In search of new foundations

Journal of Finance

Volumn 55, Issue 4, 2000, Pages 1623-1653

  Zingales, Luigi ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0039193026     PISSN: 00221082     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00262     Document Type: Article

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