Interdependence, Institutions, and the Balance of Power Britain, Germany, and World War I

International Security

Volumn 20, Issue 4, 1996, Pages 42-76

  Papayoanou, Paul A ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

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EID: 21344468113     PISSN: 01622889     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/isec.20.4.42     Document Type: Article

References (187)

1. For the liberal view, see for example, Richard Rosecrance, Tlie Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World (New York: Basic Books, 1986);
2. but see also Robert Jervis, "The Future of World Politics: Will It Resemble the Past?" International Security, Vol. 16, No. 3 (Winter 1991/92), pp. 39-73;
3. and Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe After the Cold War," International Security, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Winter 1990/91), pp. 7-57. For the realist view,
4. see esp. John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War," International Security, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Summer 1990), pp. 5-56;
5. and Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979), chapter 7.
6. A longer and slightly different version of this theory, with applications to the other historical cases and periods since the late nineteenth century discussed briefly in this article, can be found in Paul A. Papayoanou, "Economic Interdependence and the Balance of Power/' and Economic Interdependence and the Balance of Power, unpublished manuscripts. Other recent interpretations of the relationship between international economic and security factors include Joanne Gowa, Allies, Adversaries, and Intenwtional Trade (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994);
7. Edward D. Mansfield, Power, Trade, and War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994);
8. and Barry Buzan, "Economic Structure and International Security: The Limits of the Liberal Case," International Organiwtion, Vol. 38, No. 4 (Autumn 1984), pp. 597-624.
9. There are many variants of realist balance-of-power theory, but all essentially argue that states tend to oppose threatening powers in the international system and that this balancing behavior is conducive to international stability as aspiring revisionist states will be prevented or deterred from achieving or pursuing their expansionist goals, or because states will be socialized to the system's balancing dynamic. See Waltz, Tlieory of International Politics; Edward Vose Gulick, Europe's Classical Balance of Power (New York: Norton, 1955);
10. Morion A. Kaplan, System and Process in International Politics (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1957);
11. Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 3rd ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1960).
12. For an argument about how realist conceptions cannot explain why threats emerge and why countries develop revisionist aspirations, see also Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991), pp. 11, 22.
13. On the need for making such a distinction, see also Randall L. Schweller, "Bandvvagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 72-107.
14. On threat perception, see Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987).
15. Note that I am concerned only with the perceptions of strategists (or national security leaders). My intention is to avoid a definition of threat perceptions that would make the theory potentially tautologous and non-falsifiable. Note also that threats need not be projected toward individual status quo powers to be significant, for great powers will also be deeply concerned about threats in the geographically proximate system since an upset to the balance can quickly endanger their security. See Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, p. 169.
16. I am using here a logic found in Robert Jervis, The Logic of Images in International Relations (New York: Columbia University Press Momingside Edition, 1989) and in signaling game theory. For a review of that literature,
17. see Jeffrey S. Banks, Signaling Games in Political Scietice (Chur, Switzerland: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1991).
18. The distinction I am making between firm and weak responses differs from the popular balancing-bandwagoning analogy in the literature (see Walt, Jlie Origins of Alliances). Bandwagoning-alignment or alliance with the source of danger-is not a choice in this model, for if status quo powers were to take sides with threatening powers, they would by definition no longer be status quo powers. My continuum is similar to that of Evan Luard, "Conciliation and Deterrence: A Comparison of Political Strategies in the Interwar and Postwar Periods," World Politics, Vol. 19, No. 2 (January 1967), pp. 167-189;
19. Luard sees policies as ranging from conciliation to deterrence, but typically including some mix even where one policy dominates. See also Dan Reiter, "Learning, Realism, and Alliances: The Weight of the Shadow of the Past," World Politics, Vol. 46, No. 4 (July 1994), pp. 490-526;
20. Reiter notes that between balancing and bandwagoning is a choice of neutrality that often gets overlooked in the realist framework.
