives from a World War II myth that maintains that the occupying Germans, confronted with a dedicated guerrilla opposition, were forced to divert a huge number of forces to maintain their control in Yugoslavia. Even assuming the situations are comparable, the Germans occupied the country in a matter of days and rarely found the Yugoslav occupation much of a diversion. Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, pp. 49-50; and J.P. Mackley, "The Balkan Quagmire Myth: Taking On the Serbs Would Be More Grenada than Vietnam," Washington Post, March 7, 1993, p. C3. In Bosnia, suggests Mackley, no Yugoslav combat unit, regular or irregular, could successfully compete with the U.S. military "in anything but a drinking contest."
286. John Mueller, "The Common Sense," National Interest, Spring 1997, p. 83. On the other hand, this is not such an unusual position for humanitarian ventures. If Red Cross or other workers are killed while carrying out humanitarian missions, their organizations frequently threaten to withdraw no matter how much good they may be doing. Essentially what they are saying, then, is that the saving of lives is not worth the deaths of even a few rescuers.
287. On Spain, see Chris Hedges, "On Bosnia's Ethnic Fault Lines, It's Still Tense, but World Is Silent," New York Times, February 28, 1997, p. A1. On Belgium, see Des Forges, "Leave None to Tell the Story," pp. 618-620; Gourevitch, We Wish to Inform You, pp. 114-150; and African Rights, Rwanda, p. 1112. Poll data demonstrate that President Clinton (in part because he confronted vocal Republican opposition on the issue) was never able to increase the numbers of Americans who saw wisdom or value in sending U.S. policing troops to Bosnia even though it was expected that there would be few casualties. In fact, six months after the venture began, support for it had still not risen even though it was completely successful: Bosnians had stopped killing each other (even if they had not come to love each other) and, most important, no Americans had been killed. Americans have a deep concern for U.S. casualties and very little for foreign ones, and they have never had much stomach for losing American lives in humanitarian ventures. On the other hand, it seems likely that, if they are not being killed, U.S. troops can remain on peacekeeping missions almost indefinitely. See Mueller, "Common Sense"; and John Mueller, "Public Opinion as a Constraint on U.S. Foreign Policy: Assessing the Perceived Value of American and Foreign Lives," paper presented at the annual convention of the International Studies Association, Los Angeles, California, March 14-18, 2000.
288. On Spain, see Chris Hedges, "On Bosnia's Ethnic Fault Lines, It's Still Tense, but World Is Silent," New York Times, February 28, 1997, p. A1. On Belgium, see Des Forges, "Leave None to Tell the Story," pp. 618-620; Gourevitch, We Wish to Inform You, pp. 114-150; and African Rights, Rwanda, p. 1112. Poll data demonstrate that President Clinton (in part because he confronted vocal Republican opposition on the issue) was never able to increase the numbers of Americans who saw wisdom or value in sending U.S. policing troops to Bosnia even though it was expected that there would be few casualties. In fact, six months after the venture began, support for it had still not risen even though it was completely successful: Bosnians had stopped killing each other (even if they had not come to love each other) and, most important, no Americans had been killed. Americans have a deep concern for U.S. casualties and very little for foreign ones, and they have never had much stomach for losing American lives in humanitarian ventures. On the other hand, it seems likely that, if they are not being killed, U.S. troops can remain on peacekeeping missions almost indefinitely. See Mueller, "Common Sense"; and John Mueller, "Public Opinion as a Constraint on U.S. Foreign Policy: Assessing the Perceived Value of American and Foreign Lives," paper presented at the annual convention of the International Studies Association, Los Angeles, California, March 14-18, 2000.
289. On Spain, see Chris Hedges, "On Bosnia's Ethnic Fault Lines, It's Still Tense, but World Is Silent," New York Times, February 28, 1997, p. A1. On Belgium, see Des Forges, "Leave None to Tell the Story," pp. 618-620; Gourevitch, We Wish to Inform You, pp. 114-150; and African Rights, Rwanda, p. 1112. Poll data demonstrate that President Clinton (in part because he confronted vocal Republican opposition on the issue) was never able to increase the numbers of Americans who saw wisdom or value in sending U.S. policing troops to Bosnia even though it was expected that there would be few casualties. In fact, six months after the venture began, support for it had still not risen even though it was completely successful: Bosnians had stopped killing each other (even if they had not come to love each other) and, most important, no Americans had been killed. Americans have a deep concern for U.S. casualties and very little for foreign ones, and they have never had much stomach for losing American lives in humanitarian ventures. On the other hand, it seems likely that, if they are not being killed, U.S. troops can remain on peacekeeping missions almost indefinitely. See Mueller, "Common Sense"; and John Mueller, "Public Opinion as a Constraint on U.S. Foreign Policy: Assessing the Perceived Value of American and Foreign Lives," paper presented at the annual convention of the International Studies Association, Los Angeles, California, March 14-18, 2000.
