The controversy over the democratic peace: Rearguard action or cracks in the wall?

International Security

Volumn 22, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 162-198

  Maoz, Zeev ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0348008413     PISSN: 01622889     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/isec.22.1.162     Document Type: Review

References (133)

1. For reviews of this literature, see Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993); James Lee Ray, Democracy and International Conflict (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1995); Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., Debating the Democratic Peace (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press 1996); and James Lee Ray, "The Pacifying Impact of Democracy: Indubitable or Chimerical?" Mimeo, Vanderbilt University (January 1997).
2. For reviews of this literature, see Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993); James Lee Ray, Democracy and International Conflict (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1995); Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., Debating the Democratic Peace (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press 1996); and James Lee Ray, "The Pacifying Impact of Democracy: Indubitable or Chimerical?" Mimeo, Vanderbilt University (January 1997).
3. For reviews of this literature, see Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993); James Lee Ray, Democracy and International Conflict (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1995); Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., Debating the Democratic Peace (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press 1996); and James Lee Ray, "The Pacifying Impact of Democracy: Indubitable or Chimerical?" Mimeo, Vanderbilt University (January 1997).
4. For reviews of this literature, see Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993); James Lee Ray, Democracy and International Conflict (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1995); Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., Debating the Democratic Peace (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press 1996); and James Lee Ray, "The Pacifying Impact of Democracy: Indubitable or Chimerical?" Mimeo, Vanderbilt University (January 1997).
5. An example of this critique is given by John D. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War," International Security, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Summer 1990), pp. 5-56. This study is not discussed here because it does not present empirical evidence to substantiate these claims. Other studies of this genre are discussed below.
6. Some of the first studies to examine the democratic peace issue hinted at the danger involved in extrapolating prescriptive guidelines from the fact that democracies seemingly do not fight each other. See Melvin Small and J. David Singer, "The War-Proneness of Democratic Regimes," Jerusalem Journal of International Relations, Vol. 1, No. 1 (April 1976), pp. 46-61, and Jack E. Vincent, "Freedom and International Conflict: Another Look," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 31, No. 1 (March 1987), pp. 103-112.
7. Some of the first studies to examine the democratic peace issue hinted at the danger involved in extrapolating prescriptive guidelines from the fact that democracies seemingly do not fight each other. See Melvin Small and J. David Singer, "The War-Proneness of Democratic Regimes," Jerusalem Journal of International Relations, Vol. 1, No. 1 (April 1976), pp. 46-61, and Jack E. Vincent, "Freedom and International Conflict: Another Look," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 31, No. 1 (March 1987), pp. 103-112.
8. See, for example, the pessimistic status reports on international conflict and war in Ted Robert Gurr, ed., Handbook of Political Conflict (New York: Free Press, 1980), especially the articles by Dina Zinncs and Michael Stohl. Another more recent and basically pessimistic review is provided by Jack S. Levy, "The Causes of War: A Review of Theories and Evidence," in Philip E. Tetlock, Roy Radner, and Robert Axelrod, eds., Behavior, Society, and Nuclear War, Vol. 1 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 209-333. One review that views the full half of the research glass is John A. Vasquez, The War Puzzle (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
9. See, for example, the pessimistic status reports on international conflict and war in Ted Robert Gurr, ed., Handbook of Political Conflict (New York: Free Press, 1980), especially the articles by Dina Zinncs and Michael Stohl. Another more recent and basically pessimistic review is provided by Jack S. Levy, "The Causes of War: A Review of Theories and Evidence," in Philip E. Tetlock, Roy Radner, and Robert Axelrod, eds., Behavior, Society, and Nuclear War, Vol. 1 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 209-333. One review that views the full half of the research glass is John A. Vasquez, The War Puzzle (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
10. See, for example, the pessimistic status reports on international conflict and war in Ted Robert Gurr, ed., Handbook of Political Conflict (New York: Free Press, 1980), especially the articles by Dina Zinncs and Michael Stohl. Another more recent and basically pessimistic review is provided by Jack S. Levy, "The Causes of War: A Review of Theories and Evidence," in Philip E. Tetlock, Roy Radner, and Robert Axelrod, eds., Behavior, Society, and Nuclear War, Vol. 1 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 209-333. One review that views the full half of the research glass is John A. Vasquez, The War Puzzle (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
11. Zeev Maoz, Domestic Sources of Global Change (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), chaps. 1 and 7; Bruce Russett, "Processes of Dyadic Choice for War and Peace," World Politics, Vol. 47, No. 2 (January 1995), pp. 268-282; Bruce Russett, "And Yet It Moves," Internation Security, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring 1995), pp. 164-175; and Ray, Democracy and International Conflict.
