The powers of the union delegation in the EU

The Powers of the Union Delegation in the EU

Volumn , Issue , 2007, Pages 1-355

  Franchino, Fabio ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84927083030     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511585838     Document Type: Book

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