290. On Spain, see Chris Hedges, "On Bosnia's Ethnic Fault Lines, It's Still Tense, but World Is Silent," New York Times, February 28, 1997, p. A1. On Belgium, see Des Forges, "Leave None to Tell the Story," pp. 618-620; Gourevitch, We Wish to Inform You, pp. 114-150; and African Rights, Rwanda, p. 1112. Poll data demonstrate that President Clinton (in part because he confronted vocal Republican opposition on the issue) was never able to increase the numbers of Americans who saw wisdom or value in sending U.S. policing troops to Bosnia even though it was expected that there would be few casualties. In fact, six months after the venture began, support for it had still not risen even though it was completely successful: Bosnians had stopped killing each other (even if they had not come to love each other) and, most important, no Americans had been killed. Americans have a deep concern for U.S. casualties and very little for foreign ones, and they have never had much stomach for losing American lives in humanitarian ventures. On the other hand, it seems likely that, if they are not being killed, U.S. troops can remain on peacekeeping missions almost indefinitely. See Mueller, "Common Sense"; and John Mueller, "Public Opinion as a Constraint on U.S. Foreign Policy: Assessing the Perceived Value of American and Foreign Lives," paper presented at the annual convention of the International Studies Association, Los Angeles, California, March 14-18, 2000.
291. On Spain, see Chris Hedges, "On Bosnia's Ethnic Fault Lines, It's Still Tense, but World Is Silent," New York Times, February 28, 1997, p. A1. On Belgium, see Des Forges, "Leave None to Tell the Story," pp. 618-620; Gourevitch, We Wish to Inform You, pp. 114-150; and African Rights, Rwanda, p. 1112. Poll data demonstrate that President Clinton (in part because he confronted vocal Republican opposition on the issue) was never able to increase the numbers of Americans who saw wisdom or value in sending U.S. policing troops to Bosnia even though it was expected that there would be few casualties. In fact, six months after the venture began, support for it had still not risen even though it was completely successful: Bosnians had stopped killing each other (even if they had not come to love each other) and, most important, no Americans had been killed. Americans have a deep concern for U.S. casualties and very little for foreign ones, and they have never had much stomach for losing American lives in humanitarian ventures. On the other hand, it seems likely that, if they are not being killed, U.S. troops can remain on peacekeeping missions almost indefinitely. See Mueller, "Common Sense"; and John Mueller, "Public Opinion as a Constraint on U.S. Foreign Policy: Assessing the Perceived Value of American and Foreign Lives," paper presented at the annual convention of the International Studies Association, Los Angeles, California, March 14-18, 2000.
292. On Spain, see Chris Hedges, "On Bosnia's Ethnic Fault Lines, It's Still Tense, but World Is Silent," New York Times, February 28, 1997, p. A1. On Belgium, see Des Forges, "Leave None to Tell the Story," pp. 618-620; Gourevitch, We Wish to Inform You, pp. 114-150; and African Rights, Rwanda, p. 1112. Poll data demonstrate that President Clinton (in part because he confronted vocal Republican opposition on the issue) was never able to increase the numbers of Americans who saw wisdom or value in sending U.S. policing troops to Bosnia even though it was expected that there would be few casualties. In fact, six months after the venture began, support for it had still not risen even though it was completely successful: Bosnians had stopped killing each other (even if they had not come to love each other) and, most important, no Americans had been killed. Americans have a deep concern for U.S. casualties and very little for foreign ones, and they have never had much stomach for losing American lives in humanitarian ventures. On the other hand, it seems likely that, if they are not being killed, U.S. troops can remain on peacekeeping missions almost indefinitely. See Mueller, "Common Sense"; and John Mueller, "Public Opinion as a Constraint on U.S. Foreign Policy: Assessing the Perceived Value of American and Foreign Lives," paper presented at the annual convention of the International Studies Association, Los Angeles, California, March 14-18, 2000.