21. Status quo powers will be seen as responding firmly to the extent they undertake a vigorous internal mobilization of resources, a strong commitment to a defense pact, and/or forceful public declarations to counterbalance threats. Weaker responses include entente commitments, secret treaties, limited arms buildups (as opposed to an augmentation of capabilities to match the threats faced), nonalignment (i.e., refusing to ally with others or to pursue confrontational policies), and the pursuit of conciliatory policies such as appeasement, detente, or the signing of neutrality or nonaggression pacts.
22. Edward L. Morse, "The Transformation of Foreign Policies: Modernization, Interdependence and Extemalization," World Politics, Vol. 22, No. 3 (April 1970), pp. 371-392;
23. and Morse, Modernization and the Transformation of International Relations (New York: Free Press, 1976);
24. Michael Barnett, "High Politics Is Low Politics: The Domestic and Systemic Sources of Israeli Security Policy, 1967-1977," World Politics, Vol. 42, No. 4 (July 1990), pp. 529-562;
25. Alan C. Lamborn, "Power and the Politics of Extraction," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 2 (June 1983), pp. 125-146. 11.
26. Albert O. Hirschman, National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade (Berkeley: University of California Press, repr. ed. 1980);
27. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition, 2d ed. (Glenview, Illinois, Boston and London: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1989).
28. This argument is consistent with the premises of theoretical work on democracies and war, such as Michael W. Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," American Political Science Review, Vol. 80, No. 4 (December 1986), pp. 1151-1169;
29. and David A. Lake, "Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War/' American Political Science Review, Vol. 86, No. 1 (March 1992), pp. 24-37.
30. Tsarist Russia in the late nineteenth century and perhaps present-day China are examples of non-democratic states in which internationalist economic interests wield a great deal of power.
31. See Michael Gordon, "Domestic Conflict and the Origins of the First World War/' Journal of Modern History, Vol. 46 (June 1974), pp. 191-226;
32. Jack Snyder, "Averting Anarchy in the New Europe," International Security, Vol. 14, No. 4 (Spring 1990), pp. 5-41; and Snyder, Myths of Empire.
33. Alternative explanations for why a dependent state might be aggressive focus on states' vulnerability to the severance of economic ties. See Nazli Choucri and Robert C. North, Nations in Conflict (San Francisco: Freeman, 1975);
34. Robert C. North, "Toward a Framework for the Analysis of Scarcity and Conflict," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 21, No. 4 (December 1977), pp. 569591;
35. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, chapter 7;
36. and Jack Hirshleifer, "The Technology of Conflict as an Economic Activity," AEA Papers and Proceedings Vol. 81, No. 2 (May 1991), pp. ISO134. I find none of these arguments persuasive in looking at great power relationships, for they do not demonstrate that economic interest groups or state leaders would risk war against other great powers.
37. See also Dale C. Copeland, "Economic Interdependence and War: A Theory of Trade Expectations," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Spring 1996), pp. 5-41.
38. It is in turn also likely that aspiring revisionist powers will try to avoid projecting aggressive designs that threaten economic ties with those status quo powers that they hope will keep out of balance-of-power politics.
39. Note that while interdependence is an important constraint, its implications are not the only considerations leaders are faced with, and though status quo power leaders may be constrained, what decisions they are willing to risk domestically will also be a source of uncertainty.
40. While there were some concerns in Germany about a growing Russia, Russia was seen to still be several years away from being a concern. Indeed, Marc Trachtenberg, "The Meaning of Mobilization in 1914," International Security, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Winter 1990/91), pp. 120-150,
41. shows that German leaders did not feel a need to make a preemptive first strike and restrained themselves from making the first move, preferring to blame the start of a war on Russia. Note also that in 1913 the Franco-Russian alliance could not match Austro-German capabilities, but with British capabilities added to those of the French and Russians, the Triple Entente clearly counterbalanced the Dual Alliance. See Zara Steiner, Britain and the Origins of the First World War (London: Macmillan, 1977), chapters 2-3;
42. Steiner, The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, 1898-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), chapters 3-4;
43. and Paul M. Kennedy, "The First World War and the International Power System," International Security, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Summer 1984), pp. 19, 21 (Tables 8 and 9).
