Relational contracts and the nature of market interactions

Econometrica

Volumn 72, Issue 3, 2004, Pages 747-780

  Brown, Martin ^a   Falk, Armin ^a   Fehr, Ernst ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

Fairness preferences; Implicit contracts; Involuntary unemployment; Market interaction; Relational contracts; Repeated transaction

Indexed keywords

CODES (STANDARDS); COMMERCE; EMPLOYMENT; INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS; LAW ENFORCEMENT; MARKETING;

FAIRNESS PREFERENCES; IMPLICIT CONTRACTS; INVOLUMTARY UNEMPLOYMENT; MARKET INTERACTION; RELATIONAL CONTRACTS; REPEATED TRANSACTIONS;

CONTRACTS;

EID: 2642538470     PISSN: 00129682     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0262.2004.00511.x     Document Type: Article

References (47)

1. AKERLOF, G. A. (1982): "Labor Contracts as Partial Gift Exchange," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 97, 543-569.
2. AKERLOF, G. A., AND J. L. YELLEN (1990): "The Fair Wage-Effort Hypothesis and Unemployment," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 105, 255-283.
3. ANDREONI, J. A., AND J. H. MILLER (1993): "Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma: Experimental Evidence," Economic Journal, 103, 570-585.
4. BAKER, G., R. GIBBONS, AND K. J. MURPHY (1994): "Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109, 1125-1156.
5. _ (2002): "Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117, 39-84.
6. BANERJEE, A. V., AND E. DUFLO (2000): "Reputation Effects and the Limits of Contracting: A Study of the Indian Software Industry," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115, 989-1017.
7. BOLTON, G. E., AND A. OCKENFELS (2000): "ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity and Competition," American Economic Review, 100, 166-193.
8. BOWLES, S. (1985): "The Production Process in a Competitive Economy: Walrasian, Neo-Hobbesian, and Marxian Models," American Economic Review, 75, 16-36.
9. BROWN, M., A. FALK, AND E. FEHR (2002): "Contractual Incompleteness and the Nature of Market Interactions," Working Paper No. 38, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, University of Zürich.
10. BULL, C. (1987): "The Existence of Self-Enforcing Implicit Contracts," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 102, 147-159.
11. CAMERER, C. F. (2003): Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
12. CAMERER, C. F., AND K. WEIGELT (1988): "Experimental Tests of a Sequential Equilibrium Reputation Model," Econometrica, 56, 1-36.
13. CARMICHAEL, L. (1985): "Can Unemployment be Involuntary?" American Economic Review, 75, 1213-1214.
14. CHEVALIER, J., AND G. ELLISON (1997): "Risk Taking by Mutual Funds as a Response to Incentives," Journal of Political Economy, 105, 1167-1200.
15. _ (1999): "Career Concerns Of Mutual Fund Managers," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114, 389-432.
16. DIXIT, A. (2003): "On Modes of Economic Governance," Econometrica, 71, 449-481.
17. DUFWENBERG, M., AND G. KIRCHSTEIGER (forthcoming): "A Theory of Sequential Reciprocity," Games and Economic Behavior, forthcoming.
18. FALK, A., AND U. FISCHBACHER (1999): "A Theory of Reciprocity," Working Paper No. 6, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, University of Zurich.
19. FEHR, E., AND A. FALK (1999): "Wage Rigidities in a Competitive Incomplete Contract Market," Journal of Political Economy, 107, 106-134.
20. FEHR, E., AND S. GÄCHTER (2000): "Fairness and Retaliation - The Economics of Reciprocity," Journal of Economic Perspectives, 14, 159-181.
21. FEHR, E., G. KIRCHSTEIGER, AND A. RIEDL (1993): "Does Fairness Prevent Market Clearing? An Experimental Investigation," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108, 437-459.
22. FEHR, E., AND K. M. SCHMIDT (1999): "A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Co-operation," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114, 817-868.
23. FISCHBACHER, U. (1999): "z-Tree: Experimental Software," University of Zurich.
24. FUDENBERG, D., AND E. MASKIN (1986): "The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Discounting and Incomplete Information," Econometrica, 54, 533-554.
25. GINTIS, H. (1976): "The Nature of the Labor Exchange and the Theory of Capitalist Production," Review of Radical Political Economics, 8, 36-54.
26. HART, O., AND B. HOLSTRÖM (1987): "The Theory of Contracts," in Advances in Economic Theory, Fifth World Congress, ed. by T. F. Bewley. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
27. HONG, H., AND J. D. KUBIK (2003): "Analyzing the Analysts: Career Concerns and Biased Earnings Forecasts," Journal of Finance, 58, 313-351.
28. HONG, H., J. D. KUBIK, AND A. SOLOMON (2000): "Security Analysts' Career Concerns and Herding of Earnings Forecasts," RAND Journal of Economics, 31, 121-144.
29. JUNG, Y. J., J. H. KAGEL, AND D. LEVIN (1994): "On the Existence of Predatory Pricing: An Experimental Study of Reputation and Entry Deterrence in the Chain-Store Game," RAND Journal of Economics, 25, 72-93.
30. KIRCHSTEIGER, G., M. NIEDERLE, AND J. POTTERS (2001): "Public versus Private Exchanges," CentER Discussion Paper No. 101, Tilburg University.
31. KLEIN, B., AND K. B. LEFFLER (1981): "The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance," Journal of Political Economy, 89, 615-641.
32. KOLLOCK, P. (1994): "The Emergence of Exchange Structures: An Experimental Study of Uncertainty, Commitment, and Trust," American Journal of Sociology, 100, 313-345.
33. KREPS, D., P. MILGROM, J. ROBERTS, AND R. WILSON (1982): "Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, 27, 245-252.
34. LEVIN, J. (2003): "Relational Incentive Contracts," American Economic Review, 93, 835-857.
35. LEVINE, D. K. (1998): "Modeling Altruism and Spitefulness in Experiments," Review of Economic Dynamics, 1, 593-622.
36. MACLEOD, W. B., AND J. M. MALCOMSON (1989): "Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatability and Involuntary Unemployment," Econometrica, 57, 447-480.
37. _ (1993): "Wage Premiums and Profit Maximization in Efficiency Wage Models," European Economic Review, 37, 1223-1249.
38. _ (1998): "Motivation and Markets," American Economic Review, 88, 388-411.
39. MALCOMSON, J. M. (1999): "Individual Employment Contracts," in Handbook of Labor Economics, Vol. 3b, ed. by O. C. Ashenfelter and D. Card. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
40. McMILLAN, J., AND C. WOODRUFF (1999): "Interfirm Relationships and Informal Credit in Vietnam," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114, 1285-1320.
41. MILLER, R. M., AND C. R. PLOTT (1985): "Product Quality Signaling in Experimental Markets," Econometrica, 53, 837-872.
42. RABIN, M. (1993): "Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics," American Economic Review, 83, 1281-1302.
43. ROTH, A. E. (1995): "Bargaining Experiments," in Handbook of Experimental Economics, ed. by J. Kagel and A. Roth. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
44. SAMUELSON, W., AND R. ZECKHAUSER (1988): "Status Quo Bias in Decision Making," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 1, 7-59.
45. SCHMIDT, K., AND M. SCHNITZER (1995): "The Interaction of Explicit and Implicit Contracts," Economic Letters, 48, 193-199.
46. SHAPIRO, C., AND J. E. STIGLITZ (1984): "Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device," American Economic Review, 74, 433-444.
47. WILLIAMSON, O. E. (1985): The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. New York: The Free Press.