293. Quoted in Jane Perlez, "Balkan Voice of Reason and Despair," New York Times, August 14, 1997, p. B1.
294. On the murderous rivalries of motorcycle gangs in tranquil Denmark, see Stephen Kinzer, "Biker Wars in the Land of 'The Little Mermaid,'" New York Times, May 6, 1996, p. A4. In this case, however, the thugs are taken to be an aberrant "social pathology," and they are not held to be typical of the entire national spirit as so often happens in Kaplanesque discussions of the Balkans.
295. Stanley Milgram, Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View (New York: Harper and Row, 1975); Philip G. Zimbardo, Craig Haney, Curtis Banks, and David Jaffe, "The Mind Is a Formidable Jailer," New York Times Magazine, April 8, 1973, pp. 38ff; Christopher R. Browning, Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland (New York: HarperCollins, 1998); and Fred E. Katz, Ordinary People and Extraordinary Evil: A Report on the Beguilings of Evil (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993).
296. Stanley Milgram, Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View (New York: Harper and Row, 1975); Philip G. Zimbardo, Craig Haney, Curtis Banks, and David Jaffe, "The Mind Is a Formidable Jailer," New York Times Magazine, April 8, 1973, pp. 38ff; Christopher R. Browning, Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland (New York: HarperCollins, 1998); and Fred E. Katz, Ordinary People and Extraordinary Evil: A Report on the Beguilings of Evil (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993).
297. Stanley Milgram, Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View (New York: Harper and Row, 1975); Philip G. Zimbardo, Craig Haney, Curtis Banks, and David Jaffe, "The Mind Is a Formidable Jailer," New York Times Magazine, April 8, 1973, pp. 38ff; Christopher R. Browning, Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland (New York: HarperCollins, 1998); and Fred E. Katz, Ordinary People and Extraordinary Evil: A Report on the Beguilings of Evil (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993).
298. Stanley Milgram, Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View (New York: Harper and Row, 1975); Philip G. Zimbardo, Craig Haney, Curtis Banks, and David Jaffe, "The Mind Is a Formidable Jailer," New York Times Magazine, April 8, 1973, pp. 38ff; Christopher R. Browning, Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland (New York: HarperCollins, 1998); and Fred E. Katz, Ordinary People and Extraordinary Evil: A Report on the Beguilings of Evil (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993).
299. Sadowski, Myth of Global Chaos, pp. 174-176.
300. In 1991 Robert Kaplan declared that "Macedonia is once again poised to erupt. Never in half a century has there been so much anger in Macedonia, as its people wake up from a Communist-imposed sleep. . . . Unable to stand on its own, like its more populous and historically grounded neighbor Serbia, Macedonia could implode under the pressures of Albanian nationalism from the west and Bulgarian nationalism from the east. And this is to say nothing of the pressures of Greek nationalism from the south. . . . The various popular convulsions in the Balkans are inexorably converging on Macedonia. . . . It is a tragic yet fascinating development. Rarely has the very process of history been so transparent and cyclical." Kaplan, "History's Cauldron," p. 104. See also his "Ground Zero: Macedonia: The Real Battleground," New Republic, August 2, 1993, p. 15. Inspired by such wisdom, applications of the now-popular notion of "preventative diplomacy" would have concentrated on exactly the wrong place in the early 1990s. On Bulgaria, see Venelin I. Ganev, "Bulgaria's Symphony of Hope," Journal of Democracy, Vol. 8, No. 4 (October 1997), pp. 125-139. On Romania (and also Slovakia), see Robert H. Linden, "Putting on Their Sunday Best: Romania, Hungary, and the Puzzle of Peace," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 44, No. 1 (March 2000), pp. 121-145.
301. In 1991 Robert Kaplan declared that "Macedonia is once again poised to erupt. Never in half a century has there been so much anger in Macedonia, as its people wake up from a Communist-imposed sleep. . . . Unable to stand on its own, like its more populous and historically grounded neighbor Serbia, Macedonia could implode under the pressures of Albanian nationalism from the west and Bulgarian nationalism from the east. And this is to say nothing of the pressures of Greek nationalism from the south. . . . The various popular convulsions in the Balkans are inexorably converging on Macedonia. . . . It is a tragic yet fascinating development. Rarely has the very process of history been so transparent and cyclical." Kaplan, "History's Cauldron," p. 104. See also his "Ground Zero: Macedonia: The Real Battleground," New Republic, August 2, 1993, p. 15. Inspired by such wisdom, applications of the now-popular notion of "preventative diplomacy" would have concentrated on exactly the wrong place in the early 1990s. On Bulgaria, see Venelin I. Ganev, "Bulgaria's Symphony of Hope," Journal of Democracy, Vol. 8, No. 4 (October 1997), pp. 125-139. On Romania (and also Slovakia), see Robert H. Linden, "Putting on Their Sunday Best: Romania, Hungary, and the Puzzle of Peace," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 44, No. 1 (March 2000), pp. 121-145.
