Experiments with network formation

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 64, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 81-120

  Corbae, Dean ^a   Duffy, John ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH   (United States)

Author keywords

Contagion; Coordination; Experimental economics; Networks; Stability

Indexed keywords

EID: 48649091091     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2007.10.008     Document Type: Article

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