Lessons from ground combat in the Gulf: The impact of training and technology

International Security

Volumn 22, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 137-145

  Press, Daryl G ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0031484666     PISSN: 01622889     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2539369     Document Type: Review

References (50)

1. See Stephen Biddle, "Victory Misunderstood: What the Gulf War Tells Us about the Future of Conflict," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Fall 1996), pp. 139-179.
2. Run "F" of Biddle's computer model predicts that if U.S. troops had fought without high-tech weapons, the Iraqis would have exchanged evenly with the Americans at 73 Easting despite a large U.S. skill advantage. See Biddle, "Victory Misunderstood," p. 168, Figure 1. In Biddle's analysis, relative skill advantage produces decisive battlefield results only when it is combined with an absolute level of high-tech weapons (pp. 140, 161-165). It is difficult to imagine how any absolute level of technology can create battlefield advantages. Our weapons seem high-tech only when compared with the weapons that the Iraqis field today; they will probably be ineffective against the Iraqi arsenal 100 years from now. Relative technological advantages seem to be a more logical predictor of military success. Throughout this analysis, I consider both Biddle's argument about absolute levels of technology and my revised version, which considers relative levels.
3. Biddle's model predicts that if the Iraqis had trained their troops to Western levels, U.S. losses at the Battle of 73 Easting would have reached 70 percent, while Iraqi losses would have approached only 30 percent. See Biddle, "Victory Misunderstood," p. 168, Figure 1, run "A."
4. Variation in the competence of Iraqi troops was evident across the theater, but the worst of the Iraqi troops, the conscript infantry, did not fight. The only Iraqi units who fought were Republican Guard Divisions and heavy (tank and mechanized) divisions from the regular army. These forces appear to be better trained than the conscript infantry but are still uniformly deficient.
5. Only two predictions follow from the hypothesis that X is necessary for Y. First, whenever we find Y, we should also find X. Second, whenever we do not find X, we should not find Y. The hypothesis makes no prediction about whether we should detect X if we do not detect Y. So having no variation on the dependent variable (Y) does not hinder our assessment of Biddle's necessary condition.
6. Of the potential missing variables that could have caused the overwhelming Coalition victory, five are commonly considered: (1) low Iraqi morale, (2) Iraqi supply shortages, (3) Iraqi surprise, (4) broken Iraqi command and control, and (5) U.S. close air support. In the two battles I describe, however, the Iraqis had sufficient morale, supplies, and command and control to fight. In fact, in one case the Iraqis were on the attack, indicating a higher minimum level of morale and command and control. In neither battle were the Iraqis surprised, and in both cases Coalition ground forces were engaging enemy forces without significant close air support. It does not appear that any of these five variables had a decisive effect on combat outcomes.
7. Biddle focuses on absolute levels of technology rather than relative levels. In the battle at the al-Burqan oil field, described below, the United States had neither a relative technological advantage nor the absolute level of technology that Biddle hypothesizes is required for one-sided victory. This case therefore tests both versions of Biddle's argument.
8. The best high-resolution descriptions of the fighting at al-Burqan are an unpublished history by Lieutenant Colonel John H. Turner (U.S. Marine Corps [USMC]), "Counterattack: The Battle at Al Burqan"; and Lieutenant Colonel Charles H. Cureton, USMC Reserve, U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991: With the 1st Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, USMC, 1993), pp. 91-96.
9. The best high-resolution descriptions of the fighting at al-Burqan are an unpublished history by Lieutenant Colonel John H. Turner (U.S. Marine Corps [USMC]), "Counterattack: The Battle at Al Burqan"; and Lieutenant Colonel Charles H. Cureton, USMC Reserve, U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991: With the 1st Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, USMC, 1993), pp. 91-96.
10. All the tanks in the 1st Marine Division were M60A1s. The 2nd Marine Division, on the other hand, fielded 192 M1 tanks. For a list of the major weapons systems fielded by the 1st Marine Division, see Cureton, U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, Appendix B. The number of MIs in the 2nd Marine Division includes a U.S. Army armored brigade that was attached to the 2nd Marine Division before the ground offensive. See Colonel Charles J. Quilter II, U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991: With the I Marine Expeditionary Force in Desert Shield and Desert Storm (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, USMC, 1993), Appendix C.
11. All the tanks in the 1st Marine Division were M60A1s. The 2nd Marine Division, on the other hand, fielded 192 M1 tanks. For a list of the major weapons systems fielded by the 1st Marine Division, see Cureton, U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, Appendix B. The number of MIs in the 2nd Marine Division includes a U.S. Army armored brigade that was attached to the 2nd Marine Division before the ground offensive. See Colonel Charles J. Quilter II, U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991: With the I Marine Expeditionary Force in Desert Shield and Desert Storm (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, USMC, 1993), Appendix C.