302. In 1991 Robert Kaplan declared that "Macedonia is once again poised to erupt. Never in half a century has there been so much anger in Macedonia, as its people wake up from a Communist-imposed sleep. . . . Unable to stand on its own, like its more populous and historically grounded neighbor Serbia, Macedonia could implode under the pressures of Albanian nationalism from the west and Bulgarian nationalism from the east. And this is to say nothing of the pressures of Greek nationalism from the south. . . . The various popular convulsions in the Balkans are inexorably converging on Macedonia. . . . It is a tragic yet fascinating development. Rarely has the very process of history been so transparent and cyclical." Kaplan, "History's Cauldron," p. 104. See also his "Ground Zero: Macedonia: The Real Battleground," New Republic, August 2, 1993, p. 15. Inspired by such wisdom, applications of the now-popular notion of "preventative diplomacy" would have concentrated on exactly the wrong place in the early 1990s. On Bulgaria, see Venelin I. Ganev, "Bulgaria's Symphony of Hope," Journal of Democracy, Vol. 8, No. 4 (October 1997), pp. 125-139. On Romania (and also Slovakia), see Robert H. Linden, "Putting on Their Sunday Best: Romania, Hungary, and the Puzzle of Peace," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 44, No. 1 (March 2000), pp. 121-145.
303. In 1991 Robert Kaplan declared that "Macedonia is once again poised to erupt. Never in half a century has there been so much anger in Macedonia, as its people wake up from a Communist-imposed sleep. . . . Unable to stand on its own, like its more populous and historically grounded neighbor Serbia, Macedonia could implode under the pressures of Albanian nationalism from the west and Bulgarian nationalism from the east. And this is to say nothing of the pressures of Greek nationalism from the south. . . . The various popular convulsions in the Balkans are inexorably converging on Macedonia. . . . It is a tragic yet fascinating development. Rarely has the very process of history been so transparent and cyclical." Kaplan, "History's Cauldron," p. 104. See also his "Ground Zero: Macedonia: The Real Battleground," New Republic, August 2, 1993, p. 15. Inspired by such wisdom, applications of the now-popular notion of "preventative diplomacy" would have concentrated on exactly the wrong place in the early 1990s. On Bulgaria, see Venelin I. Ganev, "Bulgaria's Symphony of Hope," Journal of Democracy, Vol. 8, No. 4 (October 1997), pp. 125-139. On Romania (and also Slovakia), see Robert H. Linden, "Putting on Their Sunday Best: Romania, Hungary, and the Puzzle of Peace," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 44, No. 1 (March 2000), pp. 121-145.
304. Ignatieff, Warrior's Honor, pp. 3, 5-6; and Martin L. van Creveld, The Transformation of War (New York: Free Press, 1991), pp. ix, 197. On banditry in Chechnya, see Anatol Lieven, "A Trap for Russia," New York Times, November 30, 1999, p. A31. On the connection between crime and the Irish Republican Army, see Linda Grant, "Where Hard Men Face Hard Choices," Guardian Weekly, April 26, 1998, p. 32; on connections in Algeria, see Stathis N. Kalyvas, "Wanton and Senseless? The Logic of Massacres in Algeria," Rationality and Society, Vol. 11, No. 3 (August 1999), p. 268. On the role of criminals, alcohol, drugs, and armed children in war in Mozambique, see Keller, "In Mozambique and Other Lands, Children Fight the Wars"; in Cambodia, see Stephen J. Morris, "Pol Pot's Lingering Influence," New York Times, April 17, 1998, p. A25; in Liberia, see Howard W. French, "Liberia's Teen-Age Soldiers Find Civil War Is Over but So Is Hope," New York Times, September 11, 1995, p. A1; and in Sierra Leone, see Judith Miller, "U.N. Monitors Accuse Sierra Leone Peacekeepers of Killing," New York Times, February 12, 1999, p. A10. See also David Keen, The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars, Adelphi Paper No. 320 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1998); and Edward C. Banfield, The Unheavenly City Revisited (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), chap. 9.