12. Zeev Maoz, Domestic Sources of Global Change (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), chaps. 1 and 7; Bruce Russett, "Processes of Dyadic Choice for War and Peace," World Politics, Vol. 47, No. 2 (January 1995), pp. 268-282; Bruce Russett, "And Yet It Moves," Internation Security, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring 1995), pp. 164-175; and Ray, Democracy and International Conflict.
13. Zeev Maoz, Domestic Sources of Global Change (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), chaps. 1 and 7; Bruce Russett, "Processes of Dyadic Choice for War and Peace," World Politics, Vol. 47, No. 2 (January 1995), pp. 268-282; Bruce Russett, "And Yet It Moves," Internation Security, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring 1995), pp. 164-175; and Ray, Democracy and International Conflict.
14. Zeev Maoz, Domestic Sources of Global Change (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), chaps. 1 and 7; Bruce Russett, "Processes of Dyadic Choice for War and Peace," World Politics, Vol. 47, No. 2 (January 1995), pp. 268-282; Bruce Russett, "And Yet It Moves," Internation Security, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring 1995), pp. 164-175; and Ray, Democracy and International Conflict.
15. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future"; David E. Spiro, "The Insignificance of the Democratic Peace," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 2 (Summer 1994), pp. 50-86; and Henry Farber and Joanne Gowa, "Polities and Peace," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 2 (Summer 1995), pp. 123, 146.
16. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future"; David E. Spiro, "The Insignificance of the Democratic Peace," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 2 (Summer 1994), pp. 50-86; and Henry Farber and Joanne Gowa, "Polities and Peace," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 2 (Summer 1995), pp. 123, 146.
17. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future"; David E. Spiro, "The Insignificance of the Democratic Peace," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 2 (Summer 1994), pp. 50-86; and Henry Farber and Joanne Gowa, "Polities and Peace," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 2 (Summer 1995), pp. 123, 146.
18. Spiro, "The Insignificance of the Democratic Peace," Appendix, pp. 82-86, column 9.
19. Zeev Maoz and Nasrin Abdolali, "Regime Type and International Conflict, 1816-1976," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 33, No. 1 (March 1989), p. 25.
20. Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett, "Alliance, Wealth Contiguity, and Political Stability: Is the Lack of Conflict Between Democracies a Statistical Artifact?" International Interactions, Vol. 17, No. 4 (January 1992), pp. 245-267, and Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett, "Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace 1946-1986," American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 3 (September 1993), pp. 624-638. Politically relevant dyads are dyads that are directly or indirectly contiguous or those in which one member is a major power with a global reach capacity or a regional power with a regional reach capacity.
21. Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett, "Alliance, Wealth Contiguity, and Political Stability: Is the Lack of Conflict Between Democracies a Statistical Artifact?" International Interactions, Vol. 17, No. 4 (January 1992), pp. 245-267, and Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett, "Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace 1946-1986," American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 3 (September 1993), pp. 624-638. Politically relevant dyads are dyads that are directly or indirectly contiguous or those in which one member is a major power with a global reach capacity or a regional power with a regional reach capacity.
22. I differ with James Lee Ray, "War Between Democracies: Rare or Nonexistent?" International Interactions, Vol. 18, No. 3 (September 1993), pp. 251-276, and Ray, Democracy and International Conflict, as well as with my findings in Maoz and Abdolali, "Regime Type," due to a modified coding that allows for the changing nature of democracy over time. See Maoz Domestic Sources, chap. 2, Appendix.
23. I differ with James Lee Ray, "War Between Democracies: Rare or Nonexistent?" International Interactions, Vol. 18, No. 3 (September 1993), pp. 251-276, and Ray, Democracy and International Conflict, as well as with my findings in Maoz and Abdolali, "Regime Type," due to a modified coding that allows for the changing nature of democracy over time. See Maoz Domestic Sources, chap. 2, Appendix.
24. I differ with James Lee Ray, "War Between Democracies: Rare or Nonexistent?" International Interactions, Vol. 18, No. 3 (September 1993), pp. 251-276, and Ray, Democracy and International Conflict, as well as with my findings in Maoz and Abdolali, "Regime Type," due to a modified coding that allows for the changing nature of democracy over time. See Maoz Domestic Sources, chap. 2, Appendix.
25. Despite my objection to the Farber-Gowa breakdown of the temporal domain, I use their subperiods rather than those of Maoz and Abdolali. The Maoz-Russett democracy scale is given in Maoz and Russett, "Normative and Structural Causes." Table 1 reports only the analysis on all possible dyads. The results on politically relevant dyads are given in Zeev Maoz, "Realist and Cultural Critiques of the Democratic Peace: A Theoretical and Empirical Re-Assessment," International Interactions (forthcoming).
