Current gains and future outcomes: When cumulative relative gains matter

International Security

Volumn 21, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 112-146

  Matthews III, John C ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030521901     PISSN: 01622889     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/isec.21.1.112     Document Type: Article

References (153)

1. See, for instance, Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), esp. pp. 105, 175; Joseph Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism," International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer 1988); Joseph Grieco, Cooperation among Nations: Europe, America, and Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990); Joseph Grieco, "The Relative Gains Problem for International Cooperation," American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 3 (September 1993); Joseph Grieco, "Understanding the Problem of International Cooperation: The Limits of Neoliberal Institutionalism and the Future of Realist Theory," in David Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); Robert Keohane, International Institutions and State Power (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1989); Robert Keohane, "Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge after the Cold War," in David Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); Duncan Snidal, "Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation," American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 3 (September 1991); Robert Powell, "Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory," American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 4, (December 1991); Michael Mastanduno, "Do Relative Gains Matter? America's Response to Japanese Industrial Policy," International Security, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Summer 1991); Stephen Krasner, "Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier," World Politics, Vol. 43, No. 3 (April 1991).
2. See, for instance, Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), esp. pp. 105, 175; Joseph Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism," International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer 1988); Joseph Grieco, Cooperation among Nations: Europe, America, and Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990); Joseph Grieco, "The Relative Gains Problem for International Cooperation," American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 3 (September 1993); Joseph Grieco, "Understanding the Problem of International Cooperation: The Limits of Neoliberal Institutionalism and the Future of Realist Theory," in David Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); Robert Keohane, International Institutions and State Power (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1989); Robert Keohane, "Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge after the Cold War," in David Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); Duncan Snidal, "Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation," American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 3 (September 1991); Robert Powell, "Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory," American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 4, (December 1991); Michael Mastanduno, "Do Relative Gains Matter? America's Response to Japanese Industrial Policy," International Security, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Summer 1991); Stephen Krasner, "Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier," World Politics, Vol. 43, No. 3 (April 1991).
3. See, for instance, Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), esp. pp. 105, 175; Joseph Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism," International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer 1988); Joseph Grieco, Cooperation among Nations: Europe, America, and Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990); Joseph Grieco, "The Relative Gains Problem for International Cooperation," American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 3 (September 1993); Joseph Grieco, "Understanding the Problem of International Cooperation: The Limits of Neoliberal Institutionalism and the Future of Realist Theory," in David Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); Robert Keohane, International Institutions and State Power (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1989); Robert Keohane, "Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge after the Cold War," in David Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); Duncan Snidal, "Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation," American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 3 (September 1991); Robert Powell, "Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory," American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 4, (December 1991); Michael Mastanduno, "Do Relative Gains Matter? America's Response to Japanese Industrial Policy," International Security, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Summer 1991); Stephen Krasner, "Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier," World Politics, Vol. 43, No. 3 (April 1991).
4. See, for instance, Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), esp. pp. 105, 175; Joseph Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism," International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer 1988); Joseph Grieco, Cooperation among Nations: Europe, America, and Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990); Joseph Grieco, "The Relative Gains Problem for International Cooperation," American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 3 (September 1993); Joseph Grieco, "Understanding the Problem of International Cooperation: The Limits of Neoliberal Institutionalism and the Future of Realist Theory," in David Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); Robert Keohane, International Institutions and State Power (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1989); Robert Keohane, "Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge after the Cold War," in David Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); Duncan Snidal, "Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation," American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 3 (September 1991); Robert Powell, "Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory," American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 4, (December 1991); Michael Mastanduno, "Do Relative Gains Matter? America's Response to Japanese Industrial Policy," International Security, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Summer 1991); Stephen Krasner, "Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier," World Politics, Vol. 43, No. 3 (April 1991).
5. See, for instance, Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), esp. pp. 105, 175; Joseph Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism," International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer 1988); Joseph Grieco, Cooperation among Nations: Europe, America, and Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990); Joseph Grieco, "The Relative Gains Problem for International Cooperation," American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 3 (September 1993); Joseph Grieco, "Understanding the Problem of International Cooperation: The Limits of Neoliberal Institutionalism and the Future of Realist Theory," in David Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); Robert Keohane, International Institutions and State Power (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1989); Robert Keohane, "Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge after the Cold War," in David Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); Duncan Snidal, "Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation," American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 3 (September 1991); Robert Powell, "Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory," American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 4, (December 1991); Michael Mastanduno, "Do Relative Gains Matter? America's Response to Japanese Industrial Policy," International Security, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Summer 1991); Stephen Krasner, "Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier," World Politics, Vol. 43, No. 3 (April 1991).
6. See, for instance, Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), esp. pp. 105, 175; Joseph Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism," International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer 1988); Joseph Grieco, Cooperation among Nations: Europe, America, and Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990); Joseph Grieco, "The Relative Gains Problem for International Cooperation," American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 3 (September 1993); Joseph Grieco, "Understanding the Problem of International Cooperation: The Limits of Neoliberal Institutionalism and the Future of Realist Theory," in David Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); Robert Keohane, International Institutions and State Power (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1989); Robert Keohane, "Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge after the Cold War," in David Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); Duncan Snidal, "Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation," American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 3 (September 1991); Robert Powell, "Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory," American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 4, (December 1991); Michael Mastanduno, "Do Relative Gains Matter? America's Response to Japanese Industrial Policy," International Security, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Summer 1991); Stephen Krasner, "Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier," World Politics, Vol. 43, No. 3 (April 1991).
