Nationalism and the marketplace of ideas

International Security

Volumn 21, Issue 2, 1996, Pages 5-40

  Snyder, Jack ^a   Ballentine, Karen ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030496420     PISSN: 01622889     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/isec.21.2.5     Document Type: Article

References (200)

1. Human Rights Watch, Playing the "Communal Card" (New York: Human Rights Watch, April 1995), reprinted as Slaughter among Neighbors: The Political Origins of Communal Violence (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1995); Human Rights Watch, "'Hate Speech' and Freedom of Expression," Free Expression Project, Vol. 4, No. 3 (March 1992); see also Leonard Sussman, Press Freedom 1996: The Journalist as Pariah (New York: Freedom House, 1996); Article 19, the International Centre Against Censorship, Guidelines for Election Broadcasting in Transitional Democracies (London: Article 19, August 1994).
2. Human Rights Watch, Playing the "Communal Card" (New York: Human Rights Watch, April 1995), reprinted as Slaughter among Neighbors: The Political Origins of Communal Violence (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1995); Human Rights Watch, "'Hate Speech' and Freedom of Expression," Free Expression Project, Vol. 4, No. 3 (March 1992); see also Leonard Sussman, Press Freedom 1996: The Journalist as Pariah (New York: Freedom House, 1996); Article 19, the International Centre Against Censorship, Guidelines for Election Broadcasting in Transitional Democracies (London: Article 19, August 1994).
3. Human Rights Watch, Playing the "Communal Card" (New York: Human Rights Watch, April 1995), reprinted as Slaughter among Neighbors: The Political Origins of Communal Violence (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1995); Human Rights Watch, "'Hate Speech' and Freedom of Expression," Free Expression Project, Vol. 4, No. 3 (March 1992); see also Leonard Sussman, Press Freedom 1996: The Journalist as Pariah (New York: Freedom House, 1996); Article 19, the International Centre Against Censorship, Guidelines for Election Broadcasting in Transitional Democracies (London: Article 19, August 1994).
4. Human Rights Watch, Playing the "Communal Card" (New York: Human Rights Watch, April 1995), reprinted as Slaughter among Neighbors: The Political Origins of Communal Violence (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1995); Human Rights Watch, "'Hate Speech' and Freedom of Expression," Free Expression Project, Vol. 4, No. 3 (March 1992); see also Leonard Sussman, Press Freedom 1996: The Journalist as Pariah (New York: Freedom House, 1996); Article 19, the International Centre Against Censorship, Guidelines for Election Broadcasting in Transitional Democracies (London: Article 19, August 1994).
5. Eric Hobsbawm, "Mass Producing Traditions," in Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds., The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 263-307; Eric Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780 (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 80-100, 141-142; Stephen Van Evera, "Hypotheses on Nationalism and War," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Spring 1994), pp. 26-33; Paul Kennedy, "The Decline of Nationalistic History in the West, 1900-1970," Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 8, No. 1 (January 1973), pp. 77-100. V.P. Gagnon, Jr., "Ethnic Conflict as Demobilizer: The Case of Serbia," Institute for European Studies Working Paper No. 96.1 (Cornell University, May 1996), argues that propaganda does not mobilize popular nationalism, but rather that ethnic conflict and media control demobilizes opposition to the regime.
6. Eric Hobsbawm, "Mass Producing Traditions," in Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds., The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 263-307; Eric Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780 (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 80-100, 141-142; Stephen Van Evera, "Hypotheses on Nationalism and War," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Spring 1994), pp. 26-33; Paul Kennedy, "The Decline of Nationalistic History in the West, 1900-1970," Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 8, No. 1 (January 1973), pp. 77-100. V.P. Gagnon, Jr., "Ethnic Conflict as Demobilizer: The Case of Serbia," Institute for European Studies Working Paper No. 96.1 (Cornell University, May 1996), argues that propaganda does not mobilize popular nationalism, but rather that ethnic conflict and media control demobilizes opposition to the regime.
7. Eric Hobsbawm, "Mass Producing Traditions," in Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds., The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 263-307; Eric Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780 (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 80-100, 141-142; Stephen Van Evera, "Hypotheses on Nationalism and War," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Spring 1994), pp. 26-33; Paul Kennedy, "The Decline of Nationalistic History in the West, 1900-1970," Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 8, No. 1 (January 1973), pp. 77-100. V.P. Gagnon, Jr., "Ethnic Conflict as Demobilizer: The Case of Serbia," Institute for European Studies Working Paper No. 96.1 (Cornell University, May 1996), argues that propaganda does not mobilize popular nationalism, but rather that ethnic conflict and media control demobilizes opposition to the regime.
8. Eric Hobsbawm, "Mass Producing Traditions," in Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds., The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 263-307; Eric Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780 (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 80-100, 141-142; Stephen Van Evera, "Hypotheses on Nationalism and War," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Spring 1994), pp. 26-33; Paul Kennedy, "The Decline of Nationalistic History in the West, 1900-1970," Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 8, No. 1 (January 1973), pp. 77-100. V.P. Gagnon, Jr., "Ethnic Conflict as Demobilizer: The Case of Serbia," Institute for European Studies Working Paper No. 96.1 (Cornell University, May 1996), argues that propaganda does not mobilize popular nationalism, but rather that ethnic conflict and media control demobilizes opposition to the regime.
9. Eric Hobsbawm, "Mass Producing Traditions," in Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds., The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 263-307; Eric Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780 (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 80-100, 141-142; Stephen Van Evera, "Hypotheses on Nationalism and War," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Spring 1994), pp. 26-33; Paul Kennedy, "The Decline of Nationalistic History in the West, 1900-1970," Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 8, No. 1 (January 1973), pp. 77-100. V.P. Gagnon, Jr., "Ethnic Conflict as Demobilizer: The Case of Serbia," Institute for European Studies Working Paper No. 96.1 (Cornell University, May 1996), argues that propaganda does not mobilize popular nationalism, but rather that ethnic conflict and media control demobilizes opposition to the regime.
10. Van Evera, "Hypotheses," p. 37; V.P. Gagnon, Jr., "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 130-166, at 165.
11. Van Evera, "Hypotheses," p. 37; V.P. Gagnon, Jr., "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 130-166, at 165.
