The new institutional economics: Taking stock, looking ahead

Journal of Economic Literature

Volumn 38, Issue 3, 2000, Pages 595-613

  Williamson, Oliver E ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000409508     PISSN: 00220515     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1257/jel.38.3.595     Document Type: Article

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