26. Despite my objection to the Farber-Gowa breakdown of the temporal domain, I use their subperiods rather than those of Maoz and Abdolali. The Maoz-Russett democracy scale is given in Maoz and Russett, "Normative and Structural Causes." Table 1 reports only the analysis on all possible dyads. The results on politically relevant dyads are given in Zeev Maoz, "Realist and Cultural Critiques of the Democratic Peace: A Theoretical and Empirical Re-Assessment," International Interactions (forthcoming).
27. Maoz and Abdolali, "Regime Type," pp. 24-26.
28. Charles S. Gochman and Zeev Maoz, "Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1816-1976: Procedures, Patterns, Insights," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 29, No. 4 (December 1984), pp. 585-615.
29. Farber and Gowa, "Polities and Peace," p. 139.
30. Ibid., p. 132.
31. Melvin Small and J. David Singer, Resort to Arms (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1982). My figures differ only marginally from Spiro's, "The Insignificance of the Liberal Peace," on nation dyads and democratic-democratic dyads. Spiro's war dyads figures are larger than mine because in multilateral wars he includes non-war dyads as war participants. See discussion below on this point.
32. Melvin Small and J. David Singer, Resort to Arms (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1982). My figures differ only marginally from Spiro's, "The Insignificance of the Liberal Peace," on nation dyads and democratic-democratic dyads. Spiro's war dyads figures are larger than mine because in multilateral wars he includes non-war dyads as war participants. See discussion below on this point.
33. Spiro, "The Insignificance of the Liberal Peace," pp. 77-79.
34. See Gary Goertz and Paul F. Diehl, "Enduring Rivalries: Theoretical Constructs and Empirical Patterns," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 37, No. 2 (June 1993), pp. 147-171, and Zeev Maoz and Ben D. Mor, "Enduring Rivalries: The Early Years," International Political Science Review, Vol. 17, No. 2 (April 1996), pp. 141-160, for the definition of the concept of enduring rivalries. Paul Hensel, Gary Goertz, and Paul F. Diehl, in "The Democratic Peace and Rivalries: A Longitudinal Investigation of Regimes, Regime Change, and Conflict," Mimeo, Florida State University, 1996, provide similar results.
35. See Gary Goertz and Paul F. Diehl, "Enduring Rivalries: Theoretical Constructs and Empirical Patterns," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 37, No. 2 (June 1993), pp. 147-171, and Zeev Maoz and Ben D. Mor, "Enduring Rivalries: The Early Years," International Political Science Review, Vol. 17, No. 2 (April 1996), pp. 141-160, for the definition of the concept of enduring rivalries. Paul Hensel, Gary Goertz, and Paul F. Diehl, in "The Democratic Peace and Rivalries: A Longitudinal Investigation of Regimes, Regime Change, and Conflict," Mimeo, Florida State University, 1996, provide similar results.
36. See Gary Goertz and Paul F. Diehl, "Enduring Rivalries: Theoretical Constructs and Empirical Patterns," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 37, No. 2 (June 1993), pp. 147-171, and Zeev Maoz and Ben D. Mor, "Enduring Rivalries: The Early Years," International Political Science Review, Vol. 17, No. 2 (April 1996), pp. 141-160, for the definition of the concept of enduring rivalries. Paul Hensel, Gary Goertz, and Paul F. Diehl, in "The Democratic Peace and Rivalries: A Longitudinal Investigation of Regimes, Regime Change, and Conflict," Mimeo, Florida State University, 1996, provide similar results.
37. This is consistent with the emerging knowledge about the characteristics of conflict in the modern era. Specifically, we now know that most militarized disputes and war were waged between politically relevant dyads. See Maoz, Domestic Sources, chap. 5. We also know that many of these politically relevant dyads were disproportionately likely to evolve into enduring rivalries, characterized by extremely high dispute and war frequencies. See Goertz and Diehl, "The Empirical Importance of Enduring Rivalries," International Interactions, Vol. 18, No. 2 (June 1992), pp. 151-163.
38. This is consistent with the emerging knowledge about the characteristics of conflict in the modern era. Specifically, we now know that most militarized disputes and war were waged between politically relevant dyads. See Maoz, Domestic Sources, chap. 5. We also know that many of these politically relevant dyads were disproportionately likely to evolve into enduring rivalries, characterized by extremely high dispute and war frequencies. See Goertz and Diehl, "The Empirical Importance of Enduring Rivalries," International Interactions, Vol. 18, No. 2 (June 1992), pp. 151-163.
39. A comprehensive list of all states with more than five disputes in their common history is given in Maoz, "Realist and Cultural Critiques."
40. Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace, pp. 30-42, and Maoz and Russett, "Normative and Structural Causes."
41. Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace, pp. 30-42, and Maoz and Russett, "Normative and Structural Causes."
42. An extensive analysis of the Farber and Gowa critique of the normative and structural models is given in Maoz, "Realist and Cultural Critiques."
