Economic interdependence and war a theory of trade expectations

International Security

Volumn 20, Issue 4, 1996, Pages 5-40

  Copeland, Dale C ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA   (United States)

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EID: 21344459739     PISSN: 01622889     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2539041     Document Type: Article

References (140)

1. For a summary of the causal variables in the two schools, see John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War/' International Security, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Summer 1990), pp. 5-56;
2. Robert O. Keohane, "International Liberalism Reconsidered," in John Dünn, ed., Tlte Economic Limits to Modem Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 165-194.
3. Four other subsidiary liberal arguments, employing intervening variables, are not sufficiently compelling to discuss here. The first suggests that high trade levels promote domestic prosperity, thereby lessening the internal problems that push leaders into war. The second argues that interdependence helps to foster increased understanding between peoples, which reduces the misunderstandings that lead to war. The third asserts that trade alters the domestic structure of states, heightening the influence of groups with a vested interest in peaceful trade. The final argument contends that trade has the "spill-over" effect of increasing political ties between trading partners, thus improving the prospects for long-term cooperation. For an critical analysis of these views, see Dale Copeland, "Economic Interdependence and the Outbreak of War," paper presented to University of Virginia Department of Government's faculty workshop, March 1995.
4. Richard Cobden, The Political Writings of Ricliard Cobden (London: T. Fischer Unwin, 1903), p. 225.
5. Norman Angell, Tlie Great Illusion, 2d ed. (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1933), pp. 33, 59-60, 87-89.
6. Ibid., pp. 59-62, 256.
7. Richard Rosecrance, Tlie Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World (New York: Basic Books, 1986), pp. 13-14; 24-25 (emphasis added);
8. see also Rosecrance, "War, Trade and Interdependence," in James N. Rosenau and Hylke Tromp, eds., Interdependence and Conflict in World Politics (Aldershot, U.K.: Avebury, 1989), pp. 48-57;
9. Rosecrance, "A New Concert of Powers," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 71, No. 2 (Spring 1992), pp. 64-82.
10. A book often seen as a statement on the peace-inducing effects of interdependence-Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977)-actually contains no such causal argument. For Keohane and Nye, "complex interdependence" is more peaceful by definition: it is "a valuable concept for analyzing the political process" only when military force is "unthinkable" (pp. 29, 24).
11. In the second edition: "since we define complex interdependence in terms of [policy] goals and instruments," arguments "about how goals and instruments are affected by the degree to which a situation approximates complex interdependence or realism will be tautological." Thus, "we are left essentially with two dependent variables: changes in agendas and changes in the roles of international organizations." Keohane and Nye, PoiL'er and Interdependence, 2d ed. (Glenview, 111.: Scott, Foresman, 1989), p. 255;
12. emphasis in original. The dependent variable of this article-the likelihood of war-is nowhere to be found, which is not surprising, since it is assumed away. Other works on interdependence from the 1970s, which largely examined dependent variables other than war, are discussed in Copeland, "Economic Interdependence and the Outbreak of War."
13. One might contend that realists doubt the causal importance of economic interdependence, since relative gains concerns convince great powers to avoid becoming dependent in the first place. Aside from arguments showing why states may cooperate despite concerns for relative gains (see essays by Powell, Snidal, and Keohane in David A. Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate [New York: Columbia University Press, 1993];
14. Dale Copeland, "Why Relative Gams Concerns May Promote Economic Cooperation: A Realist Explanation for Great Power Interdependence," presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, San Diego, April 1996), the argument is empirically false. Periods of high interdependence have arisen even when the security competition between great powers was particularly intense, such as from 1880 to 1914, as Waltz acknowledges. Kenneth Waltz, "The Myth of Interdependence," in Ray Maghoori and Bennett Ramberg, Globalism versus Realism (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1982), p. 83. Since the reality of high interdependence cannot be argued or assumed away, I focus here on the core realist claim that whenever high levels of interdependence are reached, for whatever reason, war is more likely.
15. Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979), p. 106.
16. John J. Mearsheimer, "Disorder Restored," in Graham Allison and Gregory F. Treverton, eds., Rethinking America's Security (New York: W.W. Norton, 1992), p. 223;
17. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future," p. 45.
18. See also Robert Gilpin, "Economic Interdependence and National Security in Historical Perspective," in Klaus Knorr and Frank N. Trager, eds., Economic Issues and National Security (Lawrence, Kan.: Alien, 1977), p. 29.