44. Eyre Crowe of the Foreign Office wrote in 1911, "The balance of power... consists of a balance of force, actual or latent.. . . Great Britain would definitely upset the balance the day she signed away the right to use force against any particular State in the position held by Germany at present." In the minutes to British Foreign Office (FO) Political Correspondence, FO 371/1123 No. 18222, May 14,1911, U.K. Public Record Office (PRO).
45. See also Steiner, The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, pp. 87-88,94,101;
46. David French, British Strategy and War Aims, 1914-1916 (London: Alien & Unwin, 1986), pp. 2-3;
47. Keith M. Wilson, The Policy of the Entente: Essays on the Determinants of British Foreign Policy, 1904-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 48-53.
48. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 212;
49. Richard Rosecrance, Alan Alexandroff, Wallace Koehler, John Kroll, Shlomit Lacqueur, and John Stocker, "Whither Interdependence?" International Organization, Vol. 31, No. 3 (Summer 1977), pp. 425-471;
50. Peter J. Katzenstein, "International Interdependence: Some Long-term Trends and Recent Changes," International Organization, Vol. 29, No. 4 (Autumn 1975), p. 1024.
51. Paul Kennedy, The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860-1914 (London and Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: The Ashfield Press, 1980), pp. 294-295;
52. and Kennedy, Strategy and Diplomacy, 1870-1945: Eight Studies (London: Fontana Paperbacks, 1983), pp. 93-95.
53. For the statistics, see B.R. Mitchell, European Historical Statistics, 1750-1970 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975), pp. 526, 573, and in the abridged edition (1978), pp. 304, 307, 411, 416.
54. Note that, in explaining why Britain pursued the policy it did, my argument supplements the view that stresses the failure of Britain to attempt deterrence of Germany as an important factor explaining the war. See Jack S. Levy, "Preferences, Constraints, and Choices in July 1914," International Security, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Winter 1990/91), pp. 151-186;
55. Scott D. Sagan, "1914 Revisited: Allies, Offense, and Instability," International Security, Vol. 11, No. 2 (Fall 1986), pp. 151-175;
56. and Sean M. Lynn-Jones, "Détente and Deterrence: Anglo-German Relations, 1911-1914," International Security, Vol. 11, No. 2 (Fall 1986), pp. 121-150.
57. Their work and this article challenge the conventional argument that the war was a consequence of a spiral dynamic rooted in factors such as perceptions of offense-dominance, rampant unchecked militarists, tight alliances, and misperceptions. Work in that vein includes Luigi Albertini, The Origins of the War of 1914, 3 vols. (London: 1952-57);
58. L.C.F. Turner, Origins of the First World War (New York: Norton, 1970);
59. Barbara Tuchman, The Guns of August (New York: 1962);
60. Jack L. Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984);
61. and Stephen Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War," International Security, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Summer 1984), pp. 58-107.
62. See, for example, Wilson, The Policy of the Entente.
63. George L. Bernstein, Liberalism and Liberal Politics in Edwardian England (Boston: Alien & Unwin, 1986), p. 168, makes a similar point in discussing divisions within the British Cabinet;
64. K.G. Robbins, "The Foreign Secretary, the Cabinet, Parliament and the Parties," in F.H. Hinsley, ed., British Foreign Policy Under Sir Edward Grey (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp. 3-21,
65. also sees the splits in the Cabinet as not so straightforward. On the importance of bureaucratic affiliation and policy positions, see Graham Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971). Although I draw on the bureaucratic politics approach here, such a model cannot explain the behavior, for it is not clear what many bureaucratic agency heads' interests would be on British foreign policy; moreover, as Stephen Krasner, "Are Bureaucracies Important? (Or Allison Wonderland)," Foreign Policy, No. 7 (Summer 1972), pp. 159-179, writes, it matters who has the ear of the president (in this case, the prime minister) in determining the balance of power among bureaucratic interests.
