The promise of constructivism in international relations theory

International Security

Volumn 23, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 171-200

  Hopf, Ted ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0032375771     PISSN: 01622889     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/isec.23.1.171     Document Type: Article

References (136)

1. The canonical neorealist work remains Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley 1979). The debate between neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism is presented and summarized in David A. Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). Constructivist challenges can be found in Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1989); Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); and Yosef Lapid and Friedrich V. Kratochwil, eds., The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1996).
2. The canonical neorealist work remains Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley 1979). The debate between neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism is presented and summarized in David A. Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). Constructivist challenges can be found in Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1989); Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); and Yosef Lapid and Friedrich V. Kratochwil, eds., The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1996).
3. The canonical neorealist work remains Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley 1979). The debate between neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism is presented and summarized in David A. Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). Constructivist challenges can be found in Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1989); Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); and Yosef Lapid and Friedrich V. Kratochwil, eds., The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1996).
4. The canonical neorealist work remains Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley 1979). The debate between neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism is presented and summarized in David A. Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). Constructivist challenges can be found in Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1989); Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); and Yosef Lapid and Friedrich V. Kratochwil, eds., The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1996).
5. The canonical neorealist work remains Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley 1979). The debate between neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism is presented and summarized in David A. Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). Constructivist challenges can be found in Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1989); Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); and Yosef Lapid and Friedrich V. Kratochwil, eds., The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1996).
6. Most important for this article, this is the neorealist conceptualization of international structure. All references to neorealism, unless otherwise noted, are from Waltz, Theory of International Politics.
7. Friedrich Kratochwil suggests that this difference in the understanding of structure is because structuralism entered international relations theory not through sociolinguistics, but through microeconomics. Friedrich V. Kratochwil, "Is the Ship of Culture at Sea or Returning?" in Lapid and Kratochwil, The Return of Culture and Identity, p. 211.
8. The critical distinction between action and behavior is made by Charles Taylor, "Interpretation and the Sciences of Man," in Paul Rabinow and William M. Sullivan, eds., Interpretive Social Science: A Second Look (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), pp. 33-81.
9. Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter J. Katzenstein, "Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security," in Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security, p. 54.
10. David Dessler, "What's At Stake in the Agent-Structure Debate?" International Organization, Vol. 43, No. 3 (Summer 1989), pp. 459-460.
11. Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962).
12. Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Spring 1992), 391-425.
13. Elizabeth Kier, for example, shows how the same "objective" external structural arrangement of power cannot account for French military strategy between the two world wars. Elizabeth Kier, "Culture and French Military Doctrine before World War II," in Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security, pp. 186-215.
14. The focus on identity does not reflect a lack of appreciation for other elements in the constructivist approach, such as norms, culture, and institutions. Insofar as identities are the most proxmate causes of choices, preferences, and action, I concentrate on them, but with the full recognition that identities cannot be understood without a simultaneous account of normative, cultural, and institutional context.
15. Henri Tajfel, Human Groups and Social Categories: Studies in Social Psychology (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 255. Although there are many accounts of the origin of identity, I offer a cognitive explanation because it has minimal a priori expectations, assuming only that identities are needed to reduce complexity to some manageable level.
16. Dana Eyre and Mark Suchman, for example, find that, controlling far rational strategic need, domestic coalition politics, and superpower manipulation, countries in the third world prefer certain weapons systems over others because of their understanding of what it means to be "modern" in the twentieth century. Dana P. Eyre and Mark C. Suchman, "Status, Norms, and the Proliferation of Conventional Weapons: An Institutional Theory Approach," in Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security, pp. 73-113. Other examples of empirical research that have linked particular identities to particular sets of preferences are "civilized" identities driving attitudes toward weapons of mass destruction; notions of what constitutes "humanitarian" shaping decisions to intervene in other states; the identity of a "normal" state implying particular Soviet foreign policies; and "antimilitarist" identities in Japan and German shaping their post-World War II foreign policies. These arguments can be found in Richard Price and Nina Tannenwald, "Norms and Deterrence: The Nuclear and Chemical Weapons Taboos," pp. 114-152; Martha Finnemore, "Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention," pp. 153-185; Robert Herman, "Identitity, Norms, and National Security: The Soviet Foreign Policy Revolution and the End of the Cold War," pp. 271-316; and Thomas U. Berger, "Norms, Identity, and National Security in Germany and Japan," pp. 317-356. All of the above are in Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security. On identity and mutual intelligibility, see Roxanne Lynn Doty, "The Bounds of 'Race' in International Relations." Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 22. No. 3 (Winter 1993). p. 454.
17. Dana Eyre and Mark Suchman, for example, find that, controlling far rational strategic need, domestic coalition politics, and superpower manipulation, countries in the third world prefer certain weapons systems over others because of their understanding of what it means to be "modern" in the twentieth century. Dana P. Eyre and Mark C. Suchman, "Status, Norms, and the Proliferation of Conventional Weapons: An Institutional Theory Approach," in Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security, pp. 73-113. Other examples of empirical research that have linked particular identities to particular sets of preferences are "civilized" identities driving attitudes toward weapons of mass destruction; notions of what constitutes "humanitarian" shaping decisions to intervene in other states; the identity of a "normal" state implying particular Soviet foreign policies; and "antimilitarist" identities in Japan and German shaping their post-World War II foreign policies. These arguments can be found in Richard Price and Nina Tannenwald, "Norms and Deterrence: The Nuclear and Chemical Weapons Taboos," pp. 114-152; Martha Finnemore, "Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention," pp. 153-185; Robert Herman, "Identitity, Norms, and National Security: The Soviet Foreign Policy Revolution and the End of the Cold War," pp. 271-316; and Thomas U. Berger, "Norms, Identity, and National Security in Germany and Japan," pp. 317-356. All of the above are in Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security. On identity and mutual intelligibility, see Roxanne Lynn Doty, "The Bounds of 'Race' in International Relations." Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 22. No. 3 (Winter 1993). p. 454.