19. Adopting the realist argument, but emphasizing how dependence leads states to adopt destabilizing offensive strategies, is Anne Uchitel, "Interdepend-ence and Instability," in Jack Snyder and Robert Jervis, eds., Coping with Complexity in the International System (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1993), pp. 243-264.
20. For Barry Buzan, since liberal free-trading systems are dependent on a Hegemon which invariably declines, such systems are destined to fall into "malevolent" mercantilist practices, as states scramble to control access to goods formerly safeguarded by the hegemon. Avoiding the liberal system altogether, through a "benign" mercantilist system of self-sufficient trading blocs, will be therefore preferred. Buzan, "Economic Structure and International Security: The Limits of the Liberal Case," International Organization, Vol. 38, No. 4 (Autumn 1984), esp. pp. 597, 609-623.
21. For a similar argument, see Robert Gilpin, U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation (New York: Basic Books), 1975, p. 259.
22. See Eli F. Heckscher, Mercantilism, vol. 2, trans. Mendel Shapiro (London: George Alien, 1931), p. 15;
23. Jacob Vmer, "Power Versus Plenty as Objectives of Foreign Policy in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries," World Politics, Vol. 1, No. 1 (October 1948), p. 10;
24. David A. Baldwin, Economic Statecraft (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985), chap. 5.
25. Heckscher, Mercantilism, vol. 2, p. 40.
26. See Keohane and Nye, "World Politics and the International Economic System," in C. Fred Bergsten, ed., Tlie Future of the International Economic Order (Lexington: D.C. Heath, 1973), pp. 121122;
27. Neil R. Richardson and Charles W. Kegley, "Trade Dependence and Foreign Policy Compliance," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 24, No. 2 (June 1980), pp. 191-222.
28. David A. Baldwin, "Interdependence and Power: A Conceptual Analysis," International Organization, Vol. 34, No. 4 (Autumn 1980), pp. 478, 482-484, 489;
29. Baldwin, "The Power of Positive Sanctions," World Politics, Vol. 24, No. 1 (October 1971), pp. 19-38;
30. Albert O. Hirschman, National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade, exp. ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), chap. 2.
31. On the costs of adjustment, see Ruth Arad, Seev Hirsch, and Alfred Tovias, The Economics of Peacemaking (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), pp. 26-34.
32. Keohane and Nye examine the "costs of adjusting" as an integral part of "vulnerability" interdependence (Power and Interdependence, p. 13).
33. Yet they do not establish the original autarchic position as a baseline for examining these costs independently from the benefits of trade forgone; this baseline is incorporated later in building the new theory. Liberals also consider "costs" in terms of losses in "autonomy" due to trade ties; see Richard N. Cooper, The Economics of Interdependence (New York: McGraw Hill, 1968), pp. 4-12;
34. Rosecrance, Rise of the Trading State, pp. 39-41, 235.
35. Note, however, that these are costs that go hand in hand with high trade, not costs that are experienced if trade is cut off. Hence, these losses in autonomy are more accurately considered as a form of sensitivity interdependencecosts incurred when trade is ongoing-rather than as a form of "vulnerability" interdependence so worrying to realists. On this, see Keohane and Nye, "International Interdependence and Integration," hi Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, eds., Handbook of Political Science, vol. 8 (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1975), pp. 368-370.
36. Rosecrance, Rise of the Trading State, pp. 144-145.
37. In the appendix, an iterated prisoner's dilemma is used to show the "concrete benefits" from trade cooperation. If states decide not to cooperate, they simply "[do] not benefit"; pp. 233-236.
38. Rosecrance occasionally seems to accept that some goods are more vital than others, but even here he reiterates the liberal argument: "Countries dependent on the world economy for markets, assistance, and critical raw materials are doubly hesitant to embark on military adventures"; ibid., p. 133, emphasis added. -j '
39. See Plato's Phaedrus in Pliaedrus and Letters VII and VIII, trans. Walter Hamilton (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973), sections 246-256. The historical roots of this view are explicated in Albert O. Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism before its Triumph (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977). He quotes Montesquieu (ibid., p. 73): "It is fortunate for men to be in a situation in which, though their passions may prompt them to be wicked, they have nevertheless an interest in not being so."
40. Rosecrance, Rise of the Trading State, pp. 102-103 (see also p. 111). Rosecrance does point out that Germany and Japan apparently went to war also to gain raw materials (ibid., p. 108). He does not argue, however, that these two states were more dependent than other states for such materials; to have done so would suggest the validity of the realist logic.
