Is Anybody Still a Realist?

International Security

Volumn 24, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 5-55

  Legro, Jeffrey W ^a   Moravcsik, Andrew ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0033442950     PISSN: 01622889     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/016228899560130     Document Type: Article

References (260)

1. We agree with much of the analysis in John Vasquez, "The Realist Paradigm and Degenerative vs. Progressive Research Programs: An Appraisal of Neotraditional Research on Waltz's Balancing Proposition," American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 899-912. But we do not agree, among other things, that balancing behavior per se provides a strong test of realism or that realism is beyond redemption. On various criticisms, see also Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992); Richard Ned Lebow and Thomas Risse-Kappen, eds., International Relations and the End of the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995); and Paul W. Schroeder, "Historical Reality vs. Neorealist Theory," in Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1995), pp. 421-461; Peter J. Katzenstein, Robert O. Keohane, and Stephen D. Krasner, "International Organization and the Study of World Politics," International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4 (Autumn 1998), pp. 670-674; and Benjamin Frankel, ed., Realism: Restatements and Renewal (London: Frank Cass, 1996), pp. xi-xii. For rejoinders, see Kenneth N. Waltz, "Evaluating Theories," American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 913-918; Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Progressive Research and Degenerative Alliances," American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 899-912; Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman, "Correspondence: History vs. Neorealism: A Second Look," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 182-193; Elman and Elman, "Lakatos and Neorealism: A Reply to Vasquez," American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 923-926; Randall L. Schweller, "New Realist Research on Alliances: Refining, not Refuting, Waltz's Balancing Proposition," American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 927-930; and Stephen M. Walt, "The Progressive Power of Realism," American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 931-935.
2. We agree with much of the analysis in John Vasquez, "The Realist Paradigm and Degenerative vs. Progressive Research Programs: An Appraisal of Neotraditional Research on Waltz's Balancing Proposition," American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 899-912. But we do not agree, among other things, that balancing behavior per se provides a strong test of realism or that realism is beyond redemption. On various criticisms, see also Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992); Richard Ned Lebow and Thomas Risse-Kappen, eds., International Relations and the End of the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995); and Paul W. Schroeder, "Historical Reality vs. Neorealist Theory," in Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1995), pp. 421-461; Peter J. Katzenstein, Robert O. Keohane, and Stephen D. Krasner, "International Organization and the Study of World Politics," International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4 (Autumn 1998), pp. 670-674; and Benjamin Frankel, ed., Realism: Restatements and Renewal (London: Frank Cass, 1996), pp. xi-xii. For rejoinders, see Kenneth N. Waltz, "Evaluating Theories," American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 913-918; Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Progressive Research and Degenerative Alliances," American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 899-912; Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman, "Correspondence: History vs. Neorealism: A Second Look," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 182-193; Elman and Elman, "Lakatos and Neorealism: A Reply to Vasquez," American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 923-926; Randall L. Schweller, "New Realist Research on Alliances: Refining, not Refuting, Waltz's Balancing Proposition," American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 927-930; and Stephen M. Walt, "The Progressive Power of Realism," American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 931-935.
3. We agree with much of the analysis in John Vasquez, "The Realist Paradigm and Degenerative vs. Progressive Research Programs: An Appraisal of Neotraditional Research on Waltz's Balancing Proposition," American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 899-912. But we do not agree, among other things, that balancing behavior per se provides a strong test of realism or that realism is beyond redemption. On various criticisms, see also Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992); Richard Ned Lebow and Thomas Risse-Kappen, eds., International Relations and the End of the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995); and Paul W. Schroeder, "Historical Reality vs. Neorealist Theory," in Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1995), pp. 421-461; Peter J. Katzenstein, Robert O. Keohane, and Stephen D. Krasner, "International Organization and the Study of World Politics," International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4 (Autumn 1998), pp. 670-674; and Benjamin Frankel, ed., Realism: Restatements and Renewal (London: Frank Cass, 1996), pp. xi-xii. For rejoinders, see Kenneth N. Waltz, "Evaluating Theories," American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 913-918; Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Progressive Research and Degenerative Alliances," American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 899-912; Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman, "Correspondence: History vs. Neorealism: A Second Look," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 182-193; Elman and Elman, "Lakatos and Neorealism: A Reply to Vasquez," American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 923-926; Randall L. Schweller, "New Realist Research on Alliances: Refining, not Refuting, Waltz's Balancing Proposition," American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 927-930; and Stephen M. Walt, "The Progressive Power of Realism," American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 931-935.
4. We agree with much of the analysis in John Vasquez, "The Realist Paradigm and Degenerative vs. Progressive Research Programs: An Appraisal of Neotraditional Research on Waltz's Balancing Proposition," American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 899-912. But we do not agree, among other things, that balancing behavior per se provides a strong test of realism or that realism is beyond redemption. On various criticisms, see also Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992); Richard Ned Lebow and Thomas Risse-Kappen, eds., International Relations and the End of the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995); and Paul W. Schroeder, "Historical Reality vs. Neorealist Theory," in Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1995), pp. 421-461; Peter J. Katzenstein, Robert O. Keohane, and Stephen D. Krasner, "International Organization and the Study of World Politics," International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4 (Autumn 1998), pp. 670-674; and Benjamin Frankel, ed., Realism: Restatements and Renewal (London: Frank Cass, 1996), pp. xi-xii. For rejoinders, see Kenneth N. Waltz, "Evaluating Theories," American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 913-918; Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Progressive Research and Degenerative Alliances," American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 899-912; Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman, "Correspondence: History vs. Neorealism: A Second Look," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 182-193; Elman and Elman, "Lakatos and Neorealism: A Reply to Vasquez," American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 923-926; Randall L. Schweller, "New Realist Research on Alliances: Refining, not Refuting, Waltz's Balancing Proposition," American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 927-930; and Stephen M. Walt, "The Progressive Power of Realism," American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 931-935.
5. We agree with much of the analysis in John Vasquez, "The Realist Paradigm and Degenerative vs. Progressive Research Programs: An Appraisal of Neotraditional Research on Waltz's Balancing Proposition," American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 899-912. But we do not agree, among other things, that balancing behavior per se provides a strong test of realism or that realism is beyond redemption. On various criticisms, see also Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992); Richard Ned Lebow and Thomas Risse-Kappen, eds., International Relations and the End of the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995); and Paul W. Schroeder, "Historical Reality vs. Neorealist Theory," in Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1995), pp. 421-461; Peter J. Katzenstein, Robert O. Keohane, and Stephen D. Krasner, "International Organization and the Study of World Politics," International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4 (Autumn 1998), pp. 670-674; and Benjamin Frankel, ed., Realism: Restatements and Renewal (London: Frank Cass, 1996), pp. xi-xii. For rejoinders, see Kenneth N. Waltz, "Evaluating Theories," American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 913-918; Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Progressive Research and Degenerative Alliances," American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 899-912; Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman, "Correspondence: History vs. Neorealism: A Second Look," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 182-193; Elman and Elman, "Lakatos and Neorealism: A Reply to Vasquez," American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 923-926; Randall L. Schweller, "New Realist Research on Alliances: Refining, not Refuting, Waltz's Balancing Proposition," American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 927-930; and Stephen M. Walt, "The Progressive Power of Realism," American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 931-935.
6. We agree with much of the analysis in John Vasquez, "The Realist Paradigm and Degenerative vs. Progressive Research Programs: An Appraisal of Neotraditional Research on Waltz's Balancing Proposition," American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 899-912. But we do not agree, among other things, that balancing behavior per se provides a strong test of realism or that realism is beyond redemption. On various criticisms, see also Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992); Richard Ned Lebow and Thomas Risse-Kappen, eds., International Relations and the End of the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995); and Paul W. Schroeder, "Historical Reality vs. Neorealist Theory," in Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1995), pp. 421-461; Peter J. Katzenstein, Robert O. Keohane, and Stephen D. Krasner, "International Organization and the Study of World Politics," International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4 (Autumn 1998), pp. 670-674; and Benjamin Frankel, ed., Realism: Restatements and Renewal (London: Frank Cass, 1996), pp. xi-xii. For rejoinders, see Kenneth N. Waltz, "Evaluating Theories," American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 913-918; Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Progressive Research and Degenerative Alliances," American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 899-912; Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman, "Correspondence: History vs. Neorealism: A Second Look," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 182-193; Elman and Elman, "Lakatos and Neorealism: A Reply to Vasquez," American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 923-926; Randall L. Schweller, "New Realist Research on Alliances: Refining, not Refuting, Waltz's Balancing Proposition," American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 927-930; and Stephen M. Walt, "The Progressive Power of Realism," American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 931-935.
7. We agree with much of the analysis in John Vasquez, "The Realist Paradigm and Degenerative vs. Progressive Research Programs: An Appraisal of Neotraditional Research on Waltz's Balancing Proposition," American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 899-912. But we do not agree, among other things, that balancing behavior per se provides a strong test of realism or that realism is beyond redemption. On various criticisms, see also Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992); Richard Ned Lebow and Thomas Risse-Kappen, eds., International Relations and the End of the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995); and Paul W. Schroeder, "Historical Reality vs. Neorealist Theory," in Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1995), pp. 421-461; Peter J. Katzenstein, Robert O. Keohane, and Stephen D. Krasner, "International Organization and the Study of World Politics," International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4 (Autumn 1998), pp. 670-674; and Benjamin Frankel, ed., Realism: Restatements and Renewal (London: Frank Cass, 1996), pp. xi-xii. For rejoinders, see Kenneth N. Waltz, "Evaluating Theories," American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 913-918; Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Progressive Research and Degenerative Alliances," American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 899-912; Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman, "Correspondence: History vs. Neorealism: A Second Look," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 182-193; Elman and Elman, "Lakatos and Neorealism: A Reply to Vasquez," American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 923-926; Randall L. Schweller, "New Realist Research on Alliances: Refining, not Refuting, Waltz's Balancing Proposition," American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 927-930; and Stephen M. Walt, "The Progressive Power of Realism," American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 931-935.
8. We agree with much of the analysis in John Vasquez, "The Realist Paradigm and Degenerative vs. Progressive Research Programs: An Appraisal of Neotraditional Research on Waltz's Balancing Proposition," American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 899-912. But we do not agree, among other things, that balancing behavior per se provides a strong test of realism or that realism is beyond redemption. On various criticisms, see also Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992); Richard Ned Lebow and Thomas Risse-Kappen, eds., International Relations and the End of the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995); and Paul W. Schroeder, "Historical Reality vs. Neorealist Theory," in Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1995), pp. 421-461; Peter J. Katzenstein, Robert O. Keohane, and Stephen D. Krasner, "International Organization and the Study of World Politics," International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4 (Autumn 1998), pp. 670-674; and Benjamin Frankel, ed., Realism: Restatements and Renewal (London: Frank Cass, 1996), pp. xi-xii. For rejoinders, see Kenneth N. Waltz, "Evaluating Theories," American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 913-918; Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Progressive Research and Degenerative Alliances," American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 899-912; Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman, "Correspondence: History vs. Neorealism: A Second Look," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 182-193; Elman and Elman, "Lakatos and Neorealism: A Reply to Vasquez," American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 923-926; Randall L. Schweller, "New Realist Research on Alliances: Refining, not Refuting, Waltz's Balancing Proposition," American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 927-930; and Stephen M. Walt, "The Progressive Power of Realism," American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 931-935.
9. We agree with much of the analysis in John Vasquez, "The Realist Paradigm and Degenerative vs. Progressive Research Programs: An Appraisal of Neotraditional Research on Waltz's Balancing Proposition," American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 899-912. But we do not agree, among other things, that balancing behavior per se provides a strong test of realism or that realism is beyond redemption. On various criticisms, see also Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992); Richard Ned Lebow and Thomas Risse-Kappen, eds., International Relations and the End of the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995); and Paul W. Schroeder, "Historical Reality vs. Neorealist Theory," in Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1995), pp. 421-461; Peter J. Katzenstein, Robert O. Keohane, and Stephen D. Krasner, "International Organization and the Study of World Politics," International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4 (Autumn 1998), pp. 670-674; and Benjamin Frankel, ed., Realism: Restatements and Renewal (London: Frank Cass, 1996), pp. xi-xii. For rejoinders, see Kenneth N. Waltz, "Evaluating Theories," American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 913-918; Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Progressive Research and Degenerative Alliances," American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 899-912; Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman, "Correspondence: History vs. Neorealism: A Second Look," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 182-193; Elman and Elman, "Lakatos and Neorealism: A Reply to Vasquez," American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 923-926; Randall L. Schweller, "New Realist Research on Alliances: Refining, not Refuting, Waltz's Balancing Proposition," American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 927-930; and Stephen M. Walt, "The Progressive Power of Realism," American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 931-935.