7. See, for instance, Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), esp. pp. 105, 175; Joseph Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism," International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer 1988); Joseph Grieco, Cooperation among Nations: Europe, America, and Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990); Joseph Grieco, "The Relative Gains Problem for International Cooperation," American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 3 (September 1993); Joseph Grieco, "Understanding the Problem of International Cooperation: The Limits of Neoliberal Institutionalism and the Future of Realist Theory," in David Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); Robert Keohane, International Institutions and State Power (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1989); Robert Keohane, "Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge after the Cold War," in David Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); Duncan Snidal, "Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation," American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 3 (September 1991); Robert Powell, "Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory," American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 4, (December 1991); Michael Mastanduno, "Do Relative Gains Matter? America's Response to Japanese Industrial Policy," International Security, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Summer 1991); Stephen Krasner, "Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier," World Politics, Vol. 43, No. 3 (April 1991).
8. See, for instance, Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), esp. pp. 105, 175; Joseph Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism," International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer 1988); Joseph Grieco, Cooperation among Nations: Europe, America, and Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990); Joseph Grieco, "The Relative Gains Problem for International Cooperation," American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 3 (September 1993); Joseph Grieco, "Understanding the Problem of International Cooperation: The Limits of Neoliberal Institutionalism and the Future of Realist Theory," in David Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); Robert Keohane, International Institutions and State Power (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1989); Robert Keohane, "Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge after the Cold War," in David Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); Duncan Snidal, "Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation," American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 3 (September 1991); Robert Powell, "Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory," American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 4, (December 1991); Michael Mastanduno, "Do Relative Gains Matter? America's Response to Japanese Industrial Policy," International Security, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Summer 1991); Stephen Krasner, "Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier," World Politics, Vol. 43, No. 3 (April 1991).
9. See, for instance, Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), esp. pp. 105, 175; Joseph Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism," International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer 1988); Joseph Grieco, Cooperation among Nations: Europe, America, and Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990); Joseph Grieco, "The Relative Gains Problem for International Cooperation," American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 3 (September 1993); Joseph Grieco, "Understanding the Problem of International Cooperation: The Limits of Neoliberal Institutionalism and the Future of Realist Theory," in David Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); Robert Keohane, International Institutions and State Power (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1989); Robert Keohane, "Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge after the Cold War," in David Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); Duncan Snidal, "Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation," American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 3 (September 1991); Robert Powell, "Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory," American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 4, (December 1991); Michael Mastanduno, "Do Relative Gains Matter? America's Response to Japanese Industrial Policy," International Security, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Summer 1991); Stephen Krasner, "Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier," World Politics, Vol. 43, No. 3 (April 1991).
10. See, for instance, Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), esp. pp. 105, 175; Joseph Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism," International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer 1988); Joseph Grieco, Cooperation among Nations: Europe, America, and Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990); Joseph Grieco, "The Relative Gains Problem for International Cooperation," American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 3 (September 1993); Joseph Grieco, "Understanding the Problem of International Cooperation: The Limits of Neoliberal Institutionalism and the Future of Realist Theory," in David Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); Robert Keohane, International Institutions and State Power (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1989); Robert Keohane, "Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge after the Cold War," in David Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); Duncan Snidal, "Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation," American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 3 (September 1991); Robert Powell, "Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory," American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 4, (December 1991); Michael Mastanduno, "Do Relative Gains Matter? America's Response to Japanese Industrial Policy," International Security, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Summer 1991); Stephen Krasner, "Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier," World Politics, Vol. 43, No. 3 (April 1991).
11. See, for instance, Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), esp. pp. 105, 175; Joseph Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism," International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer 1988); Joseph Grieco, Cooperation among Nations: Europe, America, and Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990); Joseph Grieco, "The Relative Gains Problem for International Cooperation," American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 3 (September 1993); Joseph Grieco, "Understanding the Problem of International Cooperation: The Limits of Neoliberal Institutionalism and the Future of Realist Theory," in David Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); Robert Keohane, International Institutions and State Power (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1989); Robert Keohane, "Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge after the Cold War," in David Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); Duncan Snidal, "Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation," American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 3 (September 1991); Robert Powell, "Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory," American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 4, (December 1991); Michael Mastanduno, "Do Relative Gains Matter? America's Response to Japanese Industrial Policy," International Security, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Summer 1991); Stephen Krasner, "Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier," World Politics, Vol. 43, No. 3 (April 1991).
12. This article uses the terms "IPE" or "international political economy" to denote the issue area of international economic affairs and "security" for state security affairs. The first deals with issues of trade, monetary policy, investment, and other economic activities that generally have wealth as their principal goal. Security deals with issues of military capacity and the ability to wage war and physically defend a state against attackers. These distinctions are not clear-cut, as economic interactions can have security implications and vice versa. Nevertheless, much of the literature in international relations makes the strong argument that the two issue areas are sufficiently different to be analytically dissimilar in terms of prospects for cooperation. For a somewhat contrasting usage of the term "security," see Charles L. Glaser, "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 53, fn. 6, and pp. 70-73.
13. I define "gain" as a benefit derived from cooperation. In economic cooperation this will generally take the form of monetary benefits. In security cooperation the primary benefit is a decrease in the capability of a potential adversary to inflict damage to one's own state or its physical assets. A "relative gain" is a disproportionate benefit which changes the balance between two states. An absolute gain is the total award received by a state for a transaction; the comparative measure of absolute gains is the same state relative to itself at different times. Relative gains create "advantages" when they allow the state that benefits more to secure additional gains not directly linked to the terms of the original agreement or outcome. Advantages result when relative gains can be used to influence other outcomes.
14. I use "round" to mean a period of limited duration during which a state attempts to alter significantly the status quo existing between itself and partners or rivals. Bilateral and multilateral negotiations are rounds, as are unilateral actions and counter-actions. Rounds begin when a state initiates serious efforts to create a new status quo. They end when the states involved agree to accept or are forced to accept new rules for action or new payoffs, or when the states abandon, temporarily or permanently, the attempt at revision and revert to the status quo ante.
15. Grieco also used the term "cumulative" to describe increasing returns to early relative gains. His usage is brief and undeveloped, however, and refers essentially to the potential for relative losses to restrict independent action of states at a later date in their political decisions. See Grieco, "The Relative Gains Problem for International Cooperation," p. 734.
