Agency problems, equity ownership, and corporate diversification

Journal of Finance

Volumn 52, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 135-160

  Denis, David J ^a   Denis, Diane K ^a   Sarin, Atulya ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0039646787     PISSN: 00221082     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2329559     Document Type: Article

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