12. Cureton, U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, Appendix B.
13. Turner, "Counterattack," p. 9; and Cureton, U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, p. 93.
14. Turner, "Counterattack," p. 9; and Cureton, U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, p. 93.
15. See Cureton, U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, pp. 87, 93; and Turner, "Counterattack," pp. 6, 9. The Marines were able to fire TOWs, but the antitank missiles could be used only at short range. I benefited from detailed conversations on this subject with Lieutenant Colonel Turner, the operations officer in the Marine regiment that bore the brunt of the Iraqi attack, and with Colonel Michael Kephart, USMC, the commanding officer of the Marine battalion at the center of the Iraqi attack.
16. See Cureton, U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, pp. 87, 93; and Turner, "Counterattack," pp. 6, 9. The Marines were able to fire TOWs, but the antitank missiles could be used only at short range. I benefited from detailed conversations on this subject with Lieutenant Colonel Turner, the operations officer in the Marine regiment that bore the brunt of the Iraqi attack, and with Colonel Michael Kephart, USMC, the commanding officer of the Marine battalion at the center of the Iraqi attack.
17. Kephart interview, May 19, 1997.
18. See, for example, Cureton, U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, pp. 91-92, 95; Turner, "Counterattack," pp. 6, 8-9, 13; and Kephart interview.
19. See, for example, Cureton, U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, pp. 91-92, 95; Turner, "Counterattack," pp. 6, 8-9, 13; and Kephart interview.
20. U.S. artillery was unavailable for the first part of the battle, too, because a scheduled insertion of Marines by helicopter had required the creation of a "restricted fire line" (RFL) in the area around the Iraqi attack. The Marines were not able to have the RFL revoked amid the chaos caused by the Iraqi counterattack, so for the early hours of the fight the embattled Marine regiment fought without artillery support. Turner, "Counterattack," p. 9; and Kephart interview.
21. See Cureton, U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, p. 92.
22. Ibid., p. 95.
23. Kephart interview. Both the light infantry company and the TOW company described here were part of the battalion that Colonel Kephart commanded.
24. Turner, "Counterattack," pp. 8-9.
25. Ibid., pp. 8-10; and Cureton, U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, p. 93.
26. Ibid., pp. 8-10; and Cureton, U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, p. 93.
27. Turner, "Counterattack," pp. 9-10.
28. Some accounts of the fighting at the al-Burqan oil field emphasize the role played by M1 tanks, Cobra attack helicopters, and fixed-wing aircraft. See, for example, Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, The Generals' War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf (New York: Little, Brown, 1995), pp. 363-368. The Ml battles involved the 2nd Marine Division. See Cureton, U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, pp. 93, 137; and Turner, "Counterattack," p. 9. Skeptics might observe that the Marines were on the defense at al-Burqan, which is usually easier than being on the offense. Had the Marines been forced to attack without a technological advantage, critics might argue, they would have suffered significant casualties. But the Marines were not always on the defense during the ninety minutes of ground combat before the fog lifted. The Marines launched the two-company counterattack into the advancing Iraqis. A second Marine battalion was sent into the al-Burqan oil field to engage Iraqi forces still hiding in the smoke. See Cureton, U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, pp. 93-94; and Turner, "Counterattack," pp. 11-13. Even on the attack, the Marines suffered no fatalities.
29. Some accounts of the fighting at the al-Burqan oil field emphasize the role played by M1 tanks, Cobra attack helicopters, and fixed-wing aircraft. See, for example, Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, The Generals' War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf (New York: Little, Brown, 1995), pp. 363-368. The Ml battles involved the 2nd Marine Division. See Cureton, U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, pp. 93, 137; and Turner, "Counterattack," p. 9. Skeptics might observe that the Marines were on the defense at al-Burqan, which is usually easier than being on the offense. Had the Marines been forced to attack without a technological advantage, critics might argue, they would have suffered significant casualties. But the Marines were not always on the defense during the ninety minutes of ground combat before the fog lifted. The Marines launched the two-company counterattack into the advancing Iraqis. A second Marine battalion was sent into the al-Burqan oil field to engage Iraqi forces still hiding in the smoke. See Cureton, U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, pp. 93-94; and Turner, "Counterattack," pp. 11-13. Even on the attack, the Marines suffered no fatalities.
30. Some accounts of the fighting at the al-Burqan oil field emphasize the role played by M1 tanks, Cobra attack helicopters, and fixed-wing aircraft. See, for example, Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, The Generals' War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf (New York: Little, Brown, 1995), pp. 363-368. The Ml battles involved the 2nd Marine Division. See Cureton, U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, pp. 93, 137; and Turner, "Counterattack," p. 9. Skeptics might observe that the Marines were on the defense at al-Burqan, which is usually easier than being on the offense. Had the Marines been forced to attack without a technological advantage, critics might argue, they would have suffered significant casualties. But the Marines were not always on the defense during the ninety minutes of ground combat before the fog lifted. The Marines launched the two-company counterattack into the advancing Iraqis. A second Marine battalion was sent into the al-Burqan oil field to engage Iraqi forces still hiding in the smoke. See Cureton, U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, pp. 93-94; and Turner, "Counterattack," pp. 11-13. Even on the attack, the Marines suffered no fatalities.