12. Van Evera, "Hypotheses," p. 33. Human Rights Watch, Playing the "Communal Card," p. viii, points this out, but disregards it when drawing conclusions. According to Freedom House's ratings, civil liberties, which include freedom of speech, improved in Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Burundi shortly before the recent outbreaks of massive ethnic violence there. Raymond Gastil and R. Bruce McColm, eds., Freedom in the World (New York: Freedom House, 1988-93), pp. 411-412 (1988), 272-274 (1989-90)
13. Van Evera, "Hypotheses," p. 33. Human Rights Watch, Playing the "Communal Card," p. viii, points this out, but disregards it when drawing conclusions. According to Freedom House's ratings, civil liberties, which include freedom of speech, improved in Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Burundi shortly before the recent outbreaks of massive ethnic violence there. Raymond Gastil and R. Bruce McColm, eds., Freedom in the World (New York: Freedom House, 1988-93), pp. 411-412 (1988), 272-274 (1989-90)
14. Van Evera, "Hypotheses," p. 33. Human Rights Watch, Playing the "Communal Card," p. viii, points this out, but disregards it when drawing conclusions. According to Freedom House's ratings, civil liberties, which include freedom of speech, improved in Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Burundi shortly before the recent outbreaks of massive ethnic violence there. Raymond Gastil and R. Bruce McColm, eds., Freedom in the World (New York: Freedom House, 1988-93), pp. 411-412 (1988), 272-274 (1989-90)
15. Van Evera, "Hypotheses," p. 33. Human Rights Watch, Playing the "Communal Card," p. viii, points this out, but disregards it when drawing conclusions. According to Freedom House's ratings, civil liberties, which include freedom of speech, improved in Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Burundi shortly before the recent outbreaks of massive ethnic violence there. Raymond Gastil and R. Bruce McColm, eds., Freedom in the World (New York: Freedom House, 1988-93), pp. 411-412 (1988), 272-274 (1989-90)
16. 104-105, 313-315 (1990-91),
17. and 153-155, 429-431 (1992-93).
18. Van Evera, "Hypotheses," p. 33. In mature democracies, government policy is made by officials chosen through free and fair elections on the basis of wide suffrage; the actions of officials are constrained by constitutional provisions and commitments to civil liberties; and government candidates sometimes lose elections, and leave office when they do. We define states as democratizing if they have recently adopted some of these democratic characteristics, even if they retain important non-democratic features. See Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Democratization and the Danger of War," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 8-10. On the gap between institutions and participation, see Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1968).
19. Van Evera, "Hypotheses," p. 33. In mature democracies, government policy is made by officials chosen through free and fair elections on the basis of wide suffrage; the actions of officials are constrained by constitutional provisions and commitments to civil liberties; and government candidates sometimes lose elections, and leave office when they do. We define states as democratizing if they have recently adopted some of these democratic characteristics, even if they retain important non-democratic features. See Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Democratization and the Danger of War," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 8-10. On the gap between institutions and participation, see Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1968).
20. Van Evera, "Hypotheses," p. 33. In mature democracies, government policy is made by officials chosen through free and fair elections on the basis of wide suffrage; the actions of officials are constrained by constitutional provisions and commitments to civil liberties; and government candidates sometimes lose elections, and leave office when they do. We define states as democratizing if they have recently adopted some of these democratic characteristics, even if they retain important non-democratic features. See Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Democratization and the Danger of War," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 8-10. On the gap between institutions and participation, see Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1968).
21. R.H. Coase, "The Market for Goods and the Market for Ideas," American Economic Review, Vol. 64, No. 2 (May 1974), pp. 384-391, argues that imperfect markets for ideas are in no less need of regulation than imperfect markets for goods. On the benefits of gag rules in ethnically or religiously divided societies undergoing democratization, see Stephen Holmes, Passions and Constraint: On the Theory of Liberal Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1995), chapter 7, esp. pp. 206-213.
22. R.H. Coase, "The Market for Goods and the Market for Ideas," American Economic Review, Vol. 64, No. 2 (May 1974), pp. 384-391, argues that imperfect markets for ideas are in no less need of regulation than imperfect markets for goods. On the benefits of gag rules in ethnically or religiously divided societies undergoing democratization, see Stephen Holmes, Passions and Constraint: On the Theory of Liberal Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1995), chapter 7, esp. pp. 206-213.
23. The impact of Hitler's oratory before his rise to power was mainly in motivating supporters who were already predisposed toward his outlook. Few people heard him on the radio until after he had been elected chancellor. Ian Kershaw, "Ideology, Propaganda, and the Rise of the Nazi Party," in Peter Stachura, ed., The Nazi Machtergreifung (London: Allen & Unwin, 1983), pp. 162-181; Thomas Childers, "The Social Language of Politics in Germany: The Sociology of Political Discourse in the Weimar Republic," American Historical Review, Vol. 95, No. 2 (April 1990), pp. 331-358.
24. The impact of Hitler's oratory before his rise to power was mainly in motivating supporters who were already predisposed toward his outlook. Few people heard him on the radio until after he had been elected chancellor. Ian Kershaw, "Ideology, Propaganda, and the Rise of the Nazi Party," in Peter Stachura, ed., The Nazi Machtergreifung (London: Allen & Unwin, 1983), pp. 162-181; Thomas Childers, "The Social Language of Politics in Germany: The Sociology of Political Discourse in the Weimar Republic," American Historical Review, Vol. 95, No. 2 (April 1990), pp. 331-358.
25. T.C.W. Blanning, The Origins of the French Revolutionary Wars (London: Longman, 1986), p. 113; Jeremy Popkin, Revolutionary News: The Press in France, 1789-1799 (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1990), p. 41.
26. T.C.W. Blanning, The Origins of the French Revolutionary Wars (London: Longman, 1986), p. 113; Jeremy Popkin, Revolutionary News: The Press in France, 1789-1799 (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1990), p. 41.
27. Rakiya Omaar and Alex de Waal, Africa Rights, Rwanda: Death, Despair and Defiance (London: Africa Rights, September 1994, exp. ed., 1995, all page references to 1994 ed.); Mark Thompson, Article 19, Forging War: The Media in Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina (London: Article 19, May 1994).
28. Rakiya Omaar and Alex de Waal, Africa Rights, Rwanda: Death, Despair and Defiance (London: Africa Rights, September 1994, exp. ed., 1995, all page references to 1994 ed.); Mark Thompson, Article 19, Forging War: The Media in Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina (London: Article 19, May 1994).
29. Human Rights Watch, Playing the "Communal Card," pp. viii, xiv.
30. Thus, the Indian Congress government was outflanked by the nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party, the Israeli Labor government by Likud, South Africa's De Klerk government by irreconcilable Afrikaners, Romania's Iliescu government by the anti-Hungarian nationalist party, the Sri Lankan government by grassroots Buddhist organizations, Serbia's Slobodan Milošević by Vojislav Seselj, the Syrian-backed Lebanese government by leaders of the various communal groups, Russian President Boris Yeltsin by Vladimir Zhirinovsky, the moderate Armenian government of Levon Ter-Petrosian by the nationalist Dashnaks, and the inert Azerbaijani government of Ayaz Mutalibov by the ethno-populist Abulfez Elchibey. Human Rights Watch's own study often acknowledges this phenomenon, but blames the government for weakly resisting these pressures. Playing the "Communal Card," p. 28.
31. Human Rights Watch, Playing the "Communal Card," xiv, xvii. For a more nuanced NGO view, see Bruce Allyn and Steven Wilkinson, Guidelines for Journalists Covering Ethnic Conflict (Cambridge, Mass.: Conflict Management Working Paper, January 1994).
32. Human Rights Watch, Playing the "Communal Card," xiv, xvii. For a more nuanced NGO view, see Bruce Allyn and Steven Wilkinson, Guidelines for Journalists Covering Ethnic Conflict (Cambridge, Mass.: Conflict Management Working Paper, January 1994).