43. Christopher Layne, "Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 2 (Summer 1994), pp. 5-19.
44. It must be noted that realists do not agree on the question of the balance of power and conflict. Some argue that balance promotes stability. See, for example, Kenneth E. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Menlo Park, Calif.: Addison-Wesley, 1979), and Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future." Others claim that balance promotes conflict. See, for example, A.F.K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), and Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War (New York: Free Press, 1988). The empirical evidence mentioned above leans heavily in favor of the latter argument.
45. It must be noted that realists do not agree on the question of the balance of power and conflict. Some argue that balance promotes stability. See, for example, Kenneth E. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Menlo Park, Calif.: Addison-Wesley, 1979), and Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future." Others claim that balance promotes conflict. See, for example, A.F.K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), and Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War (New York: Free Press, 1988). The empirical evidence mentioned above leans heavily in favor of the latter argument.
46. It must be noted that realists do not agree on the question of the balance of power and conflict. Some argue that balance promotes stability. See, for example, Kenneth E. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Menlo Park, Calif.: Addison-Wesley, 1979), and Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future." Others claim that balance promotes conflict. See, for example, A.F.K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), and Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War (New York: Free Press, 1988). The empirical evidence mentioned above leans heavily in favor of the latter argument.
47. It must be noted that realists do not agree on the question of the balance of power and conflict. Some argue that balance promotes stability. See, for example, Kenneth E. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Menlo Park, Calif.: Addison-Wesley, 1979), and Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future." Others claim that balance promotes conflict. See, for example, A.F.K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), and Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War (New York: Free Press, 1988). The empirical evidence mentioned above leans heavily in favor of the latter argument.
48. Farber and Gowa, "Polities and Peace," p. 138.
49. See, for example, Waltz, Theory of International Politics; George Liska, Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962); Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948); Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, The War Trap (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1981); Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliance (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987); James D. Morrow, "Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Models of Alliances," American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 35, No. 44 (December 1991), pp. 904-933; and Randolph M. Siverson and Harvey Starr, "Regime Change and the Restructuring of Alliances," American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 38, No. 1 (March 1994), pp. 145-161.
50. See, for example, Waltz, Theory of International Politics; George Liska, Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962); Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948); Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, The War Trap (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1981); Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliance (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987); James D. Morrow, "Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Models of Alliances," American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 35, No. 44 (December 1991), pp. 904-933; and Randolph M. Siverson and Harvey Starr, "Regime Change and the Restructuring of Alliances," American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 38, No. 1 (March 1994), pp. 145-161.
51. See, for example, Waltz, Theory of International Politics; George Liska, Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962); Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948); Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, The War Trap (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1981); Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliance (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987); James D. Morrow, "Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Models of Alliances," American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 35, No. 44 (December 1991), pp. 904-933; and Randolph M. Siverson and Harvey Starr, "Regime Change and the Restructuring of Alliances," American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 38, No. 1 (March 1994), pp. 145-161.
52. See, for example, Waltz, Theory of International Politics; George Liska, Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962); Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948); Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, The War Trap (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1981); Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliance (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987); James D. Morrow, "Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Models of Alliances," American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 35, No. 44 (December 1991), pp. 904-933; and Randolph M. Siverson and Harvey Starr, "Regime Change and the Restructuring of Alliances," American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 38, No. 1 (March 1994), pp. 145-161.
53. See, for example, Waltz, Theory of International Politics; George Liska, Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962); Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948); Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, The War Trap (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1981); Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliance (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987); James D. Morrow, "Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Models of Alliances," American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 35, No. 44 (December 1991), pp. 904-933; and Randolph M. Siverson and Harvey Starr, "Regime Change and the Restructuring of Alliances," American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 38, No. 1 (March 1994), pp. 145-161.
54. See, for example, Waltz, Theory of International Politics; George Liska, Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962); Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948); Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, The War Trap (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1981); Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliance (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987); James D. Morrow, "Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Models of Alliances," American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 35, No. 44 (December 1991), pp. 904-933; and Randolph M. Siverson and Harvey Starr, "Regime Change and the Restructuring of Alliances," American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 38, No. 1 (March 1994), pp. 145-161.
55. See, for example, Waltz, Theory of International Politics; George Liska, Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962); Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948); Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, The War Trap (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1981); Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliance (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987); James D. Morrow, "Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Models of Alliances," American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 35, No. 44 (December 1991), pp. 904-933; and Randolph M. Siverson and Harvey Starr, "Regime Change and the Restructuring of Alliances," American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 38, No. 1 (March 1994), pp. 145-161.
56. Charles Lave and James G. March, Introduction to Models in the Social Sciences (New York: Harper and Row, 1975), and Benjamin Most and Harvey Starr, Inquiry, Logic, and International Politics (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1989). For an application of this approach in research on the democratic peace, see Maoz and Russett, "Normative and Structural Causes."