10. We agree with much of the analysis in John Vasquez, "The Realist Paradigm and Degenerative vs. Progressive Research Programs: An Appraisal of Neotraditional Research on Waltz's Balancing Proposition," American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 899-912. But we do not agree, among other things, that balancing behavior per se provides a strong test of realism or that realism is beyond redemption. On various criticisms, see also Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992); Richard Ned Lebow and Thomas Risse-Kappen, eds., International Relations and the End of the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995); and Paul W. Schroeder, "Historical Reality vs. Neorealist Theory," in Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1995), pp. 421-461; Peter J. Katzenstein, Robert O. Keohane, and Stephen D. Krasner, "International Organization and the Study of World Politics," International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4 (Autumn 1998), pp. 670-674; and Benjamin Frankel, ed., Realism: Restatements and Renewal (London: Frank Cass, 1996), pp. xi-xii. For rejoinders, see Kenneth N. Waltz, "Evaluating Theories," American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 913-918; Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Progressive Research and Degenerative Alliances," American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 899-912; Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman, "Correspondence: History vs. Neorealism: A Second Look," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 182-193; Elman and Elman, "Lakatos and Neorealism: A Reply to Vasquez," American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 923-926; Randall L. Schweller, "New Realist Research on Alliances: Refining, not Refuting, Waltz's Balancing Proposition," American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 927-930; and Stephen M. Walt, "The Progressive Power of Realism," American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 931-935.
11. We agree with much of the analysis in John Vasquez, "The Realist Paradigm and Degenerative vs. Progressive Research Programs: An Appraisal of Neotraditional Research on Waltz's Balancing Proposition," American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 899-912. But we do not agree, among other things, that balancing behavior per se provides a strong test of realism or that realism is beyond redemption. On various criticisms, see also Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992); Richard Ned Lebow and Thomas Risse-Kappen, eds., International Relations and the End of the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995); and Paul W. Schroeder, "Historical Reality vs. Neorealist Theory," in Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1995), pp. 421-461; Peter J. Katzenstein, Robert O. Keohane, and Stephen D. Krasner, "International Organization and the Study of World Politics," International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4 (Autumn 1998), pp. 670-674; and Benjamin Frankel, ed., Realism: Restatements and Renewal (London: Frank Cass, 1996), pp. xi-xii. For rejoinders, see Kenneth N. Waltz, "Evaluating Theories," American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 913-918; Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Progressive Research and Degenerative Alliances," American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 899-912; Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman, "Correspondence: History vs. Neorealism: A Second Look," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 182-193; Elman and Elman, "Lakatos and Neorealism: A Reply to Vasquez," American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 923-926; Randall L. Schweller, "New Realist Research on Alliances: Refining, not Refuting, Waltz's Balancing Proposition," American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 927-930; and Stephen M. Walt, "The Progressive Power of Realism," American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 931-935.
12. We agree with much of the analysis in John Vasquez, "The Realist Paradigm and Degenerative vs. Progressive Research Programs: An Appraisal of Neotraditional Research on Waltz's Balancing Proposition," American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 899-912. But we do not agree, among other things, that balancing behavior per se provides a strong test of realism or that realism is beyond redemption. On various criticisms, see also Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992); Richard Ned Lebow and Thomas Risse-Kappen, eds., International Relations and the End of the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995); and Paul W. Schroeder, "Historical Reality vs. Neorealist Theory," in Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1995), pp. 421-461; Peter J. Katzenstein, Robert O. Keohane, and Stephen D. Krasner, "International Organization and the Study of World Politics," International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4 (Autumn 1998), pp. 670-674; and Benjamin Frankel, ed., Realism: Restatements and Renewal (London: Frank Cass, 1996), pp. xi-xii. For rejoinders, see Kenneth N. Waltz, "Evaluating Theories," American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 913-918; Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Progressive Research and Degenerative Alliances," American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 899-912; Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman, "Correspondence: History vs. Neorealism: A Second Look," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 182-193; Elman and Elman, "Lakatos and Neorealism: A Reply to Vasquez," American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 923-926; Randall L. Schweller, "New Realist Research on Alliances: Refining, not Refuting, Waltz's Balancing Proposition," American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 927-930; and Stephen M. Walt, "The Progressive Power of Realism," American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 931-935.
13. Giovanni Sartori, "Concept Misinformation in Comparative Politics," American Political Science Review, Vol. 64, No. 4 (December 1970), pp. 1033-1053. This is another way in which our critique differs from that of Vasquez, who has also charged that the realist paradigm is degenerating. Vasquez argues that "there is no falsification before the emergence of better theory," and that alternative paradigms do not exist. We demonstrate that they do. Vasquez, "The Realist Paradigm," p. 910.
14. Giovanni Sartori, "Concept Misinformation in Comparative Politics," American Political Science Review, Vol. 64, No. 4 (December 1970), pp. 1033-1053. This is another way in which our critique differs from that of Vasquez, who has also charged that the realist paradigm is degenerating. Vasquez argues that "there is no falsification before the emergence of better theory," and that alternative paradigms do not exist. We demonstrate that they do. Vasquez, "The Realist Paradigm," p. 910.
15. Vasquez, "The Realist Paradigm"; and David A. Lake and Robert Powell, eds., Strategic Choice and International Relations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999).
16. Vasquez, "The Realist Paradigm"; and David A. Lake and Robert Powell, eds., Strategic Choice and International Relations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999).
17. Jared Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997).
18. Or a "basic theory," "research program," "school," or "approach." For similar usage, see Stephen Van Evera, cited in Benjamin Frankel, "Restating the Realist Case," in Frankel, Realism, p. xiii; and Walt, "The Progressive Power of Realism." We do not mean to imply more with the term "paradigm" than we state.
19. Or a "basic theory," "research program," "school," or "approach." For similar usage, see Stephen Van Evera, cited in Benjamin Frankel, "Restating the Realist Case," in Frankel, Realism, p. xiii; and Walt, "The Progressive Power of Realism." We do not mean to imply more with the term "paradigm" than we state.
20. For a fuller account of the desirable criteria, see Jeffrey Legro and Andrew Moravcsik, "Is Anybody Still a Realist?" Weatherhead Center for International Affairs Working Paper Series (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, 1998). There we also employ these standards to reject paradigmatic definitions of realism based on ideal-typical outcomes (e.g., "pessimism" or "conflict"), vague concepts (e.g., "power and interest"), intellectual history, or outcomes predicted by more than one theory (e.g., "balancing").
21. Our central criticism of recent realism is not that the realist paradigm is incoherent or indistinct simply because it generates various, even conflicting, theories and hypotheses. We do not believe that disagreement among realists per se is a sign of degeneration. See Walt, "The Progressive Power of Realism," pp. 932-933.
22. See Imre Lakatos, "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programs," in Lakatos and Alan Musgrave, eds., Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp. 131-132.
23. Fundamental debates are always (at least) "three-cornered," pitting two (or more) theories against the data. See ibid., p. 115.
24. For a statement of core assumptions, see Robert O. Keohane, International Institutions and State Power (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1989); Stephen D. Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1983); and Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984).
25. For a statement of core assumptions, see Robert O. Keohane, International Institutions and State Power (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1989); Stephen D. Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1983); and Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984).
26. For a statement of core assumptions, see Robert O. Keohane, International Institutions and State Power (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1989); Stephen D. Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1983); and Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984).
27. For a statement of core assumptions, see Andrew Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics," International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 4 (Autumn 1997), pp. 513-553. Helen V. Milner, "Rationalizing Politics: The Emerging Synthesis of International, American, and Comparative Politics," International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4 (Autumn 1998), pp. 759-786; Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977); Michael W. Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," American Political Science Review, Vol. 80, No. 4 (December 1986), pp. 1151-1169; Richard Cooper, The Economics of Interdependence: Economic Policy in the Atlantic Community (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968); and Elman and Elman, "Correspondence," p. 924, all concur that such theories are nonrealist.
28. For a statement of core assumptions, see Andrew Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics," International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 4 (Autumn 1997), pp. 513-553. Helen V. Milner, "Rationalizing Politics: The Emerging Synthesis of International, American, and Comparative Politics," International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4 (Autumn 1998), pp. 759-786; Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977); Michael W. Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," American Political Science Review, Vol. 80, No. 4 (December 1986), pp. 1151-1169; Richard Cooper, The Economics of Interdependence: Economic Policy in the Atlantic Community (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968); and Elman and Elman, "Correspondence," p. 924, all concur that such theories are nonrealist.
29. For a statement of core assumptions, see Andrew Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics," International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 4 (Autumn 1997), pp. 513-553. Helen V. Milner, "Rationalizing Politics: The Emerging Synthesis of International, American, and Comparative Politics," International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4 (Autumn 1998), pp. 759-786; Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977); Michael W. Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," American Political Science Review, Vol. 80, No. 4 (December 1986), pp. 1151-1169; Richard Cooper, The Economics of Interdependence: Economic Policy in the Atlantic Community (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968); and Elman and Elman, "Correspondence," p. 924, all concur that such theories are nonrealist.
30. For a statement of core assumptions, see Andrew Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics," International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 4 (Autumn 1997), pp. 513-553. Helen V. Milner, "Rationalizing Politics: The Emerging Synthesis of International, American, and Comparative Politics," International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4 (Autumn 1998), pp. 759-786; Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977); Michael W. Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," American Political Science Review, Vol. 80, No. 4 (December 1986), pp. 1151-1169; Richard Cooper, The Economics of Interdependence: Economic Policy in the Atlantic Community (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968); and Elman and Elman, "Correspondence," p. 924, all concur that such theories are nonrealist.
31. For a statement of core assumptions, see Andrew Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics," International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 4 (Autumn 1997), pp. 513-553. Helen V. Milner, "Rationalizing Politics: The Emerging Synthesis of International, American, and Comparative Politics," International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4 (Autumn 1998), pp. 759-786; Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977); Michael W. Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," American Political Science Review, Vol. 80, No. 4 (December 1986), pp. 1151-1169; Richard Cooper, The Economics of Interdependence: Economic Policy in the Atlantic Community (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968); and Elman and Elman, "Correspondence," p. 924, all concur that such theories are nonrealist.
32. For a statement of core assumptions, see Andrew Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics," International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 4 (Autumn 1997), pp. 513-553. Helen V. Milner, "Rationalizing Politics: The Emerging Synthesis of International, American, and Comparative Politics," International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4 (Autumn 1998), pp. 759-786; Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977); Michael W. Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," American Political Science Review, Vol. 80, No. 4 (December 1986), pp. 1151-1169; Richard Cooper, The Economics of Interdependence: Economic Policy in the Atlantic Community (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968); and Elman and Elman, "Correspondence," p. 924, all concur that such theories are nonrealist.
33. An "episteme" or "system of understanding" implies a collective mentality and should be distinguished from purely psychological approaches about individual perceptions and personality traits, although these may share similarities. Our use of the word seeks to situate the paradigm between deep constitutive connotations of "social episteme" in John G. Ruggie, "Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations," International Organization, Vol. 47, No. 4 (Winter 1993), p. 157, and interest-group focus of "epistemic community" in Peter M. Haas, "Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination," International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 1 (Winter 1992), pp. 1-35.
34. An "episteme" or "system of understanding" implies a collective mentality and should be distinguished from purely psychological approaches about individual perceptions and personality traits, although these may share similarities. Our use of the word seeks to situate the paradigm between deep constitutive connotations of "social episteme" in John G. Ruggie, "Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations," International Organization, Vol. 47, No. 4 (Winter 1993), p. 157, and interest-group focus of "epistemic community" in Peter M. Haas, "Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination," International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 1 (Winter 1992), pp. 1-35.
35. On the role of beliefs in rationalist theory see Jon Elster, "Introduction," in Elster, ed., Rational Choice (New York: New York University Press, 1986), pp. 1-33; and Arthur Denzau and Douglass North, "Shared Mental Models: Ideologies and Institutions," Kyklos, Vol. 47, No. 1 (Spring 1994), pp. 3-31.
36. On the role of beliefs in rationalist theory see Jon Elster, "Introduction," in Elster, ed., Rational Choice (New York: New York University Press, 1986), pp. 1-33; and Arthur Denzau and Douglass North, "Shared Mental Models: Ideologies and Institutions," Kyklos, Vol. 47, No. 1 (Spring 1994), pp. 3-31.