31. Some accounts of the fighting at the al-Burqan oil field emphasize the role played by M1 tanks, Cobra attack helicopters, and fixed-wing aircraft. See, for example, Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, The Generals' War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf (New York: Little, Brown, 1995), pp. 363-368. The Ml battles involved the 2nd Marine Division. See Cureton, U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, pp. 93, 137; and Turner, "Counterattack," p. 9. Skeptics might observe that the Marines were on the defense at al-Burqan, which is usually easier than being on the offense. Had the Marines been forced to attack without a technological advantage, critics might argue, they would have suffered significant casualties. But the Marines were not always on the defense during the ninety minutes of ground combat before the fog lifted. The Marines launched the two-company counterattack into the advancing Iraqis. A second Marine battalion was sent into the al-Burqan oil field to engage Iraqi forces still hiding in the smoke. See Cureton, U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, pp. 93-94; and Turner, "Counterattack," pp. 11-13. Even on the attack, the Marines suffered no fatalities.
32. Some accounts of the fighting at the al-Burqan oil field emphasize the role played by M1 tanks, Cobra attack helicopters, and fixed-wing aircraft. See, for example, Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, The Generals' War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf (New York: Little, Brown, 1995), pp. 363-368. The Ml battles involved the 2nd Marine Division. See Cureton, U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, pp. 93, 137; and Turner, "Counterattack," p. 9. Skeptics might observe that the Marines were on the defense at al-Burqan, which is usually easier than being on the offense. Had the Marines been forced to attack without a technological advantage, critics might argue, they would have suffered significant casualties. But the Marines were not always on the defense during the ninety minutes of ground combat before the fog lifted. The Marines launched the two-company counterattack into the advancing Iraqis. A second Marine battalion was sent into the al-Burqan oil field to engage Iraqi forces still hiding in the smoke. See Cureton, U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, pp. 93-94; and Turner, "Counterattack," pp. 11-13. Even on the attack, the Marines suffered no fatalities.
33. In the Sinai, where the terrain is similar to Kuwait, Israel achieved an exchange ratio of 10 to 1 in soldiers and almost 6 to 1 in tanks. See Trevor N. Dupuy, Elusive Victory: The Arab-Israeli Wars, 1947-1974 (Fairfax, Va: Greenhill Books, 1984), p. 333.
34. Ibid., pp. 333, 337.
35. In addition to highlighting the errors involved in preparing tank positions, Biddle focuses on Iraq's failure to set up screening forces to warn of an impending attack. U.S. air power forced Iraqi tank gunners to stay out of their tanks, fearing attacks against their armored vehicles from the sky. But if the Iraqis had had proper screening forces in front of their units, Biddle argues, Iraqi gunners would have had time to get back in their vehicles before the U.S. ground units advanced into range.
36. See Robert H. Scales, Certain Victory: The U.S. Army in the Gulf War (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 1994), pp. 269-270. Scales reports that seventy-six T-72s and eighty-four BMPs were destroyed in this engagement. Based on estimates of the Tawakalna Division's total equipment at the beginning of the ground war, and the Tawakalna's known deployment at the battle of 73 Easting, these figures seem high. Nevertheless, at least 100 Iraqi vehicles appear to have been destroyed. See Central Intelligence Agency, "Operation Desert Storm: A Snapshot of the Battlefield," report IA 93-10022 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 1993); and W.M. Christenson and Robert A. Zirkle, "73 Easting Battle Replication - A Janus Combat Simulation" (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Defense Analysis, September 1992), p. 11.
37. See Robert H. Scales, Certain Victory: The U.S. Army in the Gulf War (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 1994), pp. 269-270. Scales reports that seventy-six T-72s and eighty-four BMPs were destroyed in this engagement. Based on estimates of the Tawakalna Division's total equipment at the beginning of the ground war, and the Tawakalna's known deployment at the battle of 73 Easting, these figures seem high. Nevertheless, at least 100 Iraqi vehicles appear to have been destroyed. See Central Intelligence Agency, "Operation Desert Storm: A Snapshot of the Battlefield," report IA 93-10022 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 1993); and W.M. Christenson and Robert A. Zirkle, "73 Easting Battle Replication - A Janus Combat Simulation" (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Defense Analysis, September 1992), p. 11.
