Bayesian potentials and information structures: Team decision problems revisited

International Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 5, Issue 3, 2009, Pages 271-291

  Ui, Takashi ^a  

^a YOKOHAMA NATIONAL UNIVERSITY   (Japan)

Author keywords

Bayesian potential game; Best response equivalence; Information structure; Team

Indexed keywords

EID: 77957261128     PISSN: 17427355     EISSN: 17427363     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1742-7363.2009.00109.x     Document Type: Article

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