Financial contracting theory meets the real world: An empirical analysis of venture capital contracts

Review of Economic Studies

Volumn 70, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 281-315

  Kaplan, Steven N ^a   Strömberg, Per ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CAPITAL FLOW; EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS; ENTREPRENEUR; FINANCIAL PROVISION;

EID: 0038660446     PISSN: 00346527     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-937X.00245     Document Type: Article

References (57)

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