37. John Odell, U.S. International Monetary Policy: Markets, Power, and Ideas as Sources of Change (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1982); Paul Egon Rohrlich, "Economic Culture and Foreign Policy," International Organization, Vol. 41, No. 1 (Winter 1987), pp. 61-92; Kathryn Sikkink, Ideas and Institutions: Developmentalism in Brazil and Argentina (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1991); Peter Hall, "Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State," Comparative Politics, Vol. 25, No. 3 (April 1993), pp. 275-295; Judith Goldstein, Ideas, Interests, and American Trade Policy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993); Alastair lain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995); Jeffrey W. Legro, Cooperation under Fire: Anglo-German Restraint during World War II (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1995); Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms, Identity, and World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Dan Reiter, Crucible of Beliefs (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1996); and Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine between the Wars (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997).
38. John Odell, U.S. International Monetary Policy: Markets, Power, and Ideas as Sources of Change (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1982); Paul Egon Rohrlich, "Economic Culture and Foreign Policy," International Organization, Vol. 41, No. 1 (Winter 1987), pp. 61-92; Kathryn Sikkink, Ideas and Institutions: Developmentalism in Brazil and Argentina (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1991); Peter Hall, "Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State," Comparative Politics, Vol. 25, No. 3 (April 1993), pp. 275-295; Judith Goldstein, Ideas, Interests, and American Trade Policy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993); Alastair lain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995); Jeffrey W. Legro, Cooperation under Fire: Anglo-German Restraint during World War II (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1995); Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms, Identity, and World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Dan Reiter, Crucible of Beliefs (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1996); and Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine between the Wars (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997).
39. John Odell, U.S. International Monetary Policy: Markets, Power, and Ideas as Sources of Change (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1982); Paul Egon Rohrlich, "Economic Culture and Foreign Policy," International Organization, Vol. 41, No. 1 (Winter 1987), pp. 61-92; Kathryn Sikkink, Ideas and Institutions: Developmentalism in Brazil and Argentina (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1991); Peter Hall, "Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State," Comparative Politics, Vol. 25, No. 3 (April 1993), pp. 275-295; Judith Goldstein, Ideas, Interests, and American Trade Policy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993); Alastair lain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995); Jeffrey W. Legro, Cooperation under Fire: Anglo-German Restraint during World War II (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1995); Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms, Identity, and World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Dan Reiter, Crucible of Beliefs (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1996); and Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine between the Wars (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997).
40. John Odell, U.S. International Monetary Policy: Markets, Power, and Ideas as Sources of Change (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1982); Paul Egon Rohrlich, "Economic Culture and Foreign Policy," International Organization, Vol. 41, No. 1 (Winter 1987), pp. 61-92; Kathryn Sikkink, Ideas and Institutions: Developmentalism in Brazil and Argentina (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1991); Peter Hall, "Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State," Comparative Politics, Vol. 25, No. 3 (April 1993), pp. 275-295; Judith Goldstein, Ideas, Interests, and American Trade Policy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993); Alastair lain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995); Jeffrey W. Legro, Cooperation under Fire: Anglo-German Restraint during World War II (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1995); Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms, Identity, and World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Dan Reiter, Crucible of Beliefs (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1996); and Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine between the Wars (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997).
41. John Odell, U.S. International Monetary Policy: Markets, Power, and Ideas as Sources of Change (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1982); Paul Egon Rohrlich, "Economic Culture and Foreign Policy," International Organization, Vol. 41, No. 1 (Winter 1987), pp. 61-92; Kathryn Sikkink, Ideas and Institutions: Developmentalism in Brazil and Argentina (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1991); Peter Hall, "Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State," Comparative Politics, Vol. 25, No. 3 (April 1993), pp. 275-295; Judith Goldstein, Ideas, Interests, and American Trade Policy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993); Alastair lain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995); Jeffrey W. Legro, Cooperation under Fire: Anglo-German Restraint during World War II (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1995); Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms, Identity, and World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Dan Reiter, Crucible of Beliefs (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1996); and Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine between the Wars (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997).
42. John Odell, U.S. International Monetary Policy: Markets, Power, and Ideas as Sources of Change (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1982); Paul Egon Rohrlich, "Economic Culture and Foreign Policy," International Organization, Vol. 41, No. 1 (Winter 1987), pp. 61-92; Kathryn Sikkink, Ideas and Institutions: Developmentalism in Brazil and Argentina (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1991); Peter Hall, "Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State," Comparative Politics, Vol. 25, No. 3 (April 1993), pp. 275-295; Judith Goldstein, Ideas, Interests, and American Trade Policy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993); Alastair lain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995); Jeffrey W. Legro, Cooperation under Fire: Anglo-German Restraint during World War II (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1995); Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms, Identity, and World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Dan Reiter, Crucible of Beliefs (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1996); and Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine between the Wars (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997).
43. John Odell, U.S. International Monetary Policy: Markets, Power, and Ideas as Sources of Change (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1982); Paul Egon Rohrlich, "Economic Culture and Foreign Policy," International Organization, Vol. 41, No. 1 (Winter 1987), pp. 61-92; Kathryn Sikkink, Ideas and Institutions: Developmentalism in Brazil and Argentina (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1991); Peter Hall, "Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State," Comparative Politics, Vol. 25, No. 3 (April 1993), pp. 275-295; Judith Goldstein, Ideas, Interests, and American Trade Policy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993); Alastair lain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995); Jeffrey W. Legro, Cooperation under Fire: Anglo-German Restraint during World War II (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1995); Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms, Identity, and World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Dan Reiter, Crucible of Beliefs (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1996); and Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine between the Wars (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997).
44. John Odell, U.S. International Monetary Policy: Markets, Power, and Ideas as Sources of Change (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1982); Paul Egon Rohrlich, "Economic Culture and Foreign Policy," International Organization, Vol. 41, No. 1 (Winter 1987), pp. 61-92; Kathryn Sikkink, Ideas and Institutions: Developmentalism in Brazil and Argentina (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1991); Peter Hall, "Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State," Comparative Politics, Vol. 25, No. 3 (April 1993), pp. 275-295; Judith Goldstein, Ideas, Interests, and American Trade Policy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993); Alastair lain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995); Jeffrey W. Legro, Cooperation under Fire: Anglo-German Restraint during World War II (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1995); Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms, Identity, and World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Dan Reiter, Crucible of Beliefs (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1996); and Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine between the Wars (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997).
45. John Odell, U.S. International Monetary Policy: Markets, Power, and Ideas as Sources of Change (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1982); Paul Egon Rohrlich, "Economic Culture and Foreign Policy," International Organization, Vol. 41, No. 1 (Winter 1987), pp. 61-92; Kathryn Sikkink, Ideas and Institutions: Developmentalism in Brazil and Argentina (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1991); Peter Hall, "Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State," Comparative Politics, Vol. 25, No. 3 (April 1993), pp. 275-295; Judith Goldstein, Ideas, Interests, and American Trade Policy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993); Alastair lain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995); Jeffrey W. Legro, Cooperation under Fire: Anglo-German Restraint during World War II (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1995); Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms, Identity, and World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Dan Reiter, Crucible of Beliefs (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1996); and Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine between the Wars (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997).
46. John Odell, U.S. International Monetary Policy: Markets, Power, and Ideas as Sources of Change (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1982); Paul Egon Rohrlich, "Economic Culture and Foreign Policy," International Organization, Vol. 41, No. 1 (Winter 1987), pp. 61-92; Kathryn Sikkink, Ideas and Institutions: Developmentalism in Brazil and Argentina (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1991); Peter Hall, "Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State," Comparative Politics, Vol. 25, No. 3 (April 1993), pp. 275-295; Judith Goldstein, Ideas, Interests, and American Trade Policy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993); Alastair lain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995); Jeffrey W. Legro, Cooperation under Fire: Anglo-German Restraint during World War II (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1995); Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms, Identity, and World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Dan Reiter, Crucible of Beliefs (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1996); and Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine between the Wars (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997).
47. James S. Coleman, Foundations of Social Theory (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990).
48. Randall L. Schweller and David Priess suggest this definition, although they neglect it in their midrange theorizing. Schweller and Priess, "A Tale of Two Realisms: Expanding the Institutions Debate," International Studies Review, Vol. 41, No. 1 (1997), pp. 1-32. Walt comes close in Walt, "The Progressive Power of Realism," p. 932. For an all-inclusive definition including many of these elements, see Frankel, "Restating the Realist Case."
49. Randall L. Schweller and David Priess suggest this definition, although they neglect it in their midrange theorizing. Schweller and Priess, "A Tale of Two Realisms: Expanding the Institutions Debate," International Studies Review, Vol. 41, No. 1 (1997), pp. 1-32. Walt comes close in Walt, "The Progressive Power of Realism," p. 932. For an all-inclusive definition including many of these elements, see Frankel, "Restating the Realist Case."
50. Randall L. Schweller and David Priess suggest this definition, although they neglect it in their midrange theorizing. Schweller and Priess, "A Tale of Two Realisms: Expanding the Institutions Debate," International Studies Review, Vol. 41, No. 1 (1997), pp. 1-32. Walt comes close in Walt, "The Progressive Power of Realism," p. 932. For an all-inclusive definition including many of these elements, see Frankel, "Restating the Realist Case."
51. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979), p. 94; Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Conflict: The Third World against Global Liberalism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), p. 28; Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973), pp. 7-8; Robert Gilpin, "No One Loves a Political Realist," in Frankel, Realism, p. 7; and Robert O. Keohane, "Realism, Neorealism, and the Study of World Politics," in Keohane, ed., Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), pp. 1-26. This rationality can be bounded; the precise level of calculating ability is inessential to our purposes here, as long as miscalculations are random; if they are not, then other theories may take over.
52. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979), p. 94; Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Conflict: The Third World against Global Liberalism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), p. 28; Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973), pp. 7-8; Robert Gilpin, "No One Loves a Political Realist," in Frankel, Realism, p. 7; and Robert O. Keohane, "Realism, Neorealism, and the Study of World Politics," in Keohane, ed., Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), pp. 1-26. This rationality can be bounded; the precise level of calculating ability is inessential to our purposes here, as long as miscalculations are random; if they are not, then other theories may take over.
53. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979), p. 94; Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Conflict: The Third World against Global Liberalism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), p. 28; Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973), pp. 7-8; Robert Gilpin, "No One Loves a Political Realist," in Frankel, Realism, p. 7; and Robert O. Keohane, "Realism, Neorealism, and the Study of World Politics," in Keohane, ed., Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), pp. 1-26. This rationality can be bounded; the precise level of calculating ability is inessential to our purposes here, as long as miscalculations are random; if they are not, then other theories may take over.
54. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979), p. 94; Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Conflict: The Third World against Global Liberalism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), p. 28; Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973), pp. 7-8; Robert Gilpin, "No One Loves a Political Realist," in Frankel, Realism, p. 7; and Robert O. Keohane, "Realism, Neorealism, and the Study of World Politics," in Keohane, ed., Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), pp. 1-26. This rationality can be bounded; the precise level of calculating ability is inessential to our purposes here, as long as miscalculations are random; if they are not, then other theories may take over.
55. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979), p. 94; Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Conflict: The Third World against Global Liberalism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), p. 28; Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973), pp. 7-8; Robert Gilpin, "No One Loves a Political Realist," in Frankel, Realism, p. 7; and Robert O. Keohane, "Realism, Neorealism, and the Study of World Politics," in Keohane, ed., Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), pp. 1-26. This rationality can be bounded; the precise level of calculating ability is inessential to our purposes here, as long as miscalculations are random; if they are not, then other theories may take over.
56. Gilpin, "No One Loves a Political Realist"; and Kenneth N. Waltz, "Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory," in Robert L. Rothstein, ed., The Evolution of Theory in International Relations (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1991), p. 37.
57. Gilpin, "No One Loves a Political Realist"; and Kenneth N. Waltz, "Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory," in Robert L. Rothstein, ed., The Evolution of Theory in International Relations (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1991), p. 37.
58. Preferences should remain clearly distinct from strategies. State preferences are defined over states of the social world and are therefore "prestrategic," that is, they remain uninfluenced by shifts in the strategic environment, such as the distribution of power. Preferences are akin to "tastes" that states bring to the international bargaining table, although they themselves may of course result from forms of international interaction other than those being studied, as do national preferences resulting from economic interdependence. See Robert Powell, "Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate," International Organization, Vol. 48, No. 2 (Spring 1994), pp. 313-344; and Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously."
59. Preferences should remain clearly distinct from strategies. State preferences are defined over states of the social world and are therefore "prestrategic," that is, they remain uninfluenced by shifts in the strategic environment, such as the distribution of power. Preferences are akin to "tastes" that states bring to the international bargaining table, although they themselves may of course result from forms of international interaction other than those being studied, as do national preferences resulting from economic interdependence. See Robert Powell, "Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate," International Organization, Vol. 48, No. 2 (Spring 1994), pp. 313-344; and Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously."
60. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, pp. 2-12; Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 18-37; and Waltz, "Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory," pp. 21-37.
61. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, pp. 2-12; Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 18-37; and Waltz, "Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory," pp. 21-37.
62. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, pp. 2-12; Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 18-37; and Waltz, "Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory," pp. 21-37.
63. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 118.
64. Powell, "Anarchy in International Relations Theory," p. 315; Alexander Wendt, "Social Theory of International Politics," unpublished manuscript, Dartmouth College, 1998, p. 309; Randall L. Schweller, "Neorealism's Status-Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?" in Frankel, Realism; Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously"; Jeffrey W. Legro, "Culture and Preferences in the International Cooperation Two-step," American Political Science Review, Vol. 90, No. 1 (March 1996), pp. 118-137; Barry Buzan, Charles Jones, and Richard Little, The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural Realism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); and John Gerard Ruggie, "International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order," in Krasner, International Regimes.
65. Powell, "Anarchy in International Relations Theory," p. 315; Alexander Wendt, "Social Theory of International Politics," unpublished manuscript, Dartmouth College, 1998, p. 309; Randall L. Schweller, "Neorealism's Status-Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?" in Frankel, Realism; Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously"; Jeffrey W. Legro, "Culture and Preferences in the International Cooperation Two-step," American Political Science Review, Vol. 90, No. 1 (March 1996), pp. 118-137; Barry Buzan, Charles Jones, and Richard Little, The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural Realism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); and John Gerard Ruggie, "International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order," in Krasner, International Regimes.
66. Powell, "Anarchy in International Relations Theory," p. 315; Alexander Wendt, "Social Theory of International Politics," unpublished manuscript, Dartmouth College, 1998, p. 309; Randall L. Schweller, "Neorealism's Status-Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?" in Frankel, Realism; Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously"; Jeffrey W. Legro, "Culture and Preferences in the International Cooperation Two-step," American Political Science Review, Vol. 90, No. 1 (March 1996), pp. 118-137; Barry Buzan, Charles Jones, and Richard Little, The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural Realism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); and John Gerard Ruggie, "International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order," in Krasner, International Regimes.
67. Powell, "Anarchy in International Relations Theory," p. 315; Alexander Wendt, "Social Theory of International Politics," unpublished manuscript, Dartmouth College, 1998, p. 309; Randall L. Schweller, "Neorealism's Status-Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?" in Frankel, Realism; Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously"; Jeffrey W. Legro, "Culture and Preferences in the International Cooperation Two-step," American Political Science Review, Vol. 90, No. 1 (March 1996), pp. 118-137; Barry Buzan, Charles Jones, and Richard Little, The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural Realism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); and John Gerard Ruggie, "International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order," in Krasner, International Regimes.
68. Powell, "Anarchy in International Relations Theory," p. 315; Alexander Wendt, "Social Theory of International Politics," unpublished manuscript, Dartmouth College, 1998, p. 309; Randall L. Schweller, "Neorealism's Status-Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?" in Frankel, Realism; Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously"; Jeffrey W. Legro, "Culture and Preferences in the International Cooperation Two-step," American Political Science Review, Vol. 90, No. 1 (March 1996), pp. 118-137; Barry Buzan, Charles Jones, and Richard Little, The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural Realism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); and John Gerard Ruggie, "International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order," in Krasner, International Regimes.
69. Powell, "Anarchy in International Relations Theory," p. 315; Alexander Wendt, "Social Theory of International Politics," unpublished manuscript, Dartmouth College, 1998, p. 309; Randall L. Schweller, "Neorealism's Status-Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?" in Frankel, Realism; Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously"; Jeffrey W. Legro, "Culture and Preferences in the International Cooperation Two-step," American Political Science Review, Vol. 90, No. 1 (March 1996), pp. 118-137; Barry Buzan, Charles Jones, and Richard Little, The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural Realism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); and John Gerard Ruggie, "International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order," in Krasner, International Regimes.
70. Powell, "Anarchy in International Relations Theory," p. 315; Alexander Wendt, "Social Theory of International Politics," unpublished manuscript, Dartmouth College, 1998, p. 309; Randall L. Schweller, "Neorealism's Status-Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?" in Frankel, Realism; Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously"; Jeffrey W. Legro, "Culture and Preferences in the International Cooperation Two-step," American Political Science Review, Vol. 90, No. 1 (March 1996), pp. 118-137; Barry Buzan, Charles Jones, and Richard Little, The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural Realism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); and John Gerard Ruggie, "International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order," in Krasner, International Regimes.
71. John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," International Security, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Summer 1990), pp. 5-56; and Joseph M. Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism," International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer 1988), pp. 485-507. Grieco maintains that states seek both absolute and relative gains. The relative importance of relative gains is given by the coefficient k. The higher the value of k, Grieco maintains, the stronger the incentives for relative-gains seeking and the more pronounced the tendency to engage in "defensive positionalist" realist behavior. For a more detailed analysis, see pp. 25-27 below.
72. John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," International Security, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Summer 1990), pp. 5-56; and Joseph M. Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism," International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer 1988), pp. 485-507. Grieco maintains that states seek both absolute and relative gains. The relative importance of relative gains is given by the coefficient k. The higher the value of k, Grieco maintains, the stronger the incentives for relative-gains seeking and the more pronounced the tendency to engage in "defensive positionalist" realist behavior. For a more detailed analysis, see pp. 25-27 below.
73. Schweller puts this well: "If states are assumed to seek nothing more than their own survival, why would they feel threatened? . . . Anarchy and self-preservation alone are not sufficient. . . . Predatory states motivated by expansion and absolute gains, not security and the fear of relative losses, are the prime movers of neo-realist theory. Without some possibility for their existence, the security dilemma melts away, as do most concepts associated with contemporary realism." Schweller, "Neorealism's Status-Quo Bias," pp. 91, 119. Somewhat perversely for a realist, he cites Fukuyama, The End of History, pp. 254-255. See also Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously"; Charles L. Glaser, "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help," in Brown, Lynn-Jones, and Miller, The Perils of Anarchy; and Andrew Kydd, "Sheep in Sheep's Clothing: Why Security Seekers Do Not Fight Each Other," Security Studies, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Autumn 1997), pp. 153-154.
74. Schweller puts this well: "If states are assumed to seek nothing more than their own survival, why would they feel threatened? . . . Anarchy and self-preservation alone are not sufficient. . . . Predatory states motivated by expansion and absolute gains, not security and the fear of relative losses, are the prime movers of neo-realist theory. Without some possibility for their existence, the security dilemma melts away, as do most concepts associated with contemporary realism." Schweller, "Neorealism's Status-Quo Bias," pp. 91, 119. Somewhat perversely for a realist, he cites Fukuyama, The End of History, pp. 254-255. See also Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously"; Charles L. Glaser, "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help," in Brown, Lynn-Jones, and Miller, The Perils of Anarchy; and Andrew Kydd, "Sheep in Sheep's Clothing: Why Security Seekers Do Not Fight Each Other," Security Studies, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Autumn 1997), pp. 153-154.
75. Schweller puts this well: "If states are assumed to seek nothing more than their own survival, why would they feel threatened? . . . Anarchy and self-preservation alone are not sufficient. . . . Predatory states motivated by expansion and absolute gains, not security and the fear of relative losses, are the prime movers of neo-realist theory. Without some possibility for their existence, the security dilemma melts away, as do most concepts associated with contemporary realism." Schweller, "Neorealism's Status-Quo Bias," pp. 91, 119. Somewhat perversely for a realist, he cites Fukuyama, The End of History, pp. 254-255. See also Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously"; Charles L. Glaser, "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help," in Brown, Lynn-Jones, and Miller, The Perils of Anarchy; and Andrew Kydd, "Sheep in Sheep's Clothing: Why Security Seekers Do Not Fight Each Other," Security Studies, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Autumn 1997), pp. 153-154.
76. Schweller puts this well: "If states are assumed to seek nothing more than their own survival, why would they feel threatened? . . . Anarchy and self-preservation alone are not sufficient. . . . Predatory states motivated by expansion and absolute gains, not security and the fear of relative losses, are the prime movers of neo-realist theory. Without some possibility for their existence, the security dilemma melts away, as do most concepts associated with contemporary realism." Schweller, "Neorealism's Status-Quo Bias," pp. 91, 119. Somewhat perversely for a realist, he cites Fukuyama, The End of History, pp. 254-255. See also Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously"; Charles L. Glaser, "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help," in Brown, Lynn-Jones, and Miller, The Perils of Anarchy; and Andrew Kydd, "Sheep in Sheep's Clothing: Why Security Seekers Do Not Fight Each Other," Security Studies, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Autumn 1997), pp. 153-154.
77. Schweller puts this well: "If states are assumed to seek nothing more than their own survival, why would they feel threatened? . . . Anarchy and self-preservation alone are not sufficient. . . . Predatory states motivated by expansion and absolute gains, not security and the fear of relative losses, are the prime movers of neo-realist theory. Without some possibility for their existence, the security dilemma melts away, as do most concepts associated with contemporary realism." Schweller, "Neorealism's Status-Quo Bias," pp. 91, 119. Somewhat perversely for a realist, he cites Fukuyama, The End of History, pp. 254-255. See also Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously"; Charles L. Glaser, "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help," in Brown, Lynn-Jones, and Miller, The Perils of Anarchy; and Andrew Kydd, "Sheep in Sheep's Clothing: Why Security Seekers Do Not Fight Each Other," Security Studies, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Autumn 1997), pp. 153-154.
78. Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Fall 1993), p. 57; Waltz, Theory of International Politics; Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); and Michael Mastanduno, "Do Relative Gains Matter? America's Response to Japanese Industrial Policy," in David A. Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).
79. Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Fall 1993), p. 57; Waltz, Theory of International Politics; Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); and Michael Mastanduno, "Do Relative Gains Matter? America's Response to Japanese Industrial Policy," in David A. Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).
80. Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Fall 1993), p. 57; Waltz, Theory of International Politics; Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); and Michael Mastanduno, "Do Relative Gains Matter? America's Response to Japanese Industrial Policy," in David A. Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).
81. Disaggregating the interactions between two may be empirically and theoretically challenging, but the conceptual distinction between the two dimensions of preferences remains unavoidable. Howard Raiffa, The Art and Science of Negotiation (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982); James D. Morrow, "Social Choice and System Structure in World Politics," World Politics, Vol. 41, No. 1 (October 1988), pp. 75-97; and Stephen D. Krasner, "Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier," in Baldwin, Neorealism and Neoliberalism, pp. 234-249. These theorists do not, of course, concede to a theory based on material resources the sole ability to explain the outcome of conflict-prevailing beliefs; asymmetrical interdependence or preference intensity, institutional context, and various process-level theories may also play a role.
82. Disaggregating the interactions between two may be empirically and theoretically challenging, but the conceptual distinction between the two dimensions of preferences remains unavoidable. Howard Raiffa, The Art and Science of Negotiation (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982); James D. Morrow, "Social Choice and System Structure in World Politics," World Politics, Vol. 41, No. 1 (October 1988), pp. 75-97; and Stephen D. Krasner, "Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier," in Baldwin, Neorealism and Neoliberalism, pp. 234-249. These theorists do not, of course, concede to a theory based on material resources the sole ability to explain the outcome of conflict-prevailing beliefs; asymmetrical interdependence or preference intensity, institutional context, and various process-level theories may also play a role.
83. Disaggregating the interactions between two may be empirically and theoretically challenging, but the conceptual distinction between the two dimensions of preferences remains unavoidable. Howard Raiffa, The Art and Science of Negotiation (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982); James D. Morrow, "Social Choice and System Structure in World Politics," World Politics, Vol. 41, No. 1 (October 1988), pp. 75-97; and Stephen D. Krasner, "Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier," in Baldwin, Neorealism and Neoliberalism, pp. 234-249. These theorists do not, of course, concede to a theory based on material resources the sole ability to explain the outcome of conflict-prevailing beliefs; asymmetrical interdependence or preference intensity, institutional context, and various process-level theories may also play a role.
84. John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," in Brown, Lynn-Jones, and Miller, The Perils of Anarchy, p. 337; Eric Labs, "Beyond Victory: Offensive Realism and the Expansion of War Aims," Security Studies, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Summer 1997), pp. 1-49; and Robert Gilpin, "The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism," in Keohane, Neorealism and Its Critics.
85. John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," in Brown, Lynn-Jones, and Miller, The Perils of Anarchy, p. 337; Eric Labs, "Beyond Victory: Offensive Realism and the Expansion of War Aims," Security Studies, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Summer 1997), pp. 1-49; and Robert Gilpin, "The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism," in Keohane, Neorealism and Its Critics.