16. See for instance Robert Jervis, "Security Regimes," in Stephen Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983), esp. pp. 174-176. Jervis argues that because security differs so fundamentally from other issues in international relations, cooperation and regime formation are exceedingly difficult.
17. See, e.g., Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation," p. 487.
18. I define cooperation as a joint decision by two or more states to limit or regulate conflict over a contentious issue. This generally will bring mutual benefit, though it may be unequal. See, for example, Grieco, Cooperation among Nations, p. 22.
19. Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation," p. 487.
20. Waltz provides the theoretical underpinning for this argument in his analysis of anarchy. See particularly Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 114.
21. Keohane, "Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge after the Cold War," pp. 273-283.
22. See Keohane, "Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge after the Cold War," pp. 278-279; and Grieco, "Understanding the Problem of International Cooperation," p. 323.
23. See Keohane, "Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge after the Cold War," pp. 278-279; and Grieco, "Understanding the Problem of International Cooperation," p. 323.
24. This is essentially the nature of Grieco's "K Factor," as well as Snidal's relative gains variable. They express the same idea, that relative gains concerns vary according to some set of factors. See Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation," p. 501; Snidal, "Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation."
25. This is essentially the nature of Grieco's "K Factor," as well as Snidal's relative gains variable. They express the same idea, that relative gains concerns vary according to some set of factors. See Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation," p. 501; Snidal, "Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation."
26. Grieco, Cooperation among Nations, pp. 45-47. This argument suggests that in some instances IPE and security do overlap and economic interactions produce security results. When this happens, relative gains become more problematic. While this argument links the two issue areas, it also reinforces the conventional distinction, which sees economic interactions as being more cooperative by nature and security interactions as being necessarily conflictual. The implication of the security linkage argument is that cooperation is more likely and relative gains are less problematic in economic affairs that have small security implications. I do not contend that this framework is never useful; for a variety of reasons discussed in the literature, security is a more difficult area for cooperation. I do suggest that the distinction has become too strongly drawn, however, and that explanations of variance in relative gains based on it have difficulty accounting for many important cases within and across the issue areas.
27. For the argument that relative gains concerns decline as the number of partners increases, see Snidal, "Relative Gains and the Pattern of Cooperation"; and Snidal's contribution to "The Relative Gains Problem for International Cooperation," American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 3 (September 1993), esp. pp. 738-739. For the argument regarding the translation of gains into military instruments, see Powell, "Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory," pp. 1311-1314.
28. For the argument that relative gains concerns decline as the number of partners increases, see Snidal, "Relative Gains and the Pattern of Cooperation"; and Snidal's contribution to "The Relative Gains Problem for International Cooperation," American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 3 (September 1993), esp. pp. 738-739. For the argument regarding the translation of gains into military instruments, see Powell, "Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory," pp. 1311-1314.
29. For the argument that relative gains concerns decline as the number of partners increases, see Snidal, "Relative Gains and the Pattern of Cooperation"; and Snidal's contribution to "The Relative Gains Problem for International Cooperation," American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 3 (September 1993), esp. pp. 738-739. For the argument regarding the translation of gains into military instruments, see Powell, "Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory," pp. 1311-1314.
30. Snidal, "Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation," p. 716.
31. In large part, these arguments are not contested. Most analysts seem to concur that insofar as these conditions obtain, relative gains will vary. More of the dispute centers on which conditions, threatening or benign, most frequently characterize attempts at cooperation.
32. A good collection of essays on the nature of power in international relations is David Baldwin, Paradoxes of Power (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1989), esp. p. 3.
33. Robert Gilpin, "The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism," in Robert Keohane, ed., Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), p. 305.
34. For a critique of this perspective on security and relative gains, see Glaser, "Realists as Optimists," pp. 74-75, in which he argues that while it is true that states care about how much the other is gaining or losing in military assets, this is best seen as a concern over levels of absolute security. Glaser's analyses on this point, however, and on how security can be viewed as an absolute measure, remain vague, and much of his logic continues to suggest that states will still act in the same way as indicated by relative gains theorists.
35. Jervis, "Security Regimes," pp. 174-176.
36. Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation," p. 499.
37. Powell, "Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory," pp. 1309-1310. This type of analysis is in many ways similar to my thesis of cumulation effects. However, while these works focus on cumulation across issue areas, from IPE to security, my focus is on cumulation within issue areas. However, a broader notion of cumulation could include both types of analysis.
38. Mearsheimer, for example, rejects the distinction between IPE and security for this reason, arguing that in any agreement on economics there will be concerns over relative security gains that may inhibit cooperation. It is notable that Mearsheimer acknowledges that there may be other reasons for relative gains concerns that are not security based, but declares that they are not realist in nature because they are "non-military." Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," pp. 20-21, fn. 62.
39. See Snidal, "Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation"; Mastanduno, "Do Relative Gains Matter? America's Response to Japanese Industrial Policy"; Krasner, "Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier."
40. See Snidal, "Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation"; Mastanduno, "Do Relative Gains Matter? America's Response to Japanese Industrial Policy"; Krasner, "Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier."
41. See Snidal, "Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation"; Mastanduno, "Do Relative Gains Matter? America's Response to Japanese Industrial Policy"; Krasner, "Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier."
42. See for example, Paul Krugman, "Competitiveness: A Dangerous Obsession," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 2 (March/April 1994). It may be the case, however, that economists are the only ones to believe this. See Robert Reich, "Do We Want U.S. Rich or Japan Poor?" Wall Street Journal, June 18, 1990.
43. See for example, Paul Krugman, "Competitiveness: A Dangerous Obsession," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 2 (March/April 1994). It may be the case, however, that economists are the only ones to believe this. See Robert Reich, "Do We Want U.S. Rich or Japan Poor?" Wall Street Journal, June 18, 1990.
