In the shadow of law or power? Consensus-based bargaining and outcomes in the GATT/WTO

International Organization

Volumn 56, Issue 2, 2002, Pages

  Steinberg, Richard H ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036083447     PISSN: 00208183     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/002081802320005504     Document Type: Review

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