86. John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," in Brown, Lynn-Jones, and Miller, The Perils of Anarchy, p. 337; Eric Labs, "Beyond Victory: Offensive Realism and the Expansion of War Aims," Security Studies, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Summer 1997), pp. 1-49; and Robert Gilpin, "The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism," in Keohane, Neorealism and Its Critics.
87. Coleman argues that coercion - "where the superordinate agrees to withhold an action that would make the subordinate worse off in exchange for the subordinate's obeying the superordinate" - is a "somewhat special" case of exchange. Coleman, Foundations of Social Theory, p. 29; and Kenneth A. Oye, Economic Discrimination and Political Exchange: World Political Economy in the 1930s and 1980s (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992).
88. Coleman argues that coercion - "where the superordinate agrees to withhold an action that would make the subordinate worse off in exchange for the subordinate's obeying the superordinate" - is a "somewhat special" case of exchange. Coleman, Foundations of Social Theory, p. 29; and Kenneth A. Oye, Economic Discrimination and Political Exchange: World Political Economy in the 1930s and 1980s (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992).
89. The language in Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, p. 5, is echoed almost verbatim in Waltz, Theory of International Politics. On Weber, see Michael Joseph Smith, Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1986).
90. The language in Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, p. 5, is echoed almost verbatim in Waltz, Theory of International Politics. On Weber, see Michael Joseph Smith, Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1986).
91. The language in Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, p. 5, is echoed almost verbatim in Waltz, Theory of International Politics. On Weber, see Michael Joseph Smith, Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1986).
92. Frankel, "Restating the Realist Case," pp. xii-xiv.
93. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future."
94. Joanne Gowa, Allies, Adversaries, and International Trade (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994).
95. Stephen D. Krasner, "State Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade," World Politics, Vol. 28, No. 3 (April 1976), pp. 317-347; Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics; David A. Lake, Power, Protection, and Free Trade: International Sources of U.S. Commercial Policy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1988); and Lake, "Leadership, Hegemony, and the International Economy: Naked Emperor or Tattered Monarch with Potential?" International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 37 No 4 (December 1993), pp. 459-489.
96. Stephen D. Krasner, "State Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade," World Politics, Vol. 28, No. 3 (April 1976), pp. 317-347; Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics; David A. Lake, Power, Protection, and Free Trade: International Sources of U.S. Commercial Policy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1988); and Lake, "Leadership, Hegemony, and the International Economy: Naked Emperor or Tattered Monarch with Potential?" International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 37 No 4 (December 1993), pp. 459-489.
97. Stephen D. Krasner, "State Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade," World Politics, Vol. 28, No. 3 (April 1976), pp. 317-347; Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics; David A. Lake, Power, Protection, and Free Trade: International Sources of U.S. Commercial Policy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1988); and Lake, "Leadership, Hegemony, and the International Economy: Naked Emperor or Tattered Monarch with Potential?" International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 37 No 4 (December 1993), pp. 459-489.
98. Stephen D. Krasner, "State Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade," World Politics, Vol. 28, No. 3 (April 1976), pp. 317-347; Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics; David A. Lake, Power, Protection, and Free Trade: International Sources of U.S. Commercial Policy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1988); and Lake, "Leadership, Hegemony, and the International Economy: Naked Emperor or Tattered Monarch with Potential?" International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 37 No 4 (December 1993), pp. 459-489.
99. Keohane, After Hegemony.
100. Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics; and Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (New York: Random House, 1987).
101. Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics; and Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (New York: Random House, 1987).
102. Dale Copeland, Anticipating Power: Dynamic Realism and the Origins of Major War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, forthcoming); and Christopher Layne, "Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace," in Brown, Lynn-Jones, and Miller, The Perils of Anarchy, pp. 287-331.
103. Dale Copeland, Anticipating Power: Dynamic Realism and the Origins of Major War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, forthcoming); and Christopher Layne, "Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace," in Brown, Lynn-Jones, and Miller, The Perils of Anarchy, pp. 287-331.
104. Robert Powell, "Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory," American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 4 (December 1991), pp. 701-726; and Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the Wars (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984), pp. 69, 229.
105. Robert Powell, "Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory," American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 4 (December 1991), pp. 701-726; and Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the Wars (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984), pp. 69, 229.
106. Joseph M. Grieco, "Realist International Theory and the Study of World Politics," in Michael W. Doyle and G. John Ikenberry, eds., New Thinking in International Relations Theory (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1997), pp. 166-168, is most explicit.
107. The transmethodological consensus on this point is near universal. In addition to Wendt, Powell, Moravcsik, Legro, and Schweller, cited above in n. 22, see Helen V. Milner, "The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations Theory," Review of International Studies, Vol. 17, No. 1 (January 1991), pp. 67-85.
108. This is true also of some more unwieldy definitions. Elman and Elman, "Lakatos and Neorealism," p. 923, define the realist hard core as rational, strategic states in anarchy seeking survival with limited resources. Ashley Tellis, "Reconstructing Political Realism: The Long March to Scientific Theory," Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Winter 1995-1996), p. 3, describes "political actions aimed at enhancing security" as the "minimum realist program." Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, "Preface," in Brown, Lynn-Jones, and Miller, The Perils of Anarchy, pp. ix-x, focus on rationality, anarchy, and power, but make no assumption that underlying goals conflict and limit their definition to the use of military force. We see a similar move in Buzan, Jones, and Little, The Logic of Anarchy, which seeks to integrate interdependence, preferences, information, and institutions into a "realist" theory tied together only by the fact that it is systemic.
109. This is true also of some more unwieldy definitions. Elman and Elman, "Lakatos and Neorealism," p. 923, define the realist hard core as rational, strategic states in anarchy seeking survival with limited resources. Ashley Tellis, "Reconstructing Political Realism: The Long March to Scientific Theory," Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Winter 1995-1996), p. 3, describes "political actions aimed at enhancing security" as the "minimum realist program." Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, "Preface," in Brown, Lynn-Jones, and Miller, The Perils of Anarchy, pp. ix-x, focus on rationality, anarchy, and power, but make no assumption that underlying goals conflict and limit their definition to the use of military force. We see a similar move in Buzan, Jones, and Little, The Logic of Anarchy, which seeks to integrate interdependence, preferences, information, and institutions into a "realist" theory tied together only by the fact that it is systemic.
110. This is true also of some more unwieldy definitions. Elman and Elman, "Lakatos and Neorealism," p. 923, define the realist hard core as rational, strategic states in anarchy seeking survival with limited resources. Ashley Tellis, "Reconstructing Political Realism: The Long March to Scientific Theory," Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Winter 1995-1996), p. 3, describes "political actions aimed at enhancing security" as the "minimum realist program." Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, "Preface," in Brown, Lynn-Jones, and Miller, The Perils of Anarchy, pp. ix-x, focus on rationality, anarchy, and power, but make no assumption that underlying goals conflict and limit their definition to the use of military force. We see a similar move in Buzan, Jones, and Little, The Logic of Anarchy, which seeks to integrate interdependence, preferences, information, and institutions into a "realist" theory tied together only by the fact that it is systemic.
111. This is true also of some more unwieldy definitions. Elman and Elman, "Lakatos and Neorealism," p. 923, define the realist hard core as rational, strategic states in anarchy seeking survival with limited resources. Ashley Tellis, "Reconstructing Political Realism: The Long March to Scientific Theory," Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Winter 1995-1996), p. 3, describes "political actions aimed at enhancing security" as the "minimum realist program." Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, "Preface," in Brown, Lynn-Jones, and Miller, The Perils of Anarchy, pp. ix-x, focus on rationality, anarchy, and power, but make no assumption that underlying goals conflict and limit their definition to the use of military force. We see a similar move in Buzan, Jones, and Little, The Logic of Anarchy, which seeks to integrate interdependence, preferences, information, and institutions into a "realist" theory tied together only by the fact that it is systemic.
112. Some sociological theories take the somewhat different view that actors behave according to a noninstrumental "logic of appropriateness," whereby actors conform to internalized rules imposed by society. See Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1996), pp. 28-31; and James March and Johan Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics (New York: Free Press, 1989).
113. Some sociological theories take the somewhat different view that actors behave according to a noninstrumental "logic of appropriateness," whereby actors conform to internalized rules imposed by society. See Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1996), pp. 28-31; and James March and Johan Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics (New York: Free Press, 1989).
114. Stefano Guzzini's assessment goes to the heart of the matter: "The closest we can get to . . . a single . . . assumption that would demarcate realism is the idea of anarchy . . . [But] traditional defenders of collective security [as well as 'democratic peace' liberals] have the same starting point. Rather than setting Realism apart from other international theories, the assumption of anarchy sets International Relations apart from other disciplines." Guzzini, Realism in International Relations and International Political Economy: The Continuing Story of a Death Foretold (New York: Routledge, 1998), pp. viii-ix. See also Helen V. Milner, "The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations"; and Keohane, "Introduction," After Hegemony.
115. Stefano Guzzini's assessment goes to the heart of the matter: "The closest we can get to . . . a single . . . assumption that would demarcate realism is the idea of anarchy . . . [But] traditional defenders of collective security [as well as 'democratic peace' liberals] have the same starting point. Rather than setting Realism apart from other international theories, the assumption of anarchy sets International Relations apart from other disciplines." Guzzini, Realism in International Relations and International Political Economy: The Continuing Story of a Death Foretold (New York: Routledge, 1998), pp. viii-ix. See also Helen V. Milner, "The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations"; and Keohane, "Introduction," After Hegemony.
116. Stefano Guzzini's assessment goes to the heart of the matter: "The closest we can get to . . . a single . . . assumption that would demarcate realism is the idea of anarchy . . . [But] traditional defenders of collective security [as well as 'democratic peace' liberals] have the same starting point. Rather than setting Realism apart from other international theories, the assumption of anarchy sets International Relations apart from other disciplines." Guzzini, Realism in International Relations and International Political Economy: The Continuing Story of a Death Foretold (New York: Routledge, 1998), pp. viii-ix. See also Helen V. Milner, "The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations"; and Keohane, "Introduction," After Hegemony.
117. Morgenthau speaks for nearly all realists in arguing that realism must "guard against two popular fallacies: the concern with motives and the concern with ideological preferences. . . . History shows no exact and necessary correlation between the quality of motives and the quality of foreign policy." Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, pp. 5-7; Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 29, see also pp. 65-66, 79, 90, 108-112, 196-198, 271; and Grieco, "Realist International Theory," p. 165.
118. Morgenthau speaks for nearly all realists in arguing that realism must "guard against two popular fallacies: the concern with motives and the concern with ideological preferences. . . . History shows no exact and necessary correlation between the quality of motives and the quality of foreign policy." Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, pp. 5-7; Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 29, see also pp. 65-66, 79, 90, 108-112, 196-198, 271; and Grieco, "Realist International Theory," p. 165.
119. Morgenthau speaks for nearly all realists in arguing that realism must "guard against two popular fallacies: the concern with motives and the concern with ideological preferences. . . . History shows no exact and necessary correlation between the quality of motives and the quality of foreign policy." Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, pp. 5-7; Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 29, see also pp. 65-66, 79, 90, 108-112, 196-198, 271; and Grieco, "Realist International Theory," p. 165.
120. Morgenthau's use of the term "power" can be ill-defined and overly expansive. See Inis L. Claude, Power and International Relations (New York: Random House, 1962), pp. 25-37.
121. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 118, 126. Fareed Zakaria speaks for most contemporary realists when he terms Waltz's writings on such questions "confused and contradictory." Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998), pp. 26-28.
122. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 118, 126. Fareed Zakaria speaks for most contemporary realists when he terms Waltz's writings on such questions "confused and contradictory." Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998), pp. 26-28.
123. Arnold Wolfers, "The Pole of Power and the Pole of Indifference," in Wolfers, ed., Discord and Collaboration: Essays in International Politics (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), p. 42, see also pp. 86, 156, 160. Even in Waltz, Theory of International Politics, we encounter only the assertion, rather than the derivation, of the primacy of systemic concerns.
124. Arnold Wolfers, "The Pole of Power and the Pole of Indifference," in Wolfers, ed., Discord and Collaboration: Essays in International Politics (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), p. 42, see also pp. 86, 156, 160. Even in Waltz, Theory of International Politics, we encounter only the assertion, rather than the derivation, of the primacy of systemic concerns.
125. Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991).
126. Ibid., p. 12, see also pp. 19-20, 64.
127. Fareed Zakaria, "Realism and Domestic Politics: A Review Essay," in Brown, Lynn-Jones, and Miller, The Perils of Anarchy, quote on p. 463, and Zakaria, From Wealth to Power, pp. 32-33, 181-183. We do not endorse all of Zakaria's criticisms of Snyder.