44. Snidal, "Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation," p. 704.
45. A "pareto-superior" arrangement is one which some or all of the partners to the arrangement realize greater gains than they presently receive, and no parties realize lower ones. A pareto-optimal arrangement is one in which it is impossible for this to happen because the total gains to be realized are bounded and any alteration in the existing arrangements would increase the share one party receives at the expense of others' share. When states or firms are at the pareto frontier, that is, when they have reached this boundary of total gains, the only way to increase their own absolute gains is by taking some from a partner or rival.
46. Krasner, "Global Communications and National Power," pp. 362-336.
47. Mastanduno, "Do Relative Gains Matter?" pp. 86-87.
48. See, for example, Charles Lipson, "International Cooperation in Security and Economic Affairs," World Politics, Vol. 37, No. 1 (October 1984).
49. Cumulation is measured by examining whether the issue displays characteristics that allow a state to demand or acquire additional benefits later. When an issue displays many such characteristics, the cumulation effect is high; when it displays few, cumulation is low.
50. Powell, "Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory," p. 1305; Keohane, "Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge after the Cold War," p. 275.
51. Powell, "Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory," p. 1305; Keohane, "Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge after the Cold War," p. 275.
52. This article focuses on the way in which this argument works within a given issue area, but the concept of cumulation need not be analytically confined to a single issue. In many instances, relative gains in one issue area can cumulate into advantages in related areas as well; gains sometimes are fungible. This more expansive application of the idea of a cumulation effect is clearly similar to the existing arguments in the literature described above which highlight the importance for security of relative gains acquired in economic interactions.
53. This relatively narrow focus differs in obvious ways from many attempts to explain variance in relative gains, which point to broader conditions such as the number of actors (roughly equivalent to polarity) or the differences between economics and security. Current explanations for variation in relative gains point most often to the strategic setting in ways which have led some to conclude that these conditions rarely change and, as a consequence, relative gains concerns are generally quite high. See, e.g., Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," p. 23. Powell also argues that relative gains concerns either vary by their strategic setting, or do not vary at all. Powell, "Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate," International Organization, Vol. 48, No. 2 (Spring 1994), p. 335.
54. This relatively narrow focus differs in obvious ways from many attempts to explain variance in relative gains, which point to broader conditions such as the number of actors (roughly equivalent to polarity) or the differences between economics and security. Current explanations for variation in relative gains point most often to the strategic setting in ways which have led some to conclude that these conditions rarely change and, as a consequence, relative gains concerns are generally quite high. See, e.g., Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," p. 23. Powell also argues that relative gains concerns either vary by their strategic setting, or do not vary at all. Powell, "Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate," International Organization, Vol. 48, No. 2 (Spring 1994), p. 335.
55. Cumulation in this article is about advantages. In any trade agreement, for example, both partners will, over time, accumulate absolute gains. However, in some instances one partner will be able not only to accumulate more gains, but to use disproportionate gains to increase its advantage. The relative gap in distribution will grow, leaving the "losing" state worse off than it could have been had the initial conditions not been unbalanced. Even when states are both anticipating absolute gains from an arrangement with few security implications, relative gains can be very significant due to the potentially massive long-term absolute-gains consequences of initial conditions.
56. This article does not contend that relative gains are only important for their cumulation effects. Rather, it argues that concerns over relative gains limited to a single current interaction present more tractable problems for cooperation. The more likely cumulation effects are to exist, however, the more likely relative gains are to be major barriers to cooperation rather than manageable ones. Thus, while cumulation is not the sole cause for concern over relative gains, it is the one most likely to preclude cooperation.
57. The Prisoner's Dilemma is the most common game theory model used in international relations. Two players each have two choices, to cooperate or to, defect, C or D. The payoffs for each depend on the choice of the other, so that the order of preferences for an individual is DC, CC, DD, CD, where the first letter indicates the player's own choice and the second the choice of its partner or opponent. Because of the incentives in this game, any player on a single round should defect, resulting in a DD outcome. However, if the game is extended to multiple rounds, the players can establish a pattern of CC in order to reap the greatest long-term gains. Achieving cooperation under the incentives of a Prisoner's Dilemma is the subject of much of the cooperation literature. The classic work on this subject is Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984). For a discussion of the effect of the shadow of the future on cooperation generally, see Kenneth Oye, "Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies," in Kenneth Oye, ed., Cooperation under Anarchy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 12-18 . Also see Robert Axelrod and Robert Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions," in ibid., pp. 232-234.
58. The Prisoner's Dilemma is the most common game theory model used in international relations. Two players each have two choices, to cooperate or to, defect, C or D. The payoffs for each depend on the choice of the other, so that the order of preferences for an individual is DC, CC, DD, CD, where the first letter indicates the player's own choice and the second the choice of its partner or opponent. Because of the incentives in this game, any player on a single round should defect, resulting in a DD outcome. However, if the game is extended to multiple rounds, the players can establish a pattern of CC in order to reap the greatest long-term gains. Achieving cooperation under the incentives of a Prisoner's Dilemma is the subject of much of the cooperation literature. The classic work on this subject is Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984). For a discussion of the effect of the shadow of the future on cooperation generally, see Kenneth Oye, "Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies," in Kenneth Oye, ed., Cooperation under Anarchy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 12-18 . Also see Robert Axelrod and Robert Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions," in ibid., pp. 232-234.
59. The Prisoner's Dilemma is the most common game theory model used in international relations. Two players each have two choices, to cooperate or to, defect, C or D. The payoffs for each depend on the choice of the other, so that the order of preferences for an individual is DC, CC, DD, CD, where the first letter indicates the player's own choice and the second the choice of its partner or opponent. Because of the incentives in this game, any player on a single round should defect, resulting in a DD outcome. However, if the game is extended to multiple rounds, the players can establish a pattern of CC in order to reap the greatest long-term gains. Achieving cooperation under the incentives of a Prisoner's Dilemma is the subject of much of the cooperation literature. The classic work on this subject is Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984). For a discussion of the effect of the shadow of the future on cooperation generally, see Kenneth Oye, "Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies," in Kenneth Oye, ed., Cooperation under Anarchy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 12-18 . Also see Robert Axelrod and Robert Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions," in ibid., pp. 232-234.
60. Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation, pp. 12-17.
61. The traditional extended play Prisoner's Dilemma keeps the payoffs for an outcome constant. If in the first round a DC has a 4:1 payoff, it will have the same payoff in later rounds. The cumulation argument suggests that by winning the 4:1 payoff now, states can construct different payoffs in the future so that the ratio may grow beyond 4:1. This may also influence the payoffs for all other outcomes as well so that unequal payoffs can be built into later rounds by current victors. This reduces the effectiveness of the loser's retaliation.
62. In effect, this is an extended version of Krasner's argument. He suggests that relative gains concerns are important for distributional reasons, and in fact the issue is made even more difficult by the temporal aspect considered in this article. Krasner, "Global Communications and National power."
63. The classic work on the offense-defense balance and the effects on cooperation between states is Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2 (January 1978).
64. For a similar argument regarding the effects of offensive advantage on relative gains concerns, see Powell, "Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory," pp. 1311-1314. Powell does not use the term offense-defense balance, but that logic is the foundation of his argument about when relative gains will matter most.
65. For an excellent overview of the literature on the offense-defense balance and its critics, and a defense of the concept, see Sean Lynn-Jones, "Offense-Defense Theory and Its Critics," Security Studies, Vol. 4, No. 4 (Summer 1995). Of particular relevance here is Lynn-Jones's argument that while any particular weapon has both offensive and defensive potential, some weapons and constellations of weapons make offensive maneuvers less costly and make defense more costly. Tanks can be used for defense, but, as Lynn-Jones notes, their advent made offensive operations less costly and thus shifted the offense-defense balance to make offense more attractive than it had been. Ibid., pp. 674-677. This article diverges from Lynn-Jones on offense-defense advantages in that it examines them not as only as technological properties of the system, but as balances that apply to particular relationships. In the cases examined in this article, these are the nuclear and conventional relationships between the United States and the Soviet Union during the 1970s and 1980s. For Lynn-Jones' specification of the offense-defense balance as a systemic property, see ibid., p. 668.
66. For an excellent overview of the literature on the offense-defense balance and its critics, and a defense of the concept, see Sean Lynn-Jones, "Offense-Defense Theory and Its Critics," Security Studies, Vol. 4, No. 4 (Summer 1995). Of particular relevance here is Lynn-Jones's argument that while any particular weapon has both offensive and defensive potential, some weapons and constellations of weapons make offensive maneuvers less costly and make defense more costly. Tanks can be used for defense, but, as Lynn-Jones notes, their advent made offensive operations less costly and thus shifted the offense-defense balance to make offense more attractive than it had been. Ibid., pp. 674-677. This article diverges from Lynn-Jones on offense-defense advantages in that it examines them not as only as technological properties of the system, but as balances that apply to particular relationships. In the cases examined in this article, these are the nuclear and conventional relationships between the United States and the Soviet Union during the 1970s and 1980s. For Lynn-Jones' specification of the offense-defense balance as a systemic property, see ibid., p. 668.
67. For an excellent overview of the literature on the offense-defense balance and its critics, and a defense of the concept, see Sean Lynn-Jones, "Offense-Defense Theory and Its Critics," Security Studies, Vol. 4, No. 4 (Summer 1995). Of particular relevance here is Lynn-Jones's argument that while any particular weapon has both offensive and defensive potential, some weapons and constellations of weapons make offensive maneuvers less costly and make defense more costly. Tanks can be used for defense, but, as Lynn-Jones notes, their advent made offensive operations less costly and thus shifted the offense-defense balance to make offense more attractive than it had been. Ibid., pp. 674-677. This article diverges from Lynn-Jones on offense-defense advantages in that it examines them not as only as technological properties of the system, but as balances that apply to particular relationships. In the cases examined in this article, these are the nuclear and conventional relationships between the United States and the Soviet Union during the 1970s and 1980s. For Lynn-Jones' specification of the offense-defense balance as a systemic property, see ibid., p. 668.
68. For a good general overview of these issues and models, see David M. Kreps, A Course in Microeconomic Theory (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), pp. 325-330.
69. Kreps, A Course in Microeconomic Theory, p. 329.
70. Esther Gal-Or, "First Mover and Second Mover Advantages," International Economic Review, Vol. 26, No. 3 (1985), p. 651.
71. This argument draws upon and to some extent parallels some of the strategic trade literature. See Paul Krugman, ed., Strategic Trade Policy and the New International Economics (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1986). The underlying concern of both strategic trade and the notion of cumulation as related to IPE in this essay is very similar, namely that a state may be disadvantaged in particular types of markets if it does not compete for relative share at early stages. Notably, both arguments see barriers to entry increasing as the market matures, making late entry quite expensive if not impossible. However, the notion of cumulation is a more expansive category and could be applied to IPE areas outside of trade such as monetary policy. Furthermore, unlike strategic trade theory, the theory of cumulation in this essay is not limited necessarily to so-called "sunrise" industries, or even to high-value-added industries per se. That is, whereas strategic trade suggests that certain types of industries may be worth fighting for, and may also exhibit the characteristics described above, this essay simply suggests that certain markets do not easily admit late-comers and therefore will elicit stronger competitive responses from states.
72. J. Farrell and G. Saloner, "Standardization, Compatibility, and Innovation," Rand Journal of Economics, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Spring 1985), p. 71; Paul David, "CLIO and the Economics of QWERTY," American Economic Review, Vol. 75, No. 2 (May 1985), pp. 332-337.
