Catalysing private capital flows: Do IMF programmes work as commitment devices?

Economic Journal

Volumn 116, Issue 513, 2006, Pages 843-867

  Mody, Ashoka ^a   Saravia, Diego ^b  

^a INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND   (United States)

^b PONTIFICIA UNIVERSIDAD CATÓLICA DE CHILE   (Chile)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CAPITAL FLOW; DEVELOPING WORLD; ECONOMIC IMPACT; FINANCIAL POLICY; FINANCIAL SYSTEM; IMF; POLICY REFORM;

EID: 33745964353     PISSN: 00130133     EISSN: 14680297     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2006.01114.x     Document Type: Article

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