128. Fareed Zakaria, "Realism and Domestic Politics: A Review Essay," in Brown, Lynn-Jones, and Miller, The Perils of Anarchy, quote on p. 463, and Zakaria, From Wealth to Power, pp. 32-33, 181-183. We do not endorse all of Zakaria's criticisms of Snyder.
129. Joseph M. Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism," in Baldwin, Neorealism and Neoliberalism, p. 138; and Powell, "Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory."
130. Joseph M. Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism," in Baldwin, Neorealism and Neoliberalism, p. 138; and Powell, "Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory."
131. For the subsequent debate, see Baldwin, Neorealism and Neoliberalism.
132. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," p. 342.
133. Bruce M. Russett, Grasping the Democratic Pence: Principles for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993); Robert Jervis, "Security Regimes," International Organization, Vol. 36, No. 2 (Spring 1982), pp. 357-378; Jack Snyder, "Averting Anarchy in the New Europe," International Security, Vol. 14, No. 4 (Spring 1990), pp. 5-41; and George Downs and Keisuke Iida, "Assessing the Theoretical Case against Collective Security," in Downs, ed., Collective Security beyond the Cold War (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994), pp. 17-39.
134. Bruce M. Russett, Grasping the Democratic Pence: Principles for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993); Robert Jervis, "Security Regimes," International Organization, Vol. 36, No. 2 (Spring 1982), pp. 357-378; Jack Snyder, "Averting Anarchy in the New Europe," International Security, Vol. 14, No. 4 (Spring 1990), pp. 5-41; and George Downs and Keisuke Iida, "Assessing the Theoretical Case against Collective Security," in Downs, ed., Collective Security beyond the Cold War (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994), pp. 17-39.
135. Bruce M. Russett, Grasping the Democratic Pence: Principles for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993); Robert Jervis, "Security Regimes," International Organization, Vol. 36, No. 2 (Spring 1982), pp. 357-378; Jack Snyder, "Averting Anarchy in the New Europe," International Security, Vol. 14, No. 4 (Spring 1990), pp. 5-41; and George Downs and Keisuke Iida, "Assessing the Theoretical Case against Collective Security," in Downs, ed., Collective Security beyond the Cold War (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994), pp. 17-39.
136. Bruce M. Russett, Grasping the Democratic Pence: Principles for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993); Robert Jervis, "Security Regimes," International Organization, Vol. 36, No. 2 (Spring 1982), pp. 357-378; Jack Snyder, "Averting Anarchy in the New Europe," International Security, Vol. 14, No. 4 (Spring 1990), pp. 5-41; and George Downs and Keisuke Iida, "Assessing the Theoretical Case against Collective Security," in Downs, ed., Collective Security beyond the Cold War (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994), pp. 17-39.
137. Krasner, Structural Conflict; Mastanduno, "Do Relative Gains Matter?"; James D. Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War," International Organization, Vol. 49, No. 3 (Summer 1995), pp. 379- 414; and Lake, "Leadership, Hegemony, and the International Economy."
138. Krasner, Structural Conflict; Mastanduno, "Do Relative Gains Matter?"; James D. Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War," International Organization, Vol. 49, No. 3 (Summer 1995), pp. 379- 414; and Lake, "Leadership, Hegemony, and the International Economy."
139. Krasner, Structural Conflict; Mastanduno, "Do Relative Gains Matter?"; James D. Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War," International Organization, Vol. 49, No. 3 (Summer 1995), pp. 379-414; and Lake, "Leadership, Hegemony, and the International Economy."
140. Krasner, Structural Conflict; Mastanduno, "Do Relative Gains Matter?"; James D. Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War," International Organization, Vol. 49, No. 3 (Summer 1995), pp. 379- 414; and Lake, "Leadership, Hegemony, and the International Economy."
141. Peter Liberman, "Trading with the Enemy: Security and Relative Economic Gains," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Summer 1996), pp. 155-158; Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously," pp. 538-540; and Robert O. Keohane, "Institutionalist Theory and the Realist Challenge after the Cold War," in Baldwin, Neorealism and Neoliberalism, p. 280ff.
142. Peter Liberman, "Trading with the Enemy: Security and Relative Economic Gains," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Summer 1996), pp. 155-158; Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously," pp. 538-540; and Robert O. Keohane, "Institutionalist Theory and the Realist Challenge after the Cold War," in Baldwin, Neorealism and Neoliberalism, p. 280ff.
143. Peter Liberman, "Trading with the Enemy: Security and Relative Economic Gains," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Summer 1996), pp. 155-158; Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously," pp. 538-540; and Robert O. Keohane, "Institutionalist Theory and the Realist Challenge after the Cold War," in Baldwin, Neorealism and Neoliberalism, p. 280ff.
144. Because k cannot be observed directly and it is difficult to differentiate security from power seeking-hence the security dilemma - it is difficult to know how this theory could be tested, absent a theory of the determinants of k. There has been, to our knowledge, no attempt to measure k independently of state behavior. Cf. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," pp. 347-348.
145. See Joseph M. Grieco, "Realist Theory and the Problem of International Cooperation," Journal of Politics, Vol. 50, No. 3 (August 1988), pp. 610-612; and Grieco, Cooperation among Nations: Europe, America, and Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1990), pp. 45-47.
146. See Joseph M. Grieco, "Realist Theory and the Problem of International Cooperation," Journal of Politics, Vol. 50, No. 3 (August 1988), pp. 610-612; and Grieco, Cooperation among Nations: Europe, America, and Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1990), pp. 45-47.
147. For a review of this literature, James E. Alt, Jeffry Frieden, Michael J. Gilligan, Dani Rodrik, and Ronald Rogowski, "The Political Economy of International Trade: Enduring Puzzles and an Agenda for Inquiry," Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 29, No. 6 (December 1996), pp. 689-717.
148. Krasner, "Global Communications and National Power"; and Keohane, "Institutionalist Theory and the Realist Challenge." If such bargaining failure cannot be attributed to concerns about ex post cheating, Grieco argues, it confirms realist claims. Yet Grieco concedes the existence of a competing liberal explanation in a long footnote, but then drops the point. Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation," pp. 486-488.
149. Krasner, "Global Communications and National Power"; and Keohane, "Institutionalist Theory and the Realist Challenge." If such bargaining failure cannot be attributed to concerns about ex post cheating, Grieco argues, it confirms realist claims. Yet Grieco concedes the existence of a competing liberal explanation in a long footnote, but then drops the point. Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation," pp. 486-488.
150. Krasner, "Global Communications and National Power"; and Keohane, "Institutionalist Theory and the Realist Challenge." If such bargaining failure cannot be attributed to concerns about ex post cheating, Grieco argues, it confirms realist claims. Yet Grieco concedes the existence of a competing liberal explanation in a long footnote, but then drops the point. Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation," pp. 486-488.
151. Gideon Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy," World Politics Vol. 51, No. 1 (October 1998), pp. 144-172.
152. Ibid. Rose seeks to make a virtue of this, citing Aristotle for the proposition that domestic politics is simply too complex a subject about which to generalize. This claim must come as a surprise not only to scholars of comparative and U.S. politics, but to those who study the democratic peace, economic interdependence, aggressive ideologies, and other domestic determinants of security policy. In any case, no more recent support for the assumption is provided.
153. For a similar argument, see Thomas J. Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996).
154. Zakaria, From Wealth to Power, p. 38.
155. Ibid., pp. 60-67, 77-78, 90-127.
156. Zakaria cites Otto Hintze and Morgenthau in his defense. Yet Hintze viewed state structure as a product of international circumstances, not the reverse. Morgenthau, we shall see, did not believe that his claims about moral restraint were realist. Vague though Morgenthau's notion of "power" may be, he firmly rejects appeals to public opinion. "The government," he wrote, "must realize that it is the leader and not the slave of public opinion. [Public opinion is] continuously created and recreated by informed and responsible leadership." Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, pp. 133-135, 205, chap. 9.
157. Randall L. Schweller, Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler's Strategy of World Conquest (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998).
158. Ibid., pp. 26-29, 93-120.
159. Ibid., p. 22; and Randall L. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In," in Brown, Lynn-Jones, and Miller, The Perils of Anarchy, pp. 255-257. Andrew Kydd terms this view "motivational realism." Kydd, "Sheep in Sheep's Clothing." This, it should be noted, violates Rose's explicit definition of NCR, which assumes that systemic factors remain empirically more important.
160. Ibid., p. 22; and Randall L. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In," in Brown, Lynn-Jones, and Miller, The Perils of Anarchy, pp. 255-257. Andrew Kydd terms this view "motivational realism." Kydd, "Sheep in Sheep's Clothing." This, it should be noted, violates Rose's explicit definition of NCR, which assumes that systemic factors remain empirically more important.
161. Ibid., p. 22; and Randall L. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In," in Brown, Lynn-Jones, and Miller, The Perils of Anarchy, pp. 255-257. Andrew Kydd terms this view "motivational realism." Kydd, "Sheep in Sheep's Clothing." This, it should be noted, violates Rose's explicit definition of NCR, which assumes that systemic factors remain empirically more important.
162. See Schweller, Deadly Imbalances, pp. 84-89; and Schweller, "New Realist Research on Alliances," pp. 928-929.
163. See Schweller, Deadly Imbalances, pp. 84-89; and Schweller, "New Realist Research on Alliances," pp. 928-929.
164. See Schweller, Deadly Imbalances, pp. 31-38.
165. See, for example, ibid., pp. 200-201.
166. This confusing situation can arise because Schweller, like other contemporary realists, tests his theory against neorealism but ignores nonrealist alternatives.
167. Ibid., p. 20.
168. Those with concerns other than social scientific explanation may legitimately see indeterminacy and richness as a virtue. Michael W. Doyle concludes a recent study of realism by warning that if we "want to retain the range of insight embodied in the works of Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Rousseau . . . we need to reject a monolithic conception of a Realist model." Doyle, Ways of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997), p. 195; see also pp. 137-160.
169. For example, Morgenthau distinguishes consistently and explicitly between realist and nonrealist elements. The realist elements rest on "the concept of interest defined in terms of power," which "sets politics as [a] . . . sphere of action and understanding" independent of law, morality, or economics. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, pp. 5, 7-8, 12. He explicitly sets off sections on norms and institutions with an introduction presenting them as alternatives to the initial realist theory. Ibid., p. 227. E.H. Carr's classic realist statement contains similarly self-conscious dichotomies. Carr, The Twenty-Years' Crisis, 1919-1939 (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), pp. 93-94.
170. For example, Morgenthau distinguishes consistently and explicitly between realist and nonrealist elements. The realist elements rest on "the concept of interest defined in terms of power," which "sets politics as [a] . . . sphere of action and understanding" independent of law, morality, or economics. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, pp. 5, 7-8, 12. He explicitly sets off sections on norms and institutions with an introduction presenting them as alternatives to the initial realist theory. Ibid., p. 227. E.H. Carr's classic realist statement contains similarly self-conscious dichotomies. Carr, The Twenty-Years' Crisis, 1919-1939 (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), pp. 93-94.
171. For example, Morgenthau distinguishes consistently and explicitly between realist and nonrealist elements. The realist elements rest on "the concept of interest defined in terms of power," which "sets politics as [a] . . . sphere of action and understanding" independent of law, morality, or economics. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, pp. 5, 7-8, 12. He explicitly sets off sections on norms and institutions with an introduction presenting them as alternatives to the initial realist theory. Ibid., p. 227. E.H. Carr's classic realist statement contains similarly self-conscious dichotomies. Carr, The Twenty-Years' Crisis, 1919-1939 (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), pp. 93-94.
172. See especially Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, pp. 50-51. About this there is no exegetical ambiguity in the relevant chapters. Still, we agree with Robert Keohane that there is considerable contradiction and paradigmatic ambiguity in these theorists.
173. Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration, p. 96.
174. Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1999); citations are from a manuscript copy.
175. Ibid., p. 8.
176. Ibid., pp. 9-10. Van Evera is quite explicit that he considers this move realist: "The theories discussed here address the effects of the structure of power, or of perceptions of the structure of power. As such they fall into the Realist camp. Their explanatory power therefore adds to the overall explanatory power of Realism, and bolsters Realist arguments that power factors strongly shape international politics."
177. Ibid.
178. Stephen Van Evera, "Causes of War, Volume 2, Misperception and Its Roots," unpublished book manuscript, pp. 9-10.
179. For a study demonstrating why it is necessary to treat Van Evera as something other than a realist in order to engage in any sort of orderly empirical testing, see Peter Liberman, "The Spoils of Conquest," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Fall 1993), pp. 125-153.