33. Pierre Birnbaum, States and Collective Action (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 39-40; Peter Fritzsche, Rehearsals for Fascism: Populism and Political Mobilization in Weimar Germany (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 75. Robert Putnam, Making Democracy Work (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993), fails to address the Weimar case.
34. Pierre Birnbaum, States and Collective Action (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 39-40; Peter Fritzsche, Rehearsals for Fascism: Populism and Political Mobilization in Weimar Germany (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 75. Robert Putnam, Making Democracy Work (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993), fails to address the Weimar case.
35. Pierre Birnbaum, States and Collective Action (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 39-40; Peter Fritzsche, Rehearsals for Fascism: Populism and Political Mobilization in Weimar Germany (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 75. Robert Putnam, Making Democracy Work (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993), fails to address the Weimar case.
36. Larry Diamond, "Rethinking Civil Society: Toward Democratic Consolidation," Journal of Democracy, Vol. 5, No. 3 (September 1994), pp. 5-6; Steven Fish, "Russia's Fourth Transition," Journal of Democracy, Vol. 5, No. 3 (September 1994), pp. 31-33.
37. Larry Diamond, "Rethinking Civil Society: Toward Democratic Consolidation," Journal of Democracy, Vol. 5, No. 3 (September 1994), pp. 5-6; Steven Fish, "Russia's Fourth Transition," Journal of Democracy, Vol. 5, No. 3 (September 1994), pp. 31-33.
38. Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983), chap. 1.
39. Although narrower definitions are in principle preferable, we adopt a broader definition that includes both state-seeking ethnic nationalism and nationalism in comparatively homogeneous, established states, on the grounds that our theory illuminates a dynamic that occurs equally in both types of case. On the relative merits of broad versus narrow definitions of nationalism, see Alexander Motyl, "The Modernity of Nationalism," Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 45, No. 2 (Winter 1992), pp. 307-324.
40. Similarly, John Zaller, The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 313, defines "elite domination" of opinion as "a situation in which elites induce citizens to hold opinions that they would not hold if aware of the best available information and analysis."
41. Quoted in Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism, p. 12.
42. Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations (Oxford, U.K.: Blackwell, 1986), pp. 15, 24; John Armstrong, Nations before Nationalism (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982).
43. Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations (Oxford, U.K.: Blackwell, 1986), pp. 15, 24; John Armstrong, Nations before Nationalism (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982).
44. Miroslav Hroch, Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 11-13; Elie Kedourie, Nationalism (London: Hutchinson, 1960).
45. Miroslav Hroch, Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 11-13; Elie Kedourie, Nationalism (London: Hutchinson, 1960).
46. However, where democratic norms are intimately bound to national self-conceptions, nationalism may in fact support peaceful democracy by promoting loyalty to civic institutions. See Victor Zaslavsky, "Nationalism and Democratic Transition in Postcommunist Societies," Daedalus, Vol. 12, No. 2 (Spring 1992), pp. 97-122; Rogers Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992), chaps. 2 and 5.
47. However, where democratic norms are intimately bound to national self-conceptions, nationalism may in fact support peaceful democracy by promoting loyalty to civic institutions. See Victor Zaslavsky, "Nationalism and Democratic Transition in Postcommunist Societies," Daedalus, Vol. 12, No. 2 (Spring 1992), pp. 97-122; Rogers Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992), chaps. 2 and 5.
48. Van Evera, "Hypotheses," pp. 26-33; Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991), pp. 5-6.
49. Van Evera, "Hypotheses," pp. 26-33; Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991), pp. 5-6.
50. We define perfect competition in the marketplace of ideas, which exists only as an ideal type, as a situation of no monopolies of information or media access, low barriers to entry, full exposure of all consumers to the full range of ideas, the confrontation of ideas in common forums, and public scrutiny of factual and causal claims by knowledgeable experts. On the benefits of a free market of ideas, see John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1989), part 2. Mill himself argued only that unconstrained debate was a guarantee that superior ideas would not be permanently suppressed; even he did not contend that the invisible hand of competition would automatically lead to the victory of the best idea, let alone of truth.
51. Stephen Van Evera, "Primed For Peace: Europe after the Cold War," International Security, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Winter 1990/91), p. 27.
52. Gary Becker, "A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 98, No. 3 (August 1983), pp. 371-400.
53. Our conception of the free marketplace of ideas includes features commonly ascribed to "civil society" and Jürgen Habermas's notion of "the public sphere." Like civil society, of which it is part, the free marketplace requires a legally sanctioned societal capacity for voluntary and autonomous organization. Like the "public sphere," a well-functioning marketplace is characterized by a public debate in which rational arguments are more decisive than appeals to tradition or the status of actors. However, whereas both civil society and the public sphere are typically conceived as exclusively non-state realms of activity, the marketplace of ideas embraces both state and non-state actors, focusing on their discursive and institutional interaction. Craig Calhoun, "Civil Society and The Public Sphere," Public Culture, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Winter 1993), pp. 267-280; Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1989).
54. Our conception of the free marketplace of ideas includes features commonly ascribed to "civil society" and Jürgen Habermas's notion of "the public sphere." Like civil society, of which it is part, the free marketplace requires a legally sanctioned societal capacity for voluntary and autonomous organization. Like the "public sphere," a well-functioning marketplace is characterized by a public debate in which rational arguments are more decisive than appeals to tradition or the status of actors. However, whereas both civil society and the public sphere are typically conceived as exclusively non-state realms of activity, the marketplace of ideas embraces both state and non-state actors, focusing on their discursive and institutional interaction. Craig Calhoun, "Civil Society and The Public Sphere," Public Culture, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Winter 1993), pp. 267-280; Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1989).
55. Our conception of the free marketplace of ideas includes features commonly ascribed to "civil society" and Jürgen Habermas's notion of "the public sphere." Like civil society, of which it is part, the free marketplace requires a legally sanctioned societal capacity for voluntary and autonomous organization. Like the "public sphere," a well-functioning marketplace is characterized by a public debate in which rational arguments are more decisive than appeals to tradition or the status of actors. However, whereas both civil society and the public sphere are typically conceived as exclusively non-state realms of activity, the marketplace of ideas embraces both state and non-state actors, focusing on their discursive and institutional interaction. Craig Calhoun, "Civil Society and The Public Sphere," Public Culture, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Winter 1993), pp. 267-280; Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1989).
56. Becker, "A Theory of Competition," p. 392.
57. Ideas may also serve as signals of commitment, staking suppliers' reputation on their promise to deliver on a policy pledge. For example, nationalists may choose to enhance their credibility with their supporters through extremist rhetoric that burns bridges to alternative constituencies.
58. Paul Samuelson, Economics, 15th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1995), chaps. 9-10, esp. p. 152; Edwin Mansfield, Microeconomics, 4th ed. (New York: Norton, 1982), chaps. 11-12, esp. pp. 323, 344-346, 353-355; James W. Friedman, Oligopoly Theory (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 138-145; Robert Kuenne, The Economics of Oligopolistic Competition (Oxford, U.K.: Blackwell, 1992), pp. 469-476.
