Electing directors

Journal of Finance

Volumn 64, Issue 5, 2009, Pages 2389-2421

  Cai, Jie ^a   Garner, Jacqueline L ^a   Walkling, Ralph A ^a  

^a DREXEL UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 70349458959     PISSN: 00221082     EISSN: 15406261     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2009.01504.x     Document Type: Article

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