Director interlocks and spillover effects of reputational penalties from financial reporting fraud

Academy of Management Journal

Volumn 51, Issue 3, 2008, Pages 537-555

  Kang, Eugene ^a  

^a NANYANG TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY   (Singapore)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 47649094594     PISSN: 00014273     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.5465/AMJ.2008.32626007     Document Type: Article

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