18. Dana Eyre and Mark Suchman, for example, find that, controlling far rational strategic need, domestic coalition politics, and superpower manipulation, countries in the third world prefer certain weapons systems over others because of their understanding of what it means to be "modern" in the twentieth century. Dana P. Eyre and Mark C. Suchman, "Status, Norms, and the Proliferation of Conventional Weapons: An Institutional Theory Approach," in Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security, pp. 73-113. Other examples of empirical research that have linked particular identities to particular sets of preferences are "civilized" identities driving attitudes toward weapons of mass destruction; notions of what constitutes "humanitarian" shaping decisions to intervene in other states; the identity of a "normal" state implying particular Soviet foreign policies; and "antimilitarist" identities in Japan and German shaping their post-World War II foreign policies. These arguments can be found in Richard Price and Nina Tannenwald, "Norms and Deterrence: The Nuclear and Chemical Weapons Taboos," pp. 114-152; Martha Finnemore, "Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention," pp. 153-185; Robert Herman, "Identitity, Norms, and National Security: The Soviet Foreign Policy Revolution and the End of the Cold War," pp. 271-316; and Thomas U. Berger, "Norms, Identity, and National Security in Germany and Japan," pp. 317-356. All of the above are in Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security. On identity and mutual intelligibility, see Roxanne Lynn Doty, "The Bounds of 'Race' in International Relations." Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 22. No. 3 (Winter 1993). p. 454.
19. Dana Eyre and Mark Suchman, for example, find that, controlling far rational strategic need, domestic coalition politics, and superpower manipulation, countries in the third world prefer certain weapons systems over others because of their understanding of what it means to be "modern" in the twentieth century. Dana P. Eyre and Mark C. Suchman, "Status, Norms, and the Proliferation of Conventional Weapons: An Institutional Theory Approach," in Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security, pp. 73-113. Other examples of empirical research that have linked particular identities to particular sets of preferences are "civilized" identities driving attitudes toward weapons of mass destruction; notions of what constitutes "humanitarian" shaping decisions to intervene in other states; the identity of a "normal" state implying particular Soviet foreign policies; and "antimilitarist" identities in Japan and German shaping their post-World War II foreign policies. These arguments can be found in Richard Price and Nina Tannenwald, "Norms and Deterrence: The Nuclear and Chemical Weapons Taboos," pp. 114-152; Martha Finnemore, "Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention," pp. 153-185; Robert Herman, "Identitity, Norms, and National Security: The Soviet Foreign Policy Revolution and the End of the Cold War," pp. 271-316; and Thomas U. Berger, "Norms, Identity, and National Security in Germany and Japan," pp. 317-356. All of the above are in Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security. On identity and mutual intelligibility, see Roxanne Lynn Doty, "The Bounds of 'Race' in International Relations." Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 22. No. 3 (Winter 1993). p. 454.
20. Dana Eyre and Mark Suchman, for example, find that, controlling far rational strategic need, domestic coalition politics, and superpower manipulation, countries in the third world prefer certain weapons systems over others because of their understanding of what it means to be "modern" in the twentieth century. Dana P. Eyre and Mark C. Suchman, "Status, Norms, and the Proliferation of Conventional Weapons: An Institutional Theory Approach," in Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security, pp. 73-113. Other examples of empirical research that have linked particular identities to particular sets of preferences are "civilized" identities driving attitudes toward weapons of mass destruction; notions of what constitutes "humanitarian" shaping decisions to intervene in other states; the identity of a "normal" state implying particular Soviet foreign policies; and "antimilitarist" identities in Japan and German shaping their post-World War II foreign policies. These arguments can be found in Richard Price and Nina Tannenwald, "Norms and Deterrence: The Nuclear and Chemical Weapons Taboos," pp. 114-152; Martha Finnemore, "Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention," pp. 153-185; Robert Herman, "Identitity, Norms, and National Security: The Soviet Foreign Policy Revolution and the End of the Cold War," pp. 271-316; and Thomas U. Berger, "Norms, Identity, and National Security in Germany and Japan," pp. 317-356. All of the above are in Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security. On identity and mutual intelligibility, see Roxanne Lynn Doty, "The Bounds of 'Race' in International Relations." Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 22. No. 3 (Winter 1993). p. 454.
21. Dana Eyre and Mark Suchman, for example, find that, controlling far rational strategic need, domestic coalition politics, and superpower manipulation, countries in the third world prefer certain weapons systems over others because of their understanding of what it means to be "modern" in the twentieth century. Dana P. Eyre and Mark C. Suchman, "Status, Norms, and the Proliferation of Conventional Weapons: An Institutional Theory Approach," in Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security, pp. 73-113. Other examples of empirical research that have linked particular identities to particular sets of preferences are "civilized" identities driving attitudes toward weapons of mass destruction; notions of what constitutes "humanitarian" shaping decisions to intervene in other states; the identity of a "normal" state implying particular Soviet foreign policies; and "antimilitarist" identities in Japan and German shaping their post-World War II foreign policies. These arguments can be found in Richard Price and Nina Tannenwald, "Norms and Deterrence: The Nuclear and Chemical Weapons Taboos," pp. 114-152; Martha Finnemore, "Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention," pp. 153-185; Robert Herman, "Identitity, Norms, and National Security: The Soviet Foreign Policy Revolution and the End of the Cold War," pp. 271-316; and Thomas U. Berger, "Norms, Identity, and National Security in Germany and Japan," pp. 317-356. All of the above are in Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security. On identity and mutual intelligibility, see Roxanne Lynn Doty, "The Bounds of 'Race' in International Relations." Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 22. No. 3 (Winter 1993). p. 454.