38. See Robert H. Scales, Certain Victory: The U.S. Army in the Gulf War (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 1994), pp. 269-270. Scales reports that seventy-six T-72s and eighty-four BMPs were destroyed in this engagement. Based on estimates of the Tawakalna Division's total equipment at the beginning of the ground war, and the Tawakalna's known deployment at the battle of 73 Easting, these figures seem high. Nevertheless, at least 100 Iraqi vehicles appear to have been destroyed. See Central Intelligence Agency, "Operation Desert Storm: A Snapshot of the Battlefield," report IA 93-10022 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 1993); and W.M. Christenson and Robert A. Zirkle, "73 Easting Battle Replication - A Janus Combat Simulation" (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Defense Analysis, September 1992), p. 11.
39. Scales, Certain Victory, pp. 269-270.
40. Ibid.; Enzio Bonsignore, "Gulf Experience Raises Tank Survivability Issues," Military Technology, Vol. 16, No. 2 (February 1992), pp. 67-68; Jane's Armour and Artillery, 1996-1997 (London: Jane's Information Group, 1996), p. 138; and David Eshel, "Trends in Future Tank Developments," Military Technology, Vol. 16, No. 10 (October 1992), p. 14.
41. Ibid.; Enzio Bonsignore, "Gulf Experience Raises Tank Survivability Issues," Military Technology, Vol. 16, No. 2 (February 1992), pp. 67-68; Jane's Armour and Artillery, 1996-1997 (London: Jane's Information Group, 1996), p. 138; and David Eshel, "Trends in Future Tank Developments," Military Technology, Vol. 16, No. 10 (October 1992), p. 14.
42. Ibid.; Enzio Bonsignore, "Gulf Experience Raises Tank Survivability Issues," Military Technology, Vol. 16, No. 2 (February 1992), pp. 67-68; Jane's Armour and Artillery, 1996-1997 (London: Jane's Information Group, 1996), p. 138; and David Eshel, "Trends in Future Tank Developments," Military Technology, Vol. 16, No. 10 (October 1992), p. 14.
43. Ibid.; Enzio Bonsignore, "Gulf Experience Raises Tank Survivability Issues," Military Technology, Vol. 16, No. 2 (February 1992), pp. 67-68; Jane's Armour and Artillery, 1996-1997 (London: Jane's Information Group, 1996), p. 138; and David Eshel, "Trends in Future Tank Developments," Military Technology, Vol. 16, No. 10 (October 1992), p. 14.
44. Bonsignore, "Gulf Experience Raises Tank Survivability Issues," pp. 68, 69. After the war, captured T-72s were used to test the firepower and armor of Western tanks. In one test, T-72s were fired against German tanks protected by modern composite armor. The T-72s were apparently unable to penetrate the armor.
45. Jane's Armour and Artillery, 1996-1997, p. 138; Bonsignore, "Gulf Experience Raises Tank Survivability Issues," p. 67; and U.S. Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992), p. 751.
46. Jane's Armour and Artillery, 1996-1997, p. 138; Bonsignore, "Gulf Experience Raises Tank Survivability Issues," p. 67; and U.S. Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992), p. 751.
47. Jane's Armour and Artillery, 1996-1997, p. 138; Bonsignore, "Gulf Experience Raises Tank Survivability Issues," p. 67; and U.S. Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992), p. 751.
48. Even high-velocity rounds from the M1's own 120 mm gun had difficulty destroying other MIs. There are at least six known cases of M1A1s being hit by other M1A1s. None of these cases resulted in a catastrophic penetration of the tank, and only one crewman was killed. See Bonsignore, "Gulf Experience Raises Tank Survivability Issues," p. 67. On one other occasion, a U.S. tank got stuck in the sand and had to be destroyed to ensure that it did not fall into enemy hands. But, at least one source claims, U.S. forces had difficulty destroying the disabled Ml. See James F. Dunnigan and Austin Bay, From Shield to Storm: High-Tech Weapons, Military Strategy, and Coalition Warfare in the Persian Gulf (New York: William Morrow, 1992), pp. 294-295.
49. Even high-velocity rounds from the M1's own 120 mm gun had difficulty destroying other MIs. There are at least six known cases of M1A1s being hit by other M1A1s. None of these cases resulted in a catastrophic penetration of the tank, and only one crewman was killed. See Bonsignore, "Gulf Experience Raises Tank Survivability Issues," p. 67. On one other occasion, a U.S. tank got stuck in the sand and had to be destroyed to ensure that it did not fall into enemy hands. But, at least one source claims, U.S. forces had difficulty destroying the disabled Ml. See James F. Dunnigan and Austin Bay, From Shield to Storm: High-Tech Weapons, Military Strategy, and Coalition Warfare in the Persian Gulf (New York: William Morrow, 1992), pp. 294-295.
50. Scales, Certain Victory, p. 268.