41. See ibid., pp. 106, 123,150, 162.
42. See ibid., pp. 18-19, 88, 96-97, 99,150.
43. Ibid., p. 141 (see also p. 150). The argument here borders on being non-falsifiable: disconfirming cases where war occurs despite high interdependence can be sidestepped by saying simply that states did not "accept" being peaceful traders. Note as well that if states have already decided to be peaceful, then interdependence is not needed as a restraint.
44. On liberalism's inherently unit-level orientation to conflict, see Andrew Moravcsik, "Liberalism and International Relations Theory," Working Paper, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1992;
45. Michael Howard, War and the Liberal Conscience (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1978). On the democratic peace argument,
46. see Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).
47. See Rosecrance, Rise of the Trading State,"appendix.
48. On the differences between comparative statics and dynamic analyses that incorporate the future, see Eugene Silberberg, Tlie Structure of Economics, 2d ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1990), chaps. 1, 12, and 18.
49. That is, war is rational if it has either a higher net positive value or a lower net negative value. The theory thus works regardless of whether states are innately "greedy"-seeking positive gains from war-or simply security-seekers desiring to minimize long-term threats. See Charles L. Glaser, "Political Consequences of Military Strategy: Expanding and Refining the Spiral and Deterrence Models," World Politics, Vol. 44, No. 4 (July 1992), pp. 497-538.
50. By connecting the trading environment to fears about relative decline, I draw upon the notion that declining states launch preventive wars to uphold their waning security. Elsewhere, I build a solely power-driven theory showing why states faced with deep and inevitable decline initiate major wars. Dale Copeland, "Neorealism and the Myth of Bipolar Stability: Toward a New Dynamic Realist Theory of Major War," Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Spring 1996).
51. This is consistent with standard trade theory. See Richard E. Caves and Ronald W. Jones, World Trade and Payments, 4th ed. (Boston: Little Brown, 1985), chaps. 3-4.
52. I thank Andrew Moravcsik for discussions on the potential benefits of trade.
53. The capital investments represent "sunk costs" not easily recouped. See Arad, Hirsch, and Tovias, The Economics of Peacemaking, pp. 26-28.
54. On the importance of alternatives, see Baldwin, "Interdependence and Power," p. 482;
55. Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence, p. 13.
56. It is worth remembering that alternative suppliers and markets are only valuable in reducing A's dependence if A can get access to them. If B is able not only to sever bilateral trade, but also to blockade A to prevent third-party trading, then A effectively has no alternatives and is therefore dependent. This was the situation for Japan vis-à-vis the United States before 1941 regarding oil imports. 31.
57. This Une of reasoning is developed formally in Dale Copeland, "Modelling Economic Interdependence and War: A Theory of Trade Expectations," paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September 1995.
58. It is consistent with consideration of the "probability of transaction" as a determinant of expected national income in Arad, Hirsch, and Tovias, The Economic of Peacemaking, pp. 37-43, although they do not employ expectations of future trade as a theoretical variable affecting the likelihood of war.
59. The U.S.-Soviet Cold War case is covered in Copeland, "Modelling Economic Interdependence and War."
60. See Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), chaps. 2-3.
61. This is developed formally in Copeland, "Modelling Economic Interdependence and War."
62. See Peter Liberman, "Does Conquest Pay? The Exploitation of Occupied Industrial Economies" (Ph.D. diss., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1991).
63. Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, trans. Rex Warner (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1954), Book 1, lines 80-88.
64. When one state is very large and the other very small, it is harder to sort out the effects of interdependence from the effects of relative power, at least hi actual cases of war. The expected value of war for the superior state is likely to be quite positive anyway, and thus will tend to overshadow the expected value of trade even when the state has positive expectations of future trade. Here, the superior state simply chooses war as the "greater of two goods." This choice would not be altered by any diminution of trade expectations; indeed, war would simply be even more rational as the expected value of trade (and therefore peace) falls. War in such a situation of marked power imbalance and low expectations of future trade is thus overdetermined; it would be difficult to tell whether war occurred because of the positive expected value of war, the negative expected value of trade, or both. Thus, in my empirical analysis, I examine cases where great powers attacked great powers in long and costly total wars. While these cases do not cover the universe of wars, they do isolate the role of economic interdependence and changing expectations of future trade in the outbreak of war.