59. Paul Samuelson, Economics, 15th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1995), chaps. 9-10, esp. p. 152; Edwin Mansfield, Microeconomics, 4th ed. (New York: Norton, 1982), chaps. 11-12, esp. pp. 323, 344-346, 353-355; James W. Friedman, Oligopoly Theory (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 138-145; Robert Kuenne, The Economics of Oligopolistic Competition (Oxford, U.K.: Blackwell, 1992), pp. 469-476.
60. Paul Samuelson, Economics, 15th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1995), chaps. 9-10, esp. p. 152; Edwin Mansfield, Microeconomics, 4th ed. (New York: Norton, 1982), chaps. 11-12, esp. pp. 323, 344-346, 353-355; James W. Friedman, Oligopoly Theory (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 138-145; Robert Kuenne, The Economics of Oligopolistic Competition (Oxford, U.K.: Blackwell, 1992), pp. 469-476.
61. Paul Samuelson, Economics, 15th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1995), chaps. 9-10, esp. p. 152; Edwin Mansfield, Microeconomics, 4th ed. (New York: Norton, 1982), chaps. 11-12, esp. pp. 323, 344-346, 353-355; James W. Friedman, Oligopoly Theory (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 138-145; Robert Kuenne, The Economics of Oligopolistic Competition (Oxford, U.K.: Blackwell, 1992), pp. 469-476.
62. Richard Leftwich and Ross Eckert, The Price System and Resource Allocation, 9th ed. (Chicago: Dryden, 1985), p. 407. The same uncertainty that fuels rivalrous behavior in a "young industry" typically characterizes periods of democratization and, in the absence of shared norms or effective enforcement mechanisms, often produces the same results. See Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
63. Richard Leftwich and Ross Eckert, The Price System and Resource Allocation, 9th ed. (Chicago: Dryden, 1985), p. 407. The same uncertainty that fuels rivalrous behavior in a "young industry" typically characterizes periods of democratization and, in the absence of shared norms or effective enforcement mechanisms, often produces the same results. See Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
64. Ellen Mickiewicz, Split Signals: Television and Politics in The Soviet Union (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988); Allyn and Wilkinson, Guidelines for Journalists, pp. 17-18; Ithiel de Sola Pool, "Communication in Totalitarian Societies," in Ithiel de Sola Pool, Wilbur Schramm, et al., Handbook of Communication (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1973), pp. 462-511.
65. Ellen Mickiewicz, Split Signals: Television and Politics in The Soviet Union (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988); Allyn and Wilkinson, Guidelines for Journalists, pp. 17-18; Ithiel de Sola Pool, "Communication in Totalitarian Societies," in Ithiel de Sola Pool, Wilbur Schramm, et al., Handbook of Communication (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1973), pp. 462-511.
66. Ellen Mickiewicz, Split Signals: Television and Politics in The Soviet Union (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988); Allyn and Wilkinson, Guidelines for Journalists, pp. 17-18; Ithiel de Sola Pool, "Communication in Totalitarian Societies," in Ithiel de Sola Pool, Wilbur Schramm, et al., Handbook of Communication (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1973), pp. 462-511.
67. Stanislav Andreski, "On the Peaceful Disposition of Military Dictatorships," Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 3, No. 3 (December 1980), pp. 3-10.
68. Robert B. Holtman, Napoleonic Propaganda (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1950); Richard Smethurst, A Social Basis for Prewar Japanese Militarism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974); on the role of the Japanese press in promoting nationalism and empire, see John A. Lent, ed., Newspapers in Asia (Hong Kong: Heineman Asia, 1982), pp. 103, 106-108; on the nationalist rhetoric of the increasingly free Argentine press on the eve of the Falklands War, see Richard Ned Lebow, "Miscalculation in the South Atlantic," in Robert Jervis et al., Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), pp. 98-99.
69. Robert B. Holtman, Napoleonic Propaganda (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1950); Richard Smethurst, A Social Basis for Prewar Japanese Militarism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974); on the role of the Japanese press in promoting nationalism and empire, see John A. Lent, ed., Newspapers in Asia (Hong Kong: Heineman Asia, 1982), pp. 103, 106-108; on the nationalist rhetoric of the increasingly free Argentine press on the eve of the Falklands War, see Richard Ned Lebow, "Miscalculation in the South Atlantic," in Robert Jervis et al., Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), pp. 98-99.
70. Robert B. Holtman, Napoleonic Propaganda (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1950); Richard Smethurst, A Social Basis for Prewar Japanese Militarism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974); on the role of the Japanese press in promoting nationalism and empire, see John A. Lent, ed., Newspapers in Asia (Hong Kong: Heineman Asia, 1982), pp. 103, 106-108; on the nationalist rhetoric of the increasingly free Argentine press on the eve of the Falklands War, see Richard Ned Lebow, "Miscalculation in the South Atlantic," in Robert Jervis et al., Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), pp. 98-99.
71. Robert B. Holtman, Napoleonic Propaganda (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1950); Richard Smethurst, A Social Basis for Prewar Japanese Militarism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974); on the role of the Japanese press in promoting nationalism and empire, see John A. Lent, ed., Newspapers in Asia (Hong Kong: Heineman Asia, 1982), pp. 103, 106-108; on the nationalist rhetoric of the increasingly free Argentine press on the eve of the Falklands War, see Richard Ned Lebow, "Miscalculation in the South Atlantic," in Robert Jervis et al., Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), pp. 98-99.
72. Modris Eksteins, The Limits of Reason: The German Democratic Press and the Collapse of Weimar Democracy (London: Oxford University Press, 1975).
73. Laura Silber and Allan Little, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation (New York: TV Books, 1996), pp. 38-39.
74. Brett Fairbairn, "Interpreting Wilhelmine Elections: National Issues, Fairness Issues, and Electoral Mobilization," in Larry Eugene Jones and James Retallack, eds., Elections, Mass Politics, and Social Change in Modern Germany (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 20-23;
75. Robert J. Goldstein, Political Repression in Nineteenth Century Europe (London: Croom Helm, 1983), p. 39;
76. Dirk Stegmann, "Between Economic Interests and Radical Nationalism," in Larry Eugene Jones and James Retallack, eds., Between Reform, Reaction, and Resistance: Studies in the History of German Conservatism from 1789 to 1945 (Providence, R.I.: Berg, 1993), pp. 173, 183;
77. Geoff Eley, Reshaping the German Right (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1980), pp. 140-147.
78. On the latter point, see Karen Barkey, "Consequences of Empire," in Karen Barkey and Mark von Hagen, eds., After Empire: Multi-Ethnic Societies and Nation-Building (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, forthcoming 1997). On the contending discourses of class and nation, see Ronald Suny, The Revenge of the Past (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1993).
79. On the latter point, see Karen Barkey, "Consequences of Empire," in Karen Barkey and Mark von Hagen, eds., After Empire: Multi-Ethnic Societies and Nation-Building (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, forthcoming 1997). On the contending discourses of class and nation, see Ronald Suny, The Revenge of the Past (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1993).
