Leading-by-example and signaling in voluntary contribution games: An experimental study

Economic Theory

Volumn 33, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 169-182

  Potters, Jan ^a   Sefton, Martin ^b   Vesterlund, Lise ^c  

^a TILBURG UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

^b UNIVERSITY OF NOTTINGHAM   (United Kingdom)

^c UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH   (United States)

Author keywords

Leading by example; Public goods; Reciprocity; Signaling; Voluntary provision

Indexed keywords

EID: 34547161379     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: 14320479     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-006-0186-3     Document Type: Conference Paper

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