57. Charles Lave and James G. March, Introduction to Models in the Social Sciences (New York: Harper and Row, 1975), and Benjamin Most and Harvey Starr, Inquiry, Logic, and International Politics (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1989). For an application of this approach in research on the democratic peace, see Maoz and Russett, "Normative and Structural Causes."
58. Charles Lave and James G. March, Introduction to Models in the Social Sciences (New York: Harper and Row, 1975), and Benjamin Most and Harvey Starr, Inquiry, Logic, and International Politics (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1989). For an application of this approach in research on the democratic peace, see Maoz and Russett, "Normative and Structural Causes."
59. The first and second panels of Table 3 test the democratic peace theory against the Farber-Gowa interest-driven conflict theory. They cover all dyads and all politically relevant dyads. The third panel tests the democratic peace theory against Layne's proposition of power-balance-driven escalation of disputes, and focuses only on dispute outcomes in terms of war/no war.
60. Layne, "The Myth of the Democratic Peace," p. 13.
61. Raymond Cohen, "Pacific Unions: A Reappraisal of the Theory That Democracies Do Not Fight One Another," Review of International Studies, Vol. 20, No. 3 (August 1994), pp. 207-224. See the reply to Cohen by Bruce Russett and James Lee Ray, "Raymond Cohen on Pacific Unions: A Response and a Reply," Review of International Studies, Vol. 21, No. 3 (July 1995), pp. 319-325.
62. Raymond Cohen, "Pacific Unions: A Reappraisal of the Theory That Democracies Do Not Fight One Another," Review of International Studies, Vol. 20, No. 3 (August 1994), pp. 207-224. See the reply to Cohen by Bruce Russett and James Lee Ray, "Raymond Cohen on Pacific Unions: A Response and a Reply," Review of International Studies, Vol. 21, No. 3 (July 1995), pp. 319-325.
63. Charles W. Kegley Jr. and Margaret G. Hermann, "Military Intervention and the Democratic Peace," International Interactions, Vol. 21, No. 1 (1995), pp. 1-21, and Margaret G. Hermann and Charles W. Kegley Jr., "Ballots, a Barrier Against the Use of Bullets and Bombs: Democratization and Military Intervention," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 40, No. 1 (September 1996), pp. 436-459.
64. Charles W. Kegley Jr. and Margaret G. Hermann, "Military Intervention and the Democratic Peace," International Interactions, Vol. 21, No. 1 (1995), pp. 1-21, and Margaret G. Hermann and Charles W. Kegley Jr., "Ballots, a Barrier Against the Use of Bullets and Bombs: Democratization and Military Intervention," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 40, No. 1 (September 1996), pp. 436-459.
65. Ray, "War Between Democracies."
66. This is Ido Oren's line of argument in "The Subjectivity of the 'Democratic' Peace," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 2 (Fall 1995), pp. 147-184.
67. See Gochman and Maoz, "Militarized Interstate Disputes," pp. 611-612, and Zeev Maoz, "The Onset and Initiation of Militarized Interstate Disputes in the Modern Era," International Interaction, Vol. 19, No. 2-3 (September 1993), pp. 117-141, for a list of dispute-prone states and dyads.
68. See Gochman and Maoz, "Militarized Interstate Disputes," pp. 611-612, and Zeev Maoz, "The Onset and Initiation of Militarized Interstate Disputes in the Modern Era," International Interaction, Vol. 19, No. 2-3 (September 1993), pp. 117-141, for a list of dispute-prone states and dyads.
69. For figures on these extraregional dyads, see Maoz, "Realist and Cultural Critiques," Table 4.
70. See evidence on this issue in Maoz, "Realist and Cultural Critiques," Table 3, which shows the levels of dispute involvement and war involvement for all dyads by regime type. In all of the above-mentioned cases, periods of joint democracy for each dyad are marked by a substantial reduction in conflict activity for the dyad.
71. See Zeev Maoz, "Regional Security in the Middle East: Past Trends, Present Realities, and Future Challenges," Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 17, No. 1 (forthcoming).
72. Oren, "The Subjectivity of the 'Democratic' Peace."
73. See Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman, War and Reason (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1992), and Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace.
74. See Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman, War and Reason (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1992), and Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace.
75. Oren justifies his focus on political scientists because they represent a "control group" of today's political scientists who subscribe to the democratic peace literature. This is irrelevant to the argument, because it deals with sociology of knowledge, not with the substantive argument.
76. Arthur A. Link, The Papers of Woodrow Wilson (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979).
77. Link, The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, Vol. 31, p. 459 (emphasis added).
78. Ibid., pp. 461-463. House's account of Wilson's remarks may be biased given his pro-British attitude. Nevertheless, this fits other perceptions that Wilson directly stated in 1915-17.
