The adoption of institutionally contested organizational practices: The emergence of stock option pay in Germany

Academy of Management Journal

Volumn 50, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 33-56

  Sanders, Wm Gerard ^a   Tuschke, Anja ^b  

^a BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF BERN   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33846577975     PISSN: 00014273     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.5465/AMJ.2007.24160889     Document Type: Article

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