73. J. Farrell and G. Saloner, "Standardization, Compatibility, and Innovation," Rand Journal of Economics, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Spring 1985), p. 71; Paul David, "CLIO and the Economics of QWERTY," American Economic Review, Vol. 75, No. 2 (May 1985), pp. 332-337.
74. Axelrod suggests, for example, that a reason for defection has little to do with rationality and a good deal to do with a psychological need to measure performance against peers. Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation, pp. 110-113.
75. George Kozmetsky, "Supercomputers and National Policy: Maintaining U.S. Predominance in an Emerging Industry," in J.R. Kirkland and J.H. Pierce, Supercomputers: A Key to U.S. Scientific, Technological, and Industrial Preeminence (New York: Praeger Press, 1987), pp. 10-11.
76. U.S. firms retain 90 percent market share. "The Genius: Seymour Cray, Father of the Supercomputer," Business Week, April 30, 1990, pp. 81-83.
77. Testimony of Julie Fox Gorte, Office of Technology Assessment, before Legislation and National Security Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, House of Representatives, 102nd Congress, July 1 and 8, 1992, p. 23.
78. For a good, brief overview of the U.S.-Japanese relation over supercomputers, see Laura D'Andrea Tyson, Who's Bashing Whom: Trade Conflict in High-Technology Industries (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics), 1992, pp. 76-82.
79. Tyson, Who's Bashing Whom, pp. 76-77.
80. Testimony of Representative Martin Sabo at hearings before Legislation and National Security Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, House of Representatives, 102nd Congress, July 1 and 8, 1992, p. 13.
81. Tyson, Who's Bashing Whom, p. 80.
82. Christopher Lazou, Supercomputers and Their Use (Oxford, U.K.: Clarendon Press, 1988), p. 197. For a general review of current U.S. efforts to aid the supercomputer industry, see Congressional Budget Office, Promoting High-Performance Computing and Communications (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office [U.S. GPO], 1993).
83. Christopher Lazou, Supercomputers and Their Use (Oxford, U.K.: Clarendon Press, 1988), p. 197. For a general review of current U.S. efforts to aid the supercomputer industry, see Congressional Budget Office, Promoting High-Performance Computing and Communications (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office [U.S. GPO], 1993).
84. Susumu Awanohara, "Friends Like These: U.S. Gets Tough with Its Trading Partners," Far Eastern Economic Review, May 13, 1993, p. 74; "The Japanese Public Sector: Problems and Prospects for U.S. Supercomputing Vendors," Cray Report, May 1990, p. 55.
85. Susumu Awanohara, "Friends Like These: U.S. Gets Tough with Its Trading Partners," Far Eastern Economic Review, May 13, 1993, p. 74; "The Japanese Public Sector: Problems and Prospects for U.S. Supercomputing Vendors," Cray Report, May 1990, p. 55.
86. "Japanese Procurement of Supercomputers an Issue of Concern to United States," Business America, Vol. 114, No. 7 (1993), p. 15.
87. David Kahaner and Ulrich Wattenberg, "Japan: A Competitive Assessment," IEEE Spectrum, Vol. 29, No. 9 (September 1992), pp. 42-43; Jack Worlton, "Existing Conditions," in National Academy of Sciences, Supercomputers: Directions in Technology and Applications (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1989), pp. 42-43.
88. David Kahaner and Ulrich Wattenberg, "Japan: A Competitive Assessment," IEEE Spectrum, Vol. 29, No. 9 (September 1992), pp. 42-43; Jack Worlton, "Existing Conditions," in National Academy of Sciences, Supercomputers: Directions in Technology and Applications (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1989), pp. 42-43.
89. Testimony of Arvid Larson, Vice President of IEEE, in hearings before Legislation and National Security Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, House of Representatives, 102nd Congress, July 1 and 8, 1992, pp. 118-119.
90. Kozmetsky, "Supercomputers and National Policy," pp. 29, 36-37; Kenneth Wilson, "Science, Industry and the New Japanese Challenge," Proceedings of the IEEE, Vol. 72, No. 1 (January 1984), p. 12; "The Genius," Business Week, pp. 81-83; George Cybenko and David Kuck, "Revolution or Evolution," IEEE Spectrum, Vol. 29, No. 9 (September 1992), pp. 39-40.
91. Kozmetsky, "Supercomputers and National Policy," pp. 29, 36-37; Kenneth Wilson, "Science, Industry and the New Japanese Challenge," Proceedings of the IEEE, Vol. 72, No. 1 (January 1984), p. 12; "The Genius," Business Week, pp. 81-83; George Cybenko and David Kuck, "Revolution or Evolution," IEEE Spectrum, Vol. 29, No. 9 (September 1992), pp. 39-40.
92. Kozmetsky, "Supercomputers and National Policy," pp. 29, 36-37; Kenneth Wilson, "Science, Industry and the New Japanese Challenge," Proceedings of the IEEE, Vol. 72, No. 1 (January 1984), p. 12; "The Genius," Business Week, pp. 81-83; George Cybenko and David Kuck, "Revolution or Evolution," IEEE Spectrum, Vol. 29, No. 9 (September 1992), pp. 39-40.
93. Kozmetsky, "Supercomputers and National Policy," pp. 29, 36-37; Kenneth Wilson, "Science, Industry and the New Japanese Challenge," Proceedings of the IEEE, Vol. 72, No. 1 (January 1984), p. 12; "The Genius," Business Week, pp. 81-83; George Cybenko and David Kuck, "Revolution or Evolution," IEEE Spectrum, Vol. 29, No. 9 (September 1992), pp. 39-40.
94. Raul Mendez, "Japanese Supercomputers: An Overview," in Raul Mendez, ed., High Performance Computing: Research and Practice in Japan (West Sussex, U.K.: John Wiley and Sons, 1992), p. 4.
