Cooperation over finite horizons: A theory and experiments

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 95, Issue 7-8, 2011, Pages 500-512

  Ambrus, Attila ^a   Pathak, Parag A ^b,c  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

Public goods; Restart effect

Indexed keywords

EID: 79955035689     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.11.016     Document Type: Article

References (56)

1. Anderson S., Goeree J., Holt C. A theoretical analysis of altruism and decision error in public goods games. Journal of Public Economics 1998, 70(2):297-323.
2. Andreoni J. Why free ride? Strategies and learning in public goods experiments. Journal of Public Economics 1988, 37(3):291-304.
3. Andreoni J. Giving with impure altruism: applications to charity and Ricardian equivalence. Journal of Political Economy 1989, 97(6):1447-1458.
4. Andreoni J., Petrie R. Public goods experiments without confidentiality: a glimpse into fund-raising. Journal of Public Economics 2004, 88:1605-1623.
5. Andreoni J., Samuelson L. Building rational cooperation. Journal of Economic Theory 2006, 127:117-154.
6. Bandiera O., Barankay I., Rasul I. Social preferences and the response to incentives: evidence from personnel data. Quarterly Journal of Economics 2005, 120:917-962.
7. Biele, G., 2006. No man is an island: Cooperation in groups and social learning. PhD dissertation, Freie Universität Berlin.
8. Blount S. When social outcomes aren't fair: the effect of causal attributions on preferences. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 1995, 63:131-144.
9. Bolton G.E., Ockenfels A. ERC: a theory of equity, reciprocity, and competition. American Economic Review 2000, 90:166-193.
10. Brandts J., Schram A. Cooperation and noise in public goods experiments: applying the contribution function approach. Journal of Public Economics 2001, 79:399-427.
11. Brown M., Falk A., Fehr E. Relational contracts and the nature of market interactions. Econometrica 2004, 72:747-780.
12. Cameron C., Gelbach J., Miller D. Robust Inference with Multi-Way Clustering. Journal of Business and Economics Statistics 2011, 29(2):238-249.
13. Cox J. On modeling voluntary contributions to public goods. Public Finance Review 2007, 35:311-332.
14. Cox J., Friedman D., Gjestard S. A tractable model of reciprocity and fairness. Games and Economic Behavior 2007, 59:17-45.
15. Croson R. Partners and strangers revisited. Economics Letters 1996, 25:25-32.
16. Duwfenberg M., Kirchsteiger G. A theory of sequential reciprocity. Games and Economic Behavior 2004, 47:268-298.
17. Fehr E., Schmidt K. A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation. Quarterly Journal Of Economics 1999, 114:817-868.
18. Fehr E., Schmidt K. Theories of fairness and reciprocity - evidence and economic applications. Advances in Economics and Econometrics - 8th World Congress, Econometric Society Monographs 2002, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
19. Field A. Altruistically inclined? The behavioral sciences, evolutionary theory and the origins of reciprocity 2002, UMichigan Press, Ann Arbor.
20. Fischbacher U. z-Tree: Zurich Toolbox for Readymade Economic Experiments. Experimental Economics 2007, 10(2):171-178.
21. Fischbacher U., Gächter S. Social preferences, beliefs, and the dynamics of free riding in public goods. American Economic Review 2010, 100:541-556.
22. Fischbacher U., Gächter S., Fehr E. Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment. Economics Letters 2001, 71:397-404.
23. Fiske A.P. The four elementary forms of sociality: framework for unified theory of social relations. Psychological Review 1992, 99(4):689-723.
24. Fudenberg D., Maskin E. The folk theorem in repeated games with discounting and incomplete information. Econometrica 1986, 54:533-554.
25. Gächter S. Conditional cooperation. behavioral regularities from the lab and the field and their policy implications. CESifo Seminar Series 2007, The MIT Press.
