Corporations in Evolving Diversity: Cognition, Governance, and Institutional Rules

Corporations in Evolving Diversity: Cognition, Governance, and Institutional Rules

Volumn , Issue , 2010, Pages 1-232

  Aoki, Masahiko ^a  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Co evolution; Cognition; Corporate governance; Corporate landscape; CSR; Diversity; Financial crisis; Institutions; Organizational architecture

Indexed keywords

EID: 84920614580     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199218530.001.0001     Document Type: Book

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