79. See Maoz and Russett, "Normative and Structural Causes"; Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace; and William J. Dixon, "Democracy and the Management of International Conflict," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 37, No. 1 (March 1993), pp. 42-68.
80. See Maoz and Russett, "Normative and Structural Causes"; Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace; and William J. Dixon, "Democracy and the Management of International Conflict," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 37, No. 1 (March 1993), pp. 42-68.
81. See Maoz and Russett, "Normative and Structural Causes"; Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace; and William J. Dixon, "Democracy and the Management of International Conflict," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 37, No. 1 (March 1993), pp. 42-68.
82. Maoz, "Realist and Cultural Critiques"; William J. Dixon, "Democracy and the Peaceful Settlement of International Conflict," American Political Science Review, Vol. 88, No. 1 (March 1994), pp. 14-32; and Dixon, "Democracy and the Management of International Conflict."
83. Maoz, "Realist and Cultural Critiques"; William J. Dixon, "Democracy and the Peaceful Settlement of International Conflict," American Political Science Review, Vol. 88, No. 1 (March 1994), pp. 14-32; and Dixon, "Democracy and the Management of International Conflict."
84. Maoz, "Realist and Cultural Critiques"; William J. Dixon, "Democracy and the Peaceful Settlement of International Conflict," American Political Science Review, Vol. 88, No. 1 (March 1994), pp. 14-32; and Dixon, "Democracy and the Management of International Conflict."
85. Oren, "The Subjectivity of the Democratic Peace," p. 150.
86. Ido Oren, "The War Proneness of Alliances," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 34, No. 2 (June 1990), pp. 208-233.
87. For a study that examines perceptual aspects of "coding" of states as democracies, see John M. Owen, "How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 2 (Fall 1994), pp. 87-125. Owen's article is an example of case study-type research. Oren's criticism, however, is not about method, but rather about systematic coding.
88. See, for example, Maoz and Abdolali, "Regime Type"; Stuart Bremer, "Dangerous Dyads: Conditions Affecting the Likelihood of Interstate War, 1816-1965," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 36, No. 2 (June 1992), pp. 309-341; Stuart Bremer, "Democracy and Militarized Interstate Conflict, 1816-1965," International Interactions, Vol. 18, No. 3 (September 1993), pp 231-249; Maoz and Russett, "Normative and Structural Changes"; and Ray, Democracy and International Conflict.
89. See, for example, Maoz and Abdolali, "Regime Type"; Stuart Bremer, "Dangerous Dyads: Conditions Affecting the Likelihood of Interstate War, 1816-1965," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 36, No. 2 (June 1992), pp. 309-341; Stuart Bremer, "Democracy and Militarized Interstate Conflict, 1816-1965," International Interactions, Vol. 18, No. 3 (September 1993), pp 231-249; Maoz and Russett, "Normative and Structural Changes"; and Ray, Democracy and International Conflict.
90. See, for example, Maoz and Abdolali, "Regime Type"; Stuart Bremer, "Dangerous Dyads: Conditions Affecting the Likelihood of Interstate War, 1816-1965," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 36, No. 2 (June 1992), pp. 309-341; Stuart Bremer, "Democracy and Militarized Interstate Conflict, 1816-1965," International Interactions, Vol. 18, No. 3 (September 1993), pp 231-249; Maoz and Russett, "Normative and Structural Changes"; and Ray, Democracy and International Conflict.
91. See, for example, Maoz and Abdolali, "Regime Type"; Stuart Bremer, "Dangerous Dyads: Conditions Affecting the Likelihood of Interstate War, 1816-1965," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 36, No. 2 (June 1992), pp. 309-341; Stuart Bremer, "Democracy and Militarized Interstate Conflict, 1816-1965," International Interactions, Vol. 18, No. 3 (September 1993), pp 231-249; Maoz and Russett, "Normative and Structural Changes"; and Ray, Democracy and International Conflict.
92. See, for example, Maoz and Abdolali, "Regime Type"; Stuart Bremer, "Dangerous Dyads: Conditions Affecting the Likelihood of Interstate War, 1816-1965," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 36, No. 2 (June 1992), pp. 309-341; Stuart Bremer, "Democracy and Militarized Interstate Conflict, 1816-1965," International Interactions, Vol. 18, No. 3 (September 1993), pp 231-249; Maoz and Russett, "Normative and Structural Changes"; and Ray, Democracy and International Conflict.
93. Oren, "The Subjectivity of the Democratic Peace," p. 150, fn. 9.
94. Maoz and Russett, "Normative and Structural Causes."
95. Ted Robert Gurr and his associates have produced an updated version of the Polity II data set, which served as the basis for the Maoz and Russett regime measure. This data set is documented in Keith Jaggers and Ted Robert Gurr, "Tracking Democracy's Third Wave with the Polity III Data," Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 32, No. 4 (December 1995), pp. 453-468. Using this data set, I have recalculated the regime score of the states mentioned herein. The United States never exceeded a regime score of +50 given a scale that ranged from -90 to +70 in the new Polity III data set, contrary to Oren's claim.