80. Gérard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), p. 140.
81. On market segmentation in the Russian case, see Laura Belin, "Russia: Wrestling Political and Financial Repression," ibid., pp. 59-63; Victor Davidoff, "Regional Press Fights Political Control," ibid., p. 65; Laurie Wilson, "Communication and Russia: Evolving Media in a Changing Society," Social Science Journal, Vol. 32, No. 1 (January 1995), p. 113.
82. On market segmentation in the Russian case, see Laura Belin, "Russia: Wrestling Political and Financial Repression," ibid., pp. 59-63; Victor Davidoff, "Regional Press Fights Political Control," ibid., p. 65; Laurie Wilson, "Communication and Russia: Evolving Media in a Changing Society," Social Science Journal, Vol. 32, No. 1 (January 1995), p. 113.
83. On market segmentation in the Russian case, see Laura Belin, "Russia: Wrestling Political and Financial Repression," ibid., pp. 59-63; Victor Davidoff, "Regional Press Fights Political Control," ibid., p. 65; Laurie Wilson, "Communication and Russia: Evolving Media in a Changing Society," Social Science Journal, Vol. 32, No. 1 (January 1995), p. 113.
84. For related arguments, see Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent (New York: Pantheon, 1988).
85. Eksteins, Limits of Reason, pp. 80-81; Thomas Childers, The Nazi Voter (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1983), pp. 157-159.
86. Eksteins, Limits of Reason, pp. 80-81; Thomas Childers, The Nazi Voter (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1983), pp. 157-159.
87. Richard Bessel, "The Formation and Dissolution of a German National Electorate," in Larry Eugene Jones and James Retallack, eds., Elections, Mass Politics, and Social Change in Modern Germany (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 404, 412-413; Peter Fritzsche, "Weimar Populism and National Socialism in Local Perspective," in Jones and Retallack, Elections, pp. 301-304; Wolfgang Mommsen, "Government without Parties," in Jones and Retallack, Between Reform, Reaction, and Resistance, pp. 359, 372.
88. Richard Bessel, "The Formation and Dissolution of a German National Electorate," in Larry Eugene Jones and James Retallack, eds., Elections, Mass Politics, and Social Change in Modern Germany (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 404, 412-413; Peter Fritzsche, "Weimar Populism and National Socialism in Local Perspective," in Jones and Retallack, Elections, pp. 301-304; Wolfgang Mommsen, "Government without Parties," in Jones and Retallack, Between Reform, Reaction, and Resistance, pp. 359, 372.
89. Richard Bessel, "The Formation and Dissolution of a German National Electorate," in Larry Eugene Jones and James Retallack, eds., Elections, Mass Politics, and Social Change in Modern Germany (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 404, 412-413; Peter Fritzsche, "Weimar Populism and National Socialism in Local Perspective," in Jones and Retallack, Elections, pp. 301-304; Wolfgang Mommsen, "Government without Parties," in Jones and Retallack, Between Reform, Reaction, and Resistance, pp. 359, 372.
90. E.J. Feuchtwanger, From Weimar to Hitler (London: Macmillan, 1993), pp. 298, 313-314. On the negative effects of unmodified proportional representation systems like Weimar's in fragmented polities, see Donald Horowitz, A Democratic South Africa? Constitutional Engineering in a Divided Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), pp. 166-176.
91. E.J. Feuchtwanger, From Weimar to Hitler (London: Macmillan, 1993), pp. 298, 313-314. On the negative effects of unmodified proportional representation systems like Weimar's in fragmented polities, see Donald Horowitz, A Democratic South Africa? Constitutional Engineering in a Divided Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), pp. 166-176.
92. Susanne Hoeber Rudolph and Lloyd Rudolph, "Modern Hate," New Republic, Vol. 208, No. 12 (March 22, 1993), pp. 24-29; Milton Esman, Ethnic Politics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1994), pp. 28-31.
93. Susanne Hoeber Rudolph and Lloyd Rudolph, "Modern Hate," New Republic, Vol. 208, No. 12 (March 22, 1993), pp. 24-29; Milton Esman, Ethnic Politics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1994), pp. 28-31.
94. Paul Keckemeti, "Propaganda," in Pool, Handbook of Communication, pp. 844-870; Donald Kinder and David Sears, "Public Opinion and Political Action," in Gardner Lindzey and Elliot Aronson, eds., Handbook of Social Psychology, Vol. 3 (New York: Random House, 1985), pp. 659-741; Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976).
95. Paul Keckemeti, "Propaganda," in Pool, Handbook of Communication, pp. 844-870; Donald Kinder and David Sears, "Public Opinion and Political Action," in Gardner Lindzey and Elliot Aronson, eds., Handbook of Social Psychology, Vol. 3 (New York: Random House, 1985), pp. 659-741; Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976).
96. Paul Keckemeti, "Propaganda," in Pool, Handbook of Communication, pp. 844-870; Donald Kinder and David Sears, "Public Opinion and Political Action," in Gardner Lindzey and Elliot Aronson, eds., Handbook of Social Psychology, Vol. 3 (New York: Random House, 1985), pp. 659-741; Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976).
97. Benjamin Page and Robert Shapiro, The Rational Public (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1992). Consumers' level of education - and presumably their sophistication about propaganda - seems to have mixed effects. Page and Shapiro, pp. 178, 203-205, 313-330.
98. John Zaller, The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
99. Stegmann, "Between Economic Interests and Radical Nationalism," in Jones and Retallack, Between Reform, p. 170; Fairbairn, "Interpreting Wilhelmine Elections," in Jones and Retallack, Elections, pp. 22-23.
100. Stegmann, "Between Economic Interests and Radical Nationalism," in Jones and Retallack, Between Reform, p. 170; Fairbairn, "Interpreting Wilhelmine Elections," in Jones and Retallack, Elections, pp. 22-23.
101. Eley, Reshaping the German Right, chap. 11; James Retallack, "The Road to Philippi: The Conservative Party and Bethmann Hollweg's 'Politics of the Diagonal,' 1909-1914," in Jones and Retallack, Between Reform, pp. 286-287.
102. Eley, Reshaping the German Right, chap. 11; James Retallack, "The Road to Philippi: The Conservative Party and Bethmann Hollweg's 'Politics of the Diagonal,' 1909-1914," in Jones and Retallack, Between Reform, pp. 286-287.
103. For various approaches to regulating speech and media, see Judith Lichtenberg, ed., Democracy and the Mass Media (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1990), esp. pp. 52, 127-128, 144-145, 186-201.
104. Page and Shapiro, The Rational Public, pp. 339-354; for a skeptical view, see Robert Entman, Democracy without Citizens (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).
105. Page and Shapiro, The Rational Public, pp. 339-354; for a skeptical view, see Robert Entman, Democracy without Citizens (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).
106. See the periodic country studies by Article 19 and Freedom House.
107. Phillip Knightly, The First Casualty (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1975), pp. 21-25; Michael Schudson, Discovering the News: A Social History (New York: Basic, 1978); Belin, "Russia: Wrestling Political and Financial Repression," pp. 59-63; Lent, Newspapers in Asia, pp. 176, 211.
