Economic Organizations and Corporate Governance in Japan

Economic Organizations and Corporate Governance in Japan

Volumn , Issue , 2004, Pages 1-400

  Milhaupt, Curtis J ^a   West, Mark D ^b  

^a Och Spine at New York Presbyterian Hospitals   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

Author keywords

Bureaucracy; Corporate governance; Economy; Empirical; Informal institutions; Japan; Law; Markets; Organized crime; Regulation; Rules; Venture capital

Indexed keywords

EID: 84922967236     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/0199272115.001.0001     Document Type: Book

References (44)

1. Richard A. Posner, Social Norms and the Law: An Economic Approach, 87 Am. Econ. Rev. 365 (1997).
2. Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 943 (1996).
3. Mark D. West, Legal Rules and Social Norms in Japan's Secret World of Sumo, 26 J. Legal Stud. 165 (1997).
4. Yoshiro Miwa and J. Mark Ramseyer, The Myth of the Main Bank: Japan and Comparative Corporate Governance, 27 Law & Soc. Inq. 401 (2002).
5. Kevin M. Murphy et al., The Allocation of Talent: Implications for Growth, 106 Q. J. Econ. 503 (1991).
6. Stephen P. Magee et al., Black Hole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory (1989).
7. Derek C. Bok, A Flawed System of Law Practice and Training, 33 J. Legal Ed. 570 (1983).
8. Ronald J. Gilson, How Many Lawyers Does it Take to Change an Economy?, 17 Law & Soc. Inq. 635 (1993).
9. J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 Yale L.J. 239 (1984).
10. Marc Galanter, Predators and Parasites: Lawyer Bashing and Civil Justice, 28 Ga. L. Rev. 633, 671 (1994).
11. Robert C. Clark, Why So Many Lawyers: Are they Good or Bad?, 61 Fordham L. Rev. 275, 279.
12. Ulrike Schaede, The "Old Boy" Network and Government-Business Relationships in Japan, 21 J. Japan. Stud. 293 (1995).
13. Milton Friedman, Essays in Positive Economics 21(1953).
14. Lu Hong and Scott E. Page, Problem Solving by Heterogeneous Agents, 97 J. Econ. Theory 123 (2001).
15. Stuart A. Kauffman, The Origins of Order: Self-organization and Selection in Evolution (1993).
16. Oliver E. Williamson, The Mechanisms of Governance 102 (1996).
17. Harold Demsetz, The Structure of Ownership and the Theory of the Firm, 26 J. L. & Econ. 375 (1983).
18. Gerald F. Davis, Agents without Principles? The Spread of the Poison Pill through the Intercorporate Network, 36 Admin. Sci. Q. 583 (1991).
19. Hideki Kanda, Developments in Japanese Securities Regulation: An Overview, 29 Int'l Law 599 (1995).
20. John M. Abowd and David S. Kaplan, Executive Compensation: Six Questions that Need Answering, 13 Journal of Economic Perspectives 145, 146 (1999).
21. Michael E. Porter et al., Can Japan Compete? 78-91 (2000).
22. Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. Fin. 1131 (1997).
23. Ronald J. Gilson and Mark J. Roe, Understanding the Japanese Keiretsu: Overlaps Between Corporate Governance and Industrial Organization, 102 Yale L. J. 871 (1993).
24. Yoichiro Taniguchi, Japan's Company Law and the Promotion of Corporate Democracy: A Futile Attempt?, 27 Colum. J. of Transnat'l L. 195, 201 (1988).
25. Richard A. Posner, Blackmail, Privacy, and Freedom of Contract, 141 U. Penn. L. Rev. 1817, 1841 (1993).
26. James Lindgren, Unraveling the Paradox of Blackmail, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 670, 683 (1984).
27. Daniel H. Foote, The Benevolent Paternalism of Japanese Criminal Justice, 80 Calif. L. Rev. 317 (1992).
28. Stephen M. Davis, Shareholder Rights Abroad: A Handbook for the Global Investor 64, 136 (1989).
29. Paul Milgrom and John Roberts, Economics, Organization & Management 425-6 (1992).
30. Stuart Rosenstein and Jeffrey G. Wyatt, Inside Directors, Board Effectiveness, and Shareholder Wealth, 44 J. Fin. Econ. 229 (1997).
31. Douglas J. Skinner, Why Firms Voluntarily Disclose Bad News, 32 J. Acct. Res. 38 (1994).
32. Douglas G. Baird et al., Game Theory and the Law 96 (1994).
33. Curtis J. Milhaupt, Managing the Market: The Ministry of Finance and Securities Regulation in Japan, 30 Stan. J. Int'l L. 423, 444-60 (1994).
34. Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class Actions, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 497 (1991).
35. Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation, 7 J. L. Econ. & Org. 55 (1991).
36. Jonathan R. Macey, Italian Corporate Governance: One American's Perspective, 1998 Col. Bus. L. Rev. 121 (1998).
37. A. A. Berle, Jr., Economic Power and the Free Society 7 (1957).
38. Steven N. Kaplan, Top Executive Rewards and Firm Performance: A Comparison of Japan and the United States, 102 J. Pol. Econ. 510, 542-3 (1994).
39. W. Brian Arthur, Increasing Returns and Path Dependence in the Economy 116-18 (1994).
40. Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 10 (1991).
41. Ronald J. Gilson, Corporate Governance and Economic Efficiency: When Do Institutions Matter?, 74 Wash. U.L.Q. 327, 334-45 (1996).
42. Josh Lerner, Venture Capitalists and the Oversight of Private Firms, 50 J. Fin. 301 (1995).
43. William A. Sahlman, The Structure and Governance of Venture-Capital Organizations, 27 J. Fin. Econ. 473, 489-503 (1990).
44. Shinichi Kishima, Japan Stock Paralysis Chance for Venture Capital, Reuters, Mar. 16, 1993.