305. Ignatieff, Warrior's Honor, pp. 3, 5-6; and Martin L. van Creveld, The Transformation of War (New York: Free Press, 1991), pp. ix, 197. On banditry in Chechnya, see Anatol Lieven, "A Trap for Russia," New York Times, November 30, 1999, p. A31. On the connection between crime and the Irish Republican Army, see Linda Grant, "Where Hard Men Face Hard Choices," Guardian Weekly, April 26, 1998, p. 32; on connections in Algeria, see Stathis N. Kalyvas, "Wanton and Senseless? The Logic of Massacres in Algeria," Rationality and Society, Vol. 11, No. 3 (August 1999), p. 268. On the role of criminals, alcohol, drugs, and armed children in war in Mozambique, see Keller, "In Mozambique and Other Lands, Children Fight the Wars"; in Cambodia, see Stephen J. Morris, "Pol Pot's Lingering Influence," New York Times, April 17, 1998, p. A25; in Liberia, see Howard W. French, "Liberia's Teen-Age Soldiers Find Civil War Is Over but So Is Hope," New York Times, September 11, 1995, p. A1; and in Sierra Leone, see Judith Miller, "U.N. Monitors Accuse Sierra Leone Peacekeepers of Killing," New York Times, February 12, 1999, p. A10. See also David Keen, The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars, Adelphi Paper No. 320 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1998); and Edward C. Banfield, The Unheavenly City Revisited (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), chap. 9.
306. Ignatieff, Warrior's Honor, pp. 3, 5-6; and Martin L. van Creveld, The Transformation of War (New York: Free Press, 1991), pp. ix, 197. On banditry in Chechnya, see Anatol Lieven, "A Trap for Russia," New York Times, November 30, 1999, p. A31. On the connection between crime and the Irish Republican Army, see Linda Grant, "Where Hard Men Face Hard Choices," Guardian Weekly, April 26, 1998, p. 32; on connections in Algeria, see Stathis N. Kalyvas, "Wanton and Senseless? The Logic of Massacres in Algeria," Rationality and Society, Vol. 11, No. 3 (August 1999), p. 268. On the role of criminals, alcohol, drugs, and armed children in war in Mozambique, see Keller, "In Mozambique and Other Lands, Children Fight the Wars"; in Cambodia, see Stephen J. Morris, "Pol Pot's Lingering Influence," New York Times, April 17, 1998, p. A25; in Liberia, see Howard W. French, "Liberia's Teen-Age Soldiers Find Civil War Is Over but So Is Hope," New York Times, September 11, 1995, p. A1; and in Sierra Leone, see Judith Miller, "U.N. Monitors Accuse Sierra Leone Peacekeepers of Killing," New York Times, February 12, 1999, p. A10. See also David Keen, The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars, Adelphi Paper No. 320 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1998); and Edward C. Banfield, The Unheavenly City Revisited (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), chap. 9.
307. Ignatieff, Warrior's Honor, pp. 3, 5-6; and Martin L. van Creveld, The Transformation of War (New York: Free Press, 1991), pp. ix, 197. On banditry in Chechnya, see Anatol Lieven, "A Trap for Russia," New York Times, November 30, 1999, p. A31. On the connection between crime and the Irish Republican Army, see Linda Grant, "Where Hard Men Face Hard Choices," Guardian Weekly, April 26, 1998, p. 32; on connections in Algeria, see Stathis N. Kalyvas, "Wanton and Senseless? The Logic of Massacres in Algeria," Rationality and Society, Vol. 11, No. 3 (August 1999), p. 268. On the role of criminals, alcohol, drugs, and armed children in war in Mozambique, see Keller, "In Mozambique and Other Lands, Children Fight the Wars"; in Cambodia, see Stephen J. Morris, "Pol Pot's Lingering Influence," New York Times, April 17, 1998, p. A25; in Liberia, see Howard W. French, "Liberia's Teen-Age Soldiers Find Civil War Is Over but So Is Hope," New York Times, September 11, 1995, p. A1; and in Sierra Leone, see Judith Miller, "U.N. Monitors Accuse Sierra Leone Peacekeepers of Killing," New York Times, February 12, 1999, p. A10. See also David Keen, The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars, Adelphi Paper No. 320 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1998); and Edward C. Banfield, The Unheavenly City Revisited (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), chap. 9.
