The influence of IMF programs on the re-election of debtor governments

Economics and Politics

Volumn 16, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 53-76

  Dreher, Axel ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MANNHEIM   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

DEBT; ELECTION; IMF; POLITICAL ECONOMY;

EID: 1342332399     PISSN: 09541985     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0343.2004.00131.x     Document Type: Article

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