Proposal rights and political power

American Journal of Political Science

Volumn 50, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 441-448

  Kalandrakis, Tasos ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33645300104     PISSN: 00925853     EISSN: 15405907     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00193.x     Document Type: Article

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