65. Given space constraints, my case studies in this article do not provide a full analysis of the bargaining dynamic. For an analysis of interstate economic bargaining, see Baldwin, Economic Statecraft, chap. 6;
66. R. Harrison Wagner, "Economic Interdependence, Bargaining Power, and Political Influence," International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer 1988), pp. 461183.
67. Note also that there may be a causal feedback loop, whereby increasing fears of war lead others to reduce trade, which in turn heightens the incentive of dependent states to initiate war. These and other issues involving the endogeneity of trade expectations are addressed more fully in my book manuscript, "Economic Interdependence and War."
68. Note that state A, the decision-making unit in the theory, can still be treated as a rational unitary actor responding to the observed domestic forces on the other side.
69. See Copeland, "Modeling Economic Interdependence and War," pp. 62-66.
70. International trade institutions such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), by lowering transaction costs and facilitating the punishment of cheaters, may be an additional means to build positive expectations for future trade. Indeed, for some liberals, peace may only be likely when both interdependence and effective global institutions co-exist and reinforce one another; Keohane, "International Liberalism Reconsidered," p. 183. While such institutions may indeed affect trade expectations, they are unlikely to be as significant in history as the systemic and domestic factors just discussed, for the simple reason that these institutions are a creation of the post-World War II era. Moreover, since concerns for war and peace revolve mostly around the great powers, and powers like Soviet Union and China have been historically excluded from trade institutions like GATT, such institutions cannot account for fluctuations in the levels of tension between the United States and these powers since 1945. Finally, the institutional approach overlooks bilateral diplomacy as the principal mechanism through which expectations of trade change; consider the United States and Japan up to December 1941, or the United States and Japan today. Accordingly, while my argument recognizes the contribution institutions can make to the improvement of future trade expectations, the focus both theoretically and empirically remains fundamentally non-institutional.
71. Trade expectations theory, like realism, is a systemic theory; it assumes no unit-level drives towards aggression. While expectations may seem like a unit-level factor, remember that these are expectations of an external phenomenon, namely, the other's propensity to trade into the future; the causal source of behavior comes from outside, not from within, the actor. See Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 60. One might also argue that domestic and individual level factors within a state can distort expectations, but I simply assume that such misperceptions are minimal for purposes of building a deductive theory; this assumption can be later relaxed if so desired.
72. Given space limitations, my "best case" among the major wars of this century, Japan and World War II, is covered elsewhere; Copeland, "Modelling Economic Interdependence and War." I show that Japanese leaders-military, civilian, and the emperor himself-reluctantly moved towards a consensus for war with the United States and Britain due to progressively more devastating U.S.-British trade sanctions. Japan, due to its small size, was almost completely dependent on outside sources for the raw materials and oil that supported its industrial structure. As American and British trade restrictions began to increase after 1930, and especially after a series of embargoes starting in 1939, Japan shifted from a primary concern with the Soviet threat to the need for control of raw materials in South East Asia. After the U.S., British, and Dutch severed all oil trade to Japan in July-August 1941, Japanese leaders agreed that unless oil imports were restored, economic decline would imperil long-term security. Hence, following the failure of desperate diplomatic initiatives in November 1941 to secure renewed trade, the plan for all-out war was accepted by the emperor. In short, Japan's extreme dependence, coupled with very negative expectations for future trade, pushed the country into a war that almost all recognized would have great costs and a low probability of success. See Nobutaka Ike, Irans, and ed., Japan's Decision for War: Records of the 1941 Policy Conferences (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967).
73. See note 37, above. To minimize the selection bias of focusing just on the wars themselves, I also look at the periods before the wars began, to see how incentives for aggression changed as independent variables did.
74. Empirical analyses so far have been primarily correlational studies, finding that high trade tends to be associated with lower conflict. Mark J. Gasiorowski, "Economic Interdependence and International Conflict: Some Cross-national Evidence," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 30, No. 1 (March 1986), pp. 22-38;
75. Mark J. Gasiorowski and Solomon W. Polachek, "Conflict and Interdependence: East-West Trade and Linkages in the Era of Detente," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 26, No. 4 (December 1982), pp. 709-729;
76. Polachek, "Conflict and Trade," Journal of Conflict Research, Vol. 24, No. 1 (March 1980), pp. 55-78;
77. William J. Domke, War and the dunging Global System (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), chap. 5;