180. Frankel, "Restating the Realist Case," p. xiii.
181. Robert Jervis, "Realism, Game Theory, and Cooperation," World Politics, Vol. 40, No. 3 (April 1988), pp. 317-349. It is, of course, consistent with realism to trace the nature of perception and calculation back to the distribution of material power, as does Waltz in Theory of International Politics, pp. 168-172.
182. Robert Jervis, "Realism, Game Theory, and Cooperation," World Politics, Vol. 40, No. 3 (April 1988), pp. 317-349. It is, of course, consistent with realism to trace the nature of perception and calculation back to the distribution of material power, as does Waltz in Theory of International Politics, pp. 168-172.
183. Snyder, Myths of Empire, pp. 41-42, 49. Van Evera recognizes the problem and resolves it by assertion: " The Realist family includes causes lying in the structure of international power and in the misperceptions of that structure, although rather limited room is allowed for misperceptions." Van Evera, Causes of War, p. 9 n. 12.
184. Snyder, Myths of Empire, pp. 41-42, 49. Van Evera recognizes the problem and resolves it by assertion: " The Realist family includes causes lying in the structure of international power and in the misperceptions of that structure, although rather limited room is allowed for misperceptions." Van Evera, Causes of War, p. 9 n. 12.
185. Van Evera, Causes of War, chap. 6. Building on Van Evera's earlier work, Christensen and Snyder emphasize perception and misperception of the offense-defense balance to explain alliance patterns in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Europe. In contrast to Waltz and traditional realists, however, Christensen and Snyder do not view perceptions as endogenous to power (or as a random product of uncertainty), but as the result of the lessons of past wars and the relative domestic power of civilians and the military. Their aspiration to synthesize different theories and levels of analysis is a progressive step more generally - a point to which we return in the final section. Yet there remains considerable ambiguity whether Christensen and Snyder believe this is a "progressive problem shift" within the realist paradigm or a form of theory synthesis. Certainly they are often cited as realists (e.g., Grieco, "Realist International Theory," p. 181). Either way, Christensen and Snyder clearly demonstrate the fundamental limits not just of neorealist theory but of the realism paradigm more broadly. Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity" International Organization, Vol. 44, No. 2 (Spring 1990), pp. 144, 166; Christensen, "Perceptions and Alliances in Europe," International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 1 (Winter 1997), p. 65; and
186. Van Evera, Causes of War, chap. 6. Building on Van Evera's earlier work, Christensen and Snyder emphasize perception and misperception of the offense-defense balance to explain alliance patterns in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Europe. In contrast to Waltz and traditional realists, however, Christensen and Snyder do not view perceptions as endogenous to power (or as a random product of uncertainty), but as the result of the lessons of past wars and the relative domestic power of civilians and the military. Their aspiration to synthesize different theories and levels of analysis is a progressive step more generally - a point to which we return in the final section. Yet there remains considerable ambiguity whether Christensen and Snyder believe this is a "progressive problem shift" within the realist paradigm or a form of theory synthesis. Certainly they are often cited as realists (e.g., Grieco, "Realist International Theory," p. 181). Either way, Christensen and Snyder clearly demonstrate the fundamental limits not just of neorealist theory but of the realism paradigm more broadly. Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity" International Organization, Vol. 44, No. 2 (Spring 1990), pp. 144, 166; Christensen, "Perceptions and Alliances in Europe," International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 1 (Winter 1997), p. 65; and
187. Van Evera, Causes of War, chap. 6. Building on Van Evera's earlier work, Christensen and Snyder emphasize perception and misperception of the offense-defense balance to explain alliance patterns in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Europe. In contrast to Waltz and traditional realists, however, Christensen and Snyder do not view perceptions as endogenous to power (or as a random product of uncertainty), but as the result of the lessons of past wars and the relative domestic power of civilians and the military. Their aspiration to synthesize different theories and levels of analysis is a progressive step more generally - a point to which we return in the final section. Yet there remains considerable ambiguity whether Christensen and Snyder believe this is a "progressive problem shift" within the realist paradigm or a form of theory synthesis. Certainly they are often cited as realists (e.g., Grieco, "Realist International Theory," p. 181). Either way, Christensen and Snyder clearly demonstrate the fundamental limits not just of neorealist theory but of the realism paradigm more broadly. Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity" International Organization, Vol. 44, No. 2 (Spring 1990), pp. 144, 166; Christensen, "Perceptions and Alliances in Europe," International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 1 (Winter 1997), p. 65; and
188. Van Evera, Causes of War, chap. 6. Building on Van Evera's earlier work, Christensen and Snyder emphasize perception and misperception of the offense-defense balance to explain alliance patterns in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Europe. In contrast to Waltz and traditional realists, however, Christensen and Snyder do not view perceptions as endogenous to power (or as a random product of uncertainty), but as the result of the lessons of past wars and the relative domestic power of civilians and the military. Their aspiration to synthesize different theories and levels of analysis is a progressive step more generally - a point to which we return in the final section. Yet there remains considerable ambiguity whether Christensen and Snyder believe this is a "progressive problem shift" within the realist paradigm or a form of theory synthesis. Certainly they are often cited as realists (e.g., Grieco, "Realist International Theory," p. 181). Either way, Christensen and Snyder clearly demonstrate the fundamental limits not just of neorealist theory but of the realism paradigm more broadly. Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity" International Organization, Vol. 44, No. 2 (Spring 1990), pp. 144, 166; Christensen, "Perceptions and Alliances in Europe," International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 1 (Winter 1997), p. 65; and
189. Christensen and Snyder, "Progressive Research and Degenerate Alliances," pp. 920-921.
190. Schweller, Deadly Imbalances, pp. 19, 88, 164-168, 200.
191. In an otherwise highly complimentary review, historian Walter McDougall calls our attention to precisely this empirical indeterminacy. McDougall, "American Empire: Review of Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role," New York Times Book Review, May 3, 1998, p. 25.
192. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," p. 376.
193. For specific claims of a progressive shift, see Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987), pp. viii, 5, 21, 263-265. The underlying problem is that a prediction of balancing is not unique to realism. Nearly all international relations paradigms and theories predict that states align and balance against threats to the realization of one's interests, whether the latter are status quo or revisionist. Why else would a rational government form a military alliance? Theories differ in their predictions about conditions under which states balance. Liberal theories predict balancing against "aggressor" states, institutionalist theories predict balancing within institutions, epistemic and some constructivist theories predict balancing where it is perceived as efficacious, and realist theories predict balancing against power.
194. For a striking statement, see ibid., p. 149: "In the Arab world, the most important source of power has been the ability to manipulate one's own image and the images of one's rivals in the minds of other Arab elites. . . . We are therefore dealing with two broad types of balancing: balancing conducted by military means [and] balancing conducted by political means directed at an opponent's image and legitimacy." There remains ambiguity about whether perceptions of intentions involve basic variations in preferences or beliefs about such intentions - the heart of which lies in the lack of theoretical constraint Walt is able to impose on "state intentions."
195. Ibid., p. 22. Our criticism is not simply this indeterminacy, but that his concept of "threat" subsumes all but the most implausible of prevailing rationalist explanations. Ibid., p. 26. Waltz takes a similar view, arguing that Walt (like Schweller and others) should not be seen as "increasing the explanatory power of defective theory and making it more precise," but bringing in extra-theoretical variables. "Walt," he writes, "[has] unfortunately taken the imaginative application of the theory to be a new one." Waltz, "Evaluating Theories," p. 916. See also Gunther Hellmann and Reinhard Wolf, "Neorealism, Neoliberal Institutionalism, and the Future of NATO," Security Studies, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Autumn 1993), pp. 3-43.
196. Ibid., p. 22. Our criticism is not simply this indeterminacy, but that his concept of "threat" subsumes all but the most implausible of prevailing rationalist explanations. Ibid., p. 26. Waltz takes a similar view, arguing that Walt (like Schweller and others) should not be seen as "increasing the explanatory power of defective theory and making it more precise," but bringing in extra-theoretical variables. "Walt," he writes, "[has] unfortunately taken the imaginative application of the theory to be a new one." Waltz, "Evaluating Theories," p. 916. See also Gunther Hellmann and Reinhard Wolf, "Neorealism, Neoliberal Institutionalism, and the Future of NATO," Security Studies, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Autumn 1993), pp. 3-43.
197. Ibid., p. 22. Our criticism is not simply this indeterminacy, but that his concept of "threat" subsumes all but the most implausible of prevailing rationalist explanations. Ibid., p. 26. Waltz takes a similar view, arguing that Walt (like Schweller and others) should not be seen as "increasing the explanatory power of defective theory and making it more precise," but bringing in extra-theoretical variables. "Walt," he writes, "[has] unfortunately taken the imaginative application of the theory to be a new one." Waltz, "Evaluating Theories," p. 916. See also Gunther Hellmann and Reinhard Wolf, "Neorealism, Neoliberal Institutionalism, and the Future of NATO," Security Studies, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Autumn 1993), pp. 3-43.
198. Ibid., p. 22. Our criticism is not simply this indeterminacy, but that his concept of "threat" subsumes all but the most implausible of prevailing rationalist explanations. Ibid., p. 26. Waltz takes a similar view, arguing that Walt (like Schweller and others) should not be seen as "increasing the explanatory power of defective theory and making it more precise," but bringing in extra-theoretical variables. "Walt," he writes, "[has] unfortunately taken the imaginative application of the theory to be a new one." Waltz, "Evaluating Theories," p. 916. See also Gunther Hellmann and Reinhard Wolf, "Neorealism, Neoliberal Institutionalism, and the Future of NATO," Security Studies, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Autumn 1993), pp. 3-43.
199. Douglas J. MacDonald's review in Journal of Politics, Vol. 51, No. 2 (August 1989), p. 796, accuses Walt of employing a "rigid" definition. Walt acknowledges, for example, that the Soviet Union allied with leftist regimes in the Middle East and the United States did not, but he does not treat such actions as ideologically motivated because neither superpower demanded that its allies alter their domestic policies.
200. Walt, The Origins of Alliances, pp. 149, 168, 266; and Stephen M. Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Politics," in Brown, Lynn-Jones, and Miller, The Perils of Anarchy, pp. 214, 243 (emphasis in original).
201. Walt, The Origins of Alliances, pp. 149, 168, 266; and Stephen M. Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Politics," in Brown, Lynn-Jones, and Miller, The Perils of Anarchy, pp. 214, 243 (emphasis in original).
202. We set aside another problem, namely Wohlforth's evident reliance on a distinction between status quo and revisionist states as a "contextual" factor explaining Soviet preferences and, in particular, the absence of a "World War III." As we have already discussed degeneration into liberal theory, we focus here on Wohlforth's overt perceptual challenge to objective power analysis in William C. Wohlforth, "Realism and the End of the Cold War," in Brown, Lynn-Jones, and Miller, The Perils of Anarchy, pp. 32, 36-37.
203. William C. Wohlforth, The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions during the Cold War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 1-17.
204. Wohlforth, "Realism and the End of the Cold War," p. 41.
205. Wohlforth, The Elusive Balance, pp. 233-234, 242-243, 251; and Wohlforth, "Realism and the End of the Cold War," pp. 19-22, 37.
206. Wohlforth, The Elusive Balance, pp. 233-234, 242-243, 251; and Wohlforth, "Realism and the End of the Cold War," pp. 19-22, 37.
207. For a presentation of a clearer realist argument, see Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, "How Identities Change: Material Forces, Identity Transformation, and the End of the Cold War," unpublished manuscript, March 1999.
208. Wohlforth, The Elusive Balance, pp. 52-53, 220-229, 250.
209. Wohlforth, "Realism and the End of the Cold War," pp. 21-22, 32-35.
210. Ibid., pp. 23, 34, 38-39.
211. Ibid., p. 23. It remains unclear whether Wohlforth means to argue that regime type actually shifted East European policies, or shifted Soviet perception of its relative power. Either way, the connection to relative power capabilities - even understood in a more fine-grained sense - remains unclear. Wohlforth also stresses the unintended consequences of Soviet policy shifts, particularly in Eastern Europe.
212. On Bismarck, see Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), pp. 120-131. On the realist view of international law and institutions, see Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions." Recall that institutionalists adhere to nearly all the same assumptions as realists - an underlying state of anarchy, states as rational egotistical actors, substantial conflict of interest - but argue that governments faced with collective action problems can contract among themselves to mitigate the major disadvantages of anarchy.
213. Grieco, "Realist International Theory," pp. 184-186. Liberals and institutionalists have relatively little trouble explaining this outcome. See Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998).
214. Grieco, "Realist International Theory," pp. 184-186. Liberals and institutionalists have relatively little trouble explaining this outcome. See Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998).