308. Ignatieff, Warrior's Honor, pp. 3, 5-6; and Martin L. van Creveld, The Transformation of War (New York: Free Press, 1991), pp. ix, 197. On banditry in Chechnya, see Anatol Lieven, "A Trap for Russia," New York Times, November 30, 1999, p. A31. On the connection between crime and the Irish Republican Army, see Linda Grant, "Where Hard Men Face Hard Choices," Guardian Weekly, April 26, 1998, p. 32; on connections in Algeria, see Stathis N. Kalyvas, "Wanton and Senseless? The Logic of Massacres in Algeria," Rationality and Society, Vol. 11, No. 3 (August 1999), p. 268. On the role of criminals, alcohol, drugs, and armed children in war in Mozambique, see Keller, "In Mozambique and Other Lands, Children Fight the Wars"; in Cambodia, see Stephen J. Morris, "Pol Pot's Lingering Influence," New York Times, April 17, 1998, p. A25; in Liberia, see Howard W. French, "Liberia's Teen-Age Soldiers Find Civil War Is Over but So Is Hope," New York Times, September 11, 1995, p. A1; and in Sierra Leone, see Judith Miller, "U.N. Monitors Accuse Sierra Leone Peacekeepers of Killing," New York Times, February 12, 1999, p. A10. See also David Keen, The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars, Adelphi Paper No. 320 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1998); and Edward C. Banfield, The Unheavenly City Revisited (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), chap. 9.
309. Ignatieff, Warrior's Honor, pp. 3, 5-6; and Martin L. van Creveld, The Transformation of War (New York: Free Press, 1991), pp. ix, 197. On banditry in Chechnya, see Anatol Lieven, "A Trap for Russia," New York Times, November 30, 1999, p. A31. On the connection between crime and the Irish Republican Army, see Linda Grant, "Where Hard Men Face Hard Choices," Guardian Weekly, April 26, 1998, p. 32; on connections in Algeria, see Stathis N. Kalyvas, "Wanton and Senseless? The Logic of Massacres in Algeria," Rationality and Society, Vol. 11, No. 3 (August 1999), p. 268. On the role of criminals, alcohol, drugs, and armed children in war in Mozambique, see Keller, "In Mozambique and Other Lands, Children Fight the Wars"; in Cambodia, see Stephen J. Morris, "Pol Pot's Lingering Influence," New York Times, April 17, 1998, p. A25; in Liberia, see Howard W. French, "Liberia's Teen-Age Soldiers Find Civil War Is Over but So Is Hope," New York Times, September 11, 1995, p. A1; and in Sierra Leone, see Judith Miller, "U.N. Monitors Accuse Sierra Leone Peacekeepers of Killing," New York Times, February 12, 1999, p. A10. See also David Keen, The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars, Adelphi Paper No. 320 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1998); and Edward C. Banfield, The Unheavenly City Revisited (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), chap. 9.
310. Ignatieff, Warrior's Honor, pp. 3, 5-6; and Martin L. van Creveld, The Transformation of War (New York: Free Press, 1991), pp. ix, 197. On banditry in Chechnya, see Anatol Lieven, "A Trap for Russia," New York Times, November 30, 1999, p. A31. On the connection between crime and the Irish Republican Army, see Linda Grant, "Where Hard Men Face Hard Choices," Guardian Weekly, April 26, 1998, p. 32; on connections in Algeria, see Stathis N. Kalyvas, "Wanton and Senseless? The Logic of Massacres in Algeria," Rationality and Society, Vol. 11, No. 3 (August 1999), p. 268. On the role of criminals, alcohol, drugs, and armed children in war in Mozambique, see Keller, "In Mozambique and Other Lands, Children Fight the Wars"; in Cambodia, see Stephen J. Morris, "Pol Pot's Lingering Influence," New York Times, April 17, 1998, p. A25; in Liberia, see Howard W. French, "Liberia's Teen-Age Soldiers Find Civil War Is Over but So Is Hope," New York Times, September 11, 1995, p. A1; and in Sierra Leone, see Judith Miller, "U.N. Monitors Accuse Sierra Leone Peacekeepers of Killing," New York Times, February 12, 1999, p. A10. See also David Keen, The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars, Adelphi Paper No. 320 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1998); and Edward C. Banfield, The Unheavenly City Revisited (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), chap. 9.