108. Phillip Knightly, The First Casualty (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1975), pp. 21-25; Michael Schudson, Discovering the News: A Social History (New York: Basic, 1978); Belin, "Russia: Wrestling Political and Financial Repression," pp. 59-63; Lent, Newspapers in Asia, pp. 176, 211.
109. Phillip Knightly, The First Casualty (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1975), pp. 21-25; Michael Schudson, Discovering the News: A Social History (New York: Basic, 1978); Belin, "Russia: Wrestling Political and Financial Repression," pp. 59-63; Lent, Newspapers in Asia, pp. 176, 211.
110. Phillip Knightly, The First Casualty (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1975), pp. 21-25; Michael Schudson, Discovering the News: A Social History (New York: Basic, 1978); Belin, "Russia: Wrestling Political and Financial Repression," pp. 59-63; Lent, Newspapers in Asia, pp. 176, 211.
111. Letter to John Norvell, June 14, 1807, in Merrill D. Peterson, ed., The Portable Thomas Jefferson (New York: Viking, 1975), p. 505.
112. James Manor, "The Failure of Political Integration in Sri Lanka (Ceylon),' Joumal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, Vol. 17, No. 1 (March 1979), pp. 21-44, esp. 21-23.
113. Thompson, Forging War, p. 20; Zdenka Milivojević, ́The Media in Serbia from 1985 to 1994,́ in Dušan Janjić, ed., Serbia Between the Past and the Future (Belgrade: Institute of Social Sciences, 1995), pp. 168-169.
114. Thompson, Forging War, p. 20; Zdenka Milivojević, ́The Media in Serbia from 1985 to 1994,́ in Dušan Janjić, ed., Serbia Between the Past and the Future (Belgrade: Institute of Social Sciences, 1995), pp. 168-169.
115. Velko Vujacic, ́Serbian Nationalism, Slobodan Milosevic and the Origins of the Yugoslav War,́ The Harriman Review, Vol. 8, No. 4 (December 1995), p. 29; Thompson, Forging War, p. 20.
116. Velko Vujacic, ́Serbian Nationalism, Slobodan Milosevic and the Origins of the Yugoslav War,́ The Harriman Review, Vol. 8, No. 4 (December 1995), p. 29; Thompson, Forging War, p. 20.
117. Gagnon, ́Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbiá; Susan Woodward, Balkan Tragedy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1995), pp. 99, 230-232, 293; Branka Magaš, The Destruction of Yugoslavia (London: Verso, 1993), pp. 3-76; Thompson, Forging War, p. 56, 65-66, 114-116, 124.
118. Gagnon, ́Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbiá; Susan Woodward, Balkan Tragedy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1995), pp. 99, 230-232, 293; Branka Magaš, The Destruction of Yugoslavia (London: Verso, 1993), pp. 3-76; Thompson, Forging War, p. 56, 65-66, 114-116, 124.
119. Gagnon, ́Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbiá; Susan Woodward, Balkan Tragedy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1995), pp. 99, 230-232, 293; Branka Magaš, The Destruction of Yugoslavia (London: Verso, 1993), pp. 3-76; Thompson, Forging War, p. 56, 65-66, 114-116, 124.
120. Thompson, Forging War, pp. 6-7, 16.
121. Thompson, Forging War, pp. 38-43; Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, p. 230. In Croatia, only 600,000 people out of ten million get their news from media not controlled by the government, according to a survey conducted by Miklos Biro, "Is Anybody Out There?" War Report, No. 39 (February/March 1996), p. 17.
122. Thompson, Forging War, pp. 38-43; Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, p. 230. In Croatia, only 600,000 people out of ten million get their news from media not controlled by the government, according to a survey conducted by Miklos Biro, "Is Anybody Out There?" War Report, No. 39 (February/March 1996), p. 17.
123. Thompson, Forging War, pp. 38-43; Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, p. 230. In Croatia, only 600,000 people out of ten million get their news from media not controlled by the government, according to a survey conducted by Miklos Biro, "Is Anybody Out There?" War Report, No. 39 (February/March 1996), p. 17.
124. Milivojević, "The Media in Serbia," p. 164; Thompson, Forging War, p. 54; Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, p. 33; see also Magaš, Destruction, pp. 49-76.
125. Milivojević, "The Media in Serbia," p. 164; Thompson, Forging War, p. 54; Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, p. 33; see also Magaš, Destruction, pp. 49-76.
126. Milivojević, "The Media in Serbia," p. 164; Thompson, Forging War, p. 54; Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, p. 33; see also Magaš, Destruction, pp. 49-76.
127. Milivojević, "The Media in Serbia," p. 164; Thompson, Forging War, p. 54; Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, p. 33; see also Magaš, Destruction, pp. 49-76.
128. Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia," pp. 145-152; Vujacic, "Serbian Nationalism," p. 30; Thompson, Forging War, pp. 23-24, 52-53.
129. Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia," pp. 145-152; Vujacic, "Serbian Nationalism," p. 30; Thompson, Forging War, pp. 23-24, 52-53.
130. Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia," pp. 145-152; Vujacic, "Serbian Nationalism," p. 30; Thompson, Forging War, pp. 23-24, 52-53.
131. Thompson, Forging War, p. 55.
132. Thompson, Forging War, pp. 221-224; Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, p. 230.
133. Thompson, Forging War, pp. 221-224; Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, p. 230.
134. Changes in media content were also used successfully to shift opinion in favor of peace. On April 9, 1993, 70 percent of Serbian respondents said they opposed the Vance-Owen peace plan, but on April 27, after a reversal of policy by the Serbian government and media, only 20 percent opposed it, and 39 percent were in favor.
135. Thompson, Forging War, pp. 127-128, 209, 264.
136. Nonetheless, even the independent media found itself caught in the self-fulfilling prophecies generated by nationalist mythmaking. As Serbian journalist Stojan Cerovic said in May 1992, "Anybody who explains the truth can do so only at his own cost. Reality sounds like the blackest anti-Serbian propaganda, and anyone who describes it will frighten people and turn them against him." Thompson, Forging War, pp. 73-75, 127-129. For a dissenting view which stresses the limited success of appeals to Serbian nationalism, see Gagnon, "Ethnic Conflict as Demobilizer."
137. Nonetheless, even the independent media found itself caught in the self-fulfilling prophecies generated by nationalist mythmaking. As Serbian journalist Stojan Cerovic said in May 1992, "Anybody who explains the truth can do so only at his own cost. Reality sounds like the blackest anti-Serbian propaganda, and anyone who describes it will frighten people and turn them against him." Thompson, Forging War, pp. 73-75, 127-129. For a dissenting view which stresses the limited success of appeals to Serbian nationalism, see Gagnon, "Ethnic Conflict as Demobilizer."
138. Thompson, Forging War, pp. 127-128.
139. Thompson, Forging War, pp. 105-111, 161.
140. Thompson, Forging War, pp. 225-225, 229-231.
141. Quotation from Africa Rights, Rwanda, p. 35; also pp. vi, 37-38, 63-64, 69-72, 150; Human Rights Watch, Playing the "Communal Card," pp. 7, 9.
