Enlargement and institutional reform in the European Union: Separate or connected issues?

Constitutional Political Economy

Volumn 12, Issue 4, 2001, Pages 351-370

  Steunenberg, Bernard ^a  

^a LEIDEN UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Constitutional choice; EU enlargement; Game forms; Institutional reform

Indexed keywords

EID: 52549121021     PISSN: 10434062     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1012533124779     Document Type: Review

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