Risk in international politics

Global Environmental Politics

Volumn 9, Issue 3, 2009, Pages 40-60

  Stone, Randall W ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

IMF; INSURANCE SYSTEM; INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION; INVESTMENT; KYOTO PROTOCOL; POLICY IMPLEMENTATION; POLICY MAKING; POLITICS; PUBLIC GOODS; RISK; RISK ASSESSMENT; STANDARD (REFERENCE); WELFARE PROVISION;

EID: 70349753071     PISSN: 15263800     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/glep.2009.9.3.40     Document Type: Article

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