Gift giving and worker productivity: Evidence from a firm-level experiment

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 67, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 233-244

  Bellemare, Charles ^a,b   Shearer, Bruce ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITÉ LAVAL   (Canada)

^b CIRPÉE ^*  (Germany)

Author keywords

Field experiments; Gift exchange; Incentive contracts; Reciprocity

Indexed keywords

EID: 67651204103     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2008.12.001     Document Type: Article

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