Common knowledge, salience and convention: A reconstruction of David Lewis' game theory

Economics and Philosophy

Volumn 19, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 175-210+i+iii

  Cubitt, Robin P ^a   Sugden, Robert ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF EAST ANGLIA   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0346331682     PISSN: 02662671     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0266267103001123     Document Type: Review

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