The sanctions glass: Half full or completely empty?

International Security

Volumn 23, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 50-65

  Elliott, Kimberly Ann ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032364215     PISSN: 01622889     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/isec.23.1.50     Document Type: Article

References (36)

1. Robert A. Pape, "Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work," International Security, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Fall 1997), pp. 90-136. Subsequent cites to this article are in parentheses in the text.
2. Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott, and Kimberly Ann Elliott, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 2d rev. ed., 2 vols. (Washington, U.C.: Institute for International Economics [IIE], 1990). Subsequent references to this article appear in parentheses in the text.
3. Kimberly Ann Elliott, "Evidence on the Costs and Benefits of Economic Sanctions," Statement before the Subcommittee on Trade of the House Committee on Ways and Means, October 23, 1997.
4. Those interested in the use of economic coercion in trade disputes may want to consult Thomas O. Bayard and Kimberly Ann Elliott, Reciprocity and Retaliation in U.S. Trade Policy (Washington, D.C.: IIE, 1994); and Kimberly Ann Elliott and J. David Richardson, "Determinants and Effectiveness of 'Aggressively Unilateral' U.S. Trade Actions," in Robert C. Feenstra, ed., The Effects of U.S. Trade Protection and Promotion Policies (Chicago: University of Chicago Press for the National Bureau of Economic Research, 1997).
5. Those interested in the use of economic coercion in trade disputes may want to consult Thomas O. Bayard and Kimberly Ann Elliott, Reciprocity and Retaliation in U.S. Trade Policy (Washington, D.C.: IIE, 1994); and Kimberly Ann Elliott and J. David Richardson, "Determinants and Effectiveness of 'Aggressively Unilateral' U.S. Trade Actions," in Robert C. Feenstra, ed., The Effects of U.S. Trade Protection and Promotion Policies (Chicago: University of Chicago Press for the National Bureau of Economic Research, 1997).
6. For more complete discussion of these cases, see HSE, 2d ed., vol. 2, pp. 41-44, 272-275, 205-208, 309-313.
7. Upon further reflection, however, we might concede that Tunisian willingness to throw a rhetorical bone to the French in their dispute over nationalized agricultural property was trivial.
8. We exclude cases using positive incentives, except in cases like this one where the sender uses a strategy of closely linked carrots and sticks. HSE, 2d ed., vol. 1, p. 2.
9. Kent Forster, "The Finnish-Soviet Crisis of 1958-59," International Journal, Vol. 15 (Spring 1960), p. 148, emphasis added; and John Vloyarites, "Crisis and Dysfunction: The Nightfrost, 1958," in Silkglove Hegemony: Finnish-Soviet Relations, 1944-1974 (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1975), p. 92.
10. Kent Forster, "The Finnish-Soviet Crisis of 1958-59," International Journal, Vol. 15 (Spring 1960), p. 148, emphasis added; and John Vloyarites, "Crisis and Dysfunction: The Nightfrost, 1958," in Silkglove Hegemony: Finnish-Soviet Relations, 1944-1974 (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1975), p. 92.
11. I would like to thank Gary Hufbauer for suggesting this analogy.
12. In the Vietnam case, for example, the plotters of the coup against South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem feared being betrayed by the United States and suggested that an aid suspension would be regarded as a credible sign of U.S. support for their plans. When U.S. policymakers determined that the cause in Vietnam was hopeless with Diem in power, they suspended aid and then began consulting with the coup plotters to ensure success. See HSE, 2d ed., vol. 2, pp. 260-266, Case 63-4.
13. Judith Miller, "When Sanctions Worked," Foreign Policy, No. 39 (Summer 1980), pp. 118-129.
14. Lars Schoultz, Human Rights and United States Policy toward Latin America (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981), 168-170; see also HSE, 2d ed., vol. 2, pp. 220-225, 359-362.
15. Lars Schoultz, Human Rights and United States Policy toward Latin America (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981), 168-170; see also HSE, 2d ed., vol. 2, pp. 220-225, 359-362.
16. That a number of these destabilization cases began as expropriation disputes also underscores the political nature of expropriation and the frequent overlap with other foreign policy goals.
17. The eight are: U.S., U.K., France versus Egypt (1956); U.S. versus Egypt (1963); U.S. versus India (1965); Arab League versus U.S., Netherlands (1973); U.S. versus Taiwan (1976); U.S. versus Brazil (1977); U.S. versus Iran (1979); and U.S. versus Poland (1981). There is one additional case - Canada versus the EC and Japan (1977) - that Pape (p. 135) classifies as "indeterminate" because there is insufficient evidence to determine the significance of the concessions. But the stated Canadian goal of renegotiating its nuclear supply agreements with Europe and Japan in order to strengthen attendant safeguards was achieved. Whether the additional safeguards changed behavior in those countries is irrelevant, because what Canada wanted, and what it got, was a formal, binding agreement incorporating stringent safeguards.
18. James Barros, The League of Nations and the Great Powers: The Greek-Bulgarian Incident, 1925 (Oxford, U.K.: Clarendon Press, 1970).