311. Ignatieff, Warrior's Honor, pp. 3, 5-6; and Martin L. van Creveld, The Transformation of War (New York: Free Press, 1991), pp. ix, 197. On banditry in Chechnya, see Anatol Lieven, "A Trap for Russia," New York Times, November 30, 1999, p. A31. On the connection between crime and the Irish Republican Army, see Linda Grant, "Where Hard Men Face Hard Choices," Guardian Weekly, April 26, 1998, p. 32; on connections in Algeria, see Stathis N. Kalyvas, "Wanton and Senseless? The Logic of Massacres in Algeria," Rationality and Society, Vol. 11, No. 3 (August 1999), p. 268. On the role of criminals, alcohol, drugs, and armed children in war in Mozambique, see Keller, "In Mozambique and Other Lands, Children Fight the Wars"; in Cambodia, see Stephen J. Morris, "Pol Pot's Lingering Influence," New York Times, April 17, 1998, p. A25; in Liberia, see Howard W. French, "Liberia's Teen-Age Soldiers Find Civil War Is Over but So Is Hope," New York Times, September 11, 1995, p. A1; and in Sierra Leone, see Judith Miller, "U.N. Monitors Accuse Sierra Leone Peacekeepers of Killing," New York Times, February 12, 1999, p. A10. See also David Keen, The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars, Adelphi Paper No. 320 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1998); and Edward C. Banfield, The Unheavenly City Revisited (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), chap. 9.
312. Ignatieff, Warrior's Honor, pp. 3, 5-6; and Martin L. van Creveld, The Transformation of War (New York: Free Press, 1991), pp. ix, 197. On banditry in Chechnya, see Anatol Lieven, "A Trap for Russia," New York Times, November 30, 1999, p. A31. On the connection between crime and the Irish Republican Army, see Linda Grant, "Where Hard Men Face Hard Choices," Guardian Weekly, April 26, 1998, p. 32; on connections in Algeria, see Stathis N. Kalyvas, "Wanton and Senseless? The Logic of Massacres in Algeria," Rationality and Society, Vol. 11, No. 3 (August 1999), p. 268. On the role of criminals, alcohol, drugs, and armed children in war in Mozambique, see Keller, "In Mozambique and Other Lands, Children Fight the Wars"; in Cambodia, see Stephen J. Morris, "Pol Pot's Lingering Influence," New York Times, April 17, 1998, p. A25; in Liberia, see Howard W. French, "Liberia's Teen-Age Soldiers Find Civil War Is Over but So Is Hope," New York Times, September 11, 1995, p. A1; and in Sierra Leone, see Judith Miller, "U.N. Monitors Accuse Sierra Leone Peacekeepers of Killing," New York Times, February 12, 1999, p. A10. See also David Keen, The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars, Adelphi Paper No. 320 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1998); and Edward C. Banfield, The Unheavenly City Revisited (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), chap. 9.
313. Ignatieff, Warrior's Honor, pp. 3, 5-6; and Martin L. van Creveld, The Transformation of War (New York: Free Press, 1991), pp. ix, 197. On banditry in Chechnya, see Anatol Lieven, "A Trap for Russia," New York Times, November 30, 1999, p. A31. On the connection between crime and the Irish Republican Army, see Linda Grant, "Where Hard Men Face Hard Choices," Guardian Weekly, April 26, 1998, p. 32; on connections in Algeria, see Stathis N. Kalyvas, "Wanton and Senseless? The Logic of Massacres in Algeria," Rationality and Society, Vol. 11, No. 3 (August 1999), p. 268. On the role of criminals, alcohol, drugs, and armed children in war in Mozambique, see Keller, "In Mozambique and Other Lands, Children Fight the Wars"; in Cambodia, see Stephen J. Morris, "Pol Pot's Lingering Influence," New York Times, April 17, 1998, p. A25; in Liberia, see Howard W. French, "Liberia's Teen-Age Soldiers Find Civil War Is Over but So Is Hope," New York Times, September 11, 1995, p. A1; and in Sierra Leone, see Judith Miller, "U.N. Monitors Accuse Sierra Leone Peacekeepers of Killing," New York Times, February 12, 1999, p. A10. See also David Keen, The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars, Adelphi Paper No. 320 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1998); and Edward C. Banfield, The Unheavenly City Revisited (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), chap. 9.
