Promises and partnership

Econometrica

Volumn 74, Issue 6, 2006, Pages 1579-1601

  Charness, Gary ^a   Dufwenberg, Martin ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA   (United States)

Author keywords

Behavioral economics; Beliefs; Guilt aversion; Hidden action; Lies; Partnership; Promises; Psychological game theory; Social preferences; Trust

Indexed keywords

EID: 33750561495     PISSN: 00129682     EISSN: 14680262     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00719.x     Document Type: Article

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