But who will guard the guardians?

American Economic Review

Volumn 98, Issue 3, 2008, Pages 577-585

  Hurwicz, Leonid ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 70849110053     PISSN: 00028282     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1257/aer.98.3.577     Document Type: Article

References (18)

1. Calsamiglia, Xavier. 1977. "Decentralized Resource Allocation and Increasing Returns." Journal of Economic Theory, 14(2): 263-283
2. Groves, Theodore, and John O. Ledyard. 1977. "Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the 'Free Rider' Problem." Econometrica, 45(4): 783-809.
3. Hurwicz, Leonid. 1972. "On Informationally Decentralized Systems." In Decision and Organization, ed. C. B. McGuire and Roy Radner, 297-336. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
4. Hurwicz, Leonid. 1977. "On the Dimensional Requirements of Informationally Decentralized ParetoSatisfactory Processes." In Studies in Resource Allocation Processes, ed. Kenneth J. Arrow and Leonid Hurwicz, 413-424 Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
5. Hurwicz, Leonid. 1979a. "Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points." Review of Economic Studies, 46(2): 217-225
6. Hurwicz, Leonid. 1979b. "Balanced Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points for Two or More Agents." In General Equilibrium, Growth and Trade, ed. Jerry R. Green and Jose Alexandre Sheinkman. New York: Academic Press.
7. Hurwicz, Leonid. 1993. "Implementation and Enforcement." In Political Economy, Institutions, Competition, and Representation, ed. William A. Barnett, Melvin J. Hinrich, and Norman J. Schofield, 51-59. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
8. Hurwicz, Leonid. 1996. "Institutions as Families of Game Forms." The Japanese Economic Review, 47(2): 113-132
9. Hurwicz, Leonid. 1997. "Feasible Balanced Outcome Functions Yielding Constrained Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points in Economies with Two Agents when the Designer Knows the Feasible Set." Paper presented at the Pennsylvania State University Decentralization Conference, University Park, PA.
10. Juvenal, D. 1895. Junii Juvenalis Saturarum Libri V. Mit Erklärenden Anmerkungen von Ludwig Friedlaender, Erster Band. Leipzig: Verlag von S. Hirzel.
11. Maskin, Eric S. 1965. "The Theory of Implementation in Nash Equilibrium: A Survey." In Social Goals and Social Organization, Essays in Memory of Elisha Pazner, ed. Leonid Hurwicz, David Schmeidler and Hugo Sonnenschein, 173-204. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
12. Maskin, Eric S. 1977. "Nash Equilibrium and Weifare Optimality." Unpublished.
13. Ostrom, Elinor, James Walker, and Roy Gardner. 1992. "Covenants With and Without a Sword: Self-Governance is Possible." American Political Science Review, 86(2): 404-417
14. Plato. 1930. The Republic. [IIOAITEIA]. Trans. Paul Shorey. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons.
15. Plato. 1992. The Republic. Trans. A. D. Lindsay. London: Everyman's Library.
16. Plato. 1908. The Republic. Trans. B. Jowett. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
17. Schotter, Andrew. 1981. The Economic Theory of Social Institutions. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
18. Von Hayek, Friedrich August. 1945. "The Use of Knowledge in Society." American Economic Review, 35(4): 519-530