22. Robert Keohane calls the failure to contextualize interests one of the major weaknesses of mainstream international relations theory. Robert O. Keohane, "International Institutions: Two Approaches," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 32, No. 4 (December 1988), pp. 390-391.
23. Jeffrey Legro, for example, has shown how the preferences of great powers before and during World War II with respect to the use and nonuse of strategic bombing, and chemical and submarine warfare, are unfathomable without first understanding the identities of the military organizations responsible for shaping those preferences. Jeffrey W. Legro, "Culture and Preferences in the International Cooperation Two-Step," American Political Science Review, Vol. 90, No. 1 (March 1996), pp. 118-137.
24. See, for example, Tannenwald, "Norms and Deterrence," and Kier, "Culture and French Military Doctrine before World War II," p. 203. For a brilliant account of how social structure enables and impedes the construction of identity and interest, see Jane K. Cowan, "Going Out for Coffee? Contesting the Grounds of Gendered Pleasures in Everyday Sociability," in Peter Loizos and Evthymios Papataxiarchis, eds., Contested Identities: Gender and Kinship in Modern Greece (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1991), pp. 196-197.
25. See, for example, Tannenwald, "Norms and Deterrence," and Kier, "Culture and French Military Doctrine before World War II," p. 203. For a brilliant account of how social structure enables and impedes the construction of identity and interest, see Jane K. Cowan, "Going Out for Coffee? Contesting the Grounds of Gendered Pleasures in Everyday Sociability," in Peter Loizos and Evthymios Papataxiarchis, eds., Contested Identities: Gender and Kinship in Modern Greece (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1991), pp. 196-197.
26. See, for example, Tannenwald, "Norms and Deterrence," and Kier, "Culture and French Military Doctrine before World War II," p. 203. For a brilliant account of how social structure enables and impedes the construction of identity and interest, see Jane K. Cowan, "Going Out for Coffee? Contesting the Grounds of Gendered Pleasures in Everyday Sociability," in Peter Loizos and Evthymios Papataxiarchis, eds., Contested Identities: Gender and Kinship in Modern Greece (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1991), pp. 196-197.
27. A rare effort in the mainstream literature to break away from this focus on material power is Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, eds., Ideas and Foreign Policy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993).
28. As R.B.J. Walker has clarified, "To suggest that culture and ideology are crucial for the analysis of world politics is not necessarily to take an idealist position. . . . On the contrary, it is important to recognize that ideas, consciousness, culture, and ideology are bound up with more immediately visible kinds of political, military, and economic power." In R.B.J. Walker, "East Wind, West Wind: Civilizations, Hegemonies, and World Orders," in Walker, ed., Culture, Ideology, and World Order (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984), p. 3. See also Onuf, World of Our Making, p. 64. Joseph Nye's conceptualization of "soft" power could be usefully read through a constructivist interpretation. See Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (New York: Basic Books, 1991), esp. pp. 173-201.
29. As R.B.J. Walker has clarified, "To suggest that culture and ideology are crucial for the analysis of world politics is not necessarily to take an idealist position. . . . On the contrary, it is important to recognize that ideas, consciousness, culture, and ideology are bound up with more immediately visible kinds of political, military, and economic power." In R.B.J. Walker, "East Wind, West Wind: Civilizations, Hegemonies, and World Orders," in Walker, ed., Culture, Ideology, and World Order (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984), p. 3. See also Onuf, World of Our Making, p. 64. Joseph Nye's conceptualization of "soft" power could be usefully read through a constructivist interpretation. See Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (New York: Basic Books, 1991), esp. pp. 173-201.
30. As R.B.J. Walker has clarified, "To suggest that culture and ideology are crucial for the analysis of world politics is not necessarily to take an idealist position. . . . On the contrary, it is important to recognize that ideas, consciousness, culture, and ideology are bound up with more immediately visible kinds of political, military, and economic power." In R.B.J. Walker, "East Wind, West Wind: Civilizations, Hegemonies, and World Orders," in Walker, ed., Culture, Ideology, and World Order (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984), p. 3. See also Onuf, World of Our Making, p. 64. Joseph Nye's conceptualization of "soft" power could be usefully read through a constructivist interpretation. See Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (New York: Basic Books, 1991), esp. pp. 173-201.
31. Colin Gordon, ed., Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1997, by Michel Foucault (Brighton, Sussex, U.K.: Harvester Press, 1980); Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison notebooks, trans. and ed., Quinton Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (New York: International Publishers, 1992); and Max Weber, From Max Weber, ed., Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946).
32. Colin Gordon, ed., Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1997, by Michel Foucault (Brighton, Sussex, U.K.: Harvester Press, 1980); Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison notebooks, trans. and ed., Quinton Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (New York: International Publishers, 1992); and Max Weber, From Max Weber, ed., Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946).