96. Bruce Russett and William Antholis, "Do Democracies Fight Each Other? Evidence from the Peloponnesian War," Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 29, No. 4 (December 1992), pp. 415-434, and Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace.
97. Bruce Russett and William Antholis, "Do Democracies Fight Each Other? Evidence from the Peloponnesian War," Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 29, No. 4 (December 1992), pp. 415-434, and Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace.
98. Carol Ember, Melvin Ember, and Bruce Russett, "Peace Between Participatory Polities," in Bruce Russett and William Antholis, "A Cross-National Test of the 'Democracies Rarely Fight Each Other' Hypothesis," World Politics, Vol. 44, No. 4 (July 1992), pp. 573-593.
99. Carol Ember, Melvin Ember, and Bruce Russett, "Peace Between Participatory Polities," in Bruce Russett and William Antholis, "A Cross-National Test of the 'Democracies Rarely Fight Each Other' Hypothesis," World Politics, Vol. 44, No. 4 (July 1992), pp. 573-593.
100. Maoz, Domestic Sources, chap. 2, Appendix.
101. Maoz and Abdolali, "Regime Type."
102. Maoz, "Realist and Cultural Critiques."
103. The number of dyad-years during the 41-year period following World War II is 71 percent of all dyad-years over the 1816-1986 period, although the length of this period is less than 24 percent of the entire period. See Maoz, "Realist and Cultural Critiques."
104. Other criticisms not mentioned here include Douglas Lemke and William Reed in "Regime Types and Status Quo Evaluations: Power Transition Theory and the Democratic Peace," International Interactions, Vol. 22, No. 2 (June 1996), pp. 143-164, who claim that the democratic peace theory is a subset of the power transition theory, because most democracies tend to be status quo-oriented (satisfied) states and therefore do not fight each other. Patrick James and Glenn E. Mitchell II, in "Targets of Covert Pressure: The Hidden Victims of the Democratic Peace," International Interactions, Vol. 21, No. 1 (March 1995), pp. 85-107, develop a formal model of crisis interactions and argue that weak, change-oriented democracies may become targets of powerful democratic adversaries. Scott Gates, Torbjo L. Knusten, and Jonathan W. Moses, in "Democracy and Peace: A More Skeptical View," Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 33, No. 1 (February 1996), pp. 1-10, accuse the democratic peace literature of research design problems and theoretical poverty.
105. Other criticisms not mentioned here include Douglas Lemke and William Reed in "Regime Types and Status Quo Evaluations: Power Transition Theory and the Democratic Peace," International Interactions, Vol. 22, No. 2 (June 1996), pp. 143-164, who claim that the democratic peace theory is a subset of the power transition theory, because most democracies tend to be status quo-oriented (satisfied) states and therefore do not fight each other. Patrick James and Glenn E. Mitchell II, in "Targets of Covert Pressure: The Hidden Victims of the Democratic Peace," International Interactions, Vol. 21, No. 1 (March 1995), pp. 85-107, develop a formal model of crisis interactions and argue that weak, change-oriented democracies may become targets of powerful democratic adversaries. Scott Gates, Torbjo L. Knusten, and Jonathan W. Moses, in "Democracy and Peace: A More Skeptical View," Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 33, No. 1 (February 1996), pp. 1-10, accuse the democratic peace literature of research design problems and theoretical poverty.
106. Other criticisms not mentioned here include Douglas Lemke and William Reed in "Regime Types and Status Quo Evaluations: Power Transition Theory and the Democratic Peace," International Interactions, Vol. 22, No. 2 (June 1996), pp. 143-164, who claim that the democratic peace theory is a subset of the power transition theory, because most democracies tend to be status quo-oriented (satisfied) states and therefore do not fight each other. Patrick James and Glenn E. Mitchell II, in "Targets of Covert Pressure: The Hidden Victims of the Democratic Peace," International Interactions, Vol. 21, No. 1 (March 1995), pp. 85-107, develop a formal model of crisis interactions and argue that weak, change-oriented democracies may become targets of powerful democratic adversaries. Scott Gates, Torbjo L. Knusten, and Jonathan W. Moses, in "Democracy and Peace: A More Skeptical View," Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 33, No. 1 (February 1996), pp. 1-10, accuse the democratic peace literature of research design problems and theoretical poverty.