215. Joseph M. Grieco, "State Interests and Institutional Rule Trajectories: A Neorealist Interpretation of the Maastricht Treaty and European Economic and Monetary Union," in Frankel, Realism, pp. 287-290.
216. Grieco, with admirable honesty, concedes the indeterminacy: "It will be of intense interest to students of international politics," he concludes, "to observe whether institutions [i.e., Grieco's binding hypothesis] or underlying differentials of power [i.e., the conventional realist argument] will have a greater impact on the future course of European monetary affairs." Ibid., p. 304. Yet in a realist theory of European integration in the 1990s, shouldn't the outcome of EMU be a decisive theoretical prediction, not a matter of empirical happenstance?
217. Grieco, "Realist International Theory," pp. 185-186; and Grieco, "State Interests and Institutional Rule Trajectories," p. 286. Grieco rightly observes that the historical record does not confirm that initial and ongoing support for the agreement by the most powerful government, that of Germany (rather than imposing an institutional solution on weaker countries) can be explained as an effort to balance against U.S. monetary power. Grieco invokes at various points the claim that EMU generates absolute gains (as liberals maintain) and that Germany or others may have misperceived the likely economic outcome (as epistemic theory might suggest), or because international institutions enhance the credibility of national commitments (as institutionalists maintain). He also argues that Germany was forced to grant a quid pro quo in exchange for German unification, but this flies in the face of a growing consensus that the German commitment to move to EMU began months, even years, before reunification, and did not weaken when reunification was complete. For a review of the evidence, see Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe, chap. 6.
218. Grieco, "Realist International Theory," pp. 185-186; and Grieco, "State Interests and Institutional Rule Trajectories," p. 286. Grieco rightly observes that the historical record does not confirm that initial and ongoing support for the agreement by the most powerful government, that of Germany (rather than imposing an institutional solution on weaker countries) can be explained as an effort to balance against U.S. monetary power. Grieco invokes at various points the claim that EMU generates absolute gains (as liberals maintain) and that Germany or others may have misperceived the likely economic outcome (as epistemic theory might suggest), or because international institutions enhance the credibility of national commitments (as institutionalists maintain). He also argues that Germany was forced to grant a quid pro quo in exchange for German unification, but this flies in the face of a growing consensus that the German commitment to move to EMU began months, even years, before reunification, and did not weaken when reunification was complete. For a review of the evidence, see Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe, chap. 6.
219. Grieco, "Realist International Theory," pp. 185-186; and Grieco, "State Interests and Institutional Rule Trajectories," p. 286. Grieco rightly observes that the historical record does not confirm that initial and ongoing support for the agreement by the most powerful government, that of Germany (rather than imposing an institutional solution on weaker countries) can be explained as an effort to balance against U.S. monetary power. Grieco invokes at various points the claim that EMU generates absolute gains (as liberals maintain) and that Germany or others may have misperceived the likely economic outcome (as epistemic theory might suggest), or because international institutions enhance the credibility of national commitments (as institutionalists maintain). He also argues that Germany was forced to grant a quid pro quo in exchange for German unification, but this flies in the face of a growing consensus that the German commitment to move to EMU began months, even years, before reunification, and did not weaken when reunification was complete. For a review of the evidence, see Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe, chap. 6.
220. Glaser is ambiguous on the role of motives. In "Realists as Optimists," pp. 394-397, he argues that "contingent realism suggests the importance of motives" and renders standard power variables "less important." In Charles L. Glaser, "The Security Dilemma Revisited," World Politics, Vol. 50, No. 1 (October 1997) p. 191, he argues, "contrary to the standard [realist] argument, countries should not focus solely on capabilities, but also on motives. " Kydd, "Sheep in Sheep's Clothing," p. 17, brings the distinction between democracy and nondemocracy, as well as variation in ideology, to explain such behavior.
221. Glaser is ambiguous on the role of motives. In "Realists as Optimists," pp. 394-397, he argues that "contingent realism suggests the importance of motives" and renders standard power variables "less important." In Charles L. Glaser, "The Security Dilemma Revisited," World Politics, Vol. 50, No. 1 (October 1997) p. 191, he argues, "contrary to the standard [realist] argument, countries should not focus solely on capabilities, but also on motives. " Kydd, "Sheep in Sheep's Clothing," p. 17, brings the distinction between democracy and nondemocracy, as well as variation in ideology, to explain such behavior.
222. Glaser is ambiguous on the role of motives. In "Realists as Optimists," pp. 394-397, he argues that "contingent realism suggests the importance of motives" and renders standard power variables "less important." In Charles L. Glaser, "The Security Dilemma Revisited," World Politics, Vol. 50, No. 1 (October 1997) p. 191, he argues, "contrary to the standard [realist] argument, countries should not focus solely on capabilities, but also on motives. " Kydd, "Sheep in Sheep's Clothing," p. 17, brings the distinction between democracy and nondemocracy, as well as variation in ideology, to explain such behavior.
223. Glaser, "Realists as Optimists," p. 410ff.
224. Ibid., p. 411. Another example is Mearsheimer's detailed refutation of collective security theory, yet Mearsheimer cites very few, if any, clear advocates of collective security (as opposed to concerts or regimes) after the 1950s. Robert Keohane explicitly rejects such an "idealist" account. Keohane, After Hegemony, pp. 59-60 n. 2.
225. Ibid., p. 411. Another example is Mearsheimer's detailed refutation of collective security theory, yet Mearsheimer cites very few, if any, clear advocates of collective security (as opposed to concerts or regimes) after the 1950s. Robert Keohane explicitly rejects such an "idealist" account. Keohane, After Hegemony, pp. 59-60 n. 2.
226. On Williamsonian theory, see Keohane, After Hegemony.
227. See n. 60.
228. For example, Lake and Powell, in Strategic Choice, employ nearly identical categories, but different labels.
229. Coleman, Foundations of Social Theory; and Elster, "Introduction."
230. See, for example, Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace.
231. Lake, "Leadership, Hegemony, and the International Economy."
232. Waltz, Theory of International Politics; Mearsheimer, "False Promise of International Institutions," p. 351; and Charles Lipson, "International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs," in Baldwin, Neorealism and Neoliberalism, pp. 60-84.
233. Waltz, Theory of International Politics; Mearsheimer, "False Promise of International Institutions," p. 351; and Charles Lipson, "International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs," in Baldwin, Neorealism and Neoliberalism, pp. 60-84.
234. Waltz, Theory of International Politics; Mearsheimer, "False Promise of International Institutions," p. 351; and Charles Lipson, "International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs," in Baldwin, Neorealism and Neoliberalism, pp. 60-84.
235. We should expect war and realist security dynamics, for example, only involving at least one state sufficiently "aggressive" to raise "vital" interests for all involved. Here we find support from Schweller, "New Realist Research on Alliances," pp. 928-929. For a classic statement of this position, see also Stanley Hoffmann, Duties beyond Borders: On the Limits and Possibilities of an Ethical International Politics (Syracuse, N.Y: Syracuse University Press, 1981), pp. 14-16.
236. We should expect war and realist security dynamics, for example, only involving at least one state sufficiently "aggressive" to raise "vital" interests for all involved. Here we find support from Schweller, "New Realist Research on Alliances," pp. 928-929. For a classic statement of this position, see also Stanley Hoffmann, Duties beyond Borders: On the Limits and Possibilities of an Ethical International Politics (Syracuse, N.Y: Syracuse University Press, 1981), pp. 14-16.
237. We have noted these examples above. Such scholars voice criticisms of what they take to be liberal views, but they tend to take the form of either skepticism that democracies are stable or concerns about the transition to democracy, neither of which supports realist claims against liberal ones.
238. Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously," pp. 523-524. See also Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine, pp. 60-61; Morrow, "Social Choice and System Structure," pp. 83-84; and Andrew Mack, "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetrical Conflict," World Politics, Vol. 27, No. 2 (January 1975), pp. 175-200.
239. Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously," pp. 523-524. See also Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine, pp. 60-61; Morrow, "Social Choice and System Structure," pp. 83-84; and Andrew Mack, "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetrical Conflict," World Politics, Vol. 27, No. 2 (January 1975), pp. 175-200.
240. Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously," pp. 523-524. See also Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine, pp. 60-61; Morrow, "Social Choice and System Structure," pp. 83-84; and Andrew Mack, "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetrical Conflict," World Politics, Vol. 27, No. 2 (January 1975), pp. 175-200.
241. Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously," pp. 523-524. See also Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine, pp. 60-61; Morrow, "Social Choice and System Structure," pp. 83-84; and Andrew Mack, "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetrical Conflict," World Politics, Vol. 27, No. 2 (January 1975), pp. 175-200.
242. John Ruggie, personal communication. For a view that one theory must dominate, see Ethan B. Kapstein, "Is Realism Dead? The Domestic Sources of International Politics," International Organization, Vol. 49, No. 4 (Autumn 1995), pp. 751-774.
243. Legro, "International Cooperation Two-step"; and Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously."
244. Legro, "International Cooperation Two-step"; and Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously."
245. Krasner, "Global Communications and National Power."
246. Robert O. Keohane, "Theory of International Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond," in Keohane, ed., Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), p. 192. See also Stephen Brooks, "Dueling Realisms," International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 3 (Summer 1997), pp. 471-472.
247. Robert O. Keohane, "Theory of International Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond," in Keohane, ed., Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), p. 192. See also Stephen Brooks, "Dueling Realisms," International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 3 (Summer 1997), pp. 471-472.
248. Michael C. Desch, "Culture Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Summer 1998), p. 170.
249. The "two-step" model to explain static bargaining outcomes follows, in our view, directly from the rationality assumption shared by realism and most of its basic competitors. As classic studies of power by Robert Dahl and others taught us a generation ago, it is impossible to model strategic interaction without first determining preferences or beliefs (or both) independently of the strategic circumstances. Only where the pattern of preferences is consistent with the realist assumptions above - preferences are intense, symmetrical, and zero-sum - is it proper even to consider realist theory. In any other case - say a situation where preferences are compatible or where the collective action problem is informational - realism is not simply incorrect; it is completely inappropriate. Thus in classical bargaining theory, the locations of ideal points and outside options (preferences) are almost always relevant, whereas linkage to threats and inducements are only relevant under specific conditions. This mechanism for theory synthesis is the most powerful basic tool that rationalist social science theory has developed for this sort theory synthesis.
250. Otto Hintze, The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975); Charles Tilly, ed., The Formation of National States in Western Europe (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975); Grieco, "Realist International Theory"; and Layne "Kant or Cant," pp. 326- 327.
251. Otto Hintze, The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975); Charles Tilly, ed., The Formation of National States in Western Europe (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975); Grieco, "Realist International Theory"; and Layne "Kant or Cant," pp. 326- 327.
252. Otto Hintze, The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975); Charles Tilly, ed., The Formation of National States in Western Europe (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975); Grieco, "Realist International Theory"; and Layne "Kant or Cant," pp. 326- 327.
253. Otto Hintze, The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975); Charles Tilly, ed., The Formation of National States in Western Europe (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975); Grieco, "Realist International Theory"; and Layne "Kant or Cant," pp. 326-327.
254. Barry R. Posen, "Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Military Power," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Fall 1993), pp. 80-124; and Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future."
255. Barry R. Posen, "Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Military Power," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Fall 1993), pp. 80-124; and Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future."
256. Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy Is What You Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Spring 1992), pp. 391-425.
257. On "conceptual stretching," see Sartori, "Concept Misinformation in Comparative Politics," p. 970.
258. Vasquez, "The Realist Paradigm," pp. 909-911.
259. Some constructivists seem also to encourage the use of this dichotomy. We have not, however, considered a constructivist "theory" here because we take seriously those who warn that "constructivism" - like "materialism," "rationalism," and other such broad categories of social theory-does not define a discrete international relations paradigm or theory. It should not, therefore, be employed as a counterpart to realism, liberalism, institutionalism, or epistemic theory. Constructivist arguments might be found in any of these categories. A realist versus idealist/constructionist dichotomy would thus be unhelpful. See Wendt, "Social Theory and International Politics"; and Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 2 (Spring 1998), pp. 890, 909-912.
260. Some constructivists seem also to encourage the use of this dichotomy. We have not, however, considered a constructivist "theory" here because we take seriously those who warn that "constructivism" - like "materialism," "rationalism," and other such broad categories of social theory- does not define a discrete international relations paradigm or theory. It should not, therefore, be employed as a counterpart to realism, liberalism, institutionalism, or epistemic theory. Constructivist arguments might be found in any of these categories. A realist versus idealist/constructionist dichotomy would thus be unhelpful. See Wendt, "Social Theory and International Politics"; and Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 2 (Spring 1998), pp. 890, 909-912.