33. Colin Gordon, ed., Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1997, by Michel Foucault (Brighton, Sussex, U.K.: Harvester Press, 1980); Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison notebooks, trans. and ed., Quinton Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (New York: International Publishers, 1992); and Max Weber, From Max Weber, ed., Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946).
34. Price and Tannenwald show that even power as material as nuclear missiles and chemical artillery had to be understood and interpreted before it had any meaning. In Price and Tannenwald, "Norms and Deterrence." Robert Cox has provided an account of the rise, reproduction, and demise of nineteenth-century British supremacy, and the rise and reproduction of U.S. dominance in the twentieth century through a close reading of the interaction between material and discursive power. Robert W. Cox, "Social Forces, States, and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory," Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 10, No. 1 (Spring 1981), pp. 126-155.
35. Price and Tannenwald show that even power as material as nuclear missiles and chemical artillery had to be understood and interpreted before it had any meaning. In Price and Tannenwald, "Norms and Deterrence." Robert Cox has provided an account of the rise, reproduction, and demise of nineteenth-century British supremacy, and the rise and reproduction of U.S. dominance in the twentieth century through a close reading of the interaction between material and discursive power. Robert W. Cox, "Social Forces, States, and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory," Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 10, No. 1 (Spring 1981), pp. 126-155.
36. Onuf sees these reproducible patterns of action as the product of "reflexive self-regulation," whereby agents refer to their own and other's past and anticipated actions in deciding how to act. Onuf, World of Our Making, p. 62.
37. Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality (New York: MIT Press, 1953), pp. 60-80.
38. Deutsch was a constructivist long ahead of his time to the extent that he argued that individuals could not engage in meaningful action absent some community-wide intersubjectivity. Another work constructivist in essence is Robert Jervis's The Logic of Images in International Relations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970). Applying Erving Goffmann's self-presentation theory to international politics, Jervis pointed out that state actions, such as gunboat diplomacy, were meaningless unless situated in a larger intersubjective community of diplomatic practice.
39. See Doty, "The Bounds of Race," p. 454; and Carol Cohn, "Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals," Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, Vol. 12, No. 32 (Summer 1987), pp. 687-718.
40. See Doty, "The Bounds of Race," p. 454; and Carol Cohn, "Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals," Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, Vol. 12, No. 32 (Summer 1987), pp. 687-718.
41. See Richard K. Ashley, "Untying the Sovereign State: A Double Reading of the Anarchy Problématique," Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 17, No. 2 (Summer 1988), p. 243, for a discussion of this process.
42. Richard K. Ashley, "The Geopolitics of Geopolitical Space: Toward a Critical Social Theory of International Politics," Alternatives, Vol. 12, No. 4 (October-December 1987), p. 409.
43. Richard K. Ashley, "Foreign Policy as Political Performance," International Studies Notes (1988), p. 53.
44. Critical constructivism denies this vigorously.
45. R.B.J. Walker, "Realism, Change, and International Political Theory," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 31, No. 1 (March 1987), pp. 76-77.
46. See, for example, John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Winter 1994/1995), pp. 5-49, esp. 37-47.
47. Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein differentiate the kind of "sociological" analysis performed in their volume from the "radical constructivist position" of Richard Ashley, David Campbell, R.B.J. Walker, and Cynthia Weber. See Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein, "Norms, Identity, and Culture," p. 46, notes 41 and 42.
48. As, for example, in Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," wherein constructivism, reflectivism, postmodernism, and poststructuralism are all reduced to "critical theory," p. 37, note 128.
49. Yosef Lapid, "Culture's Ship: Returns and Departures in International Relations Theory," in Lapid and Kratochwil, The Return of Culture and Identity, pp. 3-20.
50. Mark Hoffman, "Critical Theory and the Inter-Paradigm Debate," Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 16, No. 2 (Summer 1987), pp. 233-236.
51. Ashley, "The Geopolitics of Geopolitical Space," p. 403.
52. In this respect, both critical and conventional constructivism can be understood as sharing an interpretivist epistemology, more generally. See Taylor, "Interpretation and the Sciences of Man."
53. James Der Derian, On Diplomacy. A Genealogy of Western Estrangement (Oxford, U.K.: Basil Blackwell, 1987), p. 4.
54. R.B.J. Walker, "World Politics and Western Reason: Universalism, Pluralism, Hegemony," in Walker, Culture, Ideology, and World Order, p. 195; and Ashley, "The Geopolitics of Geopolitical Space," pp. 409-410.
55. R.B.J. Walker, "World Politics and Western Reason: Universalism, Pluralism, Hegemony," in Walker, Culture, Ideology, and World Order, p. 195; and Ashley, "The Geopolitics of Geopolitical Space," pp. 409-410.
56. Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein, "Norms, Identity, and Culture," p. 67.
57. The only even partial, exceptions are Price and Tannenwald, "Norms and Deterrence," and Michael N. Barnett, "Institutions, Roles, and Disorder: The Case of the Arab States System," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 37, No. 3 (September 1993), pp. 271-296.
58. The only even partial, exceptions are Price and Tannenwald, "Norms and Deterrence," and Michael N. Barnett, "Institutions, Roles, and Disorder: The Case of the Arab States System," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 37, No. 3 (September 1993), pp. 271-296.
