The causes and consequences of IMF conditionality

Emerging Markets Finance and Trade

Volumn 40, Issue 3, 2004, Pages 26-54

  Dreher, Axel ^a   Vaubel, Roland ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF EXETER BUSINESS SCHOOL   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MANNHEIM   (Germany)

Author keywords

Conditionality; International Monetary Fund; Public choice

Indexed keywords

EID: 2942716951     PISSN: 1540496X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/1540496x.2004.11052571     Document Type: Review

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