When Does It Take a Nixon to Go to China?

American Economic Review

Volumn 88, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 180-197

  Cukierman, Alex ^a,b   Tommasi, Mariano ^c  

^a TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

^b TILBURG UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

^c UNIVERSIDAD DE SAN ANDRÉS   (Argentina)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000440641     PISSN: 00028282     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

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