59. Mark Hoffman, "Restructuring, Reconstruction, Reinscription, Rearticulation: Four Voices in Critical International Theory," Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Spring 1991), p. 170. David Campbell argues that no identity (or any other theoretical element for that matter) may be allowed to be fixed or final. It must be critically deconstructed as soon as it acquires a meaning. David Campbell, "Violent Performances: Identity, Sovereignty, Responsibility," in Lapid and Kratochwil, The Return of Culture and Identity pp. 164-166. See also Stephen J. Rosow, "The Forms of Internationalization: Representation of Western Culture on a Global Scale," Alternatives, Vol. 15, No. 3 (July-September 1990), p. 289, for differences on this issue.
60. Mark Hoffman, "Restructuring, Reconstruction, Reinscription, Rearticulation: Four Voices in Critical International Theory," Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Spring 1991), p. 170. David Campbell argues that no identity (or any other theoretical element for that matter) may be allowed to be fixed or final. It must be critically deconstructed as soon as it acquires a meaning. David Campbell, "Violent Performances: Identity, Sovereignty, Responsibility," in Lapid and Kratochwil, The Return of Culture and Identity pp. 164-166. See also Stephen J. Rosow, "The Forms of Internationalization: Representation of Western Culture on a Global Scale," Alternatives, Vol. 15, No. 3 (July-September 1990), p. 289, for differences on this issue.
61. Mark Hoffman, "Restructuring, Reconstruction, Reinscription, Rearticulation: Four Voices in Critical International Theory," Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Spring 1991), p. 170. David Campbell argues that no identity (or any other theoretical element for that matter) may be allowed to be fixed or final. It must be critically deconstructed as soon as it acquires a meaning. David Campbell, "Violent Performances: Identity, Sovereignty, Responsibility," in Lapid and Kratochwil, The Return of Culture and Identity pp. 164-166. See also Stephen J. Rosow, "The Forms of Internationalization: Representation of Western Culture on a Global Scale," Alternatives, Vol. 15, No. 3 (July-September 1990), p. 289, for differences on this issue.
62. Ashley, "The Geopolitics of Geopolitical Space," p. 408.
63. Hoffman, "Restructuring, Reconstruction, Reinscription, Rearticulation," p. 232.
64. Berger, "Norms, Identity, and National Security in Germany and Japan."
65. Cynthia Weber points this out as a very important distinction between her approach to the state and more modernist approaches. Weber similarly separates conventional constructivists from critical theorists. Max Weber, Simulating Sovereignty: Intervention, the State, and Symbolic Exchange (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1995). p. 3.
66. For a review of this issue see Friedrich Kratochwil, "Is the Ship of Culture at Sea or Returning?" pp. 206-210.
67. The discussion of the work of Todorov and Nandy is in Naeem Inayatullah and David L. Blaney, "Knowing Encounters: Beyond Parochialism in International Relations Theory," in Lapid and Kratochwil, The Return of Culture and Identity, pp. 65-84.
68. For an account of identity based on these three theorists, see Anne Norton, Reflections on Political Identity (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988).
69. Inayatullah and Blaney, "Knowing Encounters," pp. 65-66. For a very useful analysis of how different accounts of identity have made their way through feminist theorizing, see Allison Weir, Sacrificial Logics: Feminist Theory and the Critique of Identity (New York: Routledge, 1996).
70. Inayatullah and Blaney, "Knowing Encounters," pp. 65-66. For a very useful analysis of how different accounts of identity have made their way through feminist theorizing, see Allison Weir, Sacrificial Logics: Feminist Theory and the Critique of Identity (New York: Routledge, 1996).
71. My views on the differences separating critical and conventional constructivist positions on power were shaped in conversation with Jim Richter.
72. See Arturo Escobar, "Discourse and Power in Development: Michel Foucault and the Relevance of His Work to the Third World," Alternatives, Vol. 10, No. 4 (October-December 1984), esp. pp. 377-378.
73. This is taken from Andrew Linklater, "The Question of the Next Stage in International Relations Theory: A Critical-Theoretical Point of View," Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Spring 1992), p. 91, and is based on his interpretation of Jürgen Habermas. For a view on precisely the point of the emancipatory power of critical theory, see Chris Brown, "'Turtles All the Way Down': Anti-Foundationalism, Critical Theory, and International Relations," Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Summer 1994), p. 219.
74. This is taken from Andrew Linklater, "The Question of the Next Stage in International Relations Theory: A Critical-Theoretical Point of View," Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Spring 1992), p. 91, and is based on his interpretation of Jürgen Habermas. For a view on precisely the point of the emancipatory power of critical theory, see Chris Brown, "'Turtles All the Way Down': Anti-Foundationalism, Critical Theory, and International Relations," Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Summer 1994), p. 219.
75. For an alternative account of international relations theory from a critical theory perspective in which conventional constructivism's positions can be found as well, see Richard K. Ashley, "Three Modes of Economism," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 4 (December 1983), pp. 477-491.
76. On the construction of anarchy, in particular, see Ashley, "Untying the Sovereign State," p. 253. In addition, conventional constructivism is more willing to accept the ontological status of the state when theorizing, whereas critical theory demands that the state remain a zone of contestation, and should be understood as such; its autonomous existence should not be accepted.
77. For the former conventional view, see Alexander Wendt, "Constructing International Politics," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), p. 72.
78. For the critical view of the state, see Ashley, "Untying the Sovereign State," pp. 248-251.
79. For the challenge to constructivists to develop a research program or be marginalized, see Keohane, "International Institutions," p. 392. For criticism in a similar vein, see Thomas J. Biersteker, "Critical Reflections on Post-Positivism in International Relations," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 33, No. 3 (September 1989), p. 266.
