Leadership, beliefs and coordination: An explorative discussion

Industrial and Corporate Change

Volumn 10, Issue 2, 2001, Pages 357-388

  Foss, N J ^a  

^a Department of International Economics and Management   (Denmark)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMMUNICATION; LEADERSHIP; ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE;

EID: 0034966739     PISSN: 09606491     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/icc/10.2.357     Document Type: Article

References (95)

1. Agreeing to disagree
2. Epistemic conditions for mash equilibrium
3. The variable frame theory of focal points: An experimental study
4. Leadership and its basis in problems of social coordination
5. The rational choice theory of social institutions: Cooperation, coordination, and communication
6. Creating expectational assets in the laboratory: Coordination in "Weakest-Link" games
7. Coordination, organizational boundaries and fads in business practice
8. Coordination in organizations: A game-theoretic perspective
9. Rational organization
10. Salience and focusing in pure coordination games
11. Pay-off dominance and the stackelberg heuristic
12. Stackelberg reasoning in mixed-motive games: An experimental investigation
13. Coordinating coordination failures in Keynesian models
14. Communication in the battle of the sexes game: Some experimental results
15. Communication in coordination games
16. Alternative institutions for resolving coordination problems: Experimental evidence on forward induction and preplay communication
17. Learning how to cooperate: Optimal play in repeated coordination games
18. Strategic information transmission
19. Common knowledge and the co-ordination of economic activities
20. Common knowledge, common sense
21. Cheap talk, coordination, and entry
22. Communication, coordination, and nash equilibrium
23. Standardization, compatibility, and innovation
24. Knowledge-based approaches to the theory of the firm: Some critical comments
25. Theoretical isolation in contract economics
26. Dynamic coordination games
27. Costs of flexibility and equilibrium selection
28. Common knowledge
29. Coordination within the firm and endogenous growth
30. The costs and benefits of ownership: A theory of vertical integration
31. Economics and knowledge
32. The strategic management of the entitlement process in the employment relationship
33. Toward an economic theory of leadership: Leading by example
34. Moral hazard in teams
35. The firm as a subeconomy
36. Leadership: Some empirical generalizations and new research directions
37. Precedent transfer in experimental conflict-of-interest games
38. Dynamic focal points in N-Person coordination games
39. Corporate culture and economic theory
40. Personal capitalism as charismatic authority: The organizational economics of a weberian concept
41. Capabilities and covernance: The rebirth of production in the theory of the firm
42. Running a business: An appraisal of economics, organization and management by Paul Milgrom and John Roberts
43. Do people play nash equilibrium? Lessons from evolutionary game theory
44. Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs
45. Non-Cooperative games
46. Communication between rational agents
47. Bounded rationality, indeterminacy, and the theory of the firm
48. Leadership style and incentives
49. The electronic mail game: Strategic behavior under almost common knowledge
50. Inertia and transformation
51. How much belief is necessary for a convention?
52. Breach of trust in corporate takeovers
53. A theory of focal points
54. Tacit coordination games, strategic uncertainty, and coordination failure
55. Strategic uncertainty, equilibrium selection, and coordination failure in average opinion games
56. Comparative economic organization: The analysis of discrete structural alternatives
57. Human actors and economic organization
58. Lock-in' vs. 'critical masses'-Industrial change under network externalities
59. The economics of convention