95. Kahaner and Wattenberg, "Japan: A Competitive Assessment," p. 43.
96. Mendez, "Japanese Supercomputers," pp. 4-5.
97. Mendez, "Japanese Supercomputers," p. 5; Kahaner and Wattenberg, "Japan: A Competitive Assessment," p. 43.
98. Mendez, "Japanese Supercomputers," p. 5; Kahaner and Wattenberg, "Japan: A Competitive Assessment," p. 43.
99. Kahaner and Wattenberg, "Japan: A Competitive Assessment," p. 46; Chen, "Toward the Future," pp. 64-65.
100. Kahaner and Wattenberg, "Japan: A Competitive Assessment," p. 46; Chen, "Toward the Future," pp. 64-65.
101. Glen Zorpette, "The Power of Parallelism," IEEE Spectrum, Vol. 29, No. 9 (September 1992), pp. 32-33.
102. Lloyd Thorndyke, "Supercomputer Systems Markets," in Kirkland and Pierce, Supercomputers, p. 54.
103. "The Japanese Public Sector," Cray Report, p. 53.
104. "The Japanese Public Sector," Cray Report, p. 53.
105. An obvious question that this argument raises is how to account for the success of the 1989 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). I argue that the causes of CFE success are the radical domestic changes in, and collapse of, the Soviet Union and WTO. As Richard Falkenrath argues, the Soviet Union under Gorbachev was desperate to shift resources to its failing civilian economy and could not afford to maintain its then-current levels of conventional forces. In essence, the Soviet Union was driven to disregard relative gains because it no longer had the resources to support continued competition with NATO. This led to large-scale unilateral Soviet cuts prior to the beginning to CFE, and capitulation to NATO's demands on CFE. Successful post-MBFR arms control is thus due to the fundamental changes that occurred domestically in the Soviet Union. Had the massive alteration in Soviet domestic politics not taken place, conventional arms control would not have been successful. This event was clearly unique and is outside the scope of this thesis. For an excellent account of CFE, see Richard A. Falkenrath, Shaping Europe's Military Order: The Origins and Consequences of the CFE Treaty (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1995), esp. pp. 22-44.
106. Robert Blackwill and F. Stephen Larrabee, "Introduction," in Robert Blackwill and F. Stephen Larrabee, eds., Conventional Arms Control and East-West Security (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1989), p. xxiii. It may be true that one implicit aim of MBFR was to keep the United States in Europe and avoid the terms of the Mansfield amendment, but this cannot be seen as a successful case of arms control. On Soviet motives for entering MBFR, see John G. Keliher, The Negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions: The Search for Arms Control in Central Europe (New York: Pergamon Press, 1980), p. 145.
107. Robert Blackwill and F. Stephen Larrabee, "Introduction," in Robert Blackwill and F. Stephen Larrabee, eds., Conventional Arms Control and East-West Security (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1989), p. xxiii. It may
108. William R. Bowman, Limiting Conventional Forces in Europe (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1985), p. 53.
109. Robert Blackwill, "Conceptual Problems of Conventional Arms Control," International Security, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Spring 1988), pp. 40-41.
110. Richard Betts, "Conventional Strategy: New Critics, Old Choices,26quot; International Security, Vol. 7, No. 4 (Spring 1983), p. 141.
111. For a general overview of this issue, see Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma."
112. Samuel P. Huntington, "Conventional Deterrence and Conventional Retaliation in Europe," International Security, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Winter 1983/84).
113. See, for example, Malcolm Chalmers and Lutz Unterseher, Is There a Tank Gap? A Comparative Assessment of the Tank Fleets of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, Report No. 20 (Mosbach, Germany: AFES-Press, 1988), p. 57; Andreas von Bulow, "Defensive Entanglement: An Alternative Strategy for NATO," in Andrew J. Pierre, ed., The Conventional Defense of Europe: New Technologies and New Strategies (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1986), pp. 127-128, 141-144.
114. See, for example, Malcolm Chalmers and Lutz Unterseher, Is There a Tank Gap? A Comparative Assessment of the Tank Fleets of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, Report No. 20 (Mosbach, Germany: AFES-Press, 1988), p. 57; Andreas von Bulow, "Defensive Entanglement: An Alternative Strategy for NATO," in Andrew J. Pierre, ed., The Conventional Defense of Europe: New Technologies and New Strategies (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1986), pp. 127-128, 141-144.
115. Anthony Cordesman, "Alliance Requirements and the Need for Conventional Force Improvements," in Uwe Nerlich and James A. Thomson, eds., Conventional Arms Control and the Security of Europe (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1988), p. 90.
116. Stephen Flanagan, NATO's Conventional Defenses (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1988), p. 118.
117. Quoted in Lutz Unterseher, The Conventional Land Defense in Central Europe: Force Structure, Emerging Technology and Military Stability, Report No. 30 (Mosbach, Germany: AFES-Press, 1989), pp. 20-21.
118. James A. Thomson and Nanette C. Gantz, "Conventional Arms Control Revisited: Objectives in the New Phase," in Nerlich and Thomson, eds., Conventional Arms Control, pp. 116-119.
119. Roger L.L. Facer, "Conventional Forces and the NATO Strategy of Flexible Response: Issues and Approaches," RAND Report R-3209-FF (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, January 1985), p. 24.
120. K.-Peter Stratman, "The Military Objectives of Conventional Arms Control," in Blackwill and Larrabee, eds., Conventional Arms Control, p. 146.
121. Richard Kugler, "The Military Balance in Europe," in Blackwill and Larrabee, eds., Conventional Arms Control, p. 60.
122. Kugler, "The Military Balance in Europe," p. 60, fn. 8.
123. For good discussions of Soviet land and air operations in Europe, see Philip Peterson and John Hines, "Soviet Conventional Offensive in Europe," Department of Defense manuscript, 1983; David Glantz, "Future Directions in Soviet Military Strategy," manuscript, 1990.