142. Quotation from Africa Rights, Rwanda, p. 35; also pp. vi, 37-38, 63-64, 69-72, 150; Human Rights Watch, Playing the "Communal Card," pp. 7, 9.
143. Holly Burkhalter, "The Question of Genocide," World Policy Journal, Vol. 11, No. 4 (Winter 1994-95), pp. 44-54, esp. 51, 53.
144. Human Rights Watch, Playing, pp. 16-17; Africa Rights, Rwanda, p. 720; Reporters sans Frontières, Rwanda: L'impasse? La liberté de las presse après le génocide, 4 juillet 1994-28 août 1995 (Paris: Reporters sans Frontières, 1995), pp. 48-50; Alison Des Forges, "The Rwandan Crisis," paper prepared for a conference on Sources of Conflict in Rwanda (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, October 17, 1994).
145. Human Rights Watch, Playing, pp. 16-17; Africa Rights, Rwanda, p. 720; Reporters sans Frontières, Rwanda: L'impasse? La liberté de las presse après le génocide, 4 juillet 1994-28 août 1995 (Paris: Reporters sans Frontières, 1995), pp. 48-50; Alison Des Forges, "The Rwandan Crisis," paper prepared for a conference on Sources of Conflict in Rwanda (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, October 17, 1994).
146. Human Rights Watch, Playing, pp. 16-17; Africa Rights, Rwanda, p. 720; Reporters sans Frontières, Rwanda: L'impasse? La liberté de las presse après le génocide, 4 juillet 1994-28 août 1995 (Paris: Reporters sans Frontières, 1995), pp. 48-50; Alison Des Forges, "The Rwandan Crisis," paper prepared for a conference on Sources of Conflict in Rwanda (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, October 17, 1994).
147. Human Rights Watch, Playing, pp. 16-17; Africa Rights, Rwanda, p. 720; Reporters sans Frontières, Rwanda: L'impasse? La liberté de las presse après le génocide, 4 juillet 1994-28 août 1995 (Paris: Reporters sans Frontières, 1995), pp. 48-50; Alison Des Forges, "The Rwandan Crisis," paper prepared for a conference on Sources of Conflict in Rwanda (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, October 17, 1994).
148. Compare Africa Rights, Rwanda, pp. 32-34 with 720; also compare Des Forges, "Rwandan Crisis," pp. 1 with 9.
149. Compare Africa Rights, Rwanda, pp. 32-34 with 720; also compare Des Forges, "Rwandan Crisis," pp. 1 with 9.
150. Africa Rights, Rwanda, p. 150.
151. Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, chap. 4, "Slouching towards Democracy," esp. pp. 131-133, 157, on the low quality and extremism of these new entrants into public discourse.
152. Africa Rights, Rwanda, pp. 30-34, 44; Bruce D. Jones, "The Arusha Process," in Howard Adelman and Astri Suhrke, eds., Early Warning and Conflict Management in Rwanda (forthcoming); Alan J. Kuperman, "The Other Lesson of Rwanda: Mediators Sometimes Do More Damage Than Good," SAIS Review, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Winter-Spring 1996), pp. 221-240.
153. Africa Rights, Rwanda, pp. 30-34, 44; Bruce D. Jones, "The Arusha Process," in Howard Adelman and Astri Suhrke, eds., Early Warning and Conflict Management in Rwanda (forthcoming); Alan J. Kuperman, "The Other Lesson of Rwanda: Mediators Sometimes Do More Damage Than Good," SAIS Review, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Winter-Spring 1996), pp. 221-240.
154. Africa Rights, Rwanda, pp. 30-34, 44; Bruce D. Jones, "The Arusha Process," in Howard Adelman and Astri Suhrke, eds., Early Warning and Conflict Management in Rwanda (forthcoming); Alan J. Kuperman, "The Other Lesson of Rwanda: Mediators Sometimes Do More Damage Than Good," SAIS Review, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Winter-Spring 1996), pp. 221-240.
155. Alex de Waal, "The Genocidal State," Times Literary Supplement, July 1, 1994, pp. 3-4; see also Africa Rights, Rwanda, pp. 30-32.
156. Alex de Waal, "The Genocidal State," Times Literary Supplement, July 1, 1994, pp. 3-4; see also Africa Rights, Rwanda, pp. 30-32.
157. Africa Rights, Rwanda, p. v; also pp. 568-596; Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, p. 170; Jones, "Arusha."
158. Africa Rights, Rwanda, p. v; also pp. 568-596; Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, p. 170; Jones, "Arusha."
159. Africa Rights, Rwanda, pp. 66-68.
160. De Waal, "The Genocidal State," p. 4; also Jones, "Arusha." On Habyarimana's death, see Prunier, Rwanda Crisis, pp. 213-229.
161. De Waal, "The Genocidal State," p. 4; also Jones, "Arusha." On Habyarimana's death, see Prunier, Rwanda Crisis, pp. 213-229.
162. De Waal, "The Genocidal State," p. 4; also Jones, "Arusha." On Habyarimana's death, see Prunier, Rwanda Crisis, pp. 213-229.
163. Human Rights Watch, Playing, pp. 16-17.
164. Reporters sans Frontières, Rwanda, pp. 6, 41-42; 52-53; Reporters sans Frontières, Burundi, le Venin de la Haine: Étude sur les médias extrémistes, 2d ed. (Paris: Reporters sans Frontières, July 1995), pp. 63, 68-69; quotation on p. 69.
165. Reporters sans Frontières, Rwanda, pp. 6, 41-42; 52-53; Reporters sans Frontières, Burundi, le Venin de la Haine: Étude sur les médias extrémistes, 2d ed. (Paris: Reporters sans Frontières, July 1995), pp. 63, 68-69; quotation on p. 69.
166. Tim Harris, "Propaganda and Public Opinion in Seventeenth-Century England," in Jeremy Popkin, ed., Media and Revolution (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1995), pp. 48-73.
167. Geoffrey Holmes and Daniel Szechi, The Age of Oligarchy (London: Longman, 1993), chap. 13, esp. pp. 194-195; Martin Daunton, Progress and Poverty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 482; Linda Colley, Britons (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1992), esp. pp. 25, 220.
168. Geoffrey Holmes and Daniel Szechi, The Age of Oligarchy (London: Longman, 1993), chap. 13, esp. pp. 194-195; Martin Daunton, Progress and Poverty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 482; Linda Colley, Britons (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1992), esp. pp. 25, 220.
169. Geoffrey Holmes and Daniel Szechi, The Age of Oligarchy (London: Longman, 1993), chap. 13, esp. pp. 194-195; Martin Daunton, Progress and Poverty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 482; Linda Colley, Britons (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1992), esp. pp. 25, 220.
170. Snyder, Myths of Empire, chap. 5; Paul Kennedy, Strategy and Diplomacy (London: Allen and Unwin, 1983), chaps. 1 and 8; for a more critical view, see Charles Kupchan, The Vulnerability of Empire (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1994), chap. 3.