78. Edward D. Mansfield, Power, Trade, and War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), chap 4.
79. These studies, however, provide no documentary evidence that leaders considered trade levels in deciding between war and peace. It is thus hard to know whether the correlation is spurious or illuminating. While the result seems to support liberalism over realism, it is also consistent with trade expectations theory: high trade should be associated with lower conflict in those instances where expectations for future trade are also positive. Given their suspect methodologies, one should also be cautious about quickly dismissing realism. The correlation of trade with less conflict in the first three studies is not surprising, since dyads of small states are included to build the sample. Such states tend to have very high trade/GNP ratios. See Stephen D. Krasner, "State Power and the Structure of International Trade," World Politics, Vol. 28, No. 3 (April 1976),-p. 328. However, they are deterred from war by their very size. Note as well that all of these tests simply assume that the trade/GNP ratio alone is an adequate measure of the core concept, dependence. Given the concern of realism and trade expectations theory for the costs of severed trade, a proper test must also include such factors as dependence on others for vital goods and availability of alternative sources of supply.
80. See Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise of Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860-1914 (London: Ashfield, 1980), chaps. 12-14.
81. Quoted from German Diplomatic Documents, 1871-1914, vol. II, trans. E.T.S. Dugsdale (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1930), pp. 486-487.
82. Fritz Fischer, War of Illusions: German Policies from 1911 to 1914, trans. Marian Jackson (New York: W. W. Norton, 1975), p. 7.
83. Lamar Cecil, Albert Ballin: Business and Politics in Imperial Germany (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), p. 149.
84. It was at this time that German leaders implemented the concepts of Weltpolitik and Mitteleuropa as responses to growing foreign protectionism. Weltpolitik sought "the attainment of secure external supplies of raw materials at regulated prices," while Mitteleuropa, its continental counterpart, envisioned the development of "an organized and protected system of economic exchanges between an industrial Germany and an agricultural periphery in central and eastern Europe." See Woodruff D. Smith, The Ideological Origins of Nazi Imperialism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 65, 78.
85. See B.R. Mitchell, European Historical Statistics, 1750-1975,2d rev. ed. (New York: Facts on File, 1981), pp. 514,821 on trade/GNP; pp. 393,439 on oil; pp. 409,445-446 on iron ore.
86. See W.F. Brück, Social and Economic History of Germany from William II to Hitler, 1888-1938 (Cardiff: Oxford University Press, 1938), p. 110, on raw materials..-
87. Holger H. Herwig, Politics of Frustration: The United States in German Naval Planning, 1889-1941 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1976), p. 9.
88. Quoted in G. Lowes Dickinson, The International Anarchy, 1904-1914 (New York: Century, 1926), p. 261; see also chap. 10.
89. See Fiona Venn, Oil Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century (New York: St. Martin's, 1986), chap. 2;
90. Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991), pp. 153-163.
91. Fischer, War of Illusions, pp. 321-322;
92. see also Hans W. Gatzke, Germany's Drive to the West (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1950), pp. 30-38.
93. Quoted in Fischer, War of Illusion, p. 326; see also pp. 322-326.
94. Avner Offer, The First World War: An Agrarian Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 322; chaps. 15-21; pp. 325-326, 335. By 1906, Germany was importing about 20 per cent of its annual grain consumption (p. 230).
95. While Fischer's goal is to show that domestic causes for the war were predominant, much of his evidence actually indicates that German leaders were driven by systemic concerns, namely the safeguarding of German economic security. Fischer, War of Illusions, pp. viii-ix.
96. Quoted in ibid., p. 35.
97. Fischer's words, ibid., p. 10.
98. Quotations in ibid., pp. 234, 250-253.
99. Quoted in ibid., pp. 238, 450.
100. For a summary, see Dale Copeland, "Realism and the Origins of Major War" (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1993), chaps. 3 and 4.
101. Quoted in Fritz Fischer, Germany's Aims in the First World War (New York: W. W. Norton, 1967), pp. 103-104.
102. Ibid., pp. 101 and 11. The first part of the quote is Fischer's paraphrase from the document; the words "essential objective" Fischer takes from the document itself. Bethmann was clearly impressed by the memo; he circulated it throughout the department. Ibid., p. 101.
103. Quoted in Fischer, War of Illusions, p. 533;
104. Fischer, Germany's Aims, p. 104.
105. Fischer's words summarizing the document, War of Illusions, p. 538.
106. Quoted in ibid., p. 540. _ .
107. Quoted in ibid., p. 539.
108. Quoted in Fischer, War of Illusions, p. 539
109. and Germany's Aims, p. 251.