66. And they were built. David D'Lugo and Ronald Rogowski, "The Anglo-German Naval Race and Comparative Constitutional 'Fitness'," in Rosecrance and Stein, eds., The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 89-90;
67. Raymond James Sontag, European Diplomatic History, 1871-1932 (New York: Century, 1933), pp. 108, 113, 120,127,129-132;
68. Robbins, "The Foreign Secretary, the Cabinet, Parliament and the Parties," pp. 9-13;
69. Kennedy, TJie Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, pp. 458-459;
70. Steiner, The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, p. 89;
71. Michael Lawrence Dockrill, "David Lloyd George and Foreign Policy Before 1914," in A.J.P. Taylor, ed., Lloyd George: Twelve Essays (New York: Atheneum, 1971), pp. 5-9.
72. Michael Ekstein, "Sir Edward Grey and Imperial Germany in 1914," The Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 6, No. 3 (1971), pp. 121-128;
73. Sontag, European Diplomatic History, pp. 129,132,184-185;
74. Steiner, Britain and the Origins of the First World War, chapter 3; Wilson, Tlie Policy of the Entente, pp. 35-41;
75. Bernstein, Liberalism and Liberal Politics in Edwardian England, pp. 182-185;
76. Robbins, "The Foreign Secretary, the Cabinet, Parliament and the Parties," pp. 16, 18.
77. Quoted in K.A. Hamilton, "Great Britain and France, 1911-1914," in Hinsley, ed., British Foreign Policy Under Sir Edward Grey, p. 324. " '
78. Wilson, The Policy of the Entente, pp. 35-41;
79. Steiner, The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, pp. 123-125;
80. Bernstein, Liberalism and Liberal Politics in Edwardian England, pp. 182-186;
81. David French, British Economic and Strategic Planning, 1905-1915 (London: George Alien & Unwin, 1982), p. 32.
82. Wilson, Tile Policy of the Entente, p. 27;
83. Bernstein, Liberalism and Liberal Politics in Edwardian England, pp. 187-188;
84. Dockrill, "David Lloyd George and Foreign Policy Before 1914," pp. 14-15, 16-20.
85. Wilson, The Policy of the Entente, pp. 27-29, 135-136;
86. Robbins, "The Foreign Secretary, the Cabinet, Parliament and the Parties," pp. 15-16,20;
87. French, British Economic and Strategic Planning, pp. 32-35;
88. Hamilton, "Great Britain and France, 1911-1914," p. 325;
89. Steiner, The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, pp. 125-126;
90. Steiner, Britain and the Origins of the First World War, chapter 3.
91. French, British Strategy and War Aims, p. 5. Given McKenna's concerns to guard the Admiralty and his lack of support for the army, one might ask why Haldane supported dreadnought construction. The reason is that Britain's navy was seen as a key to its very survival. Expansion of the army was important to preserving peace on the Continent, less so to Britain's survival.
92. Steiner, The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, p. 89.
93. Ibid., pp. 125-6.
94. To be sure, Lloyd George's concerns were partly budgetary, as most accounts emphasize. However, making the entente into an alliance would have, by increasing military coordination, reduced balancing costs for Britain. Hence, budgetary concerns could not explain Lloyd George's opposition to the alliance. (
95. Dockrill, "David Lloyd George and Foreign Policy Before 1914," pp. 15-31.
96. Kennedy, Strategy and Diplomacy, pp. 93-95; CAB 16/18A (Cabinet Records, Britain), PRO.
97. See Ross J.S. Hoffman, Great Britain and the German Trade Rivalry, 1875-1914 (New York: Russell & Russell, 1964), pp. 62, 278-279;
98. K.G. Robbins, "Public Opinion, the Press and Pressure Groups," in Hinsley, ed., British Foreign Policy Under Sir Edward Grey, pp. 87-88; and documents in the Foreign Office Commercial Series FO 368, PRO.