124. For good discussions of Soviet land and air operations in Europe, see Philip Peterson and John Hines, "Soviet Conventional Offensive in Europe," Department of Defense manuscript, 1983; David Glantz, "Future Directions in Soviet Military Strategy," manuscript, 1990.
125. John Mearsheimer, "Why the Soviets Can't Win Quickly in Central Europe," International Security, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Summer 1982), pp. 27-28; Kim Holmes, "Measuring the Conventional Balance in Europe," International Security, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Spring 1988), pp. 171-172. It was thought by some analysts that NATO forces were at a good force-to-space ratio, and that cuts might jeopardize the ability of the NATO divisions to hold.
126. John Mearsheimer, "Why the Soviets Can't Win Quickly in Central Europe," International Security, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Summer 1982), pp. 27-28; Kim Holmes, "Measuring the Conventional Balance in Europe," International Security, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Spring 1988), pp. 171-172. It was thought by some analysts that NATO forces were at a good force-to-space ratio, and that cuts might jeopardize the ability of the NATO divisions to hold.
127. Robert Killebrew, Conventional Defense and Total Deterrence: Assessing NATO's Strategic Options (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 1986), p. 14; Mearsheimer, "Why the Soviets Can't Win Quickly," pp. 13-14; Mearsheimer, "Numbers, Strategy and the European Balance," p. 175.
128. Robert Killebrew, Conventional Defense and Total Deterrence: Assessing NATO's Strategic Options (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 1986), p. 14; Mearsheimer, "Why the Soviets Can't Win Quickly," pp. 13-14; Mearsheimer, "Numbers, Strategy and the European Balance," p. 175.
129. Robert Killebrew, Conventional Defense and Total Deterrence: Assessing NATO's Strategic Options (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 1986), p. 14; Mearsheimer, "Why the Soviets Can't Win Quickly," pp. 13-14; Mearsheimer, "Numbers, Strategy and the European Balance," p. 175.
130. For instance, while in 1947 U.S. steel manufacturers held 57 percent of world market share, by 1984 it had dropped to 11.8 percent. Aspy P. Palia, "The U.S. Steel Trigger Price Mechanism: Import Impact and Strategic Response," Akron Business Review, Vol. 21, No. 2 (1990), p. 46.
131. Kent Jones, Politics vs. Economics in World Steel Trade (London: Allen and Unwin, 1986), p. 6.
132. Palia, "The U.S. Steel Trigger Price Mechanism," p. 47.
133. See, for example, Michael Levine, Inside International Trade Policy Formation: A History of the 1982 U.S.-EC Steel Arrangements (New York: Praeger Press, 1985), pp. 12-28.
134. Levine, Inside International Trade Policy Formation, pp. 28-35.
135. Andrew Stritch, "State Autonomy and Societal Pressure: The Steel Industry and U.S. Import Policy," Administration and Society, 56ol. 23, No. 3 (1991), p. 299.
136. Levine, Inside International Trade Policy Formation, pp. 34-35.
137. Stritch, "State Autonomy and Societal Pressure," p. 289.
138. Levine, Inside International Trade Policy Formation, pp. 79-110.
139. Elizabeth Wehr, "Producers of Steel Press for Renewal of Steel Import Quotas: Steelmakers Praise Effects of Trade Restraints, But Users Say the Price Is Too High," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, Vol. 47, No. 12 (March 25, 1989), p. 630.
140. Foreign imports accounted for only 18 percent of the U.S. market at that time. "Protection's Stepchild," Economist, May 16, 1992, p. 98.
141. Wehr, "Producers of Steel Press for Renewal of Steel Import Quotas," p. 631.
142. Levine, Inside International Trade Policy Formation, p. 57; Wehr, "Producers of Steel Press for Renewal of Steel Import Quotas," p. 632.
143. Levine, Inside International Trade Policy Formation, p. 57; Wehr, "Producers of Steel Press for Renewal of Steel Import Quotas," p. 632.
144. Steel Panel Committee on Technology and International Economic and Trade Issues of the Foreign Secretary of the National Academy of Engineering, The Competitive Status of the U.S. Steel Industry (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1985), p. 5.
145. Steel Panel Committee, The Competitive Status of the U.S. Steel Industry, pp. 37-40.
146. Matthias Lucke, "The Diffusion of Process Innovations in Industrialized and Developing Countries: A Case Study of the World Textile and Steel Industries," World Development, Vol. 21, No. 7 (1993), pp. 1228-1229.
147. Stephen Baker, "Big Steel's Big Opportunity," Business Week, January 10, 1994, p. 74; "Protection's Stepchild," p. 98.
148. Stephen Baker, "Big Steel's Big Opportunity," Business Week, January 10, 1994, p. 74; "Protection's Stepchild," p. 98.
149. Reviews of U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms control abound. This discussion uses primarily Philip Farley, "Strategic Arms Control, 1967-1987," in Alexander George, Philip Farley, and Alexander Dallin, eds., U.S.-Soviet Security Cooperation: Achievements, Failures, Lessons (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 215-253.
150. See, for example, Barry Blechman, "Do Negotiated Arms Limitations Have a Future?" Foreign Affairs, Vol. 59, No. 1 (1980), pp. 108-109.
151. It is true that both the United States and the Soviet Union indicated a desire for some sort of offensive capability. For the Soviets, this essentially took the form of a war-fighting strategy with counter-value targeting by heavy ICBMs. For the Americans, war-fighting was offered as an option, and the possibility of fielding a ballistic missile defense system was urged.
152. As Condoleezza Rice argues, mutual deterrence and the inability to win a nuclear war were key elements to the success of arms control. Condoleezza Rice, "SALT and the Search for a Security Regime," in George, Farley, and Dallin, eds., U.S.-Soviet Security Cooperation, pp. 295-296.
153. This argument is made most forcefully and clearly in Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989), esp. ch. 3.