80. For the challenge to constructivists to develop a research program or be marginalized, see Keohane, "International Institutions," p. 392. For criticism in a similar vein, see Thomas J. Biersteker, "Critical Reflections on Post-Positivism in International Relations," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 33, No. 3 (September 1989), p. 266.
81. It is a loose adaptation because, while I adopt Lakatosian criteria for what constitutes a progressive and degenerative shift in a research program, I do not adopt his standards of falsificationism or their associated "protective belts" of auxiliary hypotheses. See Imre Lakatos, "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes," in Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave, eds., Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp. 91-196.
82. Stephen M. Waltz, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987, p. 5. By acknowledging that "one cannot determine a priori . . . which sources of threat will be most important in any given case; one can say only that all of them are likely to play a role," Waltz does not offer a nontautological means for specifying threat. Quotation on p. 26.
83. See Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Collective Identity in a Democratic Community: The Case of NATO," in Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security, pp. 361-368; Barnett, "Identity and Alliances," pp. 401-404; Peter J. Katzenstein, "Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security," in Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security, pp. 27-28; Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein, "Norms, Identity, and Culture, p. 63; and Wendt, "Constructing International Politics," p. 78.
84. See Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Collective Identity in a Democratic Community: The Case of NATO," in Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security, pp. 361-368; Barnett, "Identity and Alliances," pp. 401-404; Peter J. Katzenstein, "Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security," in Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security, pp. 27-28; Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein, "Norms, Identity, and Culture, p. 63; and Wendt, "Constructing International Politics," p. 78.
85. See Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Collective Identity in a Democratic Community: The Case of NATO," in Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security, pp. 361-368; Barnett, "Identity and Alliances," pp. 401-404; Peter J. Katzenstein, "Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security," in Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security, pp. 27-28; Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein, "Norms, Identity, and Culture, p. 63; and Wendt, "Constructing International Politics," p. 78.
86. See Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Collective Identity in a Democratic Community: The Case of NATO," in Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security, pp. 361-368; Barnett, "Identity and Alliances," pp. 401-404; Peter J. Katzenstein, "Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security," in Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security, pp. 27-28; Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein, "Norms, Identity, and Culture, p. 63; and Wendt, "Constructing International Politics," p. 78.
87. See Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Collective Identity in a Democratic Community: The Case of NATO," in Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security, pp. 361-368; Barnett, "Identity and Alliances," pp. 401-404; Peter J. Katzenstein, "Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security," in Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security, pp. 27-28; Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein, "Norms, Identity, and Culture, p. 63; and Wendt, "Constructing International Politics," p. 78.
88. Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2 (March 1978), pp. 167-214.
89. I thank Maria Fanis for bringing home to me the importance of thinking about world politics in this way.
90. Ashley, "Three Modes," p. 478; see also Ashley, "The Geopolitics of Geopolitical Space," p. 414.
91. Ashley, "Three Modes," p. 478; see also Ashley, "The Geopolitics of Geopolitical Space," p. 414.
92. Kenneth A. Oye, "Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies," in Kenneth A. Oye, ed., Cooperation under Anarchy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 1-24.
93. The regimes literature is vast. For an early foundational volume that includes theoretical specification, empirical illustration, and some self-critique, see Stephen D. Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983). Elaboration of the market failure logic is in Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984).
94. Keohane, "International Institutions," p. 386.
95. On the critical importance of a theory of reputation to account for economic transactions, such as contracts, see David M. Kreps, "Corporate Culture and Economic Theory," in James E. Alt and Kenneth A. Shepsle, eds., Perspectives on Positive Political Economy (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 90-143. Formal game-theoretic work on reputation consistently shows that it should matter, and it does, but only when assumed to do so. Empirical work in international relations has shown that reputations do not work as hypothesized by most international relations theory. See Jonathan Mercer, Reputation and International Politics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996); Ted Hopf, Peripheral Visions: Deterrence Theory and American Foreign Policy in the Third World, 1965-1990 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994); Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981); and Jervis, Logic of Images in International Relations.
96. On the critical importance of a theory of reputation to account for economic transactions, such as contracts, see David M. Kreps, "Corporate Culture and Economic Theory," in James E. Alt and Kenneth A. Shepsle, eds., Perspectives on Positive Political Economy (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 90-143. Formal game-theoretic work on reputation consistently shows that it should matter, and it does, but only when assumed to do so. Empirical work in international relations has shown that reputations do not work as hypothesized by most international relations theory. See Jonathan Mercer, Reputation and International Politics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996); Ted Hopf, Peripheral Visions: Deterrence Theory and American Foreign Policy in the Third World, 1965-1990 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994); Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981); and Jervis, Logic of Images in International Relations.
97. On the critical importance of a theory of reputation to account for economic transactions, such as contracts, see David M. Kreps, "Corporate Culture and Economic Theory," in James E. Alt and Kenneth A. Shepsle, eds., Perspectives on Positive Political Economy (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 90-143. Formal game-theoretic work on reputation consistently shows that it should matter, and it does, but only when assumed to do so. Empirical work in international relations has shown that reputations do not work as hypothesized by most international relations theory. See Jonathan Mercer, Reputation and International Politics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996); Ted Hopf, Peripheral Visions: Deterrence Theory and American Foreign Policy in the Third World, 1965-1990 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994); Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981); and Jervis, Logic of Images in International Relations.