99. French, British Economic and Strategic Planning, pp. 18, 76-77, 85.
100. Wilson, The Policy of the Entente, pp. 26-29;
101. Robbins, "The Foreign Secretary, the Cabinet, Parliament and the Parties," p. 18;
102. Sontag, European Diplomatic History, pp. 140-142;
103. Fischer, War of Illusions, p. 124.
104. R.T.B. Langhorne, "Great Britain and Germany, 1911-1914," in Hinsley, ed., British Foreign Policy Under Sir Edward Grey, pp. 288-289;
105. Steiner, The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, p. 127;
106. Wilson, Tlie Policy of the Entente, pp. 26, 29;
107. Friedrich Wilhelm Wiemann, "Lloyd George and the Struggle for the Navy Estimates of 1914," in Taylor, ed., Lloyd George, p. 73.
108. British Foreign Office Political Correspondence, FO 371/1371 No. 17863, PRO. See also Wiemann, "Lloyd George and the Struggle for the Navy Estimates of 1914," p. 73. Referring to the "financial element" as Jewish, as Reventlow did, reflected a conflation of the two groups that was then a common attitude in Britain as well as Germany. It is clear from the context of the Reventlow article and the responses cited that the concerns were with the "financial element," not its supposed domination by Jews.
109. Robbins, "The Foreign Secretary, the Cabinet, Parliament and the Parties," p. 18;
110. Fischer, War of Illusions, pp. 124-130;
111. Sontag, European Diplomatic History, pp. 169-170.
112. Lynn-Jones, "Détente and Deterrence," pp. 125-127;
113. A.J.P. Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848-1918 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1954), pp. 502-504;
114. Langhome, "Great Britain and Germany, 1911-1914," pp. 308-11;
115. Wilson, Vie Policy of the Entente, pp. 28-29.
116. Dockrill, "David Lloyd George and Foreign Policy Before 1914," pp. 24-25;
117. Wiemann, "Lloyd George and the Struggle for the Navy Estimates of 1914," pp. 75-76;
118. Robbins, "The Foreign Secretary, the Cabinet, Parliament and the Parties," pp. 20-21.
119. Dockrill, "David Lloyd George and Foreign Policy Before 1914," p. 25;
120. Wiemann, "Lloyd George and the Struggle for the Navy Estimates of 1914," pp. 80-86;
121. Robbins, "The Foreign Secretary, the Cabinet, Parliament and the Parties," p. 21.
122. Quoted in Sontag, European Diplomatic History, p. 200. On this history,
123. see Steiner, Britain and the Origins of the First World War, pp. 225-235.
124. Michael G. Ekstein and Zara Steiner, "The Sarajevo Crisis," in Hinsley, ed., British Foreign Policy Under Sir Edward Grey, pp. 404-406;
125. Bernstein, Liberalism and Liberal Politics in Edu'ardian England, p. 193;
126. Sagan, "1914 Revisited," pp. 169-170; Levy, "Preferences, Constraints, and Choices," p. 169;
127. French, British Economic and Strategic Planning, p. 87.
128. Ekstein and Steiner, "Sarajevo Crisis," pp. 407-409;
129. Steiner, Britain and the Origins of the First World War, p. 230;
130. Sontag, European Diplomatic History, pp. 200-201. Two members resigned over the change in British policy, including notably Board of Trade head Burns.