19. Elliott, "Evidence on the Costs and Benefits of Economic Sanctions."
20. See the recent reports by the Carnegie Corporation, Preventing Deadly Conflict, Final Report of the Task Force, New York, December 1997; and the United Nations Association of the United States of America, Words to Deeds: Strengthening the U.N.'s Enforcement Capabilities, Final Report of the International Task Force on the Enforcement of U.N. Security Council Resolutions, New York, December 1997.
21. See the recent reports by the Carnegie Corporation, Preventing Deadly Conflict, Final Report of the Task Force, New York, December 1997; and the United Nations Association of the United States of America, Words to Deeds: Strengthening the U.N.'s Enforcement Capabilities, Final Report of the International Task Force on the Enforcement of U.N. Security Council Resolutions, New York, December 1997.
22. This article was being finalized just after UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan's trip to Baghdad in which he negotiated an agreement allowing the weapons inspectors to resume their work after Iraq had barred them from eight "presidential residence" locations. These recent obstacles, apparently aimed at protecting an Iraqi biological weapons capability, do not vitiate the UN's earlier successes in identifying and destroying most or all of Iraq's nuclear and chemical weapons, and missile capabilities. See "Fact Sheet: Iraq's Record with UNSCOM," U.S. Information Agency web page at http://198.80.36.136/regional/nea/iraq/fact298.htm.
23. Kimberly Ann Elliott and Gary Clyde Hufbauer, "'New Approaches to Economic Sanctions," in Arnold Kanter and Linton F. Brooks, eds., U.S. Invention Policy for the Post-Cold War World (New York: W.W. Norton for the American Assembly, 1994), pp. 53-54; see also Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott, and Kimberly Ann Elliott, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 3d ed. (Washington, D.C.: IIE, forthcoming).
24. Kimberly Ann Elliott and Gary Clyde Hufbauer, "'New Approaches to Economic Sanctions," in Arnold Kanter and Linton F. Brooks, eds., U.S. Invention Policy for the Post-Cold War World (New York: W.W. Norton for the American Assembly, 1994), pp. 53-54; see also Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott, and Kimberly Ann Elliott, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 3d ed. (Washington, D.C.: IIE, forthcoming).
25. G.M. Gathorne-Hardy, A. Short History of International Affairs, 1920-39 (London: Oxford University Press, 1950); Albert E. Hindmarsh, Force in Peace: Force Short of War in International Relations (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1933); and Arnold J. Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs: 1920-23 (London: Oxford University Press, 1925).
26. G.M. Gathorne-Hardy, A. Short History of International Affairs, 1920-39 (London: Oxford University Press, 1950); Albert E. Hindmarsh, Force in Peace: Force Short of War in International Relations (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1933); and Arnold J. Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs: 1920-23 (London: Oxford University Press, 1925).
27. G.M. Gathorne-Hardy, A. Short History of International Affairs, 1920-39 (London: Oxford University Press, 1950); Albert E. Hindmarsh, Force in Peace: Force Short of War in International Relations (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1933); and Arnold J. Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs: 1920-23 (London: Oxford University Press, 1925).
28. Francis P. Walters, A History of the League of Nations, 2 vols. (London: Oxford University Press, 1952).
29. Barros, The League of Nations and the Great Powers, p. 82.
30. George McTurnan Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1952); see also Robert J. McMahon, Colonialism and Cold War: The United States and the Struggle for Indonesian Independence (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1981).
31. George McTurnan Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1952); see also Robert J. McMahon, Colonialism and Cold War: The United States and the Struggle for Indonesian Independence (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1981).
32. Richard K. Betts, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1987), emphasis added. Although he does not cite this interpretation, Pape had to have been aware of it because the Betts book is the source of the Soviet ultimatum quoted in his description of the case.
33. Diane Kunz, The Economic Diplomacy of the Suez Crisis (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991).
34. Leonard S. Spector, with Jacqueline R, Smith, Nuclear Ambitions: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, 1989-90 (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press for the Carnegie Endowment, 1990).
35. Robert Carswell, "Economic Sanctions against Iran," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 60 (Winter 1981-82), p. 259, emphasis added; see also Joseph Jude Norton and Michael H. Collins, "Reflections on the Iranian Hostage Settlement," American Bar Association Journal, Vol. 67 (April 1981), pp. 428-433.
36. Robert Carswell, "Economic Sanctions against Iran," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 60 (Winter 1981-82), p. 259, emphasis added; see also Joseph Jude Norton and Michael H. Collins, "Reflections on the Iranian Hostage Settlement," American Bar Association Journal, Vol. 67 (April 1981), pp. 428-433.