98. On the critical importance of a theory of reputation to account for economic transactions, such as contracts, see David M. Kreps, "Corporate Culture and Economic Theory," in James E. Alt and Kenneth A. Shepsle, eds., Perspectives on Positive Political Economy (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 90-143. Formal game-theoretic work on reputation consistently shows that it should matter, and it does, but only when assumed to do so. Empirical work in international relations has shown that reputations do not work as hypothesized by most international relations theory. See Jonathan Mercer, Reputation and International Politics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996); Ted Hopf, Peripheral Visions: Deterrence Theory and American Foreign Policy in the Third World, 1965-1990 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994); Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981); and Jervis, Logic of Images in International Relations.
99. For a recognition that "shared focal points," à la Thomas Schelling, have much in common with intersubjective reality and its capacity to promote cooperative solutions to iterative games, see Geoffrey Garrett and Barry R. Weigast, "Ideas, Interests, and Institutions: Constructing the European Community's Internal Market," in Goldstein and Keohane, Ideas and Foreign Policy, pp. 173-206.
100. Keohane, "International Institutions," p. 387.
101. On lags and stickiness, see Stephen D. Krasner, State Power and the Structure of International Trade," World Politics, Vol. 28, No. 3 (April 1976), pp. 317-343. On transaction costs, see Keohane, After Hegemony.
102. Another constructivist hypothesis offers itself here: institutionalized cooperation will be more likely to endure to the extent that the identities of the members of that institution are understood as common and they are reproduced by a thick array of social practices. This is meant as a continuum, with narrow self-interest being arrayed at one end of the spectrum, neoliberal institutionalization of self-interested cooperation in the middle, community of identity toward the other end, and harmony at the other pole.
103. Duncan Snidal, "The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory," International Organization, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Autumn 1985), esp. pp. 610-611.
104. For a comprehensive review of the most recent literature on the democratic peace, and an empirical test that shows that satisfaction with the status quo (a variable subject to constructivist interpretation) is the single most important factor affecting the use of force, by democracies and authoritarian states alike, see David L. Rousseau, Christopher Gelpi, and Dan Reiter, "Assessing the Dyadic Nature of the Democratic Peace, 1918-1988," American Political Science Review, Vol. 90, No. 3 (September 1996), p. 527.
105. . For a very well developed research design to test constructivist versus mainstream accounts of the democratic peace, see Colin Kahl, "Constructing a Separate Peace: Constructivism, Collective Liberal Identity, and the Democratic Peace," Security Studies (forthcoming).
106. For accounts of the democratic peace that focus on its contextual intersubjective characters, see Ido Oren, "The Subjectivity of the 'Democratic' Peace: Changing U.S. Perceptions of Imperial Germany," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 2 (Fall 1995), pp. 147-184; Thomas Risse-Kappen, Cooperation among Democracies, p. 30; and Risse-Kappen "Collective Identity in a Democratic Community," pp. 366-367.
107. For accounts of the democratic peace that focus on its contextual intersubjective characters, see Ido Oren, "The Subjectivity of the 'Democratic' Peace: Changing U.S. Perceptions of Imperial Germany," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 2 (Fall 1995), pp. 147-184; Thomas Risse-Kappen, Cooperation among Democracies, p. 30; and Risse-Kappen "Collective Identity in a Democratic Community," pp. 366-367.
108. For accounts of the democratic peace that focus on its contextual intersubjective characters, see Ido Oren, "The Subjectivity of the 'Democratic' Peace: Changing U.S. Perceptions of Imperial Germany," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 2 (Fall 1995), pp. 147-184; Thomas Risse-Kappen, Cooperation among Democracies, p. 30; and Risse-Kappen "Collective Identity in a Democratic Community," pp. 366-367.
109. I do not try to compile a comprehensive set of questions for constructivists, but instead merely elaborate general themes for research, themes that do not have a prominent place in mainstream international relations theory.
110. For a critical view of neorealism's belated efforts to capture nationalism, see Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil, "Revisiting the 'National': Toward an Identity Agenda in Neorealism?, in Lapid and Kratochwil, The Return of Culture and Identity, pp. 105-126.
111. For a most imaginative critical constructivist treatment of nationalism, see Daniel Deudney, "Ground Identity: Nature, Place, and Space in Nationalism," in ibid., pp. 129-145;
112. see also Roxanne Lynn Doty, "Sovereignty and the Nation: Constructing the Boundaries of National Identity," in Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber, eds., State Sovereignty as Social Construct (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1996) pp. 121-147.
113. For example, J. Ann Tickner observes that contemporary masculinized Western understandings of themselves lead to feminized portrayals of the South as "emotional and unpredictable. Tickner, "Identity in International Relations Theory: Feminist Perspectives," in Lapid and Kratochwil, The Return of Culture and Identity, pp. 147-162.
114. For example, Risse-Kappen, "Collective Identity in a Democratic Community," finds a common identity within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; see also Iver B. Neumann and Jennifer M. Welsh, "The Other in European self-definition," Review of International Studies, Vol. 17, No. 4 (October 1991), pp. 327-348, for an exploration of "Christian" and "European" states versus "Islamic" "Asiatic" Turkey.
115. For example, Risse-Kappen, "Collective Identity in a Democratic Community," finds a common identity within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; see also Iver B. Neumann and Jennifer M. Welsh, "The Other in European self-definition," Review of International Studies, Vol. 17, No. 4 (October 1991), pp. 327-348, for an exploration of "Christian" and "European" states versus "Islamic" "Asiatic" Turkey.
