Experimental organizational economics

The Handbook of Organizational Economics

Volumn , Issue , 2012, Pages 213-262

  Camerer, Colin F ^a   Weber, Roberto A ^b  

^a CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ZURICH   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84930739013     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: None     Document Type: Chapter

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