314. Ignatieff, Warrior's Honor, pp. 3, 5-6; and Martin L. van Creveld, The Transformation of War (New York: Free Press, 1991), pp. ix, 197. On banditry in Chechnya, see Anatol Lieven, "A Trap for Russia," New York Times, November 30, 1999, p. A31. On the connection between crime and the Irish Republican Army, see Linda Grant, "Where Hard Men Face Hard Choices," Guardian Weekly, April 26, 1998, p. 32; on connections in Algeria, see Stathis N. Kalyvas, "Wanton and Senseless? The Logic of Massacres in Algeria," Rationality and Society, Vol. 11, No. 3 (August 1999), p. 268. On the role of criminals, alcohol, drugs, and armed children in war in Mozambique, see Keller, "In Mozambique and Other Lands, Children Fight the Wars"; in Cambodia, see Stephen J. Morris, "Pol Pot's Lingering Influence," New York Times, April 17, 1998, p. A25; in Liberia, see Howard W. French, "Liberia's Teen-Age Soldiers Find Civil War Is Over but So Is Hope," New York Times, September 11, 1995, p. A1; and in Sierra Leone, see Judith Miller, "U.N. Monitors Accuse Sierra Leone Peacekeepers of Killing," New York Times, February 12, 1999, p. A10. See also David Keen, The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars, Adelphi Paper No. 320 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1998); and Edward C. Banfield, The Unheavenly City Revisited (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), chap. 9.
315. Van Creveld, Transformation of War, p. 205. On the trend, see also John Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War (New York: Basic Books, 1989); and Mueller, Quiet Cataclysm, chap. 9. Those seeking to identify a truly new form of war might better focus on the economic warfare that has become more effective because the end of the Cold War allows major countries to coordinate their efforts more fully. See John Mueller and Karl Mueller, "Sanctions of Mass Destruction," Foreign Affairs," Vol. 78, No. 1 (May/June 1999), pp. 43-53; and John Mueller and Karl Mueller, "The Methodology of Mass Destruction: Assessing Threats in the New World Order," Journal of Strategic Studies, forthcoming.
316. Van Creveld, Transformation of War, p. 205. On the trend, see also John Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War (New York: Basic Books, 1989); and Mueller, Quiet Cataclysm, chap. 9. Those seeking to identify a truly new form of war might better focus on the economic warfare that has become more effective because the end of the Cold War allows major countries to coordinate their efforts more fully. See John Mueller and Karl Mueller, "Sanctions of Mass Destruction," Foreign Affairs," Vol. 78, No. 1 (May/June 1999), pp. 43-53; and John Mueller and Karl Mueller, "The Methodology of Mass Destruction: Assessing Threats in the New World Order," Journal of Strategic Studies, forthcoming.
317. Van Creveld, Transformation of War, p. 205. On the trend, see also John Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War (New York: Basic Books, 1989); and Mueller, Quiet Cataclysm, chap. 9. Those seeking to identify a truly new form of war might better focus on the economic warfare that has become more effective because the end of the Cold War allows major countries to coordinate their efforts more fully. See John Mueller and Karl Mueller, "Sanctions of Mass Destruction," Foreign Affairs," Vol. 78, No. 1 (May/June 1999), pp. 43-53; and John Mueller and Karl Mueller, "The Methodology of Mass Destruction: Assessing Threats in the New World Order," Journal of Strategic Studies, forthcoming.
318. Van Creveld, Transformation of War, p. 205. On the trend, see also John Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War (New York: Basic Books, 1989); and Mueller, Quiet Cataclysm, chap. 9. Those seeking to identify a truly new form of war might better focus on the economic warfare that has become more effective because the end of the Cold War allows major countries to coordinate their efforts more fully. See John Mueller and Karl Mueller, "Sanctions of Mass Destruction," Foreign Affairs," Vol. 78, No. 1 (May/June 1999), pp. 43-53; and John Mueller and Karl Mueller, "The Methodology of Mass Destruction: Assessing Threats in the New World Order," Journal of Strategic Studies, forthcoming.
319. Van Creveld, Transformation of War, p. 205. On the trend, see also John Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War (New York: Basic Books, 1989); and Mueller, Quiet Cataclysm, chap. 9. Those seeking to identify a truly new form of war might better focus on the economic warfare that has become more effective because the end of the Cold War allows major countries to coordinate their efforts more fully. See John Mueller and Karl Mueller, "Sanctions of Mass Destruction," Foreign Affairs," Vol. 78, No. 1 (May/June 1999), pp. 43-53; and John Mueller and Karl Mueller, "The Methodology of Mass Destruction: Assessing Threats in the New World Order," Journal of Strategic Studies, forthcoming.
320. Cohen, Hearts Grown Brutal, p. 297.