171. Snyder, Myths of Empire, chap. 5; Paul Kennedy, Strategy and Diplomacy (London: Allen and Unwin, 1983), chaps. 1 and 8; for a more critical view, see Charles Kupchan, The Vulnerability of Empire (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1994), chap. 3.
172. Snyder, Myths of Empire, chap. 5; Paul Kennedy, Strategy and Diplomacy (London: Allen and Unwin, 1983), chaps. 1 and 8; for a more critical view, see Charles Kupchan, The Vulnerability of Empire (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1994), chap. 3.
173. Elaine Potter, The Press as Opposition: The Political Role of South African Newspapers (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1975).
174. On the segmented market, see William Finnegan, Dateline Soweto (New York: Harper and Row, 1988), pp. 24-33, and Potter, The Press as Opposition, p. 164; on the transition, see Timothy Sisk, Democratization in South Africa (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995).
175. On the segmented market, see William Finnegan, Dateline Soweto (New York: Harper and Row, 1988), pp. 24-33, and Potter, The Press as Opposition, p. 164; on the transition, see Timothy Sisk, Democratization in South Africa (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995).
176. On the segmented market, see William Finnegan, Dateline Soweto (New York: Harper and Row, 1988), pp. 24-33, and Potter, The Press as Opposition, p. 164; on the transition, see Timothy Sisk, Democratization in South Africa (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995).
177. S.N. Paul, Public Opinion and British Rule (New Delhi: Metropolitan, 1979).
178. R.C.S. Sarkar, The Press in India (New Delhi: S. Chand, 1984), pp. 190-193, 295-296; Allyn and Wilkinson, Guidelines for Journalists, appendix.
179. R.C.S. Sarkar, The Press in India (New Delhi: S. Chand, 1984), pp. 190-193, 295-296; Allyn and Wilkinson, Guidelines for Journalists, appendix.
180. Moti Lal Bhargava, Role of Press in the Freedom Movement (New Delhi: Reliance, 1987), pp. 336, 341-342.
181. S.B. Kolpe, "Caste and Communal Violence and the Role of the Press," pp. 342, 349, in Asghar Ali Engineer, ed., Communal Riots in Post-Independence India (Hyderabad: Sangam, 1984); and Asghar Ali Engineer, "The Causes of Communal Riots," ibid., pp. 36-38; Hamish McDonald, "Paper Tigers," Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 158, No. 40 (October 5, 1995), pp. 28-30; Zenab Banu, Politics of Communalism (Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1989), p. 21.
182. S.B. Kolpe, "Caste and Communal Violence and the Role of the Press," pp. 342, 349, in Asghar Ali Engineer, ed., Communal Riots in Post-Independence India (Hyderabad: Sangam, 1984); and Asghar Ali Engineer, "The Causes of Communal Riots," ibid., pp. 36-38; Hamish McDonald, "Paper Tigers," Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 158, No. 40 (October 5, 1995), pp. 28-30; Zenab Banu, Politics of Communalism (Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1989), p. 21.
183. S.B. Kolpe, "Caste and Communal Violence and the Role of the Press," pp. 342, 349, in Asghar Ali Engineer, ed., Communal Riots in Post-Independence India (Hyderabad: Sangam, 1984); and Asghar Ali Engineer, "The Causes of Communal Riots," ibid., pp. 36-38; Hamish McDonald, "Paper Tigers," Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 158, No. 40 (October 5, 1995), pp. 28-30; Zenab Banu, Politics of Communalism (Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1989), p. 21.
184. S.B. Kolpe, "Caste and Communal Violence and the Role of the Press," pp. 342, 349, in Asghar Ali Engineer, ed., Communal Riots in Post-Independence India (Hyderabad: Sangam, 1984); and Asghar Ali Engineer, "The Causes of Communal Riots," ibid., pp. 36-38; Hamish McDonald, "Paper Tigers," Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 158, No. 40 (October 5, 1995), pp. 28-30; Zenab Banu, Politics of Communalism (Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1989), p. 21.
185. S.B. Kolpe, "Caste and Communal Violence and the Role of the Press," pp. 342, 349, in Asghar Ali Engineer, ed., Communal Riots in Post-Independence India (Hyderabad: Sangam, 1984); and Asghar Ali Engineer, "The Causes of Communal Riots," ibid., pp. 36-38; Hamish McDonald, "Paper Tigers," Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 158, No. 40 (October 5, 1995), pp. 28-30; Zenab Banu, Politics of Communalism (Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1989), p. 21.
186. Šumit Ganguly, Between War and Peace: The Crisis in Kashmir (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming); Ganguly, "Explaining the Kashmir Insurgency: Political Mobilization and Institutional Decay," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Fall 1996), pp. 76-107.
187. Šumit Ganguly, Between War and Peace: The Crisis in Kashmir (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming); Ganguly, "Explaining the Kashmir Insurgency: Political Mobilization and Institutional Decay," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Fall 1996), pp. 76-107.
188. Human Rights Watch, Playing the "Communal Card," p. 21.
189. Article 19, Guidelines for Election Broadcasting, p. 5.
190. Michael W. Doyle, UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia: UNTAC's Civil Mandate (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1995), pp. 54-55. For other cases, see Dan Lindley, "Collective Security Organizations and Internal Conflict," in Michael E. Brown, ed., The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996), pp. 562-567.
191. Michael W. Doyle, UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia: UNTAC's Civil Mandate (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1995), pp. 54-55. For other cases, see Dan Lindley, "Collective Security Organizations and Internal Conflict," in Michael E. Brown, ed., The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996), pp. 562-567.
192. Thomas Carothers, Assessing Democratic Assistance: The Case of Romania (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1996), pp. 80-89.
193. Richard L. Merritt, Democracy Imposed: U.S. Occupation Policy and the German Public, 1945-1949 (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1996), pp. 291-315, esp. 296, emphasizes the effectiveness of this strategy.
194. Horowitz, A Democratic South Africa? chaps. 4 and 5; Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1977). On common media as a precondition for an integrated national consciousness, see Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (London: Verso, 1983).
195. Horowitz, A Democratic South Africa? chaps. 4 and 5; Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1977). On common media as a precondition for an integrated national consciousness, see Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (London: Verso, 1983).
196. Horowitz, A Democratic South Africa? chaps. 4 and 5; Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1977). On common media as a precondition for an integrated national consciousness, see Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (London: Verso, 1983).
197. Stephen Harold Riggins, Ethnic Minority Media (Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage, 1992).
198. Larry Diamond, Promoting Democracy in the 1990s (New York: Carnegie Corporation, Report to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, December 1995), pp. 24-25.
199. Gordon P. Means, Malaysian Politics: The Second Generation, 2d ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), esp. pp. 137-138, 313-314, 418-422, 439; Karl von Vorys, Democracy without Consensus: Communalism and Political Stability in Malaysia (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975), pp. 394-412.
200. Gordon P. Means, Malaysian Politics: The Second Generation, 2d ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), esp. pp. 137-138, 313-314, 418-422, 439; Karl von Vorys, Democracy without Consensus: Communalism and Political Stability in Malaysia (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975), pp. 394-412.