116. Michael N. Barnett, "Institutions, Roles, and Disorder: The Case of the Arab States System," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 37, No. 3 (September 1993), pp. 271-296.
117. See Risse-Kappen, "Collective Identity in a Democratic Community," and Michael N. Barnett, "Sovereignty Nationalism, and Regional Order in the Arab System," International Organization, Vol. 49 No. 3 (Summer 1995), pp. 479-510, for examples.
118. See Risse-Kappen, "Collective Identity in a Democratic Community," and Michael N. Barnett, "Sovereignty Nationalism, and Regional Order in the Arab System," International Organization, Vol. 49 No. 3 (Summer 1995), pp. 479-510, for examples.
119. Yale Ferguson and Richard Mansbach, for example, offer a rich variety of "polities," such as city-states, civilizations, polis, empires, kingdoms, caliphates, each of which had and, in some cases, has and will have, meaningful identities in world politics. Ferguson and Mansbach, "Past as Prelude," pp. 22-28, and Sujata Chakrabarti Pasic, "Culturing International Relations Theory," both in Lapid and Kratochwil, The Return
120. Yale Ferguson and Richard Mansbach, for example, offer a rich variety of "polities," such as city-states, civilizations, polis, empires, kingdoms, caliphates, each of which had and, in some cases, has and will have, meaningful identities in world politics. Ferguson and Mansbach, "Past as Prelude," pp. 22-28, and Sujata Chakrabarti Pasic, "Culturing International Relations Theory," both in Lapid and Kratochwil, The Return of Culture and Identity pp. 85-104.
121. Keohane, in "International Institutions," p. 392, has made this observation about "reflectivist" scholarship.. For similar laments, see Dessler, "What's At Stake," p. 471; and Barnett, "Institutions, Roles, and Disorder," p. 276. Alexander Wendt acknowledges he has "systematically bracketed" domestic factors in Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It," p. 423.
122. Keohane, in "International Institutions," p. 392, has made this observation about "reflectivist" scholarship.. For similar laments, see Dessler, "What's At Stake," p. 471; and Barnett, "Institutions, Roles, and Disorder," p. 276. Alexander Wendt acknowledges he has "systematically bracketed" domestic factors in Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It," p. 423.
123. Keohane, in "International Institutions," p. 392, has made this observation about "reflectivist" scholarship.. For similar laments, see Dessler, "What's At Stake," p. 471; and Barnett, "Institutions, Roles, and Disorder," p. 276. Alexander Wendt acknowledges he has "systematically bracketed" domestic factors in Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It," p. 423.
124. Keohane, in "International Institutions," p. 392, has made this observation about "reflectivist" scholarship.. For similar laments, see Dessler, "What's At Stake," p. 471; and Barnett, "Institutions, Roles, and Disorder," p. 276. Alexander Wendt acknowledges he has "systematically bracketed" domestic factors in Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It," p. 423.
125. Two works that make the connection between domestic identity construction at home and state identity are Audie Klotz, Norms in international relations: the struggle against apartheid (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1995); and Peter J. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996).
126. Two works that make the connection between domestic identity construction at home and state identity are Audie Klotz, Norms in international relations: the struggle against apartheid (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1995); and Peter J. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996).
127. Inayatullah and Blaney, "Knowing Encounters," pp. 76-80.
128. Compare this, for example, to Richard Cottam's very interesting account of imperial British images of Egypt. The critical difference is that Cottam does not see British constructions of themselves or their society's parts as relevant to an understanding of British images of Egyptians. Richard Cottam, Foreign Policy Motivation: A General Theory and Case Study (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977)
129. One might say this about the French military between World Wars I and II. See Kier, "Culture and French Military Doctrine before World War II."
130. This is done by David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992) and Jim George, Discourses of Global Politics: A Critical (Re)Introduction to International Relations (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1994).
131. This is done by David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992) and Jim George, Discourses of Global Politics: A Critical (Re)Introduction to International Relations (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1994).
132. Kratochwil, "Is the Ship of Culture at Sea or Returning?" p. 206.
133. Paul Kowert and Jeffrey Legro, "Norms, Identity, and Their Limits: A Theoretical Reprise," in Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security, p. 469. For other critical reviews of constructivism and world politics, see Jeffrey T. Checkel, "The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory," World Politics, Vol. 50, No. 2 (January 1998), pp. 324-348, and Emanuel Adler, "Seizing the Middle Grounds: Constructivism in World Politics," European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 3, No. 3 (1997), pp. 319-363.
134. Paul Kowert and Jeffrey Legro, "Norms, Identity, and Their Limits: A Theoretical Reprise," in Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security, p. 469. For other critical reviews of constructivism and world politics, see Jeffrey T. Checkel, "The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory," World Politics, Vol. 50, No. 2 (January 1998), pp. 324-348, and Emanuel Adler, "Seizing the Middle Grounds: Constructivism in World Politics," European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 3, No. 3 (1997), pp. 319-363.
135. Paul Kowert and Jeffrey Legro, "Norms, Identity, and Their Limits: A Theoretical Reprise," in Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security, p. 469. For other critical reviews of constructivism and world politics, see Jeffrey T. Checkel, "The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory," World Politics, Vol. 50, No. 2 (January 1998), pp. 324-348, and Emanuel Adler, "Seizing the Middle Grounds: Constructivism in World Politics," European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 3, No. 3 (1997), pp. 319-363.
136. Ibid., p. 479.