Leading by example with and without exclusion power in voluntary contribution experiments

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 91, Issue 5-6, 2007, Pages 1023-1042

  Güth, Werner ^a   Levati, M Vittoria ^a   Sutter, Matthias ^b   van der Heijden, Eline ^c  

^a MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR THE SCIENCE OF HUMAN HISTORY   (Germany)

^b UNIVERSITY OF INNSBRUCK   (Austria)

^c TILBURG UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Endogenous selection; Exclusion power; Leadership; Voluntary contribution experiment

Indexed keywords

EID: 33947185820     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2006.10.007     Document Type: Article

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