Endogenous group formation

Journal of Public Economic Theory

Volumn 10, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 171-194

  Ahn, T K ^a,b   Isaac, R Mark ^a   Salmon, Timothy C ^a  

^a FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b Korea University   (South Korea)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 40349098326     PISSN: 10973923     EISSN: 14679779     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2008.00357.x     Document Type: Article

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