26. Gächter S., Renner E. The effects of (incentivized) belief elicitation in public goods experiments. Experimental Economics 2010, 13:364-377.
27. Guttman J. Understanding collective action: matching behavior. American Economic Review 1978, 68:251-255.
28. Isaac M., Walker J. Group size effects in public goods provision: the voluntary contributions mechanism. Quarterly Journal of Economics 1988, 103(1):179-199.
29. Isaac M., Walker J., Thomas S. Divergent evidence on free riding: an experimental evidence of possible explanations. Public Choice 1984, 43(1):113-149.
30. Isaac M., Walker J., Williams A. Group size and the voluntary provision of public goods: experimental evidence utilizing large groups. Journal of Public Economics 1994, 54:1-36.
31. Jehiel P. Analogy-based expectation equilibrium. Journal of Economic Theory 2005, 123:81-104.
32. Kelley H., Stahelski A. Social interaction basis of cooperators' and competitors' beliefs about others. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 1970, 16:190-197.
33. Keser C., Winden F. Conditional cooperation and voluntary contributions to public goods. Scandinavian Journal of Economics 2000, 102(1):23-39.
34. Kim O., Walker M. The free rider problem: experimental evidence. Public Choice 1984, 18:3-24.
35. KLUMPP, T., 2010. Finitely repeated provision of a public good. mimeo Emory University.
36. Kreps D., Wilson R. Reputation and imperfect information,. Journal of Economic Theory 1982, 27:253-279.
37. Kreps D., Milgrom P., Roberts J., Wilson R. Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma,. Journal of Economic Theory 1982, 27:245-252.
38. Ledyard J. Public goods. Handbook of Experimental Economics 1995, Princeton University Press. J. Kagel, A. Roth (Eds.).
39. Levine D. Modeling altruism and spitefulness in experiments. Review of Economic Dynamics 1998, 1:593-622.
40. McCabe K., Rigdon M., Smith V. Positive reciprocity and intentions in trust games. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 2003, 52:267-275.
41. Mckelvey R., Palfrey T. An experimental study of the centipede game. Econometrica 1992, 60:803-836.
42. Mengel, F., 2009. Learning by (limited) forward looking players. mimeo Maastricht University.
43. Neyman A. Bounded complexity justifies cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma. Economic Letters 1985, 19:227-229.
44. Neyman A. Cooperation in repeated games when the number of stages is not commonly known. Econometrica 1999, 67:45-64.
45. Offerman T., Sonnemans J., Schram A. Value orientations, expectations, and voluntary contributions in public goods. Economic Journal 1996, 106:817-845.
46. Palfrey T., Prisbey J. Anomalous behavior in linear public goods experiments: how much and why?. American Economic Review 1997, 87(5):829-846.
47. Plott C., Smith V. Handbook of experimental economics results, Volume 1 2008, Elsevier North-Holland Publishing, New York.
48. Rabin M. Incorporating fairness into game theory and economics. American Economic Review 1993, 83:1281-1302.
49. Radner R. Collusive behavior in noncooperative epsilon-equilibria of oligopolies with long but finite lives. Journal of Economic Theory 1980, 22:136-154.
50. Radner R. Can bounded rationality resolve the prisoner's dilemma?. Contributions to Mathematical Economics 1986, 387-399. North-Holland, Amsterdam. M.-C. Andreu, W. Hildenbrand (Eds.).
51. Saijo, T. and Yamaguchi, H., 1992. The "spite" dilemma in voluntary contribution mechanism experiments. University of Tsukuba mimeo.
52. Sobel J. A theory of credibility. Review of Economic Studies 1985, 52:557-573.
53. Sonnemans J., Schram A., Offerman T. Strategic behavior in public good games: when partners drift apart. Economic Journal 1999, 35-41.
54. Stahl D., Wilson P. On players' models of other players: theory and experimental evidence. Games and Economic Behavior 1995, 10:218-254.
55. Takayama A. Mathematical Economics 1985, Cambridge University Press.
56. Ule, A., 2010. Cooperation in finitely repeated games on networks. mimeo University of Amsterdam.