Extrinsic Rewards and Intrinsic Motives: Standard and Behavioral Approaches to Agency and Labor Markets

Handbook of Labor Economics

Volumn 4, Issue PART A, 2011, Pages 701-772

  Rebitzer, James B ^a   Taylor, Lowell J ^b  

^a BOSTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Intrinsic and extrinsic motivation; Principal agent models

Indexed keywords

EID: 79953125166     PISSN: 15734463     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1016/S0169-7218(11)04114-1     Document Type: Book

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