107. Karl Popper, Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1968).
108. For example, the studies by Bremer, Dixon, Maoz and Russett, and Hensel, Goertz, and Diehl as well as Oneal, Oneal, Maoz, and Russett, "The Liberal Peace: Interdependence, Democracy, and International Conflict, 1950-1985," Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 33, No. 1 (February 1996), pp. 11-28, all support propositions relating alliances, power parity, and power status to dyadic conflict. Zeev Maoz, in "The Strategic Behavior of Nations, 1816-1986," a paper presented at the annual meeting of the Peace Science Society (International) Houston, Texas, October 1996, provides considerable evidence on this point at the nation level of analysis. These studies exhibit more consensus on empirical patterns involving realpolitik variables than much of the realpolitik literature itself.
109. For example, the studies by Bremer, Dixon, Maoz and Russett, and Hensel, Goertz, and Diehl as well as Oneal, Oneal, Maoz, and Russett, "The Liberal Peace: Interdependence, Democracy, and International Conflict, 1950-1985," Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 33, No. 1 (February 1996), pp. 11-28, all support propositions relating alliances, power parity, and power status to dyadic conflict. Zeev Maoz, in "The Strategic Behavior of Nations, 1816-1986," a paper presented at the annual meeting of the Peace Science Society (International) Houston, Texas, October 1996, provides considerable evidence on this point at the nation level of analysis. These studies exhibit more consensus on empirical patterns involving realpolitik variables than much of the realpolitik literature itself.
110. This is the point made by Margaret G. Hermann and Charles W. Kegley Jr., in "Rethinking Democracy and International Peace: Perspectives from Political Psychology," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 39, No. 4 (December 1995), p. 529.
111. Hermann and Kegley, "Rethinking Democracy and International Peace," p. 528, and Owen, "How Liberalism Produces."
112. Hermann and Kegley, "Rethinking Democracy and International Peace," p. 528, and Owen, "How Liberalism Produces."
113. Maoz, Domestic Sources.
114. Maoz, "Realist and Cultural Critiques," Appendix.
115. All data sets discussed in this study are available from the author upon request.
116. Gochman and Maoz, "Militarized Interstate Disputes," and Daniel M. Jones, Stuart A. Bremer, and J. David Singer, "Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1816-1992: Rationale, Coding Rules, and Empirical Patterns," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol. 15, No. 2 (December 1966), pp. 163-213.
117. Gochman and Maoz, "Militarized Interstate Disputes," and Daniel M. Jones, Stuart A. Bremer, and J. David Singer, "Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1816-1992: Rationale, Coding Rules, and Empirical Patterns," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol. 15, No. 2 (December 1966), pp. 163-213.
118. Small and Singer, Resort to Arms.
119. Ted Robert Gurr, Keith Jaggers, and Will Moore, Polity II Handbook (Boulder: University of Colorado, 1989). See Jaggers and Gurr, "Tracking Democracy's Third Wave," for details on updates.
120. Ted Robert Gurr, Keith Jaggers, and Will Moore, Polity II Handbook (Boulder: University of Colorado, 1989). See Jaggers and Gurr, "Tracking Democracy's Third Wave," for details on updates.
121. Oren, "The War Proneness of Alliances," Appendix.
122. See fn. 58 above for a definition of the population. Analyses for all dyads, irrespective of whether they changed regime, yield very similar results.
123. Maoz and Russett, "Alliances, Contiguity, Wealth and Political Stability"; Maoz and Russett, "Normative and Structural Changes"; and Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace; and Maoz, Domestic Sources.
124. Maoz and Russett, "Alliances, Contiguity, Wealth and Political Stability"; Maoz and Russett, "Normative and Structural Changes"; and Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace; and Maoz, Domestic Sources.
125. Maoz and Russett, "Alliances, Contiguity, Wealth and Political Stability"; Maoz and Russett, "Normative and Structural Changes"; and Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace; and Maoz, Domestic Sources.
126. Maoz and Russett, "Alliances, Contiguity, Wealth and Political Stability"; Maoz and Russett, "Normative and Structural Changes"; and Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace; and Maoz, Domestic Sources.
127. Hensel, Goertz and Diehl, "Enduring Rivalries," and Maoz and Mor, "Enduring International Rivalries: The Early Years," p. 142.
128. Hensel, Goertz and Diehl, "Enduring Rivalries," and Maoz and Mor, "Enduring International Rivalries: The Early Years," p. 142.
129. Hensel, Goertz, and Diehl, "Enduring Rivalries."
130. This argument is made by Farber and Gowa, "Polities and Peace."
131. Maoz, "The Strategic Behavior of Nations," reports very high correlations between war begun and war occurrence (0.60 < r < 0.88, depending on the level of analysis), and between dispute begun and dispute occurrence (0.66 < r < 0.7).
132. Maoz, Domestic Sources, pp. 53-54.
133. Dixon, "Democracy and the Managment of International Conflict."