110. In showing this continuity, I do not mean to minimize the atrocities committed by the Nazi regime. Rather, while Hitler's means were far more evil than Wilhelmine Germany's, many of his ends in terms of economic and territorial security were essentially the same. The most important contribution to the "continuity" argument in modern historiography is Fritz Fischer's work and the work of his followers in the "Hamburg School." See also Smith, Ideological Origins.
111. Hitler, Mein Kampf, trans. Ralph Manheim (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1925), pp. 131-140. For the pre-1914 origins of the idea of Lebensraum, see Smith, Ideological Origins, chap. 5.
112. On Hitler's fears of the rise of Russia, see Hitler, Mein Kampf, chap. 24.
113. From J. Noakes and G. Pridham's summary notes, Nazism 1919-1945: A Documentary Reader, vols. 2 and 3 (Exeter, U.K.: University of Exeter, 1988), pp. 259-260.
114. Ibid., p. 260.
115. Ibid., Doc. No. 181, p. 270.
116. Ibid., p. 274. See also Hirschman, National Power, part II.
117. Noakes and Pridham,-Nazism, 2919-1945, p. 277.
118. Ibid., Doc. No. 185, pp. 283-284.
119. Ibid., Doc. No. 185, pp. 284-286 (emphasis added).
120. Oil figures from Robert Goralski and Russell W. Freeburg, Oil and War: How the Deadly Struggle for Fuel in VfWII Meant Victory or Defeat (New York: William Morrow, 1987), p. 26;
121. iron ore from Mitchell, European Historical Statistics, pp.J446, 410; raw materials from Noakes and Pridham, Nazism 1919-1945, p. 291.
122. On German efforts to reduce dependence through increased trade ties with China and Eastern Europe, and through intervention in the Spanish Civil War, see Gerhard L. Weinberg, Tlie Foreign Policy of Hitler's Germany: Starting World War II (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), chaps. 1, 5 and 7;
123. David E. Kaiser, Economic Diplomacy and Ihe Origins of the Second World War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980);
124. Robert H. Whealey, Hitler and Spain: The Nazi Role in the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939 (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1989);
125. Berenice A. Carroll, Design for Total War: Arms and Economics in the Third Reich (The Hague: Mouton, 1968).
126. Yergin, The Prize, p. 332.
127. See Noakes and Pridham, Nazism 1919-1945, p. 680.
128. Ibid., Doc. No. 503, pp. 681-683.
129. Ibid., Doc. No. 503, pp. 682-683.
130. Ibid., Doc. No. 503, pp. 684-685.
131. One might discount Hitler's language as mere talk necessary to justify his true driving force, which was his lust to dominate others; see Hans J. Morgenthau,' Scientific Man Versus Power Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946).
132. Even if this were true, however, it begs the question of why he felt his four key military leaders would need to hear an elaborate economic rationale for war. We thus return to the point that without the support of his subordinates, Hitler could not have initiated war; calculated aggression, therefore, had to have a logical end. It is also clear that the majority of Hitler's military leaders were not simply brain-washed dupes of Nazi ideology, but accepted the necessity of major war on strategic grounds. See the essays in Correlli Barnett, ed., Hitler's Generals (New York: Quill, 1989);
133. John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), chap. 4;
134. Dale Copeland, "Deterrence, Reassurance, And Machiavellian Appeasement: Was the Second World War Inevitable?" paper presented at Security Studies conference on "Deterrence after the Cold War: Theoretical Perspectives and Policy Implications of Enduring Rivalries," Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Calif., September 1995.
135. On May 23,1939, Hitler told his top military officials that while Germany must "aim at a short war," it "must also be prepared for a war of 10-15 years' duration." Noakes and Pridham, Nazism 1919-1945, Doc. No. 539, p. 738.
136. See Nicholas D. Kristof, "The Rise of China," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 5 (November/ December 1993), p. 64.
137. China has already staked a claim to the potentially oil rich and much disputed Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. See Gerald Segal, "East Asia and The 'Constamment' of China," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Spring 1996), pp. 107-135.
138. William H. Overholt, The Rise of China: How Economic Reform is Creating a New Superpower (New York: Norton, 1993).
139. For an exaggerated but still insightful analysis of this, see George Friedman and Meredith Lebard, The Coming War with Japan (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991).
140. See Erik Whitlock, "Ukrainian-Russian Trade: The Economics of Dependency," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Report, Vol. 2, No. 43 (October 29,1993), pp. 38-42.