The Effect of Leadership in a Public Bad Experiment

Journal of Conflict Resolution

Volumn 47, Issue 6, 2003, Pages 773-795

  Moxnes, Erling ^a   Van der Heijden, Eline ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BERGEN   (Norway)

^b TILBURG UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Follower decisions; Leadership effects; Public bad experiment

Indexed keywords

EID: 0344944809     PISSN: 00220027     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0022002703258962     Document Type: Article

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