131. This contributes to the important debate on German motivations sparked by Fritz Fischer, War of Illusions: German Policies from 1911-1914 (New York: Norton, 1975);
132. and Fischer, Germany's Aims in the First World War (New York: Norton, 1961/1967). Fischer argued that Germany was primarily responsible for the First World War and that the sources of its policies could be found in its domestic political, economic, and social structures. I argue that Fischer and others, such as Gordon, "Domestic Conflict and the Origins of the First World War," and Snyder, Myths of Empire, are largely correct in pointing to political economic factors as sources of German policies, but they do not identify sufficient conditions for German behavior, which was also influenced by international-level strategic interaction calculations, particularly vis-à-vis Britain. On the Fischer controversy,
133. see David E. Kaiser, "Germany and the Origins of the First World War," Journal of Modern History, Vol. 55, No. 3 (September 1983), pp. 442-474;
134. and John A. Moses, Tlie Politics of Illusion: The Fischer Controversy in German Historiography (London: George Prior, 1975).
135. V.R. Berghahn, Germany and the Approach of War in 1914 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1973), pp. 9-11.
136. Ibid., pp. 10-11;
137. Alexander Gerschenkron, Bread and Democracy in Germany (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1943/1989), p. 25.
138. Ronald Rogowski, "Iron, Rye, and the Authoritarian Coalition in Germany After 1879," paper prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Denver, Colorado, September 1-5,1982, p. 9.
139. Snyder, Myths of Empire, p. 18, makes a coalitional argument similar to mine in contending that logrolling is a function of the "distribution of power and interests in the society and on the character of its political institutions/' an argument he, too, applies to Wilhelmine Germany. However, there is a crucially important difference between us. I have pointed to these pseudodemocratic features as crucial, whereas he characterizes the political institutions as cartelized. For Snyder, cartelization is what is important because it gives prominence to concentrated interests which tend to logroll to pursue expansion and militarism. I disagree with this argument because concentrated interests do not necessarily have expansionist aims (and many in Wilhelmine Germany did not), so a cartelized system will not necessarily give rise to such a foreign policy. What is important is what types of concentrated interests have prominence under a particular set of political institutions, not whether there is cartelization.
140. The Junkers needed high agricultural tariffs, for they were at a comparative disadvantage in the world economy. For heavy industry, protection helped them because it would force makers of manufactured goods to buy at home. Other sectors in agriculture and industry were less protectionist or more in favor of free trade.
141. Peter Gourevitch, "International Trade, Domestic Coalitions, and Liberty: Comparative Responses to the Crisis of 1873-1896," Journal of Interdisciplinary History, Vol. 8, No. 2 (Autumn 1977), pp. 285-290;
142. Gerschenkron, Bread and Democracy, pp. 42-47;
143. Rogowski, "Iron, Rye, and the Authoritarian Coalition," pp. 2-23;
144. Alan C. Lambom, The Price of Power: Risk and Foreign Policy in Britain, France, and,Germany (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1991), p. 119.
145. Gourevitch, "International Trade," p. 292;
146. Gerschenkron, Bread and Democracy, pp. 49-57.
147. David Calleo, The German Problem Reconsidered: Germany and the World Order, 1870 to the Present (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), pp. 20,82-83;
148. Gerschenkron, Bread and Democracy, pp. 52-63;
149. Eckart Kehr, Economic Interest, Militarism, and Foreign Policy: Essays on German History, ed. and Intro. by Gordon A. Craig, Irans, by Crete Heinz (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), p. 40;
150. Immanuel Geiss, German Foreign Policy, 1871-1914 (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976), p. 79;
151. D'Lugo and Rogowski, "The Anglo-German Naval Race and Comparative Constitutional 'Fitness'," pp.-79-81.
152. Calico, Tlie Gertnan Problem Reconsidered, p. 20, chapters 3-4;
153. Gerschenkron, Bread and Democracy, pp. 58-61;
154. Kehr, Economic Interest, Militarism, and Foreign Policy, chapter 2, p. 55; Geiss, German Foreign Policy, chapters 8-9;
155. Kennedy, The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, chapter 13; Fischer, War of Illusions, pp. 11-12, 22-25, 33-35, 48-50, 137-138, 234, 237, 363;
156. A.J.P. Taylor, The Course of German History: A Survey of the Development of Germany Since 1815 (New York: G.P. Putnam, 1946/1979), chapters 8-9.
157. Fischer, War of Illusions, pp. 22-25;
158. Kennedy, The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, pp. 298-302.
159. Fischer, War of Illusions, pp. 121,134, 140,199, 203, 231-236, 260.
160. Ibid., pp. 135, 140, 235, 265. I am grateful to Robert Fahre and Ronald Rogowski for their discussions and insights on heavy industry's preferences.
161. Lamborn, The Price ofPoiver, pp. 119-120.
162. Fischer, War of Illusions, pp. 50, 55-56;
163. Sontag, European Diplomatic History, pp. 142-143; Sagan, "1914 Revisited," pp. 170-171.
164. Fischer, War of Illusions, pp. 137-138, 140, 174-175, 397;
165. Sontag, European Diplomatic History, p. 193;
166. Hoffman, Great Britain and the German Trade Rivalry, pp. 273-276.
167. Fischer, War of Illusions, pp. 174-175.
168. Fischer, War of Illusions, p. 475;
169. Hoffman, Great Britain and the Gentian Trade Rivalry, pp. 275-276.
170. Fischer, War of Illusions, pp. 124,
171. 142; Sontag, European Diplomatic History, pp. 142-143.
172. See, in particular, the exchange between Jack Levy and Marc Trachtenberg in "Correspondence: Mobilization and Inadvertence in the July Crisis," International Security, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Summer 1991), pp. 189-203.
173. Levy, "Preferences, Constraints, and Choices," p. 163.
174. See, for example, Levy's argument in "Correspondence," pp. 189-190.
175. Trachtenberg, "The Meaning of Mobilization," p. 136, and in "Correspondence," p. 198.
176. See similar points made by Trachtenberg in "Correspondence," pp. 199-200; and Sagan, "1914 Revisited," pp. 167-169.
177. To be sure, there were different views within the German government regarding the possibility of British neutrality, but all believed Britain was dovish to a point. The kaiser and Foreign Minister Gottlieb Jagow were convinced that Britain would stand aside, while Bethmann was less certain. Levy, "Preferences, Constraints, and Choices," p. 164, says Bethmann was "generally confident" of British neutrality, while Trachtenberg, "The Meaning of Mobilization," p. 135, contends there is little evidence to support this and writes in "Correspondence," p. 199, that Bethmann was "not sure that Britain would stay out." There is little difference between Levy's and Trachtenberg's positions, for both see Bethmann as somewhat uncertain about whether Britain would stand aside temporarily and believe that this influenced his decision. Their positions are consistent with mine.
178. Levy, "Preferences, Constraints, and Choices," pp. 163-183;
179. Sagan, "1914 Revisited," pp. 170171;
180. Trachtenberg, "The Meaning of Mobilization," p. 137.
181. Kennedy, "The First World War and the International Power System," p. 21, points out, "the Allies were failing to win the war even after two or three years of fighting-and by 1917 were indeed in some danger of losing it."
182. Also stressing the importance of how interdependence is translated is Jervis, "The Future of World Politics," p. 49, but he focuses more on perceptions and potential perceptual biases rather than the impact of domestic political processes. On the importance of studying both political institutions and political economic interests,
183. see James Alt and Michael Gilligan, "The Political Economy of Trading States: Factor Specificity, Collective Action Problems and Domestic Political Institutions," The Journal of Political Philosophy, Vol. 2, No. 2 (June 1994), pp. 165-192.
184. Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Democratization and War," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 3 (May/June 1995), pp. 79-97.
185. Peter Reddaway, "Yeltsin's American Apologists," Washington Post, February 22,1995, p. A19;
186. Alexei K. Pushkov, "Letter from Eurasia: Russia and America-The Honeymoon's Over," Foreign Polio/, Vol. 93 (Winter 1993), pp. 76-90;
187. Fred Hiatt, "Political Elites Vie for Power In Russian Quasi-